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ABSTRACT 
Ihe International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights entered currently has 118 States Parties and has been in force for 17 years. Over the past five years, the implementation of the Covenant has come under the supervision of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. Unlike its predecessor, the Sessional Working Group, the Committee has taken its supervisory role seriously such that it has begun to develop both the substance of the Covenant and the implementation procedures. 
This study, based principally upon the work of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, discusses a number of aspects in 
which the substance of the Covenant and its supervision procedures may be seen to have been developed. 
Chapter 1 traces the roots of economic, social and cultural rights 
and outlines their codification in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and later the Covenant, following the end of the Second World War. Significant aspects of the drafting process are analysed in detail. Chapter 2 discusses the nature and scope of the State obligations 
under the Covenant as regards the implementation of the rights. Particular emphasis is given to the terms of article 2(1) and how they have been interpreted in the work of the Committee. 
Chapter 3 analyses, primarily from a theoretical standpoint, the 
manner and degree to which the terms of the Covenant may be given 
"direct effect", or in other words, relied upon directly in domestic 
courts. 
Chapters 4 to 8 address particular articles within the Covenant 
and considers the interpretation given to them by the Committee. 
Chapter 4 deals with article 2(2) (and to a lesser extent article 3) 
concerning non-discrimination; Chapter 5 deals with article 6 
concerning the right to work; Chapter 6 deals with article 7 regarding 
the right to just and favourable conditions of work; Chapter 7 deals with 
article 8 concerning rights related to trade unions; and Chapter 8 deals 
with article 11 concerning the right to an adequate standard of living 
and, in particular, the rights to food and housing. In each case, an 
attempt is made to evaluate the Committee's approach to each article and 
assess the possibilities for future development. 
Chapter 9 addresses the emergence, role and working methods, of 
the Committee as a human rights supervisory body. Particular 
consideration is also given to the problems encountered and the 
Committee's future prospects. 
Chapter 10, as the concluding chapter, draws together the 
observations made in earlier chapters and attempts to make an 
evaluation of the present and future utility of the Covenant as a 
mechanism for the promotion and protection of economic, social and 
cultural rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR)l entered into force on 3rd January 1976 following the 
deposit of the 35th instrument of ratification, and currently has 104 
States Parties. 2 The Covenant was originally intended, together with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)3 and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 4 to form the backbone 
of the international protection of human rights in the post-war era. 
However, political controversy greatly protracted the drafting of the 
Covenant such that it was only completed for signature in 1966.5 
Thereafter, a slow ratification process and an miltial "false-start" in the 
implementation system, meant that the Covenant only began to show 
signs of life in 1987 when it came under the supervision of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. As with other 
human rights treaties, the Covenant is a "living instrument" which, in 
order to fulfil its purpose effectively, requires the nurture of a 
supervisory body capable and willing to develop both the substance and 
the procedure of the guarantee. The purpose of this study is to analyze 
certain of the most pertinent aspects of the Covenant's development with 
particular emphasis upon the work of the Committee since 1987. 
Chapter One outlines the background to the institutionalisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights in the United Nations (UN) system 
and aspects of the complex and tortuous drafting process that finally 
produced the Covenant. An understanding of that process and the issues 
involved is particularly important in so far as it provides an essential 
introduction to ideas and controversies that still colour people's 
perception of the Covenant. A clear understanding of the drafting 
process is also relevant in that the travaux preparatoires represent a 
supplementary means of treaty interpretation. 
In Chapter Two an analysis is made of the nature and scope of the 
State obligations laid down within the Covenant with particular 
emphasis upon the terms of the general obligations clause in article 
1 993 U. N. T. S. 3. The text is to be found in Appendix I. 
2 As of 31 Dec. 199 1, see, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER. E/1 0, at 122 (1992). A list of 
States Parties to the Covenant may be found in Appendix III. 
999 U. N. T. S. 171. 
4 GA Resn. 217 A (III), (Dec. 10 1948), 3 UN GAOR, Resns, Pt. 1, at 71 (1948). 
5 GA Resn. 2200 (XXI), (Dec. 21 1965), 21 GAOR, Resns, Supp. (No. 16) at 
49(1966). 
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2(l). Although the Covenant, like all human rights treaties, outlines a 
number of individual rights, the principal characteristic of the Covenant is the progressive nature of the State obligations. Whilst that might 
appear to leave States with considerable discretion as to the method and 
time-scale of their implementation initiatives, consideration is given to 
the degree to which the terms of the Covenant are considered to give 
rise to more precise, immediate obligations. 
In Chapter Three, one specific aspect of State implementation is 
considered, namely the concept of "direct effect". It is generally 
considered that the most effective means by which the rights in the Covenant can be guaranteed is by the provision of domestic remedies 
through which the individual may assert his or her rights. This may be 
achieved by giving the relevant treaty provisions "direct effect" in domestic law. The Chapter attempts to assess the extent to which 
provisions of the Covenant may be given "direct effect" in light of the 
con-unonly used national criteria for determining that possibility. Chapter Four addresses the questions of non-discrimination and 
equality as found in the Covenant. These issues are of particular 
relevance to the economic, social and cultural rights in the Covenant not 
merely because they appear to give rise to obligations of an immediate 
nature, but also because a notion of equality lies close to the heart of 
what might be seen as the welfarist or redistributionalist attributes of 
the Covenant. An attempt is made to define the precise form of equality 
to which the Covenant directs itself and the form and nature of State 
obligations that arise therefrom. 
Chapters Five to Eight consider a number of the substantive 
rights within the Covenant. Chapter Five concerns rights within article 
6, Chapter Six the rights in article 7, Chapter Seven the rights in article 
8, and Chapter Eight those in article 11 
- 
These articles have been 
selected primarily upon the basis that they are the ones that have been 
developed most thoroughly by the Committee. Article 11 stands out as 
having been the subject of the most extensive consideration by the 
Committee. Articles 6 to 8, on the other hand, whilst they have not been 
given particular attention, have been amenable to interpretation given 
the wealth of existing standards developed by the ILO and other bodies 
in the area. 
In each chapter, the first section will deal with the travaux 
preparatoires of the article concerned. As indicated above, the travaux 
preparatoires provide an idea of the intended scope and meaning of the 
provisions and raise a number of issues that are still pertinent today. 
The second section of each chapter outlines the manner in which the 
Committee has developed the relevant provisions through its 
consideration of State reports. In each case an attempt has been made to 
outline the direction in which the Committee appears to be moving, 
3 
assess the appropriateness or sufficiency of its approach and, on 
occasions, make suggestions as to alternative strategies. 
Chapter Nine considers the institutional mechanisms for 
supervision of the implementation of the Covenant with particular 
emphasis on the creation, mandate and operation of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. An analysis is made of the 
theoretical framework of the reporting system and the degree to which 
its development has altered some of the basic premises upon which it 
was based. Further, attention is given to the future prospects of the 
supervision system in particular as regards the possible creation of an Optional Protocol to institute the receipt of individual complaints. 
Chapter Ten attempts to make a broad evaluation of the existing and 
potential utility of the Covenant as a human rights guarantee. 
Consideration is given to the current level of development of the 
Covenant, the problems facing the Committee and the future prospects. 
A number of points should be made about the methodology of this 
work. First, and most importantly, it is assumed that although the 
Committee is not empowered to make binding interpretations of the 
Covenant, its position as the primary supervisory body gives its 
interpretations considerable legal weight. 6 The Committee is in the 
position of being a "clearing centre" for the divergent interpretations of 
the Covenant offered by States parties and is best placed for establishing 
the common agreement of States as to the interpretation of the 
Covenant. In addition, the Committee might serve to direct and shape 
the practice of States in applying the Covenant such that the agreement 
of States is developed over time. 
Secondly, although the most coherent source of information as to 
the Committee's approach to the interpretation of the articles in the 
Covenant is its general comments, the limited number of such comments 
means that other sources of information have to be relied upon. The 
largest individual source is the comments and questions of the 
Committee members in the consideration of State reports. Although 
often contradictory and generalised, such comments sometimes give a 
clear indication as to the position of a number of the members of the 
Committee. Indeed even the questions, which by their nature do not 
presuppose any particular position, do provide an indication as to the 
concerns of the members of the Committee. 
A more useful source is the concluding comments of the 
Committee. Whilst not prescribing precise standards, the concluding 
comments occasionally indicate areas in which the Committee as a 
whole (or sometimes individual members) consider the State to fall 
(1986). 
6See e. g., Meron T., Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations, at 10 
4 
short of compliance with its obligations under the Covenant. In such 
cases, the concluding comments do provide a means by which the Committee's position can be determined. Occasionally reference will be 
made to the Committee's general discussion which provides an 
opportunity for members of the Committee and other experts to air 
their views on a particular subject. Whilst not being a direct indication 
of the position of the Committee as a whole, they may occasionally 
demonstrate a consensus of opinion on a particular issue. 
The final source of information as to the position of the 
Committee is its reporting guidelines. It is clear that the primary 
intention of the Committee in drafting the reporting guidelines was to 
assist States parties to produce adequate reports. However, in detailing 
what information is to be provided, the Committee has gone some way 
to define in more detail the scope at least, if not the meaning, of the 
provisions concerned. It might be argued that the guidelines are not 
prescriptive in any way; all they stipulate is the type of information that 
is to be provided. Nevertheless, if the Committee feels that the 
information requested is relevant to its evaluation of a States 
performance, then the nature of that information will be a tentative 
indication of what the Committee considers to be the content of the 
Covenant's provisions. 
5 
0 
COVENANT 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) entered into force on 3rd January 1976, following the 
deposit of the 35th instrument of ratification. Alongside its "sister Covenant", the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) it 
constitutes an integral part of the "International Bill of Rights" which 
was intended to form the basis of freedom, justice and world peace 
following the Second World War. The reality, however, as will be 
shown below, is that the text of the Covenant was only completed in 
1966 following a complex, over-lengthy and politically fraught drafting 
process. 
1) THE ROOTS OF ECONOMIC. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS 
Much has been written about the roots of human rights generally, 
and in particular about their derivation from natural law in Westem 
philosophy. 1 Comparatively less has been written about the 
philosophical background to economic, social and cultural rights. 2 More 
often than not, the emergence of economic, social and cultural rights is 
attributed to the growth of socialist ideals in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 3 This has led certain commentators to 
describe them as "second generation" rights. 4 It has also prompted some 
to argue that in so far as they derive from a separate tradition, 
economic, social and cultural rights are of a qualitatively different 
nature from civil and political rights. 5 
1 See e. g., Lauterpacht H., Intemational Law and Human Rights, 73-126 (1950). 
2 But see, Peces-Barba G., "Reflections on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights", 2 H. R. L. J., 281 (1981). 
3 See, Siegel R., "Socioeconomic Human Rights: Past and Future", 7 
Hum. Rts. Q., 255 (1985). 
See e. g., Weston B., "Human Rights", 6 Hum. Rts. Q. 257 (1984). 
5 See, Cranston M., "Human Rights Real and Supposed" in Raphael D. (ed), 
.f 
Bossuyt M., "La Political ThegZ and the Rights of Man, 43 (1967). Also q 
Distinction Juridique 
it 
entre les Droits Civil et Politique et les droits Economiques, 
Sociaux et Culturels 
,8H. 
-R-. 
L--. L, 783 (1975); Vierdag E., "The Legal Nature of the 
Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights", 9 Neth. I. L. R, 69 (1978). 
6 
While it is outside the scope of the present study to deal with such 
issues in detail. ) a number of points may be made. First, it is by no 
means agreed that the natural law tradition did in fact provide a 
coherent philosophical basis for the modem notion of human rights. 6 
Indeed, it is purely speculative to assert that the rights expressed in the 
Universal Declaration were inspired solely by the philosophy of Hobbes 
or Locke. Although the idea of "natural rights", like many other 
concepts, may be posited as a justification for human rights as they exist 
today7, any such justification is not necessarily dependent upon 
establishing a philosophical pedigree for the rights. 
Secondly, to present human rights as a concept that emerged 
solely from a Western philosophical tradition is to undermine their 
universal value and subject them to claims of cultural relativity. 8 It has 
to be accepted that there was probably no common conception of human 
rights among those States that drafted the UDHR. 9 Finally, even if some 
6 Some commentators have denied the link between human rights and the 
ancient and medieval law traditions, see, dEntr6ves A., Natural Law: An Introduction 
to Legal Philosohy, (1970); Berlin I., "Two Concepts of Liberty", in Four Essays on 
L: lh=, 129 (1969). Others have even seen the philosophy of Hobbes and Locke as 
deficient in this regard, see, MacPherson C., "Natural Rights in Hobbes and Locke", 
in Raphael D. (ed), Political Theory and the Ri ghts of Man, 4 (1967). 
7 See, Donnelly J., "Human Rights as Natural Rights", 4 Hum. Rts. Q., 399 (1982). A number of other justifications have been presented, see generally, Shestack 
J., "The Jurisprudence of Human Rights", in Meron T. (ed), Human Rights in 
International Law, 69 (1984). The following justifications may commonly be found: 
"Equal Respect", Dworkin R., Taking Rights Sgri ýously, (1977), Benn S., "Human 
Rights- for Whom and for What? ", in Kameneka E. and Tay A. (eds), Human Rights, 
59 (1978); "Needs", Lewis J., "On Human Rights", in UNESCO, Human Rights 
Comments and In=retations, 54, (1949), Bay C., "Self-Respect as a Human Right: 
Thoughts on the Dialectics of Wants and Needs in the Struggle for Human 
Community", 4 Hum. Rts. Q., 53 (1982); "Equality", Vlastos G., "Justice and 
Equality", in Waldron J. (ed), Theories of Rights, 41 (1984); "Social Justice", Beitz 
C., "Human Rights and Social Justice", in Brown P. and MacLean D. (eds), Human 
Rights and US Foreign Policy, 45 (1979). 
8 For issues concerning "cultural relativism" see, Howard R., "The Full-Belly 
Thesis: Should Economic Rights take Priority over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence 
from Sub-Saharan Africa", 4 Hum. Rts. Q., 467 (1983); Donnelly J., "Cultural 
Relativism and Universal Human Rights", 6 Hum. Rts. Q., 400 (1984); Teson F., 
"International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism", 25 Virg. J. I. L., 868 (1985); 
Renteln A., "The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for 
Human Rights", 7 Hum. Rts. Q., 514 (1985); Donoho D., "Relativism Versus 
Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for Meaningful Standards", 27 
Stan. J. I. L. 345 (1991). 
9 See, Maritain J., "Introduction", in UNESCO Symposium, Human Rights 
Comments and In=retations, 9 (1949); Dworkin, supra, note 7, at 10. For a detailed 
analysis of the different approaches to the UDHR see, Morsink J., "The Philosophy of 
the Universal Declaration't, 6 Hum. Rts. Q-., 309 (1984). This may also apply to the 
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valid link between the concept of human rights and the natural law 
tradition may be established, there is no evidence to suggest that there 
was any strict division in that context between economic and social 
rights on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the other. 10 
A truly universal conception of human rights has to admit the 
diversity of philosophical and cultural influences that were involved in 
the institutionalisation of human rights on the international plane. It is 
not sufficient then, to explain the recognition of economic, social and 
cultural rights merely by reference to socialist ideals and the rise of the 
labour movement in Europe. 11 Equally important influences may have 
been the traditional communitarian philosophy of the African States or 
the "fully-fledged" natural rights approach of the Latin American 
States. 
It is apparent that even the earliest formulations of human rights 
at the international level included certain economic, social and cultural 
rights. 'Ibus, the minority treaties under the League of Nations 
provided for the protection of the cultural rights of the inhabitants. 12 
Similarly the mandate system covered a whole range of civil, political, 
earlier formulations of the "Rights of Man". As McKeon stated: 
"The conception of natural rights... was written into the 
constitutions of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
not because men had agreed on a philosophy, but because they 
had agreed, despite philosophical differences, on the formulation 
of a solution to a series of moral and political problems". 
McKeon R., "The Philosophical Bases and Material Circumstances of the Rights 
of Man", in UNESCO Symposium, Human Rizhts Comments and 
In=retations, 37 (1949). See also, Fields B. and Wolf-Deiter N., "Human 
Rights as a Wholistic Concept", 14 Hum. RtsD,, 1 (1992). 
10 See, Siegel, supra, note 3, at 260-266; Raphael D., "Human Rights Old and 
New", in Raphael D. (ed), Political Theary and the Rights of Man, 57 (1967). 
For the effect of the c 
Agencies, 1-16 (1989); 
Organisation (1951). 
labour movement see, Ghebali V-Y, The 
J, The Antecedents of the Intemational Labour 
12 The provisions of the treaties generally provided that: "nationals belonging to 
minorities shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control, at their own 
expense, charitable, religious or social institutions, schools and other educational 
establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion 
freely therein". Report of the Committee of Three, (6 June 1929), LNOJ, Special 
Supp. (No. 73), at 46-54, (1929). 
Azcarate comments that the provision on equality before the law was 
extensively claimed by minorities to safeguard their economic position. de Azcarate P., 
Leazue of Nations and National Minorities, An Exp&jjýn 61-66 (1945). 
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social, economic, and cultural aspects of life in the mandated 
territories. 13 Indeed even under the Covenant of the League, members 
undertook to "endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane 
conditions of labour for men, women and children, both in their own 
countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial 
relations extend". 14 
The institutionalisation of economic, social and cultural rights was 
spurred on by the depression of the 1930s and the war. 15 This was most 
clearly expressed by Roosevelt in his message to Congress on 6th 
January 1941 in which he asserted that the aim of peace was to secure 
four freedoms: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, 
freedom from want and freedom from fear. 16 Freedom from want he 
described as "understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy 
peacetime life for its inhabitants everywhere in the world". 17 He later 
reinforced the importance of social and economic issues within the field 
of human rights in another message to Congress in 1944, where he 
commented: 
"We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true 
individual freedom cannot exist without economic security 
and independence". 18 
This concern with the social and economic aspects of human rights was 
continually reiterated up to the adoption of the Universal Declaration. 19 
13 Cf. Anker P., The Mandates System: Origin- Principles- AMlication, 
(1945). 
14 Axticle 23 Covenant of the League of Nations, 225 CTS 195. 
15 Johnson M., "The Contributions of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt to the 
Development of International Protection for Human Rights", 9 Hum. Rts. Q., 19, at 21 (1987). 
16 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: War and Aid to 
Democracies. 1940,284-5 (1941). 
17 The US Secretary of State, Stettinius, later commented that the four freedoms 
flencompass all other rights and freedoms". Freedom from want, in particular, he saw 
as encompassing the right to work, the right to social security, and the right to 
opportunity for advancement. US Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol XIII, 928-929 (1945). 
18 Congressional Record, Vol. 90, Pt. 1,78 Cong. 2nd Sess., at 57 (1944). 
Roosevelt in this speech enumerated certain rights; among them he mentioned: the right 
to a useful and remunerative job, the right to earn enough to provide adequate food and 
clothing, the right to a decent home, and the right to education 
. 
19 For example the Atlantic Charter principle six. "Great Britain-United States 
Joint Declaration of the President and the Prime Minister". US Dot. of State Bulletin, 
WIN, No. 112, at 125 (194 1), in 35 A. J. I. L., Supp. at 191, (194 1). Also the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948 contains many references 
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It was only at this point that the opposition to economic, social and 
cultural rights, which had previously existed within the US, 20 emerged 
onto the international plane. It is not difficult to associate this 
occurrence with the onset of the Cold War. 
III) DRAFTING OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF 
RIGHTS21 
As suggested, the Second World War proved to be an essential 
stimulus to the codification of human rights norms on the international 
plane. It was established early in the war, that the foundations of lasting 
peace had to be built on respect for human rights. Roosevelt's "four 
freedoms" were incorporated in the Atlantic Charter of 1941,22 which 
in turn was endorsed in principle by the preamble to the Declaration by 
United Nations. 23 Tbus human rights, whilst symbolising the allied 
powers' struggle against tyranny, became an integral part of their war 
aims. 
By 1945 there was a widespread demand for the 
institutionalisation of human rights provisions as a mechanism for 
preventing a reoccurrence of the atrocities and excesses associated with 
48 (PAU 1948). 
20 Opposition in the US was evident in the difficulties encountered in 
formulating economic and social provisions for the proposed bill of rights in 1942. See, Russell R. A HisIM of the United Nations Chartgr, 323-328 (1958). 
21 For general outlines of the drafting of the international bill of rights see, 
Tolley H., The UN Commission on Human RiRhts, (1987); Lauterpacht, supra, note 
1, at 273-434; Humphrey J., Human Rights and the United Nations- A Great 
Adventure, (1984): Green J., United Nations and Human Rights, 664-707, (1956); 
Sohn L., "A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights", in the 
18th Report of the Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace, The United 
Nations and Human Rights, 59-107 (1968). 
22 Supra, note 19. The Atlantic Charter was a declaration of principles "on 
which they base their hopes for a better fut 
, 
ure for the world". In fact the sixth principle 
only refers to freedom from fear and want, however this is considered to be a mere 
oversight, see Johnson, supra, note 15, at 22. Nevertheless Roosevelt's concern with 
economic issues was reflected in the fifth principle which proposed the "fullest 
collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for 
all, improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security". 
Equally importantly, reference was made to the "right of all peoples to choose 
the form of government under which they will live". This reflected a continuation of the 
concern for self-determination championed formerly by President Wilson in 1919. It 
has since become an issue of great controversy- not least in the formulation of the 
Covenants on human rights. See below, text accompanying notes 154-188. 
23 36 A. M. L., Supp., 191 (1942). It was declared that "complete victory over 
the enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and 
to preserve human rights and justice". The declaration was initially signed by 21 states, 
and later by a further 26. 
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By 1945 there was a widespread demand for the 
institutionalisation of human rights provisions as a mechanism for 
preventing a reoccurrence of the atrocities and excesses associated with 
the war and totalitarian regimes. 24 The United States in particular, 25 
had prepared drafts for an international bill of rights earlier in the 
war. 26 However owing to internal disputes, 27 US plans for international 
organisation after 1944 left the question of human rights open. Thus the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposal for the United Nations Charter, only 
contained a single reference to human rights. 28 
It was primarily a result of the efforts of the Latin American 
states 29 and non-governmental organisations (NGOS)30 that human 
rights provisions are to be found in the UN Charter. Although many 
proposals were not taken up (such as those for a declaration of human 
24 To some extent the collapse of the minority regimes under the League of 
Nations spelt out the need for a more general, and less discriminatory systern for 
preserving human rights. I 
25 See, Sohn, supra, note 21, at 46-47. 
26 The 1942 Draft included a Bill of Rights, US Dept. of State Postwar Foreign 
Policy R. Waration 1939-45,115-6 and 483-85 (1949); a draft of 14 Aug. 1943 
envisaged a separate "Declaration of Human Rights", ibid. at 530. "At its inception" 
writes Farer, "the United Nations seemed destined to be the engine of human rights". 
Farer T., "The United Nations and Human Rights: More Than A Whimper Less Than 
A Roar", 9 Hum. Rts. Q., 553 (1987). 
27 The main dispute centred around the formulation of rights associated with 
freedom from want, and the right to public education. Sohn, supra, note 21, at 46. 
28 Chapter IX, Sect. A(l) stated that among its purposes: 
"the Organisation should facilitate solutions of international, economic, 
social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms". 
3 UNCIO, at 90 (1945). 
29 The Latin American states had recently adopted its resolution in the Final Act 
of the American Conference at Chapultepec (the Inter-American Conference on 
Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Feb-March 1945). It requested the Inter- 
American Juridical Committee to prepare a Declaration of the International Rights and 
Duties of Man. This was finally completed, a few weeks before the Universal 
Declaration, at the Bogota Conference in 1948. Supra, note 19. 
30 The 42 non-governmental organisations, acting as consultants to the American 
delegation at San Francisco are said to have had considerable impact. See, Humphrey, 
supra, note 21, at 13. Green comments that this was an unprecedented occurrence, 
supra, note 2 1, at 656, n. 16. These efforts were to some extent successful. The 
inclusion of a reference to human rights in article 1 of the Charter is considered to be 
"directly attributable" to the efforts of the non-governmental "consultants". See, 
Humphrey J., "The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights", in 
Luard E. (ed), The International Protection of Human Rights 39, at 41 (1957). 
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rights3l), the Charter of the United Nations makes explicit references to 
human rights in its preamble and six articleS; 32 there are also a number 
of indirect references. 33 The exact nature of obligations undertaken by 
states with regard to the human rights provisions of the Charter is a 
matter of some controversy, 34 particularly as the rights themselves are 
nowhere defined. However there is no doubting the importance of the 
31 Proposals were for a Declaration in the Preamble (South Africa, 1 UNCIO, 
at 425; and 3 UNCIO, at 474-6), for a Bill of Rights in the body of the Charter (Panama, 1 UNCIO, at 560; and 3 UNCIO, at 265-69), and a "Charter of Mankind" 
containing a declaration of rights with a system of supervision (Uruguay, 3 UNCIO, at 
34-5). Similar proposals were made by Mexico (3 UNCIO, at 60-64), Cuba (3 
UNCIO, at 500-502) and Ecuador (3 UNCIO, at 400). See, Sohn, supra, note 21, at 
48-56. However, such proposals were not taken up because it was thought they 
required more detailed consideration than was possible in the situation. 
32 UN Charter, articles 1,13,55(c), 56,62(2), 68. 
33 For example the implicit obligations undertaken with regard to trust territories (article 87), and non-self-governing territories (article 73). Moreover all references to 
the purposes of the organisation can be read to allude to human rights in the light of 
article 1. 
34 On the one hand it is asserted that the Charter "does not allow the 
interpretation that the Members are under legal obligations regarding the rights and 
freedoms of their subjects", Kelsen H., The Law of the United Nations, 29 (1951). 
See also, Hudson M., "Integrity of International Instruments" 42 A. LI. L, 105 (1948), and Kunz J. "The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights" 43 AJ. I. L., 
316(1949). 
On the other hand Lauterpacht has commented that "members of the United 
Nations are under a legal obligation to act in accordance with these purposes. It is their 
legal duty to respect and observe fundamental human rights and freedoms", supra, note 
1, at 147. See also Sohn L., "The Human Rights Law of the Charter", Tex. I. L. J., 129 (1977); Schwelb argues that Lauterpachfs interpretation has been validated by 
subsequent practice: Schwelb E., "The International Court of Justice and the Human 
Rights Clauses of the Charter" 66 AI. I. L., 372 (1972). Moreover Henkin maintains 
that the injunction in article 2(7) of the UN Charter against interference in the domestic 
concerns of a state is no longer valid as regards human rights: Henldn L., 
"Introduction", in Henldn L. (ed), Intemational Bill-of Rights, 1, at 6 (1982). 
However it would seem that the actual protection of human rights is beyond the 
powers of the United Nations under the Charter. A Panamanian suggestion to insert a 
reference to the protection of human rights in the purposes of the organisation was 
widely opposed, 6 UNCIO, 324-325. Subcommittee l/l/A held in its report that 
"assuring or protecting such fundamental rights is primarily the concern of each state". 
6 UNCIO, at 705. Schwarzenberger concludes therefore that: 
"a clear distinction is drawn between the promotion and encouragement 
of respect for human rights, and the actual protection of these rights. 
The one is entrusted to the United Nations. The other remains in the 
prerogative of each member state". 
Schwarzenberger G., Power Politics- A Study of World SDg: iM, at 462 (3rd ed. 1964). 
12 
provisions in establishing human rights as a matter of prime importance 
in the post-war era. 35 
Article 68 of the Charter, included at the insistence of the US 
under NGO pressure, provides expressly for the establishment of a 
Commission "for the promotion of human rights". It was "generally 
understood"36 that the new Commission would draft an international 
bill of rights as was mentioned by Truman in his closing speech at the 
San Francisco Conference. 37 This presaged the drafting of the UDHR 
and the two Covenants on human rights. 
In 1946 the Preparatory Commission of the UN recommended 
that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) should establish a 
Commission on Human Rights and should direct it inter alia to 
formulate an "International Bill of Rights". 38 This decision was 
approved by the General Assembly in January 1946.39 ECOSOC 
established the mandate for the future Commission on Human Rights 
which was directed towards submitting proposals, recommendations and 
reports to ECOSOC regarding an international bill of rights. 40 By way 
of referring to a proposal to the Commission on Human Rights, the 
Assembly confirmed ECOSOC's decision. 41 
'Ibe Commission on Human Rights met for its first session in 
January 1947.42 Its composition included the five permanent members 
of the Security Council and was also attended by the ELO, UNESCO and 
various NGOs. The initial discussion, centred upon the need to define 
the fonn of the bill of rights. Suggestions were made as to a General 
35 There is some support for the view that the UN Charter is a form of 
constitution of the new world order. See McDonald R., "The United Nations Charter: 
Constitution or Contract", in McDonald R. and Johnstone D. (eds), The Structure and 
Process of International Law, 889 (1983). 
36 Humphrey, supra, note 30, at 4 1. 
37 US Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. XHI, No. 314, at 5 (1945). 
38 Report of the Preparatory Commission, 28, (1946). 
39 GA Resn. 7(l), (Feb. 12 1946), 1 UN GAOR, Pt. 1, Resns, at 12 (1946). 
40 ECOSOC Resn. 5(l), (Feb. 16 1946), 1 UN ESCOR, Annex 8, at 163 
(1946). Other matters with which it had to deal were the protection of minorities, the 
prevention of discrimination, and international declarations or conventions on civil 
liberties, the status of women and freedom of information. 
41 GA Resn. 43 (1), (Dec. 11 1946), 1 UN GAOR, Resns, Pt. 2, at 68 (1946). 
Humphrey comments that it was from this decision that the Commission essentially 
derived its mandate to draft the international bill of rights. Humphrey, supra, note 21, 
at 17. 
42 UN Doc. E/259,4 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), (1947). 
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Assembly Resolution, a multilateral Convention, and a Charter 
amendment. 43 A drafting committee was appointed to formulate a 
preliminary draft of the international bill of human rights for 
examination at its second session. 44 
In June 1947 the drafting committee met to review a secretariat 
outline of 48 articles. 45 Total agreement was not possible at this stage 
however, largely due to dispute as to whether the Bill should take the 
form of a binding convention or a mere declaration of principles. 46 The 
drafting Committee therefore prepared a draft declaration and a draft 
convention. 47 These it submitted, together with a Secretariat 
memorandum on the question of implementation, 48 to the Commission. 
It was decided at the Commission's second session in December 
1947,49 that three documents should be prepared: a non-binding 
declaration of a general nature, a convention of more limited scope, and 
finally a document of methods of implementation (or what might be 
called "supervision"). The term "International Bill of Rights" was to 
43 Humphrey, supra, note 21, at 26. 
441nitially the drafting comn-Attee was to have only three members of the 
Commission: Mrs Roosevelt (Chairperson), Charles Malik (Lebanon) and Chang (China). This was challenged in ECOSOC by the USSR, and the Committee was 
expanded to eight members. Additional representatives from UK, USSR, France, 
Australia, and Chile thereafter attended the drafting committee. 
45UN Doc. E/CN. 4/AC. 1/3, (1947). This was compiled by Humphrey from a 
number of proposals submitted by individuals (such as Lauterpacht H. and Wells 
H. G. ) and by NGOs (particularly the American Law Institute). The draft included 
economic, social and cultural rights as well as the basic civil and political rights. 
Humphrey describes his approach as a combination of "humanitarian liberalism with 
social democracy". 
The drafting committee also had before it a draft convention on civil and 
political rights submitted by the United Kingdom, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/21, Annex B/R. 25 (1947). The committee concentrated however on the Secretariat outline. 
46The UK on the one hand preferred the idea of a binding instrument. On the 
other hand the US (perhaps because of the need for Senate approval) preferred a 
declaration that would contain goals and aspirations rather than legally binding 
commitments. 
The divergence of opinion was not as great as it seems, as those who preferred 
a Declaration agreed that it should be followed by a Convention. Equally it was thought 
that if a Convention was adopted, a more general declaration might be formulated to 
accompany it. 
47UN Doc. E/CN. 4/21, supra, note 45, annexes F and G. The draft was 
rearranged to an extent by Rene Cassin before referral to the Commission. 
48 Ibid, Annex H. 
49 UN D(x. E/600,6 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1), (1948). 
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apply to all three documents. 50 The Commission established three 
working groups to work on the drafts. 51 On the basis of the working 
group reports the Commission drafted a declaration and a convention. 
These drafts, together with the report on methods of implementation, 
were circulated to governments for their comments. ECOSOC created a 
special Human Rights Committee to review the drafts but unfortunately 
had no time to do so. 
A) THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 
The Commission met for its third session in May 1948.52 It gave 
priority to the preparation of the Declaration, and after considering the 
replies of govenu-nents, 53 adopted it by 12 votes to none with four 
abstentions. 54 The Declaration was then referred to ECOSOC55 and 
from there to the General Assembly Third Committee. After 81 
meetings in which it dealt with 168 proposed amendments, the Tbird 
Committee adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 56 
followed by the General Assembly on 10th December 1948.57 
The Universal Declaration consists of 30 articles covering civil, 
political and economic, social and cultural rights. The inclusion of the 
latter in the Declaration has not prevented criticism of its philosophy as 
primarily "western" and "liberal", with a preference for civil and 
political rights. 58 Yet given that the Declaration was agreed upon 
50 Ibid, para. 18. 
51 The reports of the working groups are contained in UN Docs. E/CN. 4/57 (Declaration), E/CN. 4/56 (Convention), E/CN-4/53 (Methods of Implementation), in 
UN Doc. E/600, Annexes A-C, ibid. 
52 UN Doc. E/800,7 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 2), (1948). 
53 This was in fact done by the Drafting Committee at its second session Q to 
21 May 1948) which produced revised drafts of the declaration and convention. UN 
Doc. E/CN. 4/95, Annexes A and B, (1948). 
54 UN Doc. E/800, supra, note 52, Annex A. The abstentions consisted of the 
eastern bloc states (Byelorussia, Ukraine, USSR and Yugoslavia). 
55 ECOSOC made no substantive changes to the Declaration. 
56 By 29 votes to 0 with 7 abstentions. 3 UN GAOR, C. 3, Pt. 1,879-881, (1948). 
57 GA Resn. 217 A 011I), (Dec. 10 1948), 3 UN GAOR, Resns, Pt. 1, at 71 (1948). It was adopted by 48 votes to 0 with 8 abstentions (Byelorussia, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, USSR, Saudi Arabia,, Ukraine, S. Aftica, and Yugoslavia). 
58 There was seemingly an intention to maintain a distinction between the civil 
and political rights which form the first twenty articles, and economic, social and 
cultural rights which lie at the end. This was apparent in the rejection of a joint 
amendment to article 3, to include a reference to social and economic security. Similarly 
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during the time of the Cold War it is to be seen as something of an 
achievement. 59 
The main group of abstentions came from the then socialist states 
of central and eastern Europe. The USSR recorded its opposition in the 
records of the Commission's third session. 60 It complained that the 
declaration did not contain sufficient references to democracy and anti- 
fascism; that it did not guarantee the implementation of the rights; and 
that it did not enumerate the duties of the individual to the state. 61 
South Africa abstained because it felt that even though the 
declaration was not prima facie binding, it might be interpreted as "an 
authoritative definition of fundamental rights and freedoms which had 
been left undefined by the Charter". There was indeed some indication 
that States wished to endow the Universal Declaration with a status 
higher than that of a mere declaration of principles. For example, the 
French delegate declared that the UDHR represented "general principles 
of law" implying therefore that it would be enforceable by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). The US however made clear that it 
considered the declaration to be purely of a hortatory character. 62 Such 
A- 
- dic discussion on the form of article 1 suggests that much emphasis was placed on an 
eighteenth century concept of human rights. See, Morsink, supra, note 9; Dowrick F., 
"Introduction", in Human Rights- Problems, Perapectives and Texts, 1 (1979). 
59 Tolley notes that there were three ideological forces in competition. First the 
Western States preferring a minimum list of strictly enforceable civil and political 
rights. Secondly the Eastern Bloc states championed economic, social and cultural 
rights with state implementation and concomitant duties. Lastly, the Latin American 
states, having recently completed their Bogota Declaration, wished to incorporate a 
maximum catalogue of rights including the economic, social and cultural components. 
Tolley, supra, note 2 1, at 21-22. However Humphrey comments in this respect: 
"The legislative history of the Declaration shows that, while there was 
deep disagreement on how they [the provisions] should be implemented, 
there was substantial agreement on the stated objectives". 
Humphrey, supra, note 21, at 74. 
60 UN Doc. E/800, supra, note 54. 
61 This position was with the socialist concept of human rights. According to 
that philosophy, the emphasis is placed upon the individual as a citizen within a 
community. Thus individuals are deemed to have duties to the state as much as they 
have rights. As the individual is considered to have no status in international law, the 
implementation process is primarily a national one. It seems therefore, that in 
complaining about the absence of an implementation process, the soviet representative 
did not envisage an international system but merely that specific state action should be 
outlined. See, Przetacznik F., "The Socialist Concept of Human Rights: Its 
Philosophical Background and Political Justification", 13 R. B. D. I. 238 (1977). 
62 The representative of the US in her statement to the General Assembly 
commented: 
"It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does 
not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation. It is a 
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disagreements about the status of the Universal Declaration have 
persisted. 63 
Two provisions in the UDHR were explicitly excluded from the 
final draft. The first was the right to petition the state or the United 
Nations. 64It was thought that this preempted the discussion on 
implementation, and the Commission was thus asked to consider the 
matter further. 65The second was an article referring to the rights of 
ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities. Again the Assembly 
requested the Commission and the Subcommission to make a thorough 
study on the question. 66 
declaration of basic principles of human rights and freedoms. to be 
stamped with the approval of the General Assembly by a formal vote of 
its members, and to serve as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples of all nations". 
US Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, at 751 (1948). 
63 Although General Assembly Resolutions are traditionally considered to have 
no direct legal force, there has been a tendency to confer some weight upon their status. 
See e. g., Falk R., "The Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly", 60 
A. M. L., 782 (1966). This is most apparent in the intersection between General 
Assembly resolutions and customary international law. See, Sloan B., "General 
Assembly Resolutions Revisited", 58 B. Y, I. L., 39 (1987); Akehurst M., "Custom as a 
source of international law", 46 BY I. L, 4 (1972-3); Higgins R., "The United 
Nations and Lawmaking: The Political Organs", 64 Proc. Am. Soc. I. L., 38 (1970); Bin 
Cheng, "Instant International Customary Law", 5 Ind. J. I. L., 23 (1965). This has to 
some extent been generated by decisions of the ICJ: Western Sahara Case (1975) ICJ 
Rep., para. 53, and Nicaragua Case (1986) ICJ Rep., paras. 183-209. 
With regard to the Universal Declaration specifically, it has often been cited as 
an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter. See for example the Declaration on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Article 11, GA Resn. 1904 (XVIII), (Nov. 20 1963). It has also been affirmed on its own to establish obligations 
as in Article 2 of the Proclamation of Teheran (Final Act of the International Conference 
on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April-13 May, 1968. A/Conf. 32/41 at 4). See generally 
Humphrey J., "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and 
Juridical Character", in Ramcharan B. (ed), Human Rights TbiM Years After the 
Universal Declaration, (1979); Green, supra, note 21,666-677; Sohn, supra, note 21, 
at 59-73; Tolley, supra, note 21, at 19-24; Alston P., "The Universal Declaration at 
35", 31 I. C. J. Rev., 60 (1983); Lauterpacht, supra, note 1,394-434. 
64 UN Doc. A/C. 3/ 3 UN GAOR, Pt. 1, Annex 1 (1948). The French proposal 
stated that: 
"Everyone has the right, either individually, or in association with others, to petition or 
to communicate with the public authorities of the State of which he is a national or in 
which he resides. He also has the right to petition or to communicate with the 
competent organs of the United Nations in matters relating to human rights. " 
665 The preamble of the resolution stated that: "the right of petition is an essential 
human right, as is recognized in the Constitutions of a great number of countries., ' GA 
Resn. 217B (I[I), supra, note 57. 
66 GA Resn. 217 C (III), ibid. 
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B) THE COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS67 
In 1948, the Commission on Human Rights was requested by the 
General Assembly to give priority to the preparation of a draft 
Covenant on human rights and measures of implementation. 68 At its 
fifth session69 (9th May to 20th June) the Commission began to examine 
a draft Covenant which at this stage, contained only civil and political 
rights. It decided to transmit the draft Covenant, together with a 
number of proposed additional articles (including certain economic, 
social and cultural rights) and a questionnaire on implementation, to 
states for their comments. 70 
At its sixth session7l in 1950 the Commission continued with its 
consideration of the draft Covenant, but decided to begin drafting a 
separate Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights at its next 
session in 1951. However, having been requested to make a number of 
policy decisions, the General Assembly declared inter alia that only a 
single Covenant should be drafted which would include both civil and 
political, and economic, social and cultural rights. 72 The decisions of 
the Assembly were accordingly discussed by ECOSOC which then 
transferred them to the Commission and invited the specialised agencies 
to participate in the Commission's work regarding economic, social and 
cultural rights. 73 
At its seventh session in 1951,74 the Conunission held a lengthy 
discussion spanning six meetings on the question of including articles on 
economic, social and cultural rights. 75 Various draft proposals were 
considered leading to the adoption of 14 articles on economic, social 
and cultural rights. In addition, it adopted a number of articles 
67 See generally, UN Doc-A/2929,10 UN GAOR, Annexes, (Ag. Item 28), 
Pt. 11L (1955). 
658 GA Resn. 217 E (IIII), supra, note 57; ECOSOC Resn. 191 (VIII), (Feb. 9 
1949), 8 UN ESCOR, Resns, Supp. (No. 1), at 7 (1949). 
69 UN Doc. E/1371,9 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 10), (1949). 
70 Ibid. Annex 1. 
71 UN Doc. E/1681,11 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 5), (1950). 
72 GA Resn. 421 (V), Sect. E, (Dec. 4 1950), 5 UN GAOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. 20), at 42 (1950). 
73 ECOSOC Resn. 349 (XII), (Feb. 25 1951), 12 ESCOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. 1), at 8 (1951). 
74 UN Doc. E/1992,13 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 9), (1952). 
75 The discussion was conducted during the Commission's 203 to 208 
meetings. 
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providing for a system of State reporting to be included in part V of the 
draft Covenant. 
In the following year however, the General Assembly's Third 
Committee conducted an extended debate on the draft Covenant. 76 After 
deciding not to take on the drafting of the Covenant itself, 77 the Third 
Committee adopted a joint amendment78 directing the Commission to 
draft two separate Covenants. The General Assembly, in a complete 
reversal of its original position, reaffirmed the Third Committee's 
amendment in Resolution 543 (VI). 79 On the basis of that decision the 
Commission was therefore asked to revise the draft articles on 
economic, social and cultural rights, taking into consideration the views 
of governments, NGO's and the specialised agencies. 80 
In accordance with the decision of the General Assembly, the 
Commission spent most of its eighth session8l drafting two separate 
Covenants. It produced a draft article on self-determination but was 
however unable to consider the questions of implementation, 
reservations or a federal state clause. Similarly, at its ninth session, 82 
the Commission only had time to consider certain articles on civil and 
political rights. It was unable to discuss new additional articles, such as 
that concerning the right to property, for inclusion in the draft 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, the 
Commission did conclude its consideration of the Covenant at its tenth 
session in 195483 following the redrafting of the articles on periodic 
reporting and the adoption of a federal-state clause. It was noted that the 
76 UN Docs. A/C. 3/SR. 358-372,387-411,6 UN GAOR, C. 3, (358-372 and 
387-411 mtgs. ), (1952). 
77 See the report of the Committee. UN Doc. A/C. 3/559,6 UN GAOR, C. 3, 
Annexes, (Ag. Item 29), at 4 (195 1). 
78 Joint amendment proposed by Belgium, India, Lebanon and the USA: UN 
Doc. A/C. 3AL. 184/Rev. 1, (1951). 
79 The majority in this decision was relatively small: 29 votes to 25 with 4 
abstentions. GA Resn. 543 (VI), (Feb. 5,1952), 6 UN GAOR, Resns, Supp. (No. 20), 
at 36 (1952). 
80 GA Resn. 544 (VI), (Feb. 5 1952), 6 UN GAOR, Resns, Supp. (No. 20), at 
36(1952). 
81 UN Doc. E/2250,13 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4), (1952). 
82 The ninth session of the Commission was held from 7 April to 30 May 1953. 
UN Doc. E/2447,16 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8), (1953). 
83 UN Doc. E/2573,18 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 7), (1954). 
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draft Covenants as completed by the Commission, 84 "represented a 
broad compromise between differing political, economic, and cultural 
opinions and, while not ideal, should be regarded as fairly 
satisfactory". 85 
The draft Covenants were duly referred to the General Assembly 
for consideration at its ninth session. 86 After a general discussion, the 
Assembly requested further observations from States, Specialised 
Agencies and non-governmental organisations, and resolved that the 
Third Committee should discuss the drafts article by article it with a 
view to their adoption at the earliest possible date". 87 
The Third Committee began its discussion of the draft Covenants 
by considering the Preambles and article 1 of each Covenant at the 
Assembly's tenth session. 88 The Committee continued by discussing 
article 2 of the draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, 
but resolved to postpone the adoption of that article until the other 
rights in Part III of the Covenant had been discussed. At the General 
Assembly's eleventh session89 the Third Committee accordingly 
addressed itself to the substantive articles in Part III of the Covenant. It 
completed its consideration of those articles at the twelfth session. 90 The 
Committee then spent the next four sessions discussing the correlative 
provisions (articles 6-26) of the draft Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 91 
It was not until the General Assembly's seventeenth session that 
the Third Committee resumed its consideration of the draft Covenant on 
84 The final version of the Commission's draft Covenants is to be found in UN 
Doc. E/2447, supra, note 82, Annex 1. 
85 UN Doc. A/2808 and Com 1,9 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 28), at 
10, para. 30 (1954). 
86 UN Docs. A/C. 3/SR. 557-586,9 UN GAOR, C. 3, (557-586 mtgs. ), (1954). 
87 GA Resn. 833 (IX) Sect. 4, (Dec. 4 1954), 9 UN GAOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. 21), at 20 (1954). 
88 UN Doc. A/3077,10 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 28), 30-40 
(1955). 
89 UN Doc. A/3525,11 UN GAOR, C. 3., Annexes, (Ag. Item 31), 2-22 
(1956). 
90 UN Doc. A/3764,12 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 33), 1-15 (1957). 
91 UN Doc. A/4045,13 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 32), (1958); UN 
Doc. A/4299,14 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 34), (1959); UN Doc. A/4625, 
15 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 34), (1960-6 1); UN Doc-A/5000,16 UN 
GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 35), (1961-62). 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 92 After considerable discussion 
on the nature of the obligations incumbent upon the States Parties with 
regard to economic, social and cultural rights, article two was finally 
adopted. 93 Articles three to five followed; all being adopted 
unanimously, without amendment, and with minimal discussion. 94 The 
main body of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
was thus completed in 1962.95 However, the Third Committee 
continued to discuss the measures of implementation at its next sesSion96 
and again in 1966. During that time, it also reviewed the final clauses, 
found in Part V of the draft Covenant97 and considered a late 
amendment to article 11. The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and its Optional Protocol were all adopted and opened 
for signature by the General Assembly on 16th December 1966.98 The 
adoption of the Covenants witnessed the completion of the International 
Bill of Human Rights. 
111) ISSUES IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS 
A) THE INCLUSION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS99 
The initial draft Covenant, as discussed by the Commission at its 
fifth session, contained no mention of economic, social or cultural 
92UN Doc. A/5365,17 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 43), 6-17 (1962). 
93 Ibid at 13. Article two was adopted by 51 votes to four with 33 abstentions. 
An indication of the controversy is demonstrated by the fact that article two paragraph 
three was adopted by the narrow margin of 41 votes to 38 with 12 abstentions. 
94 Ibid. 
95 For the draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as adopted 
at this stage see, UN Doc. A/5929 Annex, 20 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Itern 
65), 4-7 (1966). 
96 UN Doc. A/5655,18 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 48), 14-25 
(1963). 
97 Ibid. 
98 GA Resn. 2200 (XL), (Dec. 16 1966), 21 UN GAOR, Resns, 
S upp. (No. 16), at 49 (1966). On the drafting of the ICCPR see, McGoldrick D., The 
Human Riizhts Committee, 3-43 (1991). 
99 See generally, Green, supra, note 21, at 679-682; Jhabvala F. 7 "On Human Rights and the Socio-Economic Context", 31 Neth. I. L. R-, 149 (1984); UN 
Doc. A/2929, supra, note 67, at 7-8, paras. 4-12; Van Boven T., "Distinguishing 
Criteria of Human Rights". in Vasak Kand Alston P. (eds), International Dimensions 
of Human Rights, Vol. 1,43 (1982); UN Doc. A/C. 3/559, supra, note 77, at 40-41, 
paras. 16-22. 
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rights. However, a number of proposals were made by Australia and the 
USSR, for the inclusion of certain economic and social rights in the 
draft Covenant. Without discussing the proposals, the Commission 
resolved that the Covenant should contain such articles. 100However, by 
its next session, the Commission had changed its position. It was felt that 
additional time was needed to discuss economic and social rights at 
length, in consultation with the specialised agencies and particularly 
UNESCO and the ILO. 101 As far as the Commission was concemed, the 
best course of action was to adopt an initial draft Covenant limited to 
civil and political rights, with a view to adopting further Covenants on 
other rights at a later stage-102 Thus it resolved to begin drafting a 
separate Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights at its next 
session in 1951. 
In considering the draft Covenant, ECOSOC approved103 the 
Commission's decision to consider additional Covenants104 and 
requested the Secretary 
-General to consult the specialised agencies on 
the matter of economic, social and cultural rights. 105 Furthermore, it 
asked the General Assembly to make a policy decision regarding the 
desirability of including articles on economic, social and cultural rights 
in the existing draft Covenant-106 
Following the request, the General Assembly made a policy 
decision. 107 It decided that the Covenant lacked "certain of the most 
elementary rights" and accordingly instructed the Commission to revise 
the Covenant with a view to the inclusion of other rights. 108 However in 
considering specifically the inclusion of economic and social rights, the 
100 By 12 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions. 
101 The Commission was in possession at this time of the survey of activities of 
UN organs and specialised agencies in matters within the scope of articles 22 to 27 of 
the Universal Declaration. UN Doc. E/CN. 4/364 (1950). 
102 This was decided by 13 votes to 2. 
103 ECOSOC Resn. 303 C (XI), (Aug. 9 1950), 11 UN ESCOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. 1), at 25 (1950). 
104 E/CN. 4/SR. 377-379,11 ESCOR, (377-379 mtgs. ) (1950). It actually 
referred to "economic, social, cultural" and "political" rights. The suggestion being that 
the draft convention only dealt with civil rights. 
105 ECOSOC Resn. 303 D (XI), supra, note 103, at 25-6. 
106 ECOSOC Resn. 303 I (XI), ibid, at 29. 
107 Cf UN Docs. A/C. 3/SR-278-316 and 318,5 UN GAOR, C. 3, (278-316 
and 318 mtgs. ), (1951). 
108 GA Resn. 421 (V) Sect. B, supra, note 72. 
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debate was long and acrimonious. The US, 109 Brazil and Turkey 
introduced a draft in the Third Committee instructing the Commission 
to consider additional instruments dealing with such rights. 110 The 
majority however preferred a Yugoslav amendment including 
economic, social and cultural rights within the existing Covenant. When 
the matter came to plenary the Assembly adopted the amended text by 
35 votes to nine with seven abstentions. 111 
In its resolution the General Assembly decided that "the 
enjoyment of civil and political freedoms and of economic, social and 
cultural rights are interconnected and interdependent". As such the 
Commission was to include in the draft Covenant "a clear expression of 
economic, social and cultural rights in a manner which relates them to 
the civil and political freedoms proclaimed by the draft Covenant". 112 
At its seventh session in 1951113 the Commission held a lengthy 
discussion on the question of including articles on economic, social and 
cultural rights, for which it had before it a number of documents on the 
subject. 114 Despite clear opposition to the General Assembly 
directive, 115 it discussed the various proposals for draft articles 116 first 
109 Opposition of the US to economic, social and cultural rights dates back to 
the early debates over the drafting of an international instrument for the United Nations. 
Internal opposition was such in the US that the Senate was unlikely to accept a human 
rights treaty that included economic, social and cultural rights. It was therefore of prime 
importance to the delegation to ensure the exclusion of such rights from the draft 
covenant. 
110 UN Doc. A/C. 3AL. 76, (1950). 
111 Those who voted against the amendment included Australia, Canada, the 
UK, and the US. 
112 GA Resn. 421 (V) Sect. E., supra, note 72. 
113 UN Doc. E/1992, supra, note 74. 
114 The discussion was conducted during the Commission's 203 to 208 
meetings. The documents that it had before it included: "Memorandum of the Secretary- 
General on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", UN Doc. E/CN. 4/529, (195 1); 
"Memorandum on Co-operation Between the Commission and the Specialised 
Agencies and Other Organs of the United Nations", UN Doc. E/CN. 4/534 and Add. 1- 
3, (195 1); Survey of Action by UN Organs and Specialised Agencies of Matters Within 
the Scope of Articles 22-27 UDHR", UN Doc. E/CN. 4/364, Corr. 1-3, and Add. 1-3, (195 1); various reports containing draft articles and suggestions by Specialised 
Agencies (UNESCO, WHO, ILO, High Commissioner for Refugees). 
115 The question was mooted as to whether the Commission was bound by the 
Assembly's decisions. It was considered that even if it was not, it was still bound to 
carry out the recommendations of ECOSOC which had directed the Commission in 
accordance with the Assembly's wishes. 
116 The proposals of governments and the specialised agencies are to be found 
in UN Doc. E/CN. 4/AC. 14/2 and Add. 1-5, (195 1). 
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in a working group then in plenary. The result was the adoption of 14 
draft articles on economic, social and cultural rights including two 
separate "umbrella clauses" concerning obligations and limitations. 117 
Despite the seeming ambiguity in the Commission's position 
regarding its opposition to the General Assembly's decision, an Indian 
proposal to ask ECOSOC to recommend that the General Assembly 
reconsider its decision to include economic, social and cultural rights in 
the Covenant was defeated by 12 votes to 5 with 1 abstention. 118 The 
opposition of the western states to economic, social and cultural rights 
however continued. 
ECOSOC, following a discussion of implementation measures, 
invited the General Assembly to reconsider its decision regarding a 
single Covenant. 119 The General Assembly Third Committee conducted 
an extended debate on the matter at its sixth session, 120 and adopted a joint amendmentl2l directing the Commission to draft two separate 
Covenants. This decision was reaffirmed by the General Assembly in 
Resolution 543 (VI) which requested the Commission: 
"To draft two Covenants on human rights..., one to contain 
civil and political rights and the other to contain economic, 
social and cultural rights, in order that the General 
Assembly may approve the two Covenants simultaneously 
and open them at the same time for signature, the two 
Covenants to contain, in order to emphasize the unity of the 
aim in view and to ensure respect for and observance of 
human rights, as many similar provisions as possible 
...... 
122 
The Assembly thus reversed its earlier decision, a step which Humphrey 
has commented as having been "taken largely on ideological 
117 The inclusion of the umbrella clauses (ibid. Annex 1, pt. IH, draft articles 19 
and 32) showed that the Commission was determined to maintain a distinction between 
the categories of rights even if forced to deal with them in the same convention. 
118 Draft Resn. E/CN. 4/619/Rev. 1, (195 1). The proposal recognised that 
economic, social and cultural rights were "equally fundamental", but maintained that 
they formed a separate category of rights "in that they were not justiciable". 
119 ECOSOC Resn. 384 (XIIII), (Aug. 29 1951), 13 UN ESCOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. 1), at 35 (1951). 
120 Supra, note 76. 
121 Joint amendment proposed by Belgium, India, Lebanon and the USA. UN 
Doc. A/C. 3/L. 184/Rev-1, supra, note 78. 
122 GA Resn. 543 (VI), (Feb-5 1952), 6 UN GAOR, Resns, Supp. (No. 20), at 
36 (1952). The majority in this decision was relatively small: 29 votes to 25 with 4 
abstentions. 
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grounds". 123 On the basis of this decision, the Commission was asked to 
revise the draft articles on economic, social and cultural rights taking 
into consideration the views of governments, NGO's and the specialised 
agencies. 124 From that point on, the Commission continued to draft and 
discuss economic, social and cultural rights with a view to their 
adoption in a separate Covenant. Later proposals requesting the General 
Assembly to revise its decision to draft two separate Covenants were 
rejected. 125 
The decision to draft two separate Covenants was certainly a 
momentous one, and has coloured the manner in which human rights, 
and particularly economic, social and cultural rights, have been treated 
since. The arguments on behalf of those who desired two separate 
Covenants may be summarised as follows-. 
i) Whereas civil and political rights were absolute and fundamental, 126 
economic, social and cultural rights were dependent for their realisation 
on economic resources127 and were therefore relative, contingent, 128 
long term objectives. It followed that civil and political rights were 
positive and justiciable 129 whereas economic, social and cultural rights 
were not. 
ii) Civil and political rights could be undertaken immediately through 
legislative or administrative action calling for state restraint. Economic, 
social and cultural rights on the other hand, could only be achieved 
progressively through positive state action. 130 The implementation of 
civil and political rights as "legal" rights was thus of an entirely 
different nature to that of economic, social and cultural rights which 
were "programme" rights. 
iii) Given that the Covenant was to be acceptable to the majority of 
123 Humphrey, supra, note 21, at 107. 
124 GA Resn. 544 (VI), supra, note 80. 
125 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/L. 195, (1952), and UN Doc. F, /CN. 4/L. 272, (1953). 
126 See e. g., D'Souza (India), UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 361, at 86, paras. 30-32 (1951). 
127 See e. g., Marshall (Canada), UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 362, at 91, paras 30-31 (1951). 
128 See e. g., Alfonzo-Ravard (Venezuela), UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 367, at 122, 
para. 13 (195 1). 
129 See India's proposed draft resolution at the Commission's seventh session, 
UN Doc. E/1992, supra, note 74, at 15, para. 67. 
130 See e. g., Heald (United Kingdom), UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 361, at 87, paras 
48-49 (1951). 
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states, it was unwise to include obligations in the Covenant that would 
prevent certain states from ratifying it. 131 
iv) As suggested by the general disagreement over the issue, the 
inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights would delay unduly the 
completion of the Covenant. 132 
On the other hand those who desired a single covenant containing 
all the rights advanced the following arguments: 
i) That the UN Charter (article 55) and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights both contemplated the unity of all human rights 133 and 
that the division of the Covenant created a hierarchy of rights contrary 
to such provisions. 134 
ii) That attempts to secure civil and political rights without regard to 
their social, economic and cultural context were purely abstract and 
theoretical. 135 
iii) That the asserted differences were to some extent artificial. Not only 
were some economic, social and cultural rights immediately 
enforceable, 136 but it was clear that in some countries civil and political 
rights were not "legal" in any effective way-137 
iv) 'Mat as economic, social and cultural rights were a more recent 
phenomenon they expressed the progress achieved in the field of human 
rights. Their exclusion would merely reaffirm those civil and political 
131 See e. g., Harry (Australia), UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 363, at 101, para. 43 
132 See e. g., Dehousse (Belgium), UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 361, at 83, para. 5 (1951). 
133 See e. g., Dedijer (Yugoslavia), UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 365, at 107, para. 5 (1951). 
134 See e. g., Mufti (Iraq), A/C. 3/SR. 364, at 103, para. 5 (1951). The point is 
an interesting one as, despite indications to the contrary, some states did in fact suggest 
that civil and political liberty had to be assured before the full enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights became possible, see Heald (United Kingdom), 
A/C. 3/SR. 361, at 87, para. 48 (1951). 
135 See, Albornoz (Ecuador), A/C. 3/SR. 366, at 117, para. 47 (1951). There 
were indications that some states considered economic, social and cultural rights as 
being the condition for the realisation of civil and political rights, and thus of more 
immediate importance. The tendency to create a new hierarchy of this nature was to 
become an issue of great controversy later in the General Assembly, see e. g., Howard, 
supra, note 8. 
136 E. g. Trade Union Rights, Article 8(1)(a) ICESCR. 
(1951). 
137 See e. g., summary by Najar (Israel), A/C. 3/SR. 368, at 129, paras 20-21 
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rights that already exist in constitutions, undermining any real development in the protection of human rights in general. 138 
v) That to separate the rights into two Covenants would amount to 
postponing indefinitely the realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights. 139 
The main proponents of the separation of the rights were the Western States, whereas the Soviet Bloc together with certain Latin 
American states preferred the single Covenant. There was therefore an implicit ideological conu-nitment on either side, given that it was a time 
of Cold War, to maintain the respective positions. This was made 
particularly apparent by the scant notice paid to the Israeli 
Memorandum advocating a new categorisation of the rights along the 
lines of their differing implementation requirements. 140 It was 
essentially the shifting Third World vote, however, that allowed the 
initial General Assembly decision to be reversed. 141 
It is clear that it was not intended that the division of the 
Covenant should imply any notion of relative value. Indeed it was stated 
that "the enjoyment of civil and political freedoms and economic, social 
and cultural rights are interconnected and interdependent" and that 
"when deprived of economic, social and cultural rights, man does not 
represent the human person whom the Universal Declaration regards as 
the ideal of the free man". 142 However it would seem that the division 
of the Covenants was a solution to an ideological conflict in which the 
Western States' preference for civil and political rights was to some 
extent vindicated. That this was an unsatisfactory result is apparent 
138 See e. g., Cortina (Cuba), A/C. 3/SR. 366, at 117, para. 41 (1951). 
139 Ibid, at 116, para. 40. 
140 The proposal was to divide the rights into those that were immediately 
realizable and those that were to be implemented progressively according to the 
conditions of each state. Each state would therefore have different rights in each 
category. This would cut across the existing ideological differentiation between civil 
and political, and economic, social and cultural rights. Israeli Memorandum, UN 
Doc. A/C. 3/565,6 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item. 29), at 17, (1952). 
141 See, Jhabvala, supra, note 99, at 50. 
142 Preamble to GA Resn. 543 (VI), supra, note 122. The unity of the two 
categories of rights has been continually recognised since, see Proclamation of 
Teheran, article 13, GA Resn. 32/130, (Dec. 16 1977), 33 UN GAOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. 45), at 150 (1977); GA Resn. 41/128, article 6(2), (Dec. 4 1986), 41 UN 
GAOR, Resns, Supp. (No. 53), at 186 (1986). 
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from the continuing debate as to the relationship between the rights and 
their relative importance. 143 
B) PROGRESSIVE OR IMMEDIATE OBLIGATIONS. 
The Covenants, as finally accepted, have significant differences 
not only in respect to the relative implementation procedures, but also 
with regard to the obligations accepted by the States parties to ensure 
the rights in each Covenant. Whereas under the ICCPR states undertake 
to "respect and ensure" the rights recognised, 144 under the ICESCR the 
obligation is one where the States undertake "to take steps... with a view 
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognised" 
in the covenant. 145 'IbUS the obligations under the ICCPR could be said 
to be immediate in contrast to the progressive nature of the 
undertakings in the ICESCR. 
It was initially suggested that since the two categories of rights 
were to be of equal importance, the ICESCR should have the same 
obligations clause as the ICCPR. It was recognised however that the 
process of realisation of economic, social and cultural rights was 
generally of a different nature to that of civil and political rights. 146 
The obligation upon states with regard to economic, social and cultural 
rights was considered to be necessarily progressive in character, as full 
and immediate realisation of all the rights was beyond the resources of 
many states. 
The obligations clause as adopted (article 2(1)) was criticised by 
many as providing too many loopholes for states to avoid or delay 
143 Some commentators have maintained the validity of the distinction between 
the two categories of rights, see e. g. Bossuyt, supra, note 5. Contra, Van Hoof G., 
"Ile Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Rebuttal of Some 
Traditional Views", in Alston P. and Tomasevski K(eds), The Right to Food, 97 
(1985); Berenstein A., "Economic and Social Rights: Their Inclusion in the ECBR- 
Problems of Formulation and Interpretation", 2 H. R. L. J., 257 (198 1). Others have 
gone further in arguing that civil and political rights are therefore more important, e. g. 
Cranston, supra, note 5, or that economic, social and cultural rights are "legally 
negligible" e. g. Vierdag, supra, note 5. Contra Van Hoof, ibid. 
The majority in the United Nations has alternatively expressed the interests of 
developing states with a preference for economic, social and cultural rights, see 
generally, TUrk D. Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN 
Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1989/19, (1989). 
144 Article 2(1) ICCPR. 
145 Article 2(1) ICESCR. 
146 See above. It has been argued that the implementation of the ICCPR is 
similarly progressive. Jhabvala supra, note 99. This is evidenced by the need for 
financial input to secure civil and political rights ie. for an efficient court system, and 
that the reporting procedure under article 40(l) provides for the States to report on the 
"measures they have adopted... and on the progress made". 
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undertaking their obligations. However, it was argued that the 
progressive nature of the obligation was essential given its dependency 
upon state resources and that it would leave sufficient leeway to the 
specialised agencies to develop the rights in more elaborate international 
instruments. 147 
Perhaps the greatest criticism of article 2(l), as will be seen, is its 
relative lack of sophistication. Despite the fact that it was agreed during 
the drafting of the Covenant, that certain rights should be seen as 
capable of immediate implementation, this was not reflected in the 
terms of article 2(l). Moreover, given that governments are naturally 
reluctant to give effect to human rights provisions that seem to offer 
them no obvious benefit in the short run, the general progressive nature 
of the obligation does appear to provide them with excessive leeway. 
Q THE LOCATION OF OBLIGATION PROVISIONS 
A recurring issue in the drafting of the Covenant was the location 
of provisions outlining State obligations. Although the matter was 
generally resolved in 1951 with the decision to create an umbrella 
clause outlining State obligations, individual proposals to specific 
articles thereafter often contained elaborations of the requirements laid 
down in the general clause. 148 Tbus for example, during the drafting of 
article 6, there was considerable support for the inclusion of an extra 
paragraph outlining in more detail the steps to be taken by States in 
realising the rights within the Covenant. 149 
A number of States continually opposed the inclusion of such 
phrases, on the basis that they might detract from, or serve to weaken, 
the general obligation clause, 150 and that it was inconsistent to have 
those phrases in some clauses and not others. 151 On the whole, it was 
felt that the general clause in no way prevented the inclusion of more 
specific implementation provisions within the substantive articles 
themselves. 152 However, the matter was complicated by the fact that 
article 2(l) (the general implementation provision) was drafted and 
adopted after the substantive articles themselves. Tbus, at most stages, it 
147 UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 67. 
148 See e. g. discussion on the inclusion of article 6(2), below Chapter 5, text 
accompanying notes 52-64. 
1491bid. 
150 See e. g., Rossel (Sweden), E/CN. 4/SR. 277, at 3 (1952); Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 277, at 7 (1952). 
151 See e. g. Elliot (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 143, para. 26 (1956). 
152 See e. g., Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 144, para. 38 (1956). 
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was not possible to predict exactly what would be provided for in the 
umbrella clause. 
It would appear that the inclusion of obligation clauses in the 
substantive portion of the Covenant does upset its general conceptual 
form. Many articles possess a confusing mixture of norms and sub- 
norms, with both immediate and progressive obligations. Article 11(2), 
in particular, lacks the conceptual clarity that might have been achieved 
with a stricter division between norms and measures of implementation. 
Article 11(2) not only deals with specific implementation provisions 
that relate to the right to food (such as the reform of agrarian systems), 
but it provides for an additional sub-norm (the right to be free from 
hunger) and objectives to which the measures of implementation should 
be directed (such as the equitable distribution of food supplies). 153 
D) SELF DETERMINATION 
Article 1 of both International Covenants on human rights 
proclaims that: 
"All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. " 
The inclusion of this provision was the first occasion on which self- 
determination was spelled out in a treaty as a human right. Indeed its 
fonnulation was to be a source of great controversy during the drafting 
of the covenants, to the extent that it was feared that the Covenant was 
becoming a pawn in the fight against colonialism. 
The concept evolved initially154 as a political principle most 
notably in the form of Wilson's "Fourteen Points" of 1917.155 Ilen on 
the prompting of the USSR. 156 it was set out as one of the purposes of 
153 See below, Chapter 8. 
1 
-'Alt is sometimes argued that the self-determination of individuals and peoples 
was the fundamental concept behind the development of human rights following the 
enlightenment, see e. g. Kameneka E., "Human Rights: Peoples Rights", in Crawford 
J. (ed), The Rights Of Pegples, 130 (1988). 
155 Wilson stated inter alia: 
"No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and 
accept the principle that governments derive all their powers from the 
consent of the governed". 
Address to the US Senate, Jan 1917, Washington 1917. 
The principle of self-government was also enshrined in the Atlantic Charter of 
1941 and thence in the Declaration of the United Nations of 1942. 
156 The final formulation is thought to be a compromise between the Colonialist 
and Socialist States. See, Cassese A.,, "Political Self-Determination- Old Concepts and 
New Developments", in Buergenthal. T. (ed), Human Rights. International Law and the 
30 
the United Nations in the UN Charter. 157 Although a similar attempt to 
include an article on self-determination in the UDHR came to 
nothing, 158 the idea gained more support in the drafting of the 
Covenant. 
Pressure for inclusion of a provision on self-determination came 
both from the "Socialist bloc" and the developing countries159 in the 
General Assembly. Consequently the General Assembly instructed the 
Commission to study the ways and means to ensure the right to self- 
determination160 then specifically directed it to include an article on the 
subject. 161 There was a significant amount of debate on the subject not 
Tff 
- Helsinki Accord, 137, at 138 (1979). 
157 Article 1(2) of the UN Charter was adopted unanimously and declares one 
purpose of the United Nations as being "To develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". A 
similar reference to self-determination is to be found in article 55(l) of the Charter. 
References are made in Chapters XI and XH regarding Non-Self-Governing 
and Trusteeship Territories to self-government. Although no direct reference is made to 
self-determination, Bowett argues that it is permissible to consider the entirety of those 
chapters as "reflections on the basic idea of self-determination". Bowett D., "Problems 
of Self-Determination and Political Rights in Developing Countries", 
Proc. Am. Soc. I. L. 134 (1966). 
1W See USSR proposal UN Doc. A/7 84, (1947). However article 28 reads: 
"Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. " 
Similarly article 21(3) stipulates that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government" and shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections. 
159 UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 186 and Add. 1, (1951). Morphet comments however that 
the positions of these two groups were not identical. Morphet S., "Article 1 of the 
Human Rights Covenants: Its Development and Current Significance", in Hill D. (ed), 
Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 67 (1989). 
The influence of the "newly awakened" developing states was perhaps crucial, 
their political cohesiveness can be estimated by the continual references to the Bandung 
Conference of April 1955 which inter alia recognised the right to self-determination. 
The role of the Western States however is also considered to have been 
influential, particularly in broadening the scope of the article. See Cassese A., "The 
Self-Determination of Peoples", in Henkin L. (ed), International Bill of Rights, 92, at 
93(1981). 
160 GA Resn. 421 (V) D, supra, note 72, at 42-43. 
161 The General Assembly, following a thirteen power Arab-Asian proposal, 
adopted resolution 545 (VI) on February 5th 1952 in which it stipulated that an article 
on self-determination should be included which read "All peoples shall have the right of 
self-determination". It further required that note should be made of the duty of 
Administering States to promote the right in relation to Non-Self-Governing 
Territories. GA Resn. 545 (VI), (Feb. 5 1952), 6 UN GAOR, Resns, Supp. (No. 20), 
at 36 (1952). 
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only in the Commission at its eighth session but also later in the General 
Assembly's Third Committee. 162 
Those who opposed the inclusion of an article on 
self-determination163 put forward the following arguments: 164 
i) That the inclusion of such a politically controversial subject might jeopardise the future of the Covenants by making it impossible for some 
states to ratify them. 165 
ii) That self-determination as stated in the UN Charter, was a political 
principle but not a legal right let alone a human right. 166 
iii) That the exact nature of the right to self-determination was subject 
162 See, UN Doc. A/3077, supra, note 88, at 30-40. UN Docs. A/C. 3/SR. 642- 
646,10 UN GAOR, C. 3, (642-646 mtgs. ), (1955). 
163 Opposition was primarily from the Western It colonialist" powers. It must be 
recognised however that this was not entirely coherent as the opposition of the Western 
powers faded somewhat towards the end of the drafting process. Humphrey comments 
in this light that by 1958 "so many dependent territories were becorrAng independent 
that the political implications of the articles on self-detem-fination seemed less 
important", supra, note 21, at 252. 
164 See generally UN Docs. A/2929, supra, note 67. 
165 That a certain suspicion of the concept of self-determination existed is well 
reflected by the Belgian representative who stated that it was "tantamount to an 
incitement to insurrection and separatism", Belgium, A/C. 3/SR. 643, at 94, para. 10 (1955). See also, Emerson R. "Self Determination" 60 Proc. Am. Soc. I. L. 
, 
135, at 136 
(1966). It was later argued upon this basis that the US should refrain from ratifying the 
Covenants. See, Haight G., "Human Rights Covenants", 62 Proc. Am. Soc. I. L., 96, at 
98(1968). 
Most of the Western States that opposed the article have nevertheless signed and 
ratified the Covenants. It would seem that this is at least partially due to the anti- 
colonialist bent of the UN notion of self-determination which has made the issue of 
marginal importance on the attainment of independence of the former colonies. It is 
interesting to note that the UK has submitted an "understanding" of its interpretation of 
article 1, see, Schwelb E., "The United Kingdom Signs the Covenants in Human 
Rights it 
, 
18 I. C. L. Q. 457 (1969). 
166 See United Kingdom, A/C. 3/SR 642, at 90, para. 12 (1955). The UN 
Charter only speaks of the "principle" of self determination in articles 1(2) and 55(l). 
Pomerance maintains in this respect that self-determination was merely a "deciderata" in 
interpretation of the Charter rather than a legal right. Pornerance M., Self-Detern-lination 
in Law and Practice 9 (1982). That it was not a right prior to this seems implicit in the 
decision of the Committee of Jurists in the Aaland Islands CajQ (1920) LNOJ, Spec. 
Supp. (No. 3) at 5. However it could be argued that this decision was confined to the 
right to secede and not to self-determination as a whole. 
The question of whether it has evolved into a legal right since, is also subject to 
controversy. See, Sinha, "Is Self-Determination Passe? ", 12 Columb. J. Trans. L. 260 (1973). He'concludes that practice shows the principle to be one of political expediency 
rather than international law. See also, Emerson R., From Empire to Nation,, (1960). 
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to many interpretations and involved the complex issues of minority 
rights and secession. 167 
iv) That the term f1peoples" was incapable of precise definition. 168 
167 Thoughts as to how a people might "determine" themselves have ranged from taking full independence to the institution of democratic elections. See generally, Cassese, supra, note 156. For example the socialist concept of self-determination 
confined its operation to colonial peoples, see Tunldn G., Thega of International Law, 60-69 (1974). Western states however thought the right should be more generally 
applicable not to become redundant merely on the attainment of independence. See, Umozurike U., Self-Determination in International Law, 185 (1972). In this light, 
socialist states can be seen to prefer the "external" aspect of self-determination, and 
western states the "internal", see Cassese, ibid. 
The most complex debate centred around the question of whether the right to 
self-determination included the right to secede. See generally, Buchheit L., Secession- 
The Legitimacy of Self-Determination, (1978); White R., "Self-Determination: Time 
for Reassessment", 28 Neth. I. L. J. 147 (198 1). Fear was expressed that if such a right 
was established for minorities it would lead to the disintegration of states and a threat to 
international peace, see, Thornberry P., "Self-Determination, Minorities, Human 
Rights: A Review of International Instruments", 38 I. C. L. Q., 867 (1989). 
168 See e. g., Emerson, supra, note 165, at 136. In this respect Jennings 
commented that "the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people' 
Jennings I., The Approach to Self-Government, 56, (1956). 
The debate as to the exact meaning of the term "peoples" goes back to the San 
Francisco Conference in 1945. A Belgian amendment was proposed (and ultimately 
rejected) to avoid any confusion of the term "peoples" with "states". UN Doc. 374 
1/1/17 at 1,6 UNCIO, at 300, (1945). The UN Secretariat concluded that ... nations' is 
used in the sense of all political entities, States and non-States, whereas 'peoples' 
refers to groups of human beings who may, or may not, comprise States or nations", 
UN Doc. W. D. 381 CO/156,18 UNCIO, at 657-58 (1945). See generally, Swan G., 
"Self-Determination and the UN Charter", 22 Ind. J. I. L., 264 (1982). The confusion 
over terms is amply illustrated by Kelsen who concludes that "the term 'peoples'... 
means probably states, since only states have 'equal rights' according to general 
international law". Kelsen, supra, note 34, at 52. 
Although the Commission Draft originally stated that the right should belong to 
all peoples and all nations, the latter was excluded on the grounds that the term 
ft peoples" was more comprehensive. Chen L-C., "Self Determination as a Human 
Right" in McDougal M., Lasswell H. and Chen L-C. (eds), Human Rights and World 
Public Ord 
, 
198, at 217 (1980). The right was deemed to be universal: applying not 
only to non- self-governing territories but also to fully independent states. Cassese, 
supra, note 156, at 94. Its purpose is to define the population as distinct from a 
particular government. Cf., Falk R., "The Rights of Peoples", in Crawford (ed), The 
Rights of PeODlfd, 17 (1988). 
It would seem logical that any claim of self-determination is ultimately based 
upon the subjective conviction that the governmental rule is either alien or colonial, see 
Pornerance, supra, note 166, at 14. The question is therefore whether an objective 
criterion can be elucidated, see, Buchheit, supra, note 167, at 10; Dinstein Y., 
"Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities", 25 1L. L. Q,, 102, at 104 
(1976). This is especially crucial given the general desire to exclude the operation of the 
principle from minorities. In practice it would seem that the United Nations has applied 
the right solely to colonial peoples, see e. g. Pomerance, supra, note 166, at 14-23. 
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v) That the internal aspect of self-determination was ignored 
of the external aspect169 in that it was promoted merely as a 
independence. 
in favour 
tool for 
vi) That the UDI-IR, which was intended to cover all human rights, 
contained no reference to self-determination. 170 
vii) Ihat self-determination was a right of a collective nature and 
therefore it was inappropriate to include it in a covenant which was 
devoted to the rights of individuals. 171 
On the other hand those who wanted to include an article on self- 
determination put forward the foRowing arguments: 
i) That states had undertaken under the UN Charter to respect the right 
169 Cassese succinctly outlines the two aspects of self-determination: 
"External self-determination refers to the ability of a people or a minority 
to choose in the field of international relations, opting for independence 
or union with other States. Internal self-determination usually means that 
a people in a sovereign State can elect and keep the government of its 
choice". 
Supra, note 156, at 137. 
Pomerance has noted in this respect that UN practice "consists of decolonization 
as an end result rather than "self-determination" as a technique or method". Supra, note 
166, at 28. At the time of drafting the Soviet States and the Developing States tended to 
emphasise the colonial (external) aspect of self-determination at the expense of 
questions of representative government and periodic elections. Ironically those states 
that opposed inclusion of the article (Western States) were the ones that advocated the 
human rights aspect of the concept most strongly. Cf. Cassese, supra, note 156, at 
140. 
The forthright statement of Afghanistan that self-determination "will have to be 
proclaimed even in a world from which colonial territories have vanished" however 
became the majority view, Afghanistan, A/C. 3/SR. 644, para. 10 (1955). 
170 The UDHR however did make reference to the internal aspect of self- 
determination, namely, representative government. 
171 See e. g. Shann (Australia), A/C. 3/SR-400, at 320, para. 19, (1952). 
Sieghart argues that such peoples rights form an entirely distinct category separate from 
human rights. He asks: 
"How then can the rights of a 'people' ever form part of human rights- 
that is, precisely the rights that the individual may invoke against the 
claims of those who exercise power over him, and which they only too 
often assert in the name of the people". 
Sieghart P., The Lawful Rights of Mankind, 164 (1986). 
Similar problems might have also been raised in connection with article 27 
ICCPR relating to the rights of minorities, see Rousseau C., "Droits de Momme et 
Droit des Gens", in Cassin R. (ed), Amicorum Discipulorum=, Liber IV, 315 (1969). 
However the drafters were concerned with excluding minorities from the ambit of 
article 1, thus they would be conceived of as individual rights primarily, see, 
Thomberry, supra, note 167, at 880. 
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of self-determination. 172 
ii) That the realisation of the right to self-determination was essential to 
the maintenance of peace. In reaffirming that right in the Covenants the 
United Nations would create the necessary conditions for the 
establishment of peaceful relations and international cooperation. 173 
iii) That the intended article was not concerned with the rights of 
minorities or the right of secession and therefore fears of such an 
interpretation were unfounded. 174 
iv) That it had already been decided by the General Assembly to include 
such an article and to reverse such a decision would can into question 
the authority of that body. 
v) That although self-determination was a collective right it was the 
"source" or "prerequisite" for the enjoyment of all other individual 
human rights. 175 
172 In the USSR's view, the distinction between self-determination as a right 
and a principle was artificial, USSR, A/C. 3/SR. 646, para. 23 (1955). Some 
commentators argue that the principle was established as a legal right even before the 
Charter, see Lachs M., "The Law in and of the United Nations- Some Reflections on 
the Principle of Self-Determination", 1 Ind. J. I. L. 429, at 432 (1960- 1). Whether or not 
this is the case it would seem that it has emerged as a legal right since that time, see 
Higgins R., Me Develppment of International Law Throug-h- the Political Organs of the 
United Nations, 103 (1963). 
173 See e. g. Panama who felt that the right was essential to the maintenance of 
peace, as otherwise such peoples would resort to force to ensure their claims, Panama, 
A/C. 3/SR. 827, at 322, para. 32 (1957). 
174 See e. g., D'Souza (India), A/C. 3/SR. 399, at 311, paras. 5-6 (1952); 
Greece declared that the issue "was that of national majorities and not of minorities", 
Acritas (Greece), A/C. 3/SR. 369, at 134, para. 13 (195 1). Buchheit concludes that 
"article 1 of the covenants appears in spite of its possible secessionist interpretation, 
rather than as a confirmation of that interpretation". Supra, note 167, at 83-84. 
Article 27 of the ICCPR protects the cultural, religious and linguistic rights of 
persons belonging to minorities. See, Sohn L., "The Rights of Minorities", in Henkin 
L. (ed), International Bill of Rights, 270 (1982); Thomberry, supra, note 167, at 877- 
884; Capotord F., Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic. Religious and 
Lingpistic Groups, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/384/Rev. 1. (1979). 
175 See, Cassese, supra, note 159, at 101-2. Such a view has been termed the 
ft contextual approach" by Van Boven. Van Boven T., "Tbe Relations Between 
Peoples' Rights and Human Rights in the African Charter", 7 IiR. L. L 183 (1986). It 
might also be contended that the inclusion of an article on self-determination is merely 
an example of the development of a "collective" approach to human rights already 
manifest in economic, social and cultural rights. Marie J-B-, "Les Pactes Internationaux 
Relatifs Aux Droits, De LHomme Confirment- Es L'Inspiration De La Declaration 
Universelle? ", 3 H. R. J. 397 (1970); also "Relations Between Peoples'Rights and 
Human Rights: Semantic and Methodological Distinctions", 7 H. R. L. J., 195, (1986). 
This argument, however, can be criticised on the basis that all the other rights in the 
covenants (including that of minorities) relate to the individual. 
The yugoslavian representative attempted to establish an individual facet to the 
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A certain number of suggestions were made to reconcile the two 
conflicting camps of opinion. For example proposals were made for a declaration on self-determination, or that it should be contained in a 
protocol and annexed to the covenants, or even that a third covenant 
should be drafted on the subject to be opened for signature at the same 
time as the other covenants. 176 The lobby preferring to include an 
article on self-determination were however not to be dissuaded and forced the issue by sheer weight of numbers. 177 
Following a proposal from the Chilean representative in 1952, the 
Commission added a clause to the article stating that the right to self- 
determination "shall also include permanent sovereignty over their 
natural resources". 178 The reasoning was that states should be able to 
exercise control over their own natural resources albeit through a 
process of expropriation. Such a provision was deemed to be necessary 
since political independence was considered to depended to an extent 
upon economic independence. 179 This provision which finally became 
article 1(2)180 forged a link between self-determination and 
development issues and can be seen as a forerunner of the later moves 
concept, he proposed an amendment stating that "the right of peoples to 
self-determination shall include the right of every person to participate in action to 
assure or maintain the free exercise of that right", UN Doc. E/CN. 4/L. 22/Rev. 1, at 7-8, 
para. 65,14 UN ES COR, Supp. (No. 4), (195 1). This was rejected by the slightest 
margin of six votes to six with six abstentions. There seems to have been considerable 
support therefore for individual remedies, see Buchheit, supra, note 167, at 8 1. 
Cassese contends that "internal self-determination... is the synthesis and summa 
of civil and political rights, " ibid. However it has been argued that it is more than just a 
collection of the other rights in that "it goes one step further than individual human 
rights in that it grants to a group those rights necessary to the preservation of a group 
identity". VvUte, supra, note 167, at 168. Nevertheless it is stressed that this must not 
imply any form of hierarchy in the rights, see Triggs G., "Peoples' Rights and 
Individual Rights: Conflict or Harmony? " in Crawford J. (ed) The Rights of Pegples, 
141(1988). 
176 UN Doc. A/3077, supra, note 88, at 34, paras. 41-44. 
177 Axticle one of both Covenants was finally adopted by 33 votes to 12, with 
13 abstentions. 
178 UN Doc-E/CNAIL-24, (1952). This aspect of self-determination has been 
termed "economic self-determination", see Umozurike, supra, note 167,205-224. 
Green has commented that the inclusion of this provision "clearly reflected the historic 
conflict between the underdeveloped and developed countries over the issue of 
expropriation of private property", supra, note 21, at 689. 
179 UN Doc. E/2256, at 5-6, paras. 45-46,14 UN ESCOR, Supp-(No-4), 
(1952). Urnozurike comments in this vein that "political self-determination 
is-incomplete without economic self-determination". Supra, note 167, at 224. 
180 The General Assembly acknowledged this aspect of the right to self- 
determination in, GA Resn. 1314 (XIII), (Dec. 12 1958), 13 UN GAOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. 18), at 27 (1958). 
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to create a New International Economic Order (NIEO)181 and a right to development. 182 
It was argued however that the term "permanent sovereignty" was 
meaningless as states were free to limit their sovereignty as they wished. 
Moreover the developed States contended that the provision would 
sanction unwarranted expropriation or confiscation of foreign property 
without just compensation and might jeopardise international 
agreements. 183 Accordingly a general limitation clause184 was included 
stating that the principle should operate "without prejudice to any 
obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based 
upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law". Thus the 
intention seems to have been to subject expropriation under this 
provision to the current rules of international law. 185 
However Article 25 ICESCR was subsequently adopted which 
states that "Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as 
impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and 
freely their natural wealth and resources". 186 This seems to merely 
restate the principle found in article 2(1) without the concomitant 
reference to international law. It has been suggested nevertheless that 
this does not alter the requirements of article 1 in any substantial 
way. 187 
The provision on self-determination was finally adopted by the 
Third Committee by 33 votes to 12 with 13 abstentions and included as 
article 1 in both Covenants. The question had been raised whether the 
181 GA Resn. 3201 (S-VI), (May 1 1974), 13 I. L. M. 715 (1974). A series of 
General Assembly Resolutions have dealt with the international economic issues related 
to development, beginning with the resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources in 1962, GA Resn. 1803 (XVH), (Dec. 14 1962), 17 UN GAOR, 
Resns, Supp. (No. 17), at 15 (1962). Most recently is the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States, GA Resn. 3281 (XXIX), (Dec. 12 1974), 29 GAOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. 31), at 50 (1974). On the status of these resolutions see Texaco v. Libya (1977) 53 I. L. R. 389. 
182 Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Resn. 41/128 (Dec. 4 1986) 
supra, note 142. See, Baxi U.,, "The New International Economic Order, Basic Needs 
and Rights: Notes Towards Development of the Right to Development", 23 Ind. J. I. L., 
225(1983). 
183 UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 67, at 15, paras. 19-21. 
184 It is interpreted by Cassese in this light. Supra, note 159,103-4. 
185 It is thought that the current standard at the time was for "prompt, adequate 
and effective" compensation. These traditional elements of compensation were not 
challenged until the 1960's. 
186 Cf. Article 47 ICCPR. 
187 Dinstein, supra, note 168, at 110- 111. 
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provision should have been included in both Covenants or only one of 
them. If in both, it was further asked whether its meaning differed between them. 188 
E) PROPOSED ADDITIONAL CLAUSES 
In considering the draft Covenant, ECOSOC asked the General 
Assembly to make a policy decision on the desirabidity of including a 
special article on the application of the Covenant to Non-Self-Governing 
and Trust Territories. 189 The General Assembly adopted a resolution 
directing the Commission to include a territorial provision or "colonial 
clause" in the Covenant extending application of the Covenant to Trust 
and Non-Self-Governing Territories. 190 Although such a provision was 
drafted, the Third Committee decided in 1960 that the suggested 
territorial clause ("colonial clause") should be deleted from the final 
draft on the basis that the concept of colonial subjugation had been 
declared illegal by the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples. 191 This contrasts strongly with the fate 
of the "federal clause" which eventually became article 28 of the 
Covenant. Although it was agreed that the absence of a "territorial 
clause" did not relieve an administering state from the duty to extend 
the provisions of the Covenant to all its dependent territories, by failing 
to stipulate that fact means that the obligation is deprived of any 
effective legal force. It is highly likely nonetheless that even with a 
territorial clause, States would be prepared to enter reservations as to 
the application of the Covenant to dependent territories. 
Proposals for the inclusion of a reservations clause suffered a 
similar fate. Although the question was discussed by the Commission, 
no agreement was possible. The matter was referred to the General 
188 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/649, (1952). Chile for example argued that if self- 
determination was included in the ICCPR it would apply to countries that had lost their 
independence; alternatively if it was included in the ICESCR "it would relate to under- 
developed countries that did not have full control over their natural resources". The 
majority position finally was that the article should apply equally to all peoples. 
Equally that there was no reference to different meanings for each of the two 
articles it is assumed that they are identical in this respect. The comments of the Human 
Rights Committee on the subject are of relevance then to the ICESCR. 
189 ECOSOC Resn. 303 I (XI), supra, note 103. 
190 GA Resn. 422 (V), (Dec. 4 1950), 5 UN GAOR, Resns, Supp. (No. 20), at 
42 (1950). This was included in the text of the Covenant, despite the vigorous 
opposition of the administering powers, by the Commission at its tenth session in 
1954. However it was subsequently deleted by the General Assembly Tbird Committee 
in 1966, UN Doc. A/6546,21 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 62), (1966). 
191 GA Resn. 1514 (XV), (Dec. 14 1960), 15 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), at 66 
(1960). 
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Assembly. After some debate in the Third Committee, it was considered 
that the general principles of international law were sufficiently clear 
that it was unnecessary to include an article on reservations. 192 
At certain points in the drafting of the Covenant, a proposal to include an article on the right of property was discussed. A draft article based upon article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
put forward, 193 but serious disagreement arose over the issues of 
expropriation and compensation. After the rejection of a working group 
proposal, it was decided to postpone sine die consideration of the 
question. 194 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the proposal was 
that, despite having strong roots in the Western natural rights tradition, 
the article should be proposed for inclusion in the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Had it been included, it might 
have been associated more with claims for land rights than with the idea 
of freedom from expropriation. 
F) GENERAL OR SPECIFIC PROVISIONS 
During the drafting process, an argument that underlay much of 
the Commission's and Third Committee's debates, was whether or not 
the provisions of the ICESCR should be outlined in general or specific 
terms. Broadly speaking there was awareness that provisions should not 
be so general as to deprive the instrument of any coherent obligation, 
and not be so specific as to limit the scope of the instrument and render 
it obsolete a few years thereafter. However, there was considerable 
difference of opinion over the amount of detail to be included in each 
provision. 
Those States that advocated more general provisions (the Western 
States) often argued that specific provisions might restrict the scope of 
the articles, 195 and may well conflict with the standards established by 
the specialised agencies (particularly the ILO). 196 Indeed, it seems to 
have been assumed that the specialised agencies would be central to the 
supervision system, and would themselves provide more detailed 
192 See UN Doc. A/C. 3AL. 1353/Rev. 1 and 2, (UK proposal for an additional 
article relating to the question of reservations). 
193 Proposal of the US: UN Doc. E/CN. 4/L. 313, (1949). 
194 Although the constituent parts of the Sub-Committee proposal were agreed 
upon, the text as a whole was rejected by seven votes to six with five abstentions. 
195 See e. g. opposition to the proposal to include a partial definition of article 9, 
Simarsian (USA), E/CNA/SR-282, at 13 (1952); Juvigny (France), Wd. 
196See e. g. Elliot (UK),, A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 143, para. 26 (1956); see also, 
Pickford (ILO), E/CNA/SR. 282, at 8 (1952). 
39 
standards at a later stage. 197 Other States however, whilst not disputing 
the putative role of the specialised agencies, argued that the Covenant, 
as a binding human rights instrument, should at least provide more detailed and precise standards than those found in the Universal 
Declaration. 198 If otherwise, the Covenant would be open to conflicting 
and subjective interpretations which would undermine its 
effectiveness. 199 
Whilst the Covenant is considerably more detailed than some States desired, it still remains fairly general in its terms. On certain 
occasions, this was merely a result of a failure to agree on appropriate 
terminology. On other occasions, there was a tendency to discuss 
questions of implementation at the expense of more detailed 
consideration of the normative content. It is noticeable moreover, that 
even where agreement was achieved as to the inclusion of more detailed 
standards they were accompanied by more restrictive limitations. 200 
G) MEASURES OF IMPLEMENTATION2-0-1 
The question of implementation was seen as being of primary 
importance as early as 1946. Following the recommendation of the 
Nuclear Conu-nission, ECOSOC expressed the view that the purposes of 
the United Nations "can only be fulfilled if provisions are made for the 
implementation of human rights and of an international bill of 
rights". 202 The Commission accordingly began to consider the question 
197 This is indicated in particular, by the inclusion of article 8(3) which refers to 
ILO Convention No. 87. 
198 See e. g. Abdel-Ghani (Egypt), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 143, para. 20 (1956). 
199 See e. g. Shoham-Sharon (Israel), A/C. 3/SR. 728, at 235, para-1 (1957). 
200 See e. g. the inclusion of article 8(2). Below, Chapter 7. 
201 See generally Sohn, supra, note 21, at 120-169; Schwelb E., "Notes on the 
Early I., egislative History of the Measures of Implementation of the Human Rights 
Covenants", in M61ang-es Modinos 270 (1968); Schwelb E., "Some Aspects of the 
International Covenants on Human Rights of December 1966" in Eide A. and Schou 
A. (eds), International Protection of Human Rights 103 (1968); Schwelb E., "Some 
Aspects of the Measures of Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights", 1, H. R. J. 
', 
363 (1968); Capotord F., "The International 
Measures of Implementation Included in the Covenants on Human Rights Proceedings" 
in Eide A. and Schou. A. (eds), International Protection of Human Rights, 132 (1967); 
Starr R., "International Protection of Human Rights and the United Nations 
Covenants", 4 Wisc.. L. Rev., 862 (1967). 
202 ECOSOC Resn. 9 (11), (June 21 1946), 2 ESCOR, 400-2, (1946). 
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of implementation in its first session, 203 and fortned a working group 
on implementation to discuss the matter at its second session. 204 At the 
adoption of the UDHR the General Assembly implicitly endorsed this 
view by deciding that the drafting of the covenant and measures of implementation should be given priority in the Commission's work. 
At the Commission's fifth session in 1949, a number of 
suggestions were made on the question of implementation. Proposals 
were put forward, inter alia, for the establishment of an International 
Court of Human Rights, a special Commission with authority to receive 
petitions from individuals, and a panel of experts to review inter-state 
complaints on an ad hoc basis. 205 The USSR in particular objected to 
such international implementation mechanisms which it considered to 
undermine the sovereignty of states. It suggested instead a system of 
measures to ensure that human rights are guaranteed by the state itself. 
Nevertheless a majority of the Commission agreed upon the necessity of 
some form of international supervision with the possibility of inter-state 
petitions. Opinion was divided however over the issue of individual 
complaint procedures. In light of the disagreements, the Commission 
decided to submit a questionnaire on implementation206 and the 
proposals to governments for their comments. 
At its sixth session207 in 1950 the Commission continued with its 
consideration of the mechanisms of implementation. It decided on the 
establishment of a permanent human rights committee with provision 
for inter-state (but not individuaJ208) complaints. 209 It would seem 
however that such machinery was considered to be applicable primarily 
203 The Commission had before it at this stage proposals from a number of 
states including one from Australia suggesting the establishment of an International 
Court of Human Rights with original and appellate jurisdiction, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/15,1 
- 
2, (1947). 
204 The Worldng Group on Implementation drafted a proposal for a Standing 
Committee with power to collect information, receive petitions, and submit unresolved 
disputes to the ICJ, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/53, (1947), UN Doc. E/600, supra, note 49, at 
33-53. 
205 In addition to these proposals from Australia, France and the UK, 
Guatemala suggested the establishment of a Commission within each state and a 
Conciliation Committee mandated with the review of individual petitions with final 
recourse to the International Court of Justice. Ibid, Annex III. 
206 The questionnaire was drafted by the Secretary-General and then amended 
by the Commission before referral to governments. Ibid. Annex III, pt. 111. 
207 UN Doc. E/1681, supra, note 71. 
208 The suggestion for NGO petitions was rejected by 7 votes to 4 with 3 
abstentions; that of individuals by 8 votes to 3 with 3 abstentions. 
209 Supra, note 71. 
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to civil and political rights, as the issue of whether economic, social and 
cultural rights should be included in a single covenant had not been 
resolved. 210 
This view was reinforced when, despite being instructed by the 
General Assembly to draft a single covenant including the whole range 
of rights, the Commission proceeded to draft a number of articles 
outlining a system of state reporting under UN supervision211, which 
appeared to appertain solely to economic, social and cultural rights. 212 
Faced with the unwieldy prospect of having a "covenant within a 
covenant"213 (in the sense of having two separate implementation 
systems), it became somewhat inevitable that the provisions be separated 
into two covenants. It was primarily the question of implementation that 
induced ECOSOC to request in resolution 384 C (X][II)214 that the draft 
Covenant be divided into two separate instruments. As has been noted 
above, this recommendation was eventually endorsed by the General 
Assembly. 
Nevertheless discussion of whether the Human Rights Committee 
procedure should apply to economic, social and cultural rights 
continued despite the division of covenant. Two proposals were 
submitted at the Commission's tenth session for the application of such a 
procedure to selected economic, social and cultural rights. 215 Doubts 
were expressed about the capability of the Committee to exercise its 
quasi-judicial functions with regard to rights that were of a 
programmatic nature. 216 The suggestions were also opposed by the 
210 Schwelb, "Notes", supra, note 201, at 275, n. 19. 
211 For a discussion of the rejection of the ILO proposal see below, text 
accompanying notes 232-235. 
212 Much of the discussion centred around the role of the specialised agencies 
in the reporting process suggesting that it was tailor-made for economic, social and 
cultural rights, E/CN. 4/SR. 218,237-8,241-3,236-7, (1951). Similarly the question 
of whether the petition procedure should apply to only the civil and political rights was 
to be decided at a later stage, ibid, Annex 1, pt. IV. 
213 Humphrey, supra, note 21, at 144. 
214 UN Doc. E/2152, at 36,13 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1), (1952). 
215 For the French proposal see, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/L. 338 (1954), 18 ESCOR, 
Supp. (No. 7), UN Doc. 2573, para. 216, (1954). It was suggested that the States 
Parties might be given the opportunity of accepting the Human Rights Committee's 
complaints procedure for specific economic, social or cultural rights as they so desired. 
Such a procedure would be subject to reciprocal agreement by the States concerned. 
216 Not only was it considered that there was a lack of criteria to evaluate state 
compliance, it was argued that: 
"Complaints relating to that covenant could only refer to insufficient 
programmes in the attainment of certain goals and it would be 
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Specialised Agencies who considered that they were technically better 
qualified to implement economic, social and cultural rights, and such a 
procedure would only lead to duplication of work. 217 As with the 
proposal to authorise ECOSOC to receive individual petitions, 218 the 
suggestions were withdrawn before being taken to vote. 219 
The Third Committee then turned to the question of the 
implementation of the Covenants in the following year at the eighteenth 
session. 220 To aid it in this task, the Secretary-General had compiled an 
explanatory paper on measures of implementation as directed by the 
General Assembly. 221 The review continued at the twenty-first session 
where there was general agreement as to the system of implementation 
suggested by the Commission on Human Rights. 222 
At this late stage the US and Italy put forward amendments 
providing for the establishment of an expert committee to review the 
State reports. 223 These were largely based upon the measures recently 
adopted for the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
impossible for the committee to determine what the rate of progress in 
any particular case should be. " 
UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 67, at 124, para. 41. 
217 Ibid, para. 40. However it was stressed by the proponents of the suggested 
mechanism that in case of overlap the Specialised Agencies would have pnonty. 
Moreover not all the rights in the Covenant were covered by the Specialised Agencies, 
nor would all States Parties to the Covenant be members of the Agencies, ibid, 
para. 42. 
218 The proposal was subsequent to a General Assembly draft resolution 
submitted to the Commission by resolution 737 B (VIR) proposing that the 
Commission draft provisions recognising the right of petition of groups of individuals 
and NGOs. 
219 See, UN Doc. E/2573, supra, note 83, at 21-22. 
220 UN Doc. A/5365, supra, note 92, at 14-25. 
221 GA Resn. 1843 B (XVII), (Dec. 19 1962), 17 UN GAOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. 17), at 35 (1962). For the Explanatory Paper see, UN Doc. A/5411 and 
Add. 1 
-2,18 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 48), 1-13 (1963). 
222 UN Doc. A/6546, supra, note 190, at 7-26. 
223 For the US proposal see, A/C. 3/SR. 1401, at 9-10, paras 13-14 (1966). It 
proposed that the reports should be considered by a "Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights" consisting of independent experts elected by States Parties. It is 
considered that the independence of the proposed Committee and the fact it would have 
drawn on expert individuals from States Parties and not ECOSOC as a whole, were 
matters that recommended the proposal, see Alston P., "The United Nations' 
Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights", 18 Columb. J. Trans. L, 91 (1979). 
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Forms of Racial Discrimination. 224 To an extent the opposition to the 
US proposal was a reaction to the recent opinion of the International Court of Justice in the South West Africa Cases. 225 Following that 
decision, in the developing world at least, such "expert" bodies were to 
some extent discredited. The majority resisted the proposal on the 
grounds that it would unduly restrict ECOSOC's discretion as the main 
supervisory body and that it would encroach upon the work of the 
Specialised Agencies in the area of economic, social and cultural rights. 
In light of the disagreement the proposals were subsequently withdrawn 
before going to the vote. It was specifically recognised nevertheless that 
the withdrawal of the amendments would not prevent ECOSOC 
establishing in future "such other Conunissions as may be required for 
the performance of its functions". 226 This might include the 
establishment of such an expert committee if it was considered 
necessary for the administration of the reporting system. 227 
H) THE ROLE OF THE SPECIALISM AGENCIES. 
The ILO, UNESCO, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) played an important role 
in the drafting of the International Bill of Human Rights and 
particularly the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 228 This was in part due to the effectiveness of their 
lobbying systeM229 and to the natural part they played in the 
implementation of human rights. 230 Each of the organisations submitted 
224 GA Resn. 2106, (Dec. 21 1965), 20 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 14), (1965). 
660 U. N. T. S. 195. 
225. South West Africa Cases', Second Phase, (1966) ICJ Rep. 6. The ICJ 
decided that individual members of the League of Nations had no legal standing to 
enforce the terms of South Africa's mandate over South West Africa. 
226 Article 68 UN Charter. 
227 Cf. Rumbos (Venezuela), A/C. 3/SR. 1399, at 126, para. 12 (1966). 
228 See generally, Alston, supra, note 223, at 79-92; Humphrey, supra, note 
21, at 141-149. 
229 See, Humphrey, supra, note 21, at 85. 
230 "Human Rights are not a separate part of the activities of the International 
Labour Organisation (ELO), but lie at the very heart of its mission". Wolf F., "Human 
Rights and the International Labour Organisation", in Meron T. (ed) Human Rights in 
International Law 273 (1985); see also, Jenks C., "The International Protection of 
Trade Union Rights" in Luard E. (ed), The International Protection of Human Riehts, 
210 (1957); Landy E., The Effectiveness of International SupLryýision: T'hilly Years of 
ILO EXDerience, (1966); Valticos N., "The Role of the ILO: Present Action and Future 
Perspectives", in Ramcharan B. (ed), Human Rights lljýy Years After the Universal 
Declaration, 211 (1979). The 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia as incorporated into the 
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detailed proposals for articles within their respective fields of operation 
and attended the relevant drafting sessions. 231 
The ELO, being somewhat resistant to any interference in the 
scope of its jurisdiction, initially resisted the inclusion of economic and 
social rights in the Covenant. 232 When this became an inevitable 
outcome, it argued that the provisions should be drafted only in a 
general form. 233 Again with regard to implementation, it stressed the 
necessity of preserving the primacy of the ILO procedures in relation to 
economic and social rights. In 1951, it actually proposed an 
implementation system in which the ELO itself would review the state 
ELO Constitution (annex H(a)) recognises the principle that "all human beings, 
irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue their material well-being and 
their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security 
and equal opportunity. " 15 UNTS. 35; amended 7 UST. 245. 
The Constitution of UNESCO similarly states that the purpose of the Organisation is to: 
"contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the 
nations through education, science and culture in order to further 
universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the 
world... by the Charter of the United Nations. " 
UNESCO Constitution Art. 1(l), 4 UNTS 275. See generally, Saba H., "UNESCO 
and Human Rights" in Vasak K. and Alston P. (ed), The International Dimensions 
Human Rights 401 (1982); Marks S. 9 "UNESCO and Human Rights: The Implementation of Rights Relating to Education, Science, Culture and Communication" 
13 Tex. I. L. J., 35 (1977); UNESCO Secretariat, "UNESCO and the Challenges of 
Today and Tomorrow: Universal Affirmation of Human Rights" in Ramcharan B. (ed), 
Human Rights ThiM Years After the Universal Declaration, 197 (1979); Alston P., 
"UNESCO's Procedures for Dealing with Human Rights Violations", 20 Santa Clara 
L. R., 665 (1980). 
Paragraph 3 of the preamble to the WHO Constitution states that "the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every 
human being". The constitution of the FAO makes no direct reference to human rights, 
but paragraph 1 of its preamble envisages the improvement of the "common welfare" 
through higher nutrition levels and living standards. 14 UNTS 185. 
231 From the records of the Commission sessions it is apparent that the ILO 
was initially the most involved (having attended from the first Commission session), 
UNESCO became involved at a later stage. The WHO and FAO, despite submitting 
proposals, seemingly did not become significantly involved in the debate at any stage. 
232 Alston, supra, note 223, at 84. It has been argued that the ILO was 
motivated by a desire to be the principle organ in the promotion of economic and social 
rights. See, Humphrey, supra, note 21, at 12 and 141. 
233 The ILO in this respect fell into one of two schools of thought: 
"One school held that each article should be a brief clause of a general 
character-, another school was of the opinion that each right, its scope 
and substance, its limitations, as well as the obligations of the State in 
respect thereof, should be drafted with the greatest precision. " 
UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 67, at 8, para. 13. It would seem that the ICESCR 
contains a mixture of these approaches. Compare for example Article 9 and Article 13. 
45 
reports. 234 Given that the Covenant deals with issues that extend beyond 
the competence of the ELO, it is appropriate that this proposal was 
re ected in favour of the Secretariat draft. 235 
The other Specialised Agencies did not share the view of the ELO 
in this respect. Not only did they actively encourage the addition of 
certain provisionS236 but also desired that they be given sufficient 
specificity. 237 However as regards implementation, like the ELO, they 
also expressed concern about their jurisdiction. 238 Thus although in 
principle UNESCO called for the "speediest and fullest possible 
implementation of human rights in matters of education and culture". 239 
it was opposed to the creation of an expert committee to review state 
reports. 
The role of the Specialised Agencies in the drafting of the 
Covenant was thus extremely mixed. The duality of their position in 
supporting the human rights initiatives at the same time as attempting to 
preserve their exclusive jurisdictional competence, meant that full 
cooperation was never possible. 240 
234 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/AC. 14/1, (195 1). 
235 The Secretariat plan for implementation was inspired by the technical 
assistance program and "the idea that it was better to help goverm-nents to fulfU their 
obligations than to penalise them for violations", Humphrey, supra, note 21, at 143. 
236 See e. g. the fact that UNESCO favoured the inclusion of an article on 
compulsory primary education was considered influential in its adoption. UN 
Doc. A/2929, supra, note 67, at 114, para. 5 1. 
237 The Secretary-General commented with regard to Article 13 on the right to 
health: 
"In the drafting of the text of article 13, which is more detailed than the 
preceding articles, consideration was given to the attitude of the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), which favoured the inclusion in the article 
of a certain degree of detail. " 
UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 67, at 111, para. 33. A similar comment was made on 
article 14 in relation to UNESCO, IiiL at 112, para. 36. 
238 The ILO, FAO, WHO and UNESCO all had existing reporting procedures 
in their respective fields. For a comparison of the different agency reporting 
mechanisms see, UN Doc. A/5411 and Add. 1-2, supra, note 221, paras. 1-82. 
239 UN Doc. A/2907,10 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 28), Pt. 1, at 2, 
(1955). 
240 The respect given to the Specialised Agencies with regard to their work is 
well reflected in the ICESCR. Not only do they figure substantially in the provisions 
on implementation (articles 16-23), but article 24 provides that "Nothing in the present 
Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions... of the constitutions of the 
specialised agencies... in regard to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant. "
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I) APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS DURING THE DRAFTING 
PROCESS 
Many of the disputes that arose during the drafting of the 
Covenant were underpinned by political and ideological conflicts. To a 
great extent, the whole question of human rights was used as a means of 
pursuing the controversies between East and West, and between North 
and South. This is evidenced by the quite discrete approaches to human 
rights displayed by the different political groupings. 
Broadly speaking, three main groupings of States have been 
identified: the Western States, the Socialist States and the Developing 
States. Categorisation of States into these three groups is something of a 
generalisation as it assumes an ideological homogeneity over a wide 
range of issues. It also has to be noted that States' policy did not remain 
consistent over the period of the drafting. During that twenty year 
period, both domestic changes (such as changes in government) and 
external changes (such as the shifts in the balance of power within the 
United Nations241) affected the external policies of most States. 
It is difficult to identify a coherent approach as regards the 
developing States (or Third World StateS242). Not only did the majority 
of such states only emerge onto the international scene during the 
second decade of drafting, but it is by definition a heterogenous 
body. 243 However, there is no doubt that the newly-independent African 
and Asian States did exercise a certain amount of influence in the 
development of human rights. This is seen particularly by the emphasis 
on problems of colonialism and racism244 which manifested itself, in 
human rights terms, in the inclusion of an article on self-determination 
in the Covenants and the Convention on Racial Discrmi-nination. 245 Such 
States generally supported the inclusion of economic, social and cultural 
241 See, Green J., "Changing Approaches to Human Rights: The United 
Nations, 1954 and 1974", 12 Tex. I. L. J.. 223 (1977). 
242 The use of the term the "Third World" is not without its problems. Gros 
Espiel comments that the ambiguity of the term ff complicates to a high degree all 
analysis of the evolution of human rights classified under this term". Gros Espiel H. 
The Evolving Concept of Human Rights: Western, Socialist and Third World 
Approaches", in Ramcharan B. (ed) Human Rights ThiM Years After the Universal 
Declaration, 41, at 48 (1979). 
243 Tyagi Y., "Third World Response to Human Rights", 21 Ind. J. I. L., 119, 
at 137 (1981). 
244 Vincent R., Human Rights and International Relations, 80 (1986). 
245 GA Resn. 2106 (XX), supra, note 224. 
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rights within the Covenant, and as such associated themselves with the 
position of the socialist States. 246 
The Latin American States however, took a view distinct from 
that of their African and Asian counterparts. 247 They were strong 
advocates of including human rights provisions in the UN Charter248 
and pushed for the drafting of a bill of rights. They are said to have had 
a "fully-fledged" natural rights conception which made no distinction 
between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural 
rights. 249This is illustrated by their insistence on the inclusion of 
economic, social and cultural rights in the UDHR and the Covenant. 
Similarly they argued for the retention of a single Covenant250 
implicitly necessitating identical implementation procedures. 
The Westem States in comparison advocated a 
"liberal-democratic" conception of human rights emphasising individual 
liberty and governmental restraint. In the drafting process they 
accordingly argued for a minimum catalogue of "traditional" civil and 
political rights. When faced with the inevitable fact of economic, social 
and cultural rights they pushed for the separation of the rights into two 
covenants. Opposition to "new" rights also manifested itself in the 
Western Powers objections to an article on self-determination. This was 
particularly apparent in relation to the old colonial powers such as 
Belgium and the UK. Their position however shifted during the period 
of drafting, from one of outright opposition to acceptance of the idea in 
so far as it underlined the necessity for representative and democratic 
government. 251 
On the question of implementation the Western States varied quite 
widely in their views. Although the majority supported in principle 
strong international implementation procedures, they were not willing 
to go as far as the establishment of an Intemational Court of Human 
Rights as proposed by Australia. 
246 Cassese sees this as being the position as far as Self-Determination is 
concerned. Supra, note 156; Vincent, supra, note 244, at 77. Contra, Morphet, supra, 
note 159, at 69. 
247 Gros Espiel, supra, note 242, at 49. 
248 Supra text accompanying note 29. 
249 Morsink, supra, note 9; Tolley, supra, note 21. 
250 De Alba (Mexico), A/C. 3/SR. 360, at 81, para. 44 (1951); Valenzuela 
(Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 362, at 93, para. 49 (1951). This was not the view of the Third 
World as a whole however. D'Souza (India), E/C. 3/SR. 36 1, at 86, para. 31 (195 1), 
and MaU (Lebanon), E/C. 3/SR. 370, at 139, para. 36-40 (1951), both took the 
Western view and advocated the separation of the rights into two covenants. 
251 See, Pomerance, supra, note 166, at 38-39. 
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The position of the US, although generally similar to that of the European States, was dominated by internal politics. Although the US 
was at the forefront of international concern over human rights during 
the Presidency of Roosevelt and up to the adoption of the UDHR, 252 in 
the early 1950's, internal political pressureS253 spearheaded by the 
Bricker Amendment movement254 lead to a change in US Policy 
regarding the Human Rights Covenants. Accordingly in 1953, IF 
Dulles announced that the US government "did not intend to become a Party to any such covenant or present it as a treaty for consideration by 
the Senate". 255 In the following period until about 1960, the US became 
252 Falk R., "Ideological Patterns in the United States Human Rights Debate: 
1945-197811, in Hevener (ed), The Dynamics of Human Rights in US Foreign Policy, 
29, at 33 (1981). 
253 It is thought that a substantive and an institutional concern were operative 
here. The substantive concern was about the increasing US involvement 
internationally. The onset of the Cold War marginalised human rights issues and 
increased concern about the US domestic jurisdiction. The institutional concern was 
over the distribution of power between the federal government and the constituent States. See, Kaufman N. and Whiteman D., "Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in 
the US Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment", 10 Hum. Rts. Q., 309, at 312- 
318 (1988). This issue had recently been brought to life by the decision of the lower 
court in Sei Fujii v. California, 217 P. 2nd 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) where it was 
found that the VN Charter was equal in rank to any federal statute and therefore 
superseded state legislation. See, Buergenthal T., "The US and International Human 
Rights", 9 H. R. L. J., 141 (1988). 
254 The Bricker Amendment sought to amend the US Constitution to make it 
impossible for the US to adhere to the Covenants. Principally it would have eliminated 
self-executing treaties so that an Act of Congress would be necessary for the provisions 
to become part of domestic law. This would entail that Congress would be unable to 
implement a treaty unless that legislation would have been within the powers of 
Congress in absence of a treaty. Implicitly then the decision of the Supreme Court in 
NEssouri v. Holland 
, 
252 U. S. 416 (1920) which maintained executive treaty-making 
power over State concerns, would be reversed. See, Henkin "'International Concern' 
and the Treaty Power of the United States", 63 272, (1969). Buergenthal, 
supra, note 253, at 145-152. 
It is sometimes suggested that the Bricker Amendment was the result of a 
general fear that eventually human rights treaties would deal with the condition of 
blacks in the US. Ferguson C., "The United Nations Human Rights Covenants: 
Problems of Ratification and lanplementation", 62 Proc. Am. Soc. I. L, 83, at 91 (1968). 
255 Dulles J., Hearings, Subcom., Senate Judiciary Comm., 83rd Cong., lst 
Sess., at 824 (1953). See Blaustein J., "Human Rights: A Challenge to the United 
Nations and To our Generation", in Cordier A. (ed), The Quest For Peace, 315, (1962); 
Green, supra, note 21, at 699-705. it It was considered that a treaty was not the proper and most effective way to 
spread throughout the world the goals of human liberty". The US committed itself to a 
policy of "persuasion, education and example rather than formal undertakings which 
commit one part of the world to impose its particular social and moral standards upon 
another part of the world community". As part of this new initiative the US outlined 
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overtly unwilling to compromise its domestic jurisdiction, 256 and its 
participation in the drafting process seriously decreased. It is thought 
that the disinterestedness of the US was instrumental in the acceptance 
of the USSR position on two provisions, the right to property and the federal state clause. 257 It was not until the early 1960's (an era of 
"expansive liberalism"258), that the US once again took up the human 
rights cause, by which time much of the drafting had already been 
concluded. 259 
The Socialist States (primarily of Central and Eastern Europe260) 
tended to view human rights in terms of the individual within society. 
That philosophy considered that rights are acquired not be reason of a 
person's humanity but as a citizen or social being. The individual in this 
sense is not in competition with the State but is endowed with rights and 
duties by the State. 261 ýffie corollary of this philosophy is that emphasis 
is placed upon economic, social and cultural rights as being essential to 
what it termed a Human Rights Action Program. This consisted of three programmes: a 
reporting system for those rights found in the UDHR, a system of special studies, and 
a system of advisory services in the field of human rights. The action program was 
taken up by the UN and has formed part of its work in the field of human rights since. 
256 Its policy on implementation at the time was one of inter-state procedures. It 
had previously supported the idea of individual petitions, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/21, at 95 (1947), and later returned to such a policy. 
257 Looper R., "Federal State Clauses in Multilateral Instruments", 32 
B. Y. I. L., 163, at 197 (1955-6). 
258 Falk, supra, note 252, at 33. 
259 The US has nevertheless still failed to ratify either of the Covenants. 
Several human rights treaties have been submitted to the Senate for ratification 
including the Covenants but approval has not often been forthcoming. See McChesney 
A-, "Should the US Ratify the Covenants? A Question of Merits, not of Constitutional 
Law" 62 A. J. I. L. 912 (1968); Buergenthal, supra, note 254, at 152-163. The US has 
however recently ratified the Genocide Convention, see 80 A. J. I. L., 612 (1986). It is 
thought that the constitutional issues that surrounded the Bricker Amendment are still 
alive presenting strong opposition to ratification of human rights treaties as a whole. 
See, Kaufman and Whitman, supra, note 253, at 309. In addition it is unlikely that 
there will be sufficient domestic support for the ICESCR given the ideological 
opposition to such rights within the US. See, Howell J., "Socioeconomic Dilemmas of 
US Human Rights Policy", 3 Hum. Rts. Q., 78 (1981); Good M., "Freedom From 
Want: The Failure of United States Courts to Protect Subsistence Rights", 6 
Hum. Rts. 
_Q., 
335 (1984). 
M Yugoslavia however quickly made clear its non-aligned position. 
261 See generally, Rees A., "The Soviet Union", in Vincent R. (ed), Foreign 
Policy and Human Rights, 61 (1986); Przetacznik,, supra,, note , at 239-25 1; 
KartashIdn V., "The S-ocialist Countries and Human Rights", in Vasak K and Alston 
P. (eds), The InternatiQnal Dimensions of Human Rights,, 631 (1982). 
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uae establishment of the Socialist consciousness. 262 'Me Socialist States 
thus fought for the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights in 
the Covenants and the UDHR, presenting an ideological opposition to 
the West at the level of human rights. 
Following the US abstention from proceedings in 1953 the USSR 
exercised considerable influence over the drafting process. The overt 
effects of its policy can be seen in the position adopted regarding the 
Federal State and Colonial Clauses. 263 Similarly the inclusion of the 
provision on Self-determination was a matter strongly advocated by the 
Socialist States generally. 264 
With regard to implementation, the Socialist States'position was 
characterised by two propositions. 265 First they considered human 
rights as matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of States 
in accordance with article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 266 Secondly they 
considered that States were the only real subjects of international law. 
Thus although the Socialist States were willing to comply with a 
reporting procedure at a State level, they resisted any fonn of 
complaints procedure especially those, relating to individuals. 
IV) A DISRUPTED DRAFTING PROCESS 
Many of the imperfections in the final text of the Covenant may 
be put down to the confused and disrupted nature of the drafting 
process. The text of the Covenant was drafted first by the Commission 
262 Rees, ibid, at 62. 
263 No exception is made in either Covenant for the application of the 
provisions to Federal States or Colonial Territories. It is interesting to note that the 
USSR itself was a federal state. 
264 The Soviet view on self-determination was to consider it as applying solely 
to colonial territories, see above note 167. 
265 See, Tedin K., '"Ibe Development of The Soviet Attitude Toward 
Implementing Human Rights Under the UN Charter", 5 H. R. J., 399 (1972); 
Korowicz M., "Protection and Implementation of Human Rights Within the Soviet 
Legal System", 53 Proc. Am. Soc. I. L., 248 (1959); Jhabvala F., "The Soviet-Bloc's 
View of the Implementation of Human Rights Accords", 7 Hum. Rts. Q., 461 (1985). 
266 The issue is one of general interest, see e. g. Fawcett J., "Human Rights 
and Domestic Jurisdiction", in Luard E. (ed), ne International Protection of Human 
Rights, 286 (1957); Bossuyt M., "Human Rights and Non-Intervention in Domestic 
Matters" 35 Rev. LCT, 45 (1985); Bernhardt R., "Domestic Jurisdiction of States and 
International Human Rights Organs", 7 H. R. L. J. 205 (1986); Henkin L., "Human 
Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction"', in Buergenthal T. (ed), Human Rights. 
International- Law and the Helsinki Accord, 21 (1977); Ermacora F., "Human Rights 
and Domestic Jurisdiction" 124 Hague Receuil, 371 (1968). 
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and then revised by the Third Committee. 267 The time-lag between the 
discussion of the provisions by each body did nothing to improve the 
quality of the final text. In many cases the same arguments and 
proposals were put forward in both bodies. Earlier decisions were often 
reversed and amendments deleted. In only a small number of cases did 
the Third Committee profitably extend the debate initiated in the 
Commission. 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle in the drafting process was the 
ideological conflict that underlay many of the issues and debates. 
Provisions often had to be drafted in the face of direct opposition by 
certain States. Indeed it is perhaps only due to the fact that the two 
Covenants were linked in the drafting process, that agreement upon a 
final text was possible. However, this in itself was a problem. That both 
Covenants had to be completed for adoption at the same time meant that 
the drafting of each took on a piecemeal character and became unduly 
extended. 
Despite the length of time taken in the drafting of the Covenants, 
certain provisions clearly suffered from being discussed too little. 268 At 
other times, although there was sufficient discussion, agreement was 
only possible when the provision was left as a very general statement or 
subjected to excessive limitations. 269 Moreover, even where there was 
agreement as to a certain wording, there was often no conunon 
understanding of the meaning. 270 
It was the expressed intention of the drafters that the Covenants 
should be subject to a it rationalising" process before being presented for 
adoption. This would have ironed out the inconsistencies within and 
between the two Covenants. That this did not take place has meant that 
the Covenant has been left with a number of provisions that the drafters 
intended to revise. In particular, the right to an adequate standard of 
living was retained in article 11 despite being thought to be so general 
as to be included in Part II of the Covenant. 271 
The disruptive effect of the drafting process is evident in the 
curious mixture of rights and obligations, the vastly different form of 
267 See above, text accompanying notes 67-98. 
268 See e. g. article 7(b) on safe and healthy working conditions. Below 
Chapter 6. 
269 For example agreement on the right to strike was only possible with the 
limitations provided in article 8(2), which are more restrictive than those provided for 
by the ILO. See below, chapter 7. 
270 For example there was no final agreement as to the meaning of the term 
"workers" in article 7(a). See below, chapter 6. 
271 See below, chapter 8. 
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the various articles, and the excessively casual and inconsistent use of 
terminology. A few examples illustrate these points. First, whereas 
article 9 is relatively short, this is not the case with articles 11 or 13. Article 9 is restricted to a brief statement of the right concerned, whilst 
article 11 (like articles 6,12,13 and 15) contains in addition, an outline 
of steps that should be taken by States in the realisation of the right. Secondly, although a number of articles demonstrate a clear 
pattern of wording, there a several unexplained exceptions. Tbus, many 
articles begin with the phrase "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone 
...... 
Articles 3 and 8, on the 
other hand, use the term "ensure", articles 13(3) and 15(3) use the tenn 
"respect", article 2(2) uses the word "guarantee" and there is no 
reference to rights at all in articles 10 or 14. This presents particular 
difficulties in so far as the main obligation clause (article 2(l)) 
envisages progressive realisation of the "rights recopised". 
Finally, whereas most of the rights within the Covenant 
specifically relate to the individual, articles 8(l)(b) and (c) refer to the 
rights of trade unions. Whether or not the inclusion of collective rights 
is appropriate in a human rights instrument of this kind, 272 there was no 
need to state them in that manner. As is clear from the 1988 Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, 273 such rights 
could have been inferred from the individual right to join and form 
trade unions. The inclusion of the rights as they stand, however, shows 
carelessness or lack of foresight on the part of the drafters. 
V) THE SCOPE AND LEVEL OF PROTECTION OFFERED 
One of the most significant aspects of the Covenant is the material 
scope of the protection offered. Not only does the Covenant deal with 
labour rights traditionally associated with the ILO, but also offers 
protection in the social and cultural fields. It is primarily in the latter 
fields that the Covenant may be seen to stand out in comparison with the 
272 For an argument against the inclusion of collective rights see, Sieghart, 
supra, note 17 1, at 164. 
273 P. A. U. T. S. 69. Article 8(l) of the Protocol states: 
to 1. The States Parties shall ensure: 
a. The right of workers to organise trade unions and to join the union of their 
choice for the purpose of protecting and promoting their interests. As an extension of 
that right, the States Parties shall permit trade unions to establish national federations of 
confederations, or to affiliate with those that already exist, as well as to form 
international trade union organisations and to affiliate with that of their choice. 71be 
States Parties shall also permit trade unions, federations and confederations to function 
freely; It 
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European Social Charter. 274 In particular, it contains the right to 
education, the right to cultural life, the right to food and clothing, and a 
specific statement of the right to housing which are not to be found in 
the ESC. On the other hand it does suffer from failing to identify 
specific vulnerable groups (apart from women and children) who might 
be considered to need special protection. In particular, one might 
mention aliens, migrant workers, the elderly, 275 and those with physical 
or mental disabilities. 
To some extent, these defects are remedied by the scope of the 
Covenant ratio personae. Whereas the ESC is restricted to nationals of 
Contracting parties, the Covenant explicitly relates to "everyone". This 
is apparently confirmed by article 2(3) which permits "developing 
states" to determine the extent to which they would guarantee the 
economic rights to non-nationals. The clear implication here is that 
aliens automatically have equal social and cultural rights in an cases, 
and equal economic rights in all developed states. It might be assumed 
in light of this fact, that articles on the rights of aliens and migrant 
workers did not need to be explicitly stated. 
Whilst the Covenant certainly does have an impressive breadth of 
coverage, it is often framed in excessively general tenns. For example, 
whereas the Covenant provides for a bare statement of the right to 
social security in article 9, this compares unfavourably with the three 
articles to be found in the ESC. 276 Whether or not article 9 is read to 
include the various elements found in the ESC is ultimately left to the 
vicissitudes of the supervision system. 
The generality and breadth of the Covenant's terms, whilst 
allowing for a considerable amount of constructive and dynamic 
interpretation, does place a heavy burden on the supervisory body 
whose role inevitably becomes one of developing and defining the 
normative content. Whilst the drafters clearly envisaged a continuing 
process of standard setting (whether under the auspices of the 11,0 or 
otherwise), the fact that this must take place after ratification leaves the 
way open to conflicts in interpretation that might ultimately undermine 
the supervision process as a whole. The degree to which this may be 
274 The European Social Charter (1961), 529 U. N. T. S. 89. For the scope of 
the ESC see, Harris D., The Eumpean Social Charter, 192-199 (1986). 
275 It was argued during the drafting of article 9 that the rights of the elderly 
should be provided for in a separate convention. See e. g. Mehta (India), 
E/CNA/SR. 282, at 10 (1952). 
276 The European Social Charter provides for the right to social security (article 
12), the right to social and medical assistance (article 13) and the right to benefit form 
social welfare services (article 14). 
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avoided depends upon the skill and commitment of the supervisory body. 
Similar comments may be made about the level of protection 
afforded by the Covenant. The need for additional standard setting not 
only relates to defining the material scope of the provisions, but also the 
establishment of "benchmarks" or levels of compliance. Thus, although States are under a general obligation to realise the right to adequate 
housing in a progressive manner (under article 11), standards have to 
be set to ensure that the amount and quality of housing available is 
consonant with the level of development of the country concerned. In 
absence of concrete targets of achievement, the possibility of relying 
upon the Covenant as a means of protection becomes considerably more 
restricted. 
An important comparison between the Covenant and the ESC may 
be made here. Whereas the Covenant provides for the progressive 
achievement of all the rights, the ESC allows States to contract into the 
realisation of selected rights. Each system has its benefits and 
disadvantages. The ESC benefits from allowing for (in theory at least) a 
single standard of achievement for each right but suffers from allowing 
a more restricted coverage of rights. The Covenant on the other hand, 
whilst allowing more lee-way in the level of protection, benefits from 
providing for a more immediately extensive coverage. 
VI) CONCLUSION 
Although the International Bill of Rights was intended to form the 
backbone of an international human rights regime following the Second 
World War, the drafting process became a focal point of the political 
confrontation between East and West. Effectively the ideological dispute 
can be said to be responsible for the arbitrary division of the draft 
convention into two different Covenants, the weakening of the 
supervisory mechansisms envisaged for the ICESCR, much of the 
textual confusion that remains within the Covenant, and the unduly 
protracted nature of the drafting process. 
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Article 2(1) 
"Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
take steps, individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures. " 
I) INTRODUCTION 
Article 2(l) could be described as the linch-pin of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In describing the duties incumbent upon States Parties in the 
realization of the rights contained in the Covenant, it is of critical 
importance both as to the substance and implementation of the Covenant 
as a whole. Quite appropriately the Committee has produced a General 
Comment on the subject of article 2(1) which has formed the basis for 
the Committee's approach to the Covenant in general. 
11) THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS 
Before examining the text of article 2(l) specifically, it is 
intended to consider the general nature of the obligations within the 
Covenant. Two particular methods of analysis have been mentioned in 
the Committee's work: one centring upon obligations of conduct and 
result, the other upon obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. 
A) OBLIGATIONS OF CONDUCT AND RES 
Article 2(l) has been variously interpreted as imposing 
it obligations of conduct it or "obligations of result" upon the States 
Parties. An "obligation of conduct" as understood by the International 
Law Commission is one where an organ of the State is obliged to 
undertake a specific course of conduct, whether through act or 
omission, which represents a goal in itself. It is to be contrasted with an 
It obligation of result" which requires a State to achieve a particular 
result through a course of conduct (which again can be act or omission), 
the form of which is left to the State's discretion. 1 On this analysis, the 
International Law Commission came to the conclusion that Article 2(l) 
ICESCR imposed an obligation of result. 2 
1 Report of the International Law Commission, 2 Yrbk. I. L. C.., 11-30, (1977). 
2 Ibid, at 20, para. 8. 
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To a large extent the difference between the two forms of 
obligation is not as great as first appears. In cases of obligations of 
conduct, there will often be an objective towards which that conduct is 
aimed. On the other hand, obligations of result will invariably require a 
specific course of action. 3 The classification of a particular obligation 
within one category or the other will rest primarily upon whether or 
not the objective is spelt out and the degree of specificity given to the 
conduct required. 
The obligation "to take steps" in article 2(l) is particularly 
ambiguous in this respect. It is arguable that it has to be read in the light 
of the requirement that the steps be taken "with a view to achieving... 
the fall realization of the rights recognized" in the Covenant. As such, 
the reference to a clearly stated objective would seem to place the 
obligation in the category of an "obligation of result". However, to the 
extent that the steps to be taken are outlined both in article 2(1) and in 
the substantive provisions of the Covenant, it could also be said to 
incorporate an obligation of conduCt. 4 
Article 2(1) is perhaps best explained, as the Committee has 
noted, 5 as incorporating a mixture of the two types of obligation. 6 The 
fundamental objective of the Covenant is undoubtedly the fun realisation 
of the rights contained within. This itself may involve both obligations 
of conduct and result. For example, article 6, which provides for the 
right to work, requires steps to be taken towards the achievement of full 
employment (an obligation of result), but also prohibits forced labour (an obligation of conduct). 7 
In so far as the rights within the Covenant are not capable of 
ediate fulfilment, States are required to undertake certain 
obligations of conduct with a view to their progressive achievement. It 
is one of the anomalies of the Covenant that such obligations of conduct 
3 This was readily recognised by the International Law Commission who 
commented that "every international obligation has an object or, one might say, a 
result... [clonversely, every international obligation, even if it is of the type called an 
obligation "of result", requires of the obligated State a certain course of action". Ibid, at 
13, para. 8. 
41t is worth noting that the realisation of article 8 is primarily an obligation of 
conduct. States are obliged to follow a course of conduct that ensures inter alia theright 
of everyone to form and join trade unions. 
5 General Comment No. 3 (1990), UN Doc. E/1991/23, Annex III, UN ESCOR, 
Supp. (No. 3), at 83 (1991). See also, Turk, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 21, at 4, para. 7. 
6 See e. g. Alston P. and Quinn G., "The Nature and Scope of States Parties' 
obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights", 8 Hum. Rts. Q., 156, at 165 (1987). 
See below, Chapter 5. 
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are spelt out in the substantive articles themselves. 8 However, these 
obligations may themselves be presented as "sub-norms" or 
"intermediary goals" in their own right. For example, article 6 provides for the recognition of the right to work. Paragraph 2 of that article 
outlines the "steps to be taken" including inter alia "technical and 
vocational guidance". Although described as a "step", it is possible to 
view article 6(2) as providing for a right to vocational guidance as a sub- 
norm of the right to work itself. 9 
As will be seen below, the Committee has tended to concentrate 
upon obligations of conduct. In so far as it has never actually conceded 
that a State has achieved the full realisation of the rights (if indeed that 
were possible), the Conunittee has focused its attention upon the 
measures undertaken towards that objective. In doing so, the Committee 
has gone some way towards outlining certain principles that should 
govern States conduct in the implementation of the rights. In particular 
the Committee, in its early stages of work, concentrated upon the 
procedural adequacy of State action. Its initiatives centred, specifically, 
upon the establishment of norms associated with the reporting 
requirement of States Parties under article 16.10 Theoretically the 
obligations incumbent upon States under article 16 are distinct from 
those found in article 2(l), in that they relate to the supervision process 
as opposed to the substantive realization of the rights. However, in so 
far as both the domestic implementation of the Covenant and its 
supervision involve similar monitoring obligations, this differentiation 
loses much of its force. Accordingly, a convergence between the 
procedural and substantive obligations of States Parties is evident, 
conditioned primarily by an approach that emphasises the process or 
conduct of State action rather than the result achieved. 11 
Although the approach of the Committee at this stage is legitimate 
it must not be lost from sight that the objective of the State obligation is 
clearly stated in article 2(l), namely the "full realization of the rights 
recognized" in the Covenant. The compliance of a State with its 
8 This forces the conclusion that an analysis of the obligations within the Covenant 
cannot be achieved merely by looldng at article 2(l). 
9 See below, Chapter 5. 
10 Article 16 ICESCR requires States Parties to submit reports on the measures 
adopted and the progress made in achieving observance of the rights recognised in the 
Covenant. This trend can be seen in the Committee's General Comment No. 1 on the 
purpose of the reporting guidelines at its Third Session in 1989. UN Doc. E/1989/22, 
Annex III, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4), at 87-89, (1989). 
11 Thus a member of the Cornmittee referred to obligations of conduct by way of 
reassuring the State Party concerned that the articles did not have to be implemented 
immediately in full. See, Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 5, para. 19. 
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obligations ultimately is to be measured not merely by the fulfilment of 
some procedure, but by the degree to which it has achieved the full 
realization of the rights. 12 
B) OBLIGATIONS TO RESPECT, PROTECT AND FULFIL 
A more useful method of analysis adopted by members of the Committee13 has been to view the obligations in terms of the tripartite 
typology utilised by a number of commentators, viz the obligations to 
respect, protect and fUlfil. 14 This approach provides a detailed analytical 
framework describing obligations in the context of human rights, 15 and 
serves to counteract some of the traditional assumptions16 that place 
economic, social and cultural rights at a lower level than the more civil 
and political rights. 17 
According to the tripartite typology, all human rights entail three 
forms of State obligation. The "obligation to respect" requires the State 
to abstain from interference with the freedom of the individual. The 
"obligation to protect it refers to the duty on the State to prevent other 
individuals from interference with the rights of the individual. ne 
12 This has to some extent been recognised by members of the Committee. See for 
example the comment of NEss Taya in which she recognised that attention should be 
paid to the "ideal situation" in the achievement of economic, social and cultural rights. 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 4, at 2, para. 2. 
The International Law Commission commented in this regard that "there is a 
breach by a State of an international obligation requiring it to achieve, by means of its 
own choice, a specified result if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not achieve the 
result required of it by that obligation" 
- 
Supra, note 1, at 11. Article 21 (1). 
13 Although there is considerably concurrence in the Committee as to the utility of 
this method of analysis, there appear to remain a few doubts. It was commented, for 
example, at the Committee's fourth session that there was "no consensus within the 
Committee as to the very nature of economic, social and cultural rights". Alston, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 4, at 10, para. 49. 
14 The tripartite typology of obligations is to be found in Mr Eide's presentation on 
the Right to Food at the Committee's General Discussion at its Third Session. 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20. Cf also, Centre for Human Rights, Right to Adequate Food as a 
Human "i hi, (1989). 
15 It would appear that the obligations to respect and protect tend to fall into the 
category of obligations of conduct. The obligation to fulfil relates more closely to an 
obligation of result. 
16 A common contention subsists that whereas civil and political rights require 
"State abstention", economic, social and cultural rights require "State action". See e. g. 
Bossuyt M., "La Distinction Juridique entre les Droits Civil et Politique. et les Droits 
Econorniques, Sociaux. et Culturels", 8 H. R. L. J., 783, at 790 (1975). 
17 See, Alston, F, /C. 12/1990/SR. 21, at 8, para. 28 Concern has often been 
expressed about the disinterest shown in economic, social and cultural rights on the 
international plane. See e. g. General Comment No. 2, UN Doc. E/1990/23, Annex III, 
para. 4, (1990), ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), at 86-7 (1990). 
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"obligation to fulfil" requires the State to take the necessary measures to 
ensure the satisfaction of the needs of the individual that cannot be 
secured by the personal efforts of that individual-18 
The characterisation of State obligations in such a manner has been explicitly accepted by members of the Committee, 19 and has been 
confirmed by the practice of the Committee as a whole. Although 
economic, social and cultural rights are often characterised as 
necessitating a "delivery system" for meeting basic needs, to conceive of State obligations with regard to the Covenant as merely requiring "State 
action" is somewhat superficial. 
1) The Obligation to RespekL. 
It is clear that economic, social and cultural rights require State 
abstention in particular cases. This is primarily clear with regard to 
those rights that are considered to be of immediate application. Thus it 
has been commonly stated that the trade union rights found in article 
8(1) require no substantial economic input on the part of the State and 
therefore can be implemented without delay merely through the 
exercise of State restraint. 20 Similarly, a number of articles contain 
references to "freedoms" and "liberty". Such phraseology implies that 
the State obligation in these areas is negative, involving self-restraint. 
For example, article 13(3) refers to the "liberty of parents... to choose 
for their children schools, other than those established by the public 
authorities ". 21 The State here is obliged merely to refrain from placing 
obstacles in the way of parents wishing to exercise this right. 
18 Some typologies have an additional fourth part: the duty to promote. See, Van 
Hoof G., "The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal of 
Some Traditional Views", in Alston P. and Tomasevski K(Eds), The Right To Food, 
97 (1985). Alternatively Shue speaks of the duty to aid as it more clearly describes 
"having to go back and make up for failures in respect and protection", Shue H., "The 
Interdependence of Duties", in Alston P. and Tomasevski K(Eds), The Right To 
Food 85, at 86 (1985). At an earlier stage he characterised the three obligations as 
those to forbear, protect and aid. Shue H., "Rights in the Light of Duties", in Brown P. 
and Maclean D. (eds), Human Rights and U. S. Foreign Pgliqy-, 65, at 76 (1979). 
19 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 21, at 8, para. 28. 
20 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 12, at 4, para. 21. That article 8 also imposes 
a positive obligation on States to protect the exercise of the right (for example through 
prevention of arbiamy dismissal) is indicated by the use of the word "ensure" in that 
article. Cf. Buergenthal T., "To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible 
Derogations", in Henkin L. (Ed), The International Bill of Rights, 72, at 77 (1981). 
Article 15(l)(a), which refers to the right of everyone to take part in cultural life 
could also be seen as a matter for State restraint. 
21 Article 13(4) also refers to the liberty to establish such schools. The same 
principle could apply to the references to "freedoms" in articles 6(2) and 15(3). 
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The State is also required to refrain from acts which would serve 
to deprive individuals of their rights under the Covenant. It has been 
commented that "a systematic deprivation of certain sectors of the 
community through the action of the State would obviously constitute a 
violation of the rights derived from the Covenant". 22 Thus a law in 
Zaire, that required married women to request their husband's 
permission either to work outside the home or to open an individual 
bank account, 23 was criticised by the Committee for being in 
contravention of article 6 of the Covenant. 24 
It has been argued that State obligations with regard to the 
realization of the rights are in fact secondary to those of the individual. 
Thus Eide has commented that "the primary responsibility for the 
guarantee of economic, social and cultural rights lay with the individual, 
who must try first of all to satisfy his own needs by means of his own 
resources". 25 It is considered that this is overstating the point. Certainly, 
as in the context of the right to development, it is appropriate that 
individuals should be seen as the principal "subject" of development26 in 
the sense of being given the opportunity to provide for their own needs 
without impediment. However, to argue that the individual is the 
primary duty-holder would provide States with a convenient excuse for 
not taking the action required of them. 
A point that could be made, is that even where States are required 
to take positive action to realise the rights in the Covenant, they should 
22 Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 20, at 11, para. 48. See also, Tomasevski K., 
Development Aid and Human Rights, 126 (1989). 
23 Article 3(c) Zairian Labour Code. E/1986/3/Add. 7, at 2. 
24 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 6, para. 36. The same might be said for 
the eviction of 15,000 families from their homes by the Dominican Republic 
authorities. See, UN Doc. E/1991/23,, at 64, para. 249, UN ESCOR, Supp. (NO. 3), (1991). 
25 Eide, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 2, para. 9. 
26 If individuals were seen merely as the "object" of development, their rights would 
then subsist merely at the level of entitlements to delivery of specific goods and 
services, or the fulfilment of certain "needs". The notion of the individual as a "subject" 
of development envisages an emphasis on self-reliance and participation in the 
development process which accords more closely to the concept of human dignity. See 
e. g. Tomasevski, supra, note 22, at 155. Article 2(l) of the Declaration on the Right to 
Development thus States: 
"Ile human person is the central subject of development and 
should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to 
development". 
GA Resn. 41/128, (Dec-4 1986), 41 UN GAOR, Resns, Supp. (No. 53), at 186 
(1986). 
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nevertheless do so in a manner that preserves the individual's freedom 
of action. As has been explained by one member of the Committee: 
"One of the principles underlying the Covenant was to 
secure full development of the human personality, 
something that called for the element of free choice in 
the exercise of the rights set forth... [therefore] a fine 
balance had to be maintained between protective 
conditions and the need to make sure that they did not 
inhibit the development of the human personality". 27 
Although it might be argued that achievement of economic and 
social rights entails significant government intervention, this must 
not detract from the fact that the final goal is the improvement of 
the situation of the individual. 
2) The Obligation to Protect 
The obligation to protect the individual's rights from 
violation by third parties, similarly crosses the border between 
civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights. 28 Such 
an obligation implies the "horizontal effectiveness" of rights, often 
known as "drittwirkung der grundrechte". As a concept, 
"drittwirkung" has had considerable recognition both in national29 
and international jurisprudence. 30 However, we are concerned 
here, not so much with the ability of the individual to "enforce" 
his or her fundamental rights against another individual as, in 
absence of a petition procedure, that is primarily a question of 
national law,, 31 but rather with the correlative State obligations that 
accompany a recognition of the horizontal effect of the rights. 
27 Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 6, para. 24. 
28 The obligation to protect in the field of civil and political rights would seem 
to require at minimum the provision of an effective police force and justice 
system. The problem that many jurists have with the concept of the obligation to 
protect is that it not only confers positive obligations upon States with regard to 
civil and political rights, but also that the extent of such an obligation is unclear. 
See, Sieghart P., 'ne Lawful Rights of Mankind 90-91 (1986). 
29 Starck C., "Europe's Fundamental Rights in their Newest Garb", 3 
H. R. L. J., 103, at 111 (1982). The Netherlands mentioned to the Committee that 
its legal system envisages the horizontal effectiveness of certain human rights 
provisions. E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 10, para. 59. 
30 See e. g., Van Dijk P. and Van Hoof G., ThegZ and Practice of the 
ENropean Convention on Human Rights, 16-20 (2nd ed. 1990); Drzemczewsld 
A., EuL=an Human Bights Convention in Domestic Law: A CoMarative 
Study 
-228 (1983); Buergenthal, supra, note 20,, at 77. 
, -, 
199 
31 However, on the possibility of the "direct effect" of treaty provisions, see 
below, Chapter I 
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There is no indication that the drafters of the Covenant 
expressly intended the rights to have horizontal effect. That no 
mention was made of this aspect of State obligations is not 
sufficient evidence to conclude that the Covenant was not intended 
to impose an obligation upon States to protect the rights of the individual from violations by other individuals. There has to be an 
overriding assumption, given that the drafters were committed to 
ensuring the fundamental rights of every individual, that States 
would have obligations in this respect. 
Indeed, the horizontal effectiveness of human rights is of 
particular importance in the field of economic, social and cultural 
rights. In the context of article 7, for example, if State obligations 
were limited to ensuring that public employees enjoyed fair 
conditions of work, the right would be largely deprived of effect (especially in the case of "mixed" or "market" economies). Similar 
considerations also apply in particular to the right to work (article 
6) and the right to housing (article 11). It must be assumed that 
where the State is not in position to ensure the rights itself, that it 
must regulate private interactions to the extent that individuals are 
not arbitrarily deprived of the enjoyment of their rights by other 
individuals. 32 
Recognition of an obligation to protect can be found in the 
Covenant itself. First, it is clear that the rights pertain to 
"everyone". It would be contrary to this clearly worded obligation 
if a State were to declare, for example, that it could only secure 
the right to strike for those who worked in the public sector. 33 It 
is obvious that action must be taken for all sectors of the 
population. 34 
Secondly, article 10(3) expressly stipulates that "children 
and young persons should be protected from economic and social 
exploitation" and that certain practices should be punishable by 
law. There is a clear recognition here that the responsibility of the 
State goes beyond the actions of itself or its agents, and into 
positive protection from third party violations. A similar 
reference is made in article 13(3) and (4) to the role that the State 
may take in establishing minimum standards in private educational 
32 Such a proposition has been explicitly rejected by advocates of the "market 
principle" however. See e. g. Hayek F., The Constitution of Liberty 230-232 (1960). 
33 See, Marchan Romero, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 10, at 7, para. 34. His question 
implied that the right to strike had to be secured in the private sphere. 
34 This is also conditioned by the provision of article 2(2) whereby the State 
is under an obligation to take measures in a non-discriminatory fashion. 
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establishments. Although not stated in terms of an obligation, such 
provisions seem to envisage a role for the State in which 
obligations over individual. relations are not outside the scope of its 
responsibility. 
Finally, the preamble to the Covenant establishes that "the 
individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community 
to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the 
promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant". Whereas the substantive portions of the Covenant do 
not refer to individual duties, the preamble may be seen to outline 
the philosophical context in which the realisation of the rights is to 
be undertaken. It can be assumed, as a result, that the State has a 
general obligation to regulate the private relations between 
individuals in so far as is necessary to ensure the enjoyment of the 
rights in the Covenant. 
The Committee has both expressly and impliedly established 
an obligation upon States Parties to protect the individual's 
interests against third party interference. It has shown particular 
concern over the operation of the rights in the private sphere, 
especially with regard to employment. Questions have been asked 
inter alia as to the employment of women. 35 the right to strike. 36 
retirement ages37 and the provision of pensions38 in the private 
sector. 39 As a corollary the Committee has looked towards the 
enactment of legislation as a means of regulation of the private 
sector, 40 the effective enforcement of those conditions, 41 and the 
establishment of mechanisms for the settlement of any private 
disputes. 42 
35 See e. g., Butragueno, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 8, para. 46. 
36 See e. g., Marchan Romero, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 10, at 7, para. 34. 
37 See e. g., Butragueno, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 8, para. 41. 
38 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 3, para. 9. 
39 The Committee has also concerned itself with other aspects of the private 
sector like tenants' rights. See e. g. Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 14, para. 83; 
Mrachkov, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 7, para. 27. 
40 E. g. ne enactment of a Labour Code, see Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 
5, para. 22. 
41 For example the provision of a Labour inspectorate and sanctions for 
enforcement of minimum conditions of work. See, Simma, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 5, 
at 7, para. 29; Taya, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 8, para. 34; Sparsis, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 10, at 14, para. 82. 
42 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 7, at 5, paras. 30-31. 
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Thus far, the Committee has established in a diverse range 
of cases, that the State has a duty to protect the rights of individuals against interference by third parties. It has not directly 
stated this as a proposition that relates to every right, but it is 
difficult to imagine how a State could undertake its obligations in a 
realistic manner without regulating the private sector. Indeed, to 
the extent that it requires States to actively combat discrimination 
in inter-personal relations, it has to be assumed that the State has a duty to protect all the economic, social and cultural rights of the 
individual. 
3) The Obligation to Fulfil. 
Tbe obligation to fulfil is central to the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights, and is the principal concept 
upon which the terms of article 2(1) were built. 43 As was clear in 
the drafting of the Covenant, 44 in contrast to the ICCPR, 45 it was 
felt that States could not commit themselves to the full realisation 
of economic, social and cultural rights immediately. Accordingly, 
the wording of article 2(1) was specifically drafted to reflect the 
need to allow for greater flexibility in the fulfilment of the rights 
43 It might be added that the positive role of the State has been particularly 
contentious in political philosophy. Nozick, for example, envisages "a minimal 
state limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, 
enforcement of contracts, and so on". Nozick R., Anarchy. State and UtUi 
, 
26 
(1974). 
44 See above, Chapter 1, text accompanying notes 44. 
45 Axticle 2(l) of the ICCPR requires States parties to "respect and to ensure" 
the rights. It is apparent, however, that civil and political rights do entail certain 
positive obligations upon States (outside those relating to the protection of 
individuals) such as the establishment of a court system and the provision of 
effective remedies. See, Airey v. Ireland, Eur. Court H. R., Series A, Vol. 32, 
Judgement of Oct. 9,1979, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305, where it was established 
that there was a right to legal aid for those who were unable to afford court costs 
in civil cases; Marckx v. Belgium, Eur. Court H. R., Series A, Vol. 31, Judgement 
of June 13,1979, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 330, where the Court found that the State 
had certain positive obligations to respect family life, particularly in the provision 
of legal safeguards to allow a child's integration in its family. See also, 
Berenstein A., "Economic and Social Rights: Their inclusion in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Problems of Formulation and Interpretation", 2 
H. R. L. J., 257 (1981). 
provision of legal remedies is specifically envisaged by article 
2(3)(a) ICC! PR which requires each State Party "to ensure that any person whose 
rights or freedoms... are violated shall have an effective remedy". However it 
must be recognised that although civil and political rights do not differ 
categorically from economic, social and cultural rights, their emphasis is without 
doubt more upon State restraint than State action. 
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in the Covenant. rMe intricacies of the obligation to fulfil as 
reflected in article 2(l) will be dealt with in the following sections. 
HI) "UNDERTAKES TO TAKE STE 
The fundamental obligation in the ICESCR is for the States 
Parties to "take steps" towards the realization of the rights 
contained therein. The phrase "undertakes to take steps" itself 
however, merely appears to reflect the general rule of 
international law. 46 requiring States to take the necessary action to 
execute the provisions of the Covenant. The precise nature of that 
commitment, however, is to be drawn from the other phrases 
within article 2(l). As is apparent from the discussion above, the 
phrase "undertakes to take steps" may refer either to obligations of 
conduct or obligations of result according to its context. 47 
It has been argued that since the phrase "to take steps" was 
considered an alternative to "ensure" or "guarantee" in the 
preparatory work, it has progressive overtones. 48 An analysis of 
the phrase as used in other international instruments does not seem 
to bear out this conclusion though. The obligation to take steps or 
measureS49 is to be found in various other international human 
rights instruments. For example under article 2(2) of the ICCPR 
each State Party "undertakes to take the necessary steps" to adopt 
measures to give effect to the rights contained therein. Similarly 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment50 obliges States to "take 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to 
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction". 51 It 
46 This was the conclusion of the P. C. I. J. in its advisory opinion in The Case 
Relative to the Exchanne of Greek and Turkish Poulations Under the Lausanne 
Convention VI, P. C. I. I. (1925), Series B, No. 10, at 20. It advised that a "State 
which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its 
legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the 
obligations undertaken". 
47 See above, text accompanying note 4. 
48See, Alston and Quinn, supra, note 6, at 165. 
49 Whereas the term "measures" appears to be a narrower concept than that of 
lf steps", implying merely legal action, the terms were used interchangeably. 
Whereas the English version of the phrase is "to take steps", the Spanish is " to 
adopt measures" ("a adoptar medidas") and the French "to actlt ("slengage a 
agir"). See, General Comment No. 3, supra, note 5, at 83, para. 2. 
50 GA Resn. 39/46, (June 26,1987), 39 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 5 1), at 197, 
(1984). 24 I. L. M. 535. 
51 Article 2(l), Torture Convention. 
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would seem that use of the phrase, occurring as it does in Conventions of immediate application, 52 in itself holds no 
progressive connotations. 
Whilst the phrase "to take steps" does not make any 
stipulations as to the manner of implementation, it is not entirely 
redundant. As noted above, it signals the immediate assumption of legal commitments by the States parties upon ratification. 53 The Committee has commented: 
"... while the full realisation of the relevant rights may 
be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal 
must be taken within a reasonably short time after the 
Covenant's entry into force for the States 
concemed. "54 
It appears to be considered that all States, whether developing or 
developed, will need to take specific measures following 
ratification of, or accession to, the Covenant. Lack of resources in 
itself would not allow States to defer indefinitely taking the 
necessary action to give effect to the obligations under the 
Covenant. 
IV) "BY ALL APPROPRIATE MEANS" 
In so far as the full realisation of the rights within the 
Covenant represents an obligation of result, States have a degree of 
discretion in the conduct they pursue to that end. 55 Thus in 
principle a State may choose between legislative, administrative, 
52 With regard to the Torture Convention see, Boulesbaa, A., "The Nature of 
the Obligations Incurred by States Under Article 2 of the UN Convention 
Against Torture" 12 Hum. RtsQ,, 53, at 80 (1990). For the ICCPR see below, 
notes 71-72. 
53 Robertson comments in contrast that the Covenant "does not set out 
obligations which contracting parties are required necessarily to accept 
. ately". Robertson A., Human Rights in the World, 230 (3rd Ed. 1992). 
54 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 5, at 83, para. 2. This conclusion was 
incidentally one which had been drawn in paragraph 16 of the influential 
Limburg Principles which declares that: 
"All States Parties have an obligation to begin immediately to take 
steps towards full realization of the rights contained in the 
Covenant". 
9 Hum. Rts. O., 122, at 125 (1987). See also Eide's address to the Committee 
where he took this view. E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20,, at 5, para. 14. 
55 It was certainly the view of a number of governments during the drafting 
of the Covenant that this would be the case. Yugoslavia remarked that the text 
should "require governments to undertake to do everything to promote those 
rights, it being left to each to choose the measures it would adopt for the 
purpose". E/CNA/AC. 14, at 16 (1951). 
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judicial, social, educational, or other methods to undertake the 
realisation of the rightS. 56 Given the variety of economic, social 
and legal systems that exist among the States Parties to the 
Covenant, and their different levels of development, it is natural 
that the approach of each State will vary according to the 
circumstances in which they find themselves. The Committee has 
commented in this respect: 
"... the phrase 'by all appropriate means' must be 
given its full and natural meaning. While each State 
party must decide for itself which means are the most 
appropriate under the circumstances with respect to 
each of the rights, the 'appropriateness' of the means 
chosen will not always be self-evident. It is therefore 
desirable that States parties reports should indicate not 
only the measures that have been taken but also the 
basis on which they are considered to be the most 
'appropriate' under the circumstances. However, the 
ultimate determination as to whether all appropriate 
measures have been taken remains one for the 
Committee to make". 57 
During discussion of the General Comment, one member stressed 
that the Committee could not require States to demonstrate why 
the measures taken were the most appropriate, as that was a task 
for the Committee itself to undertake. 58 However, the text of the 
General Comment does suggest that the States parties should make 
the initial decision as to what measures are considered appropriate. 
It appears that the Committee, quite correctly, considers that it is 
not in a position to prescribe to each State party the steps to be 
taken. In effect, the Conunittee might be seen to give the States 
parties a "margin of appreciation" in deciding the appropriate 
course of action to be taken. 59 Nevertheless, as the final sentence 
of the General Comment suggests, the Committee does have a 
56 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 5, at 85, para. 7. 
57 Ibid, at 84, para. 4. 
58 See, Konate, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 10, para-48. 
59 For the "margin of appreciation" doctrine in the context of the European 
Convention on Human Rights see, Van Dijk and Van Hoof, supra, note 30, at 
585-606; MacDonald R.,, "The Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights", in International Law and the Time of its 
Codification: Essays in Honour of Ro 
, 
187 (1987); O'Donnell T., "Tbe 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights", 4 Hum. Rts. Q,. 474 (1982). 
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residual power to assess whether or not the measures taken were 
the most appropriate in the circumstances. 60 
'Mere are two main limits upon the exercise of State 
discretion in determining what measures are considered to be 
appropriate in the realisation of the rights. First, certain 
provisions in the Covenant do provide indications as to the type of 
action required of States parties. Secondly, the Committee, in 
exercising its supervisory role, has established a number of 
obligations of conduct as regards the steps to be taken to 
implement the Covenant. Each will be dealt with in turn below. 
A) TEXTUAL REQUIREMENTS 
1) Prescribed Means 
As a result of the somewhat confused method of drafting, 
some of the substantive provisions of the Covenant contain details 
of the steps to be taken in implementation. 61 Thus articles 6(2), 
11(2), 12(2), 13(2) and 15(2) all contain some indication of the 
methods by which the State should realize the rights. Article 
13(2)(a) for example, stipulates that primary education should be 
made compulsory and freely available to all, as a method by which 
the right to education should be realized. In certain cases the steps 
are expressly stated to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. 62 The 
Committee has emphasised, nevertheless, the mandatory nature of 
these obligations. 63 
It is important to note that the steps, as spelt out in the 
substantive articles, highlight the interplay between the substance 
of the rights and their method of implementation. For example 
article 12(2) specifies as a step towards the achievement of the 
right to health, "the creation of conditions which would assure to 
all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness" 
This has been considered "both a definition of what it might mean 
60 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 48, at 8, para. 40. 
61 During the drafting process it was not decided until 1951 to include a 
general "umbrella" clause on economic, social and cultural rights which is now 
found in article 2(l). E/CN. 4/SR. 233, at 21 (195 1). Prior to this, some 
representatives had felt that the role of the State should be defined in each article. 
See e. g. Chile (Santa Cruz), E/CN. 4/SR. 216,, at 22 (195 1). Generally, UN Doc. 
A/2929, para. 19,10 UN GAOR, Annexes, (Ag. Itern 28). Pt. H, (1955). The 
articles however were not amended sufficiently to conform entirely to the final 
view. 
62 For example articles 6(2), 12(2) and 15(2) all state that the steps taken 
"shall include" those stipulated- 
t 63 An example is the Comnuttee s criticism of Zaire with regard to article 
13(2)(a). E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17. 
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to realize a right to health and the outline of part of a health 
delivery strategy which stresses equal access to curative medical 
services". 64 As the Committee develops the normative content of 
the various rights contained in the Covenant, it will also i licitly imp 
be prescribing methods by which the States Parties should 
implement their obligations. 
2) Appropriate Means 
Article 2(1) further limits the scope of State discretion as to 
the means to be employed to those that are "appropriate". The 
appropriateness of the method employed can be determined by its 
relation to two desiderata. Not only must the method adopted make 
some progress towards the final objective viz the full realization of 
the right concerned, but it must also conform to the requirements 
of action prescribed by the nature of the rights themselves. 65 
That the measures undertaken conform to the achievement 
of the final objective in the Covenant is quite plain. Full realization 
requires that policies are not discriminatory ratio loci, or ratio 
personae. T'hus a policy which fails to account for a sector of the 
population could be classed as inappropriate unless accompanied 
by safeguard measures. 66 Equally, measures should not promote 
one right at the expense of another. 67 nor should they apply to 
only selective parts of the territory. 68 
As far as the nature of the rights is concerned, it is 
appropriate that those rights that are capable of immediate 
implementation be realised in that manner. Thus States should not 
undertake to implement article 8, which merely calls for State 
restraint, in a progressive manner. On the other hand, however, it 
does remain open for States to implement "progressive" rights 
immediately. 
64 Trubeck D., "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Third World: 
Human Rights Law and Human Needs Programs", in Meron T. (ed), Human 
Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, 205 (1984). 
65 See above, text accompanying notes 13-46. 
66 Ile I. L. C. has noted that some obligations of result allow the State to 
achieve the required result subsequently by obliterating an earlier course of action 
that was incompatible with the achievement of the resulL It cites as an example 
the provision for compensation for unlawful arrest in article 9(5) ICCPR. Supra, 
note 1, at 22, para. 12. 
67 But see below, text accompanying note 176. 
68 This is subject to the possible positive measures taken to promote the rights 
of disadvantaged sectors of the population. 
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Article 2(l) itself does express a preference for legislative 
measures,, the nature of which will be discussed below. 69 The 
International Law Commission concludes that legislative measures 
are therefore "the most normal and appropriate for achieving the 
purposes of the Covenant in question". 70 A simidar provision in the 
ICCPR71 has been described as being a "conditional" obligation of 
conduct. 72 
B) COMMITTEE REQUIREMENTS 
Outside the question of specific rights-related comments as 
to the means for the fulfilment of the rights, 73 the Committee has 
elaborated certain general methodological requirements for the 
reporting process that have a bearing upon the approach to be 
taken by the States Parties in their implementation of the Covenant's obligations. Its approach has also suggested that certain 
substantive considerations should be borne in mind in the 
realization of the rights. 
1) Methodological. Requirements 
In its General Comment No. 1, the Committee outlined seven 
"objectives" to be served by the reporting procedure. 74 Some of 
these can be seen as having evolved into preconditions to the 
effective realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant. 
As a first step, States are obliged to monitor and evaluate the 
actual situation with regard to each of the rights within its jurisdiction. 75 In particular, attention must be paid to the 
69 See text accompanying notes 125-145. 
70 Supra, note 1, at 2 1, para. 8. It also comments that the expression of a 
preferred means of implementation is entirely consistent with an obligation of 
result as there is no obligation to take this course of action. 
71 Article 2(2) ICCPR. It reads: 
"[E]ach State Party 
... 
undertakes to take the necessary steps 
... 
to adopt 
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognised in the present Covenant". 
72 Schachter 0., '"Me Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic 
Law", in Henkin L. (ed), The International Bill of Rights, 311 (1981). 
73 Such comments will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. See below, 
Chapters 5-8. 
74 Supra, note 10. 
75 I[n its General Comment No. 1 the Committee stated that the first objective 
of the reporting process was "to ensure that a comprehensive review is 
undertaken with respect to national legislation, administrative rules and 
71 
proportion of citizens that do not enjoy a specific right. 76 In 
addition, where possible, those specific sectors of the population 
that appear to be vulnerable or disadvantaged should be 
identified. 77 Thus attention merely on aggregate national statistics, 
such as per capita G. N. P., is insufficient as it fails to reflect the 
position of the marginalised sectors of the population. 78 In practice 
procedures, and practices in an effort to ensure the fullest possible conformity 
with the Covenant". Similarly the second objective "is to ensure that a State party 
monitors the actual situation with respect to each of the rights". Supra, note 10, 
at 88, para. 2. See also, Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 3, at 3, para. 10; Sparsis, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 3, at 5, para. 19. 
76 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 11, para. 59. 
77 In its General Comment No. 1, the Committee commented that in order to 
monitor the situation adequately "special attention (should) be given to any worse- 
off regions or areas and to any specific groups or subgroups which appear to be 
particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged". Supra, note 10, at 88, para. 3. The Committee has long held that the "principal concern" of the ICESCR is the 
position of the vulnerable and disadvantaged. See, Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 3, at 3, para. 10. 
Such an emphasis on "sectors" of the population suggests that the 
Committee takes a "structuralist" approach to the non-enjoyment of rights. 
Briefly, it identifies the structures of national and international organization as the 
main impediments to the full realization of human rights. See, Muchlinski P., 
"'Basic Needs' Theory and 'Development Law"', in Snyder F. and Slinn 
P. (Eds), International Law of DevelUment: CoWarative PerapgLfives, 237, at 
238 (1987). This has been one of the views that has marked development 
thinking on the international plane. See, Eide A., "Developmentalism and 
Human Rights- Toward a Merger? Some Provisional Reflections"in Rehof L. 
and Gulmann C. (eds), Human Rights in Domestic Law and Develgpment 
Assistance Policies of the Nordic Countries, 69, at 74 (1989). Alston argues that 
the structuralist approach tends to overemphasise the international aspect of 
development. Alston P., "Prevention Versus Cure as a Human Rights Strategy", 
in I. C. J., Development, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 31 (1981). 
78 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 9, para. 42; General Comment 
No. 1, supra, note 10, at 88, para. 3. 
The use of statistics plays a crucial role in the realization of the rights in 
the Covenant, both as a means of monitoring on the part of the State Party 
concerned, and as a tool in assessment of governmental performance by the 
Committee. The Committee undertook a discussion on the use of statistical 
indicators at its sixth session in 1991, see, UN Docs. E/C. 12/1991/SR. 20-21. 
'Me problems involved in the use of statistics weigh heavily on the work of the 
Committee. As Tomasevski has noted: 
"Quantified results (data, indicators, tables) do not reflect reality 
but theoretical assumptions of reality, and they cannot be 
interpreted without an insight into the underlying assumptions". 
Tomasevski K., "Human Rights Indicators: The Right to Food as a Test Case", 
in Alston P. and Tomasevski K(eds), The Right to Food, 135, at 136 (1985). 
See also, Turk D., The New International Economic Order and the Promotion of 
Human Rights: Realisation of Economic. Social and Cultural Rights, UN 
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reports that fail to identify and analyze the relative position of 
such disadvantaged sectors of the population have been criticised. 79 Given the somewhat vague and general wording of certain 
provisions in the Covenant, such as "an adequate standard of 
living" or "adequate food, clothing and housing", an essential step 
in the realization of the rights is for these provisions to be defined 
more closely. It has been the policy of the Committee to demand 
that State Parties establish national "yardsticks" or "benchmarks" 
by which it might evaluate the domestic situation. 80 In the words 
of one Committee member, he "failed to see how a State could 
meet the obligation specified in article 11 of the Covenant... if it 
had not itself decided what might be regarded as an adequate 
standard of living, in other words if it had not established what the 
poverty threshold was. "81 The use of such indicators must be seen 
Doc. F, /CN. 4/Sub. 2/1990/19, at 3-37 (1990); Goldstein R., "The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying Human Rights Abuses", 8 Hum. Rts. Q.. 
607 (1986); Stohl M., Carleton D., Lopez G. and Samuels S., "State Violation 
of Human Rights: Issues and Problems of Measurement", 8 Hum. Rts. Q,, 592 (1986); Claude R. and Jabine P., "Editors Introduction", 8 Hum. Rts. Q., 551 (1986). 
79 E. g. Concluding remarks on the report of Argentina, Report of the 
Committee's Fourth Session, E/1990/23, at 64, para. 254, UN ESCOR, 
Supp. (No. 3), (1990); and Philippines, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 11, at 11, paras. 40-4 1. 
This is also suggested by the requirement under article 17 that States indicate the 
factors and difficulties encountered in fulfilling the obligations under the 
Covenant. See, Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 8, para. 34. This is by no means 
confmied to developing States. See, Comments of the Committee on the 
Netherlands report, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5-6. 
80 In its General Comment No. 1 the Committee decided that an objective of 
the reporting process was: 
it to provide a basis on which the State Party itself, as well as the 
Committee, can effectively evaluate the extent to which progress 
has been made towards the realization of the obligations contained 
in the Covenant. For this purpose, it may be useful for States to 
identify specific bench-marks or goals against which their 
performance in a given area can be assessed. Thus, for example, 
it is generally agreed that it is important to set specific goals with 
respect to the reduction of infant mortality,, the extent of 
vaccination of children, the intake of calories per person, the 
number of persons per health care provider, etc. ". 
Such bench-marks would seem to include both qualitative and quantitative data. 
General Comment No. 1, supra, note 10, at 89, paras. 6-7. See also references to 
a poverty threshold: Butragueno, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 3, at 7, para. 28; Alston, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2, at 11, para. 65; ibid, SR. 21, at 7, para. 22. 
81 Sparsis, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 17, at 8, para. 35. 
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as an essential part of government policy-making whereby 
problem areas can be targeted and priorities established. 82 
The necessity of utilising national indicators, as opposed to 
international ones, is justified primarily by the variety of social 
and economic contexts in which the rights operate. 83 However, 
although it might be appropriate for States to be given a degree of 
discretion in determining the level at which a national benchmark 
should be set, it may be questioned whether the Committee should 
use national standards as the sole criterion of assessment of State 
compliance with the obligations under the Covenant. If the 
indicators for assessment vary from country to country, the 
universality of the rights may be undermined. 84 Indeed it might be 
said that this is tantamount to giving States Parties the power to 
decide the extent of their own obligations. 85 
Accordingly, the Committee established at its fourth session 
that it "cannot accept their (States') national indicators as a general 
criterion for international assessment". 86 In practice, it has 
82 See General Comment No. 1 where the Committee stated: 
"While monitoring is designed to give a detailed overview of the 
existing situation the principal value of such an overview is to 
provide the basis for the elaboration of clearly stated and carefully 
targeted policies, including the establishment of priorities which 
reflect the provisions of the Covenant". 
Supra, note 10, at 88, para. 4. 
83 The Committee has commented that in many areas "global bench-marks are 
of limited use, whereas national or other more specific bench-marks can provide 
and extremely valuable indication of progress". General Comment No. 1, supra, 
note 10, at 89, para-6. 
84 Bossuyt argues that economic, social and cultural rights differ from their 
civil and political rights counterparts by the fact that they are variable,, and 
dependent upon the resources of the country concerned. Bossuyt, supra, note 
16,, at 790. 
85 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 3, at 3, para. 7. He comments that such a 
conclusion "would deprive the obligations set forth in the Covenant of any real 
significance, and there would be no point in having a monitoring procedure or an 
international supervisory body". Tomuschat has similarly concluded that "each 
State Party is entitled to suggest an interpretation which it believes to reflect the 
meaning of the provision concerned. There is no power for a state to determine 
unilaterally the legal substance of an ambiguous text". Tomuschat C., "National 
Implementation of International Standards on Human Rights", Can. H. R. r 
31, at 36 (1982). 
86 E/C. 12/CRP. l/Add. 10, at 5. Oddly enough this sentence was altered (by 
mistake it appears) in the final copy of the Committee's report, which reads: 
". 
-although Governments were 
duty bound to submit reports, the Committee 
could accept their national indicators as a general criterion for international 
assessment". UN Doc. E/1990/23, supra, note, at 68, para. 271. 
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questioned national qualitative and quantitative data on the basis of 
that received from international and non-governmental sources. It 
would appear then that national bench-marks are useful not so 
much as a definitive means of assessment, but rather as an 
indication of whether the State Party is taking its international 
obligations seriously. It should be noted, however, that the success 
of the Committee's approach here is crucially dependent upon 
access to reliable alternative sources of information against which 
the State reports may be balanced. In absence of such information, 
the State benchmarks may be the only basis on which assessment 
might be made. 87 
The next stage in implementation is for the States Parties to 
establish a coherent policy to overcome the problems encountered 
and to make sufficient progress in the realization of the rights. 
This is envisaged specifically in article 14 which establishes that 
for those States Parties that do not have free and compulsory 
primary education for all, they should adopt a plan for the 
progressive implementation of this obligation. It could be said that 
the provision of article 14 merely spells out the obligations 
implicit in the other articles. 88 Thus a member of the Committee 
commented in respect to article 11: 
"Govenunents were not entitled to content themselves 
with making a vague general commitment to take 
steps to ensure that their people did not suffer from 
hunger, but should be obliged to adopt a precise 
programme for the implementation of all the 
rights". 89 
The establishment of such a programme or policy should also 
include benchmarks to provide a "conceptual framework" in which 
the progress made towards the full realization of the rights can be 
evaluated. 90 It has also been suggested that a timetable should be 
established for the implementation of such a policy-91 This would 
be in accordance with the requirements of article 14 which 
87 For the role of alternative information in the supervision process, see 
below, Chapter 9, text accompanying notes 333-388. 
88 This was the conclusion of the Committee in its General Comment No. 1 
Supra, note 10, at 88, para-4. 
89 Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 4, at 3, para. 6. 
90 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 10, para. 58. It might be noted that the 
full realisation of some rights might of itself be progressive in nature in which 
case the requirement of progress is continuous. 
I ibid. 
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stipulates that the number of years, in which the obligation to 
provide for free primary education will be implemented, should 
be fixed in the plan. 
2) Substantive Concerns 
The perspective of the Committee in developing the 
substantive obligations incumbent upon States Parties has been 
dominated by three major issues: participation, impoverishment 
and State Control. 92 
First, the question of participation has been foreseen to some 
extent by the explicit recognition of democratic principles in the 
Covenant itself. Article 1(1) for example, proclaims the right of 
all peoples to self-determination and "by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their social 
and cultural development" [emphasis added]. Ihis "internal" aspect 
of self-determination93 is also foreseen in article 21(3) of the 
Universal Declaration which more explicitly states that "the will of 
the people shall be the basis of the authority of government". 94 
T1-1at the Covenant conceives of democracy as a concept inherent in 
the rights is further emphasised by references to "democratic 
society" in articles 8(1)(a) and (c), and by the agreement that 
education "shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a 
free society". 95 
Such a reading of the Covenant coincides with the central 
role of participation in the development process. Not only is the 
individual posited as the primary subject of development, but 
common emphasis is placed upon self-reliance as an objective. 96 
Thus the development process is conceived of as being an 
92 These issues are by no means the only concerns of the Committee, they 
merely represent areas in which the Committee seems to have expressed a 
continuing interest. Participation and impoverishment are issues that have 
derived from current development approaches, the question of State control on 
the other hand, reflects a world-wide trend towards privatization of essential 
social services. 
93 See, Cassese A., "The Self-Determination of Peoples", in Henkin L. (Ed), 
The International Bill of Rights, 92 (1981). 
94 This is reflected in article 25(b) ICCPR which provides for the right to 
vote. The interdependence of the rights within the two Covenants is foreseen in 
the preamble to the Covenants. 
95 Article 13(l). 
96 Shepherd G., "The Power System and Basic Human Rights: From Tribute 
to Self-Reliance", in Shepherd G. and Nanda V. (eds), Human Rights-and Third 
World Develmm= 13 (1985). 
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"enabling" process whereby structural impediments (both social 
and economic, on a micro and macro scale) are lifted to allow the individual to fulfil his or her material and non-material needs. 97 
Thus one member of the Committee commented with regard 
to article 11: 
"Even if the responsibility to ensure observance of the 
right to an adequate standard of living lay ultimately 
with the state, efforts should be made to see to it that 
individuals could exercise their right to participate in 
the achievement of the country's development 
objectives". 98 
Similar requirements for representation can be found in comments 
of Committee members with regard to employment rights. Here 
preference has been expressed for a tripartite bargaining process 
including representatives of the State, employers and employees. 99 
To a certain degree, the issue of participation has also been 
manifest in the requirement that the government undertake 
promotional and publicity strategies regarding the provisions of 
the Covenant. Thus it has been felt that the State report should be 
disseminated as widely as possible, 100 that NGO's should 
participate in its drafting, 101 and that the Covenant itself should be 
publicised. 102 The role of the government in this respect to educate 
and encourage participation is central to "increasing the will of the 
people to implement social change" 
- 
103 
Democratic participation also has a subsidiary aim of 
ensuring that all sectors of the population are catered for in any 
human rights strategy. This relates to the second matter in which it 
has generally been established that the "principal concern" of the 
97 For the relationship between human rights and basic needs, see, Alston P., 
"Human Rights and Basic Needs: A Critical Assessment", 12 H. R. L. J., 19 (1979); MuchlinsId, supra, note 77. 
98 Konate, FX. 12/1987/SR. 10, at 2, para-2. 
99 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 10, para. 42. Such a tripartite 
system has also been advocated with respect to establishing a strategy to combat 
unemployment, see, Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 16, para. 93. 
100 General Comment No. 1. The primary purpose of dissemination at the 
reporting stage is to facilitate public scrutiny of government policies and 
engender a constructive dialogue on the national level. Supra, note 10, at 88, 
para. 5. 
101 See e. g., Alston, E/C-12/1988/ýR. 12, at 13, para. 72. 
102 See e. g., Taya, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 9, para. 43. 
103 Ruiz Canaflas (Mexico), F, 11986/WG. 1/SR. 8, at 8, para. 43. 
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ICESCR is the position of the vulnerable and disadvantaged sectors 
of society. 104 The Committee has consistently required that 
governments look towards the position of such social groups 
within States. Accordingly, just as much as the use of aggregate 
national statistics is criticised, so also State policies that are centred 
solely upon general economic growth have been felt to be 
inadequate for securing the rights of marginalised sectors of the 
population. 105 The emphasis placed upon such groups by the 
Committee suggests that its approach has been marked by 
considerations of equality and non-discrimination. 106 To some 
extent this has allowed the Committee to side-step the issue of 
developing substantive norms for the rights within the Covenant. 
Finally, the State's obligation to fulfil raises the question of 
how far the private provision of essential services is compatible 
with the Covenant. 107 Primarily the Committee has been very 
wary of the possible inequality and discrimination involved in the 
provision of public services by the private sector. 108 Its concern 
has been that access to public services becomes a correlate of 
income distribution in which the poorer sectors of the population 
may not be able to afford the services, 109 or merely that the State 
cannot exercise such control as might be necessary. As one 
member has commented upon the privatisation process: 
"The threat to one or other of those [economic, social 
and cultural] rights was certain, bearing in mind the 
substantial element of laisser faire involved in 
privatization and the very long delay which could 
104 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 3, at 3, para. 10; ibid, 1990/SR. 31, at 
3, para. 10; Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 15, at 3, para. 7. Van Boven comments: 
"If a human rights programme has any relevance to people, it 
should first and foremost be concerned with the vulnerable, the 
weak, the oppressed, the exploited". 
Van Boven T., Peole Matter: Views on International Human Rights Poligy, 74 (1982). 
105 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/19 89/SR. 16, at 17, para. 92; Rattray, ibid, SR. 17, 
at 17, para. 90. 
106 See below, article 2(2). 
107 A distinction has been drawn between public services whose aim is "to 
ensure the best possible functioning of the community",, and social services 
whose aim is "based upon the solidarity of all the members of the Community". 
Wold T., "The Right to Social Services", 9 Jour. I. C. L. 41 (1968). The 
distinction however can be criticised for failing to recognise the contribution of 
humanitarian services to the development process. 
108 See e. g., Neneman, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 11, para. 56. 
109 See e. g., Wimer Zambrano, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 3, para. 6. 
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occur between the time when a problem was identified 
and the possible intervention of the State, which was 
no longer considered a principal protagonist". 110 
A secondary issue is that "the replacement of a public service by 
the market principle undermines the very notion of government 
obligations in the area" 111 in that the State purportedly delegates 
its responsibility for a particular service to the private sector. It is 
arguable that whatever the reason given for privatization, the 
question of whether the government complies with its obligations 
under the Covenant depends entirely upon the results achieved. 
However, given the concern of the Committee with the process of 
realization of the rights, it would seem doubtful that they would 
accept a philosophy that had at its heart the reduction of 
governmental responsibility in those areas. 
This conclusion is most apparent with regard to the 
obligation to take steps to the maximum of available resources. 
According to the policy adopted by the Committee, it is 
questionable whether a State could legitimately cut its spending on 
public services outside a claim under article 4. Even if it is 
conceded that this is possible, if that reduction were not 
accompanied by similar reductions in other sectors, such as 
defence, it would constitute a violation of the provisions of the 
Covenant. 
C) STATE ORGANISATION 
It is commonly assumed, partly as a result of the 
politicisation of human rights, that economic, social and cultural 
rights require a "socialist" or "centrally planned" form of 
government. Although a proposal to make realization of the rights 
dependent upon the "organization" of the State was narrowly 
rejected in the drafting of the Covenant, 112 it was made clear that 
the Covenant itself did not prefer any particular system of 
organization despite arguments to that effect. 113 
110 Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 7, para. 40. 
111 Tornasevski, supra, note 22, at 170. 
112 E/CN. 4/SR. 233, (1951), at 22. The vote was evenly split by six votes to 
six, with six abstentions. 
113See Alston and Quinn, supra, note 6, at 181-183. Indeed it was stated: 
"The Commission... was not concerned with the organization or 
the Constitution of a State but merely with the guarantee of 
human rights by the State. The Covenant would lay down the 
obligation: how that obligation would be fulfilled may vary from State to State 
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The Committee has made its position clear on this matter. In 
its General Comment it noted that: 
"... the undertaking 'to take steps... by all appropriate 
means including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures' neither requires nor precludes 
any particular form of government or economic 
system being used as the vehicle for the steps in 
question, provided only that it is democratic and that 
all human rights are thereby respected. Thus, in terms 
of political and economic systems the Covenant is 
neutral and its principles cannot accurately be 
described as being predicated exclusively upon the 
need for, or the desirability of a, socialist or a 
capitalist system, or a mixed, centrally planned, or 
laisser-faire economy, or upon any other particular 
approach. In this regard, the Committee reaffirms 
that the rights recognised in the Covenant are 
susceptible of realisation within the context of a wide 
variety of economic and political systems, provided 
only that the interdependence and indivisibility of the 
two sets of human rights, as affirmed inter alia in the 
preamble to the Covenant, is recognised and reflected 
in the system in question. " 114 
The Committee has followed this policy in admitting no preference 
for any particular form of State structure. It appears to concur 
with the assertion that "successes and failures have been registered 
in both market and non-market economies, in both centralized and 
de-centralized political structures. " 115 Accordingly it could be 
concluded that there is "no single road" to the full realization of 
the rights 
* 
116 
However, whereas the Covenant does not prescribe the 
precise form of organisation required, it does nevertheless require 
that the State possess certain general attributes. Thus, article 8 
Chile, E/CN. 4/SR. 271, at 7 (1952). 
114 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 5, at 85, para. 8. 
115 Limburg Principle 6. Supra, note 54, at 124, para. 6. Falk comments 
generally that "the human rights records of both socialism and capitalism are so 
poor in the Third World at this point that it is quite unconvincing to insist that 
one approach is generically preferable to the other". Falk R., "Comparative 
Protection of Human Rights in Capitalist and Socialist Third World Countries", 
I Uni. H. R. 3, at 5 (1979). 
116 This is implicit in the approach of the Committee. See e. g. Badawi El 
Sheikh, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 2, para. 1. 
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would seem to require that the State structure allowed for the 
existence of more than one trade union, 117 and the 
non-discrimination provisions arguably require the separation of 
the Church and State. 118 Members of the Committee have in this 
respect been critical of certain forms of organization that do not 
seem capable of fulfilling the rights in the Covenant. 119 One 
member concluded that the Conunittee "understood that questions 
of a general nature on wider aspects of the political or economic 
system of a country were not their concern except in so far as they 
affected the enjoyment of the rights embodied in the Covenant. "120 
Some recognition of this fact was evident in the debate 
preceding the adoption of the General Comment. There, certain 
members suggested that reference be made to the need for 
"democratic" govemment. 121 Although the final text does not 
contain any reference to democratic government, there appears to 
have been agreement as to that interpretation. 122 Indeed, the 
Committee's emphasis on participation lends weight to the 
argument that some form of democracy is a prerequisite to the 
implementation of the rights within the Covenant. 123 
However, even if the Committee does view democracy as 
being a prerequisite for the fulfilment of the rights within the 
Covenant, neither has it defined what it understands by that term, 
nor has it ever challenged a State upon that basis. Indeed if it were 
117 An example is the criticism of Rwanda whose allowance for only a single 
general Trade Union seemed to violate article 8 of the Covenant. Texier, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 12, at 4, para. 18. 
118 See e. g. the criticism of Chile's education policy, Texier, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 8, para. 35. 
119 Particular criticism was aimed at the equation of "citizen" with "activist in 
the People's Movement" in Zaire. See e. g. Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 
3, para. 9. 
120 Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 4, para. 15. 
121 See e. g., Marchan Romero, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 7, para. 35. 
122 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 48, at 8,, para-41. 
123 Cf. Article 4, which refers to "democratic society". This does not 
necessarily exclude single party states however. At the Butare Colloquium. on 
Human Rights it was generally agreed that "the one party state was not 
necessarily less democratic or more likely to give rise to violations of human 
rights than a multiparty system". Hannurn H., "The Butare Colloquiurn on 
Human Rights and Economic Development in Francophone Africa: A Summary 
and Analysis", 1 Uni. H. R., 63, at 75 (1979). Indeed it has been considered that 
minorities can be better protected in such systems. I. C. J., Human Rights in a 
One-Party State, at 110 (1978). 
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to do so, the Committee would have to face the dilemma of 
weighing the majoritarian tendencies of a democratic system with 
the need to protect minority interests. 
V) "INCLUDING PARTICULARLY THE ADOPTION 
OF LEGISLATIVE MEASURES" 
A) THE REQUIREMENT OF LEGISLATION 
It has been commonly asserted that legislation is indeed 
essential to the implementation of the rights at the domestic 
level. 124 The travaux preparatoires however are quite clear on the 
matter. The original wording of the article which provided that 
States take steps "by legislative as well as other means" was 
amended in light of the various constitutional forms, to make it 
clear that legislation was not obligatory. 125 Hence it was 
considered that: 
"The ratification of a treaty entailed, for the States 
Parties to it, no more than the fulfilment of the 
obligations expressed in the treaty, whether by 
legislation, administrative action, common law, 
custom or otherwise". 126 
Similarly the International Law Commission, in identifying article 
2(l) as imposing an obligation of result upon States Parties, 
recognized that reference to legislative action, although indicating 
a preferred method of implementation, did not alter the 
fundamental principle of State discretion in the choice of means to 
undertake its obligations under the Covenant-127 
This view seems to have been adopted by the Committee. As 
in the case of the Working Group, 128 few questions have been 
asked as to the lack of legislation in a particular case. Questions 
have rather been directed at the existence of legal or 
124 See, Sviridov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 4, para. 14. Equally, during the 
drafting process, Nikolaeva (USSR) argued that "legislative measures were 
absolutely essential to ensure respect for rights stated in the Covenant 
A/C. 3/SR. 1184, at 251, para. 31, (1962). 
125 See, U. K. objections to the original phrase, UN Doc. A/2910/Add. 1, at 
4,10 UN GAOR, Annexes, (Ag. Item 28), Pt. 1, (1955). Also, comment of 
Sharp (New Zealand), A/C. 3/SR- 118 1, at 238, para. 33, (1962). 
126 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 427, at 10 (1954). 
127 See above,, text accompanying notes 1-3. 
128AIston and Quinn, supra, note 6, at 167. Ile exception to this rule is 
perhaps the prohibition of discrimination. 
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administrative remedies 129 It has been recognised nevertheless, 
that the enactment of legislation does indicate a certain 
commitment on the part of the State to undertake its obligations in 
good faith. One member of the Committee has commented in this 
light that "the Covenant did not automatically imply that legislation 
was an indispensable component" of government policy. 
"However, it was evident that, if that were the interpretation 
adopted by Governments, the burden of proof would lie with those 
Governments, which would therefore be expected to show that the 
non-legislative measures that they had taken effectively ensured" 
the rights concerned "and that it was not essential to take 
legislative measures". 130 
Similarly, there are situations in which legislation could be 
said to be essential. The existence of a law contravening the 
provisions of the Covenant would oblige the State concerned to 
take the necessary action to annul its effectiveness. 131 Legislation 
might also become obligatory if alternative measures undertaken 
by the State such as education or persuasion were manifestly 
ineffective. 132 Finally the implicit obligation on States Parties to 
protect individuals from third party violations would also seem to 
require legislation in certain instances to ensure the rule of law. 133 
As the Committee has noted in its General Comment: 
"... in many instances legislation is highly desirable 
and in some cases may even be indispensable. For 
example, it may be difficult to combat discrimination 
effectively in the absence of a sound legislative 
foundation for the necessary measures. In fields such 
as health, the protection of children and mothers, and 
education, as well as in respect of the matters dealt 
with in articles 6 to 9, legislation may also be an 
indispensable element for many purposes". 134 
Clearly a decision as to whether further legislation is required, 
will turn upon the extent to which existing legislation is adequate. 
129 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 2, para. 3; Jimenez Butragueno, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 19, at 4, para. 12. 
130 Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 3, para. 8. 
131 Limburg Principle 18, supra, note 54, at 125. 
132 This was noted during the drafting of the Covenant. Pico (Argentina), 
A/C. 3/SR. 1184, at 250, para. 16 (1962). 
133 For example the necessity of legislation in the field of industrial safety 
and health measures. Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 6, at 5, para. 33. 
134 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 5, at 83, para. 3. 
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In such a case, there can never be a blanket requirement for 
legislation to be adopted. 
The work of many human rights bodies would seem to be directed towards a situation whereby the rights are embodied in 
the law of each State and guaranteed by effective legal remedies. 
Legislation inevitably plays a major role *in this scenario. The 
alternative, whereby the rights are secured through administrative 
or other practices, would not seem to give the effective stability 
and impartiality of established judicial systems, nor equivalent 
recourse procedures. 135 If this is the ideal, however, effective 
legal protection is to be achieved as a result. The means by which States Parties achieve this does not necessarily involve legislative 
action. Indeed, it has to be recognised that for States to create a 
situation whereby legal remedies are a realistic option, they will 
generally have to take a series of measures above and beyond the 
mere enactment of legislation. 
B) THE ADEQUACY OF LEGISLATION 
Even if legislation is considered to be an essential part of the 
implementation process, it has to be considered whether the 
enactment of legislation alone, is sufficient for States to fulfil 
effectively their obligations under the Covenant. During the 
drafting of the Covenant, it was often commented that legislation, 
whilst being essential, 136 was not necessarily adequate to secure the 
rights effectively. 137 Indeed it was remarked that: 
"It would be deceiving the people of the world to let 
them think that a legal provision was all that was 
required to implement certain provisions, when in 
fact an entire social structure had to be 
transformed". 138 
Accordingly legislative measures were intended to be merely one 
element of a series of economic and social activities intended to 
give effect to the rights in the Covenant. 139 This has been 
expressly recognised by the Committee, which commented that: 
135 Tomuschat, supra, note 85, at 42. 
136 With the imphcit hmitations above. 
137 Representative of the USSR, E/CN. 4/SR. 272, at 10 (1952). The 
representative of the U. S. dropped the use of the word "ensure" in its 
amendments to article 2(l) for fear that it might imply that legislation alone is 
enough to secure the rights. E/CN. 4/SR. 271, at 12 (1952). 
138 Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 232, at 11 (1951). 
139 Limburg Principle 18, supra, note 54, at 125. 
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"The Committee... wishes to emphasise, however, that 
the adoption of legislative measures, as specifically 
foreseen by the Covenant, is by no means exhaustive 
of the obligations of States parties. "140 
On a more detailed examination, however, it is apparent that a 
number of articles in the Covenant are clearly capable of being 
adequately secured by legislation when accompanied by 
corresponding enforcement procedures. 141 This is particularly 
true with respect to those rights that are not dependent for their 
implementation upon State resources (for example the right to 
form and join a trade union in article 8). 142 Similarly, there is 
nothing to prevent the State undertaking to guarantee other rights, 
such as the right to equal remuneration, even if they do have 
considerable resource implications. All that is required is the 
necessary commitment on the part of the State concerned. 
It is clear, however, that in a number of cases the existence 
of certain social structures or resources, will be a precondition to 
the effective realization of the rights by means of legislation. For 
example, it would be simply meaningless for the State to guarantee 
every individual a house, yet do nothing to ensure that there was 
sufficient housing available. In such a situation there is clearly a 
need for the state to take the appropriate economic or social action 
necessary to ensure that the legislation, if it exists, may be 
effectively implemented. 143 
Two questions thus present themselves to the Committee in 
analysing the adequacy of legislative measures in a particular 
situation. First is whether the social conditions are compatible with 
the legislative enforcement of the right. The second element is 
whether the enforcement procedures are adequate to secure the 
right in practice. Thus the Committee has stressed that a 
description of the legal provisions in a given State would not of 
140 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 5, at 84, para. 4. 
141 Often when the Committee refers to the inadequacy of legislation, it is in 
fact speaking about the presence or absence of enforcement procedures. It is 
submitted that coupled with the latter, legislation will often be sufficient. 
142 See below, Chapter 7. 
143 A similar position exists with regard to the ICCPR. In its General 
Comment 3(13) the Human Rights Committee recognized that "implementation 
does not depend solely on constitutional or legislative enactments, which in 
themselves are often not per se sufficient". 5th Annual Report of to the General 
Assembly. UN Doc. A/36/40, Annex VH, 36 GAOR, Supp. (No. 40), (1981). 
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itself suffice. 144 In addition, the State should provide information 
on the progress made in the practical implementation of the 
rights. 145 
C) JUDICIAL REMEDIES. 
The existence of judicial remedies assumes the presence of 
the right in the domestic legal system. Having seen above, the use 
of legislative means to secure the rights is by no means the only 
method open to States Parties. However, as far as legislation has 
been enacted the Committee has been clear about the need for 
recourse procedures. 146 These have their parallel in the 
administrative or other recourse mechanisms that run outside the 
ambit of the legal system. As the Committee stressed in its General 
Comment-. 
"Among the measures which might be considered 
appropriate, in addition to legislation, is the provision 
of judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, 
in accordance with the national legal system, be 
considered justiciable. The Committee notes, for 
144 See e. g. criticism of the Canadian report E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8. In particular 
Simma commented that: 
"When reports focused too narrowly on legal aspects, the 
suspicion naturally arose that there might be some gap between 
law and practice. " 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 8, para. 42. 
145E. g. Butragueno, E/C. 12/198 8/SR. 13, at 2, para. 1. Too much emphasis 
on theoretical implementation as opposed to practice has also been criticised, 
Nenernan, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 2, at 4, para. 17. 
146 Alston comments that in order to determine whether rights were realized 
the Committee "looked for a degree of entrenchment in a legal instrument such as 
a constitution and for "justiciability"". E/C. 12/1990/SR. 7, at 2, para. 6. Sto1jar 
argues with respect to rights in general: 
"You cannot have a right unless it can be claimed or demanded or 
insisted upon, indeed claimed effectively or enforced.... Rights 
thus are performative-dependent, their operative reality being their 
claimability; a right one could not claim, demand, ask or enjoy or 
exercise would not merely be "imperfect"- it would be a vacuous 
attribute". 
Sto1jar S., An Analysis of Rights, at 3-4 (1984). So far as implementation 
concerns the transf6rral of international obligations onto the national plane, 
domestic enforceability must therefore be a prime objective of the Covenant. 
It has been noted that although economic, social and cultural rights are to 
be found in the constitutions of many countries, there was little inclination on the 
part of national courts to enforce them. See, Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 3., at 11, 
para. 68. Witkrespect to Canada, see, Vandycke R., "La Charte Constitutionelle 
et les Droits Economiques, Sociaux et Culturels", Can. H. R. Yrbk., 167 (1989- 
90). 
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example, that the enjoyment of the rights recognised, 
without discrimination, will often be appropriately 
promoted, in part, through the provision of judicial 
or other effective remedies. Indeed those States 
parties which are also parties to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are already 
obligated (by virtue of arts. 2 (paras. 1 and 3) 3 and 
26) of that Covenant to ensure that any person whose 
rights or freedoms (including the right to equality and 
non-discrimination) recognised in that Covenant are 
violated, 'shall have an effective remedy' (art. 
2(3)(a)). "147 
The Committee goes on to state that it considers a number of 
provisions within the Covenant that it would seem to be capable of 
immediate application by judicial and other organs in many 
national legal-systems". 148 'Mese include articles 3,7(a)(i), 8, 
10(3), 13(2)(a), 13(3), 13(4) and 15(3). 149 
The specification, by the Committee, of the provisions that 
may be open to immediate application by judicial organs, is in part 
a response to the common assertion that economic, social and 
cultural rights are not justiciable. According to that view, 
economic, social and cultural rights are considered too vague for 
violations of their provisions to be effectively determined. 150 A 
distinction however has to be drawn between international and 
domestic enforcement of the rights. At the international level, judicial determination of violations would weigh up the actual 
situation in relation to the obligation contained in the Covenant. 
Domestically however, judicial remedies focus upon the 
enforcement of existing legislative or administrative measures 
taken with regard to the economic and social climate in the State 
147 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 5, at 84, para-5. 
148 Ibid. 
149Ibid. 
150 Vierdag E.,, "The Legal Nature of the Rights Guaranteed by the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 9 
Neth. I. L. R.,, 69 (1978). Similarly the representative of Colombia asserted before 
the Committee that economic, social and cultural rights "were too vague for their 
infringement to give rise to legal action". E/C. 12/1990/SR. 14, at 6, para. 3 1. 
Contra, Van Hoof, supra., note 18, at 104. 
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concerned. 151 An insistence on judicial remedies at the domestic 
level is merely to ensure that the measures taken towards the full 
realization of the rights are not purely superficial and empty of 
any real value. 
A related issue is that, given the discretion that States with 
respect to the domestic implementation of the Covenant, the rights 
are unlikely to enter into municipal law in the form that they exist in the Covenant. 152 For example it was recognized by one member 
of the Committee that the right to an adequate standard of living 
could be secured through a policy of full employment, welfare 
benefits, or a combination of the two. 153 States, thus, may adopt a form of implementation that is suitable to the requirements of 
their social and legal organization, but it is clear that the 
Committee will assess the adequacy of such measures by reference 
to the degree to which there is provision for individual remedies 
or other enforcement procedures. 
VI) "FULL REALISATION" 
Whatever the intricacies of the implementation process, it 
would appear that the ultimate objective of the Covenant is the 
"full realisation" of the rights. During the drafting of the Covenant 
the words "full realisation" were included to replace the term 
"implementation" "in order to strengthen rather than to weaken 
the objective set before future contracting parties". 154 Its effect is 
to emphasise that the State conduct referred to in article 2(l) is to 
be directed at this particular result. States therefore can not make 
do with rights It on the cheap". 155 
The Committee itself has noted that the principal obligation 
of result in article 2(l) is the "full realisation" of the rights. 156 
That this objective is conditioned by the phrase "progressive 
realisation" is merely a recognition of the fact that "the full 
151 A caveat may be that the rights could be entrenched in a constitution 
without substantial change in form. The rights have been enforced in practice on 
occasions, e. g. Canada, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 10, at 12, para. 42; Netherlands, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 14, at 3, para. 8. 
152 For the variety of forms of social legislation, see, Cranston R., "Rights in 
Practice", in Sampford C. and Galligan D. (eds), Law. Rights and the Welfare 
State 1 (1986). 
153 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 9, at 5, Para-26. 
154 Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 223, at 8, (1951). 
155 Ibid, E/CN. 4/SR. 237, at 7 (1952). 
156 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 10, at 85, para. 9. 
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realisation of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally 
not be able to be achieved in a short period of time". 157 Although 
reference has occasionally been made to the need to establish an 
understanding of the "ideal situation", 158 the Committee has 
generally concentrated upon the process rather than the result of 
implementation. It is assumed, even in the case of developed 
countries, that the full realisation of the rights has not been 
achieved. Hence the Committee requires that all States, not merely 
developing ones, show the "progress made" and the "difficulties 
encountered " in the realization of the rights. The Committee has 
not, on the other hand, analysed closely what it envisages to be the 
full realisation of the rights. 
It is submitted that the phrase "full realisation" should relate 
to the scope of the rights ratio materiae, ratio personae and ratio 
loci. A particular right could be said to be fully realised only when 
all people in all parts of the country enjoy the right at the requisite 
level. In so far as the rights might be realised through State 
restraint, the major consideration is the personal scope of the 
provisions. However, for the fulfilment of the rights, a specific 
level of achievement has to be established. 
That there may be some difficulty in establishing concrete 
objectives is apparent from the fact that certain rights were 
intended to be dynamic standards. During the drafting of the 
Covenant, it was commented that the introduction of the word 
"progressively" "introduced a dynamic element, indicating that no 
fixed goal had been set", 159 and that "the realization of those rights 
did not stop at a given level". 160 This is reflected particularly in 
article 11 which refers to "the continuous improvement of living 
conditions". 161 Here the result to be achieved becomes merged 
with the desired conduct. 
In asserting that the objectives of the Covenant are dynamic 
in nature is not to suggest that they are deprived of value. 
Although it is necessary for the rights to be given sufficient detail 
such that it is possible to predict, with reasonable accuracy, 
157 Ibid. 
158 Taya, E/C. 12/1990/S R. 4, at 2, para. 2. 
1-59 Sorensen (Denmark), E/CN. 4/SR. 236, at 21 (1951). 
160 Mr Whitlam (Australia), E/CN. 4/SR. 237, at 5 (1951). 
161 One member of the Committee has commented with regard to this article 
that "the individual was entitled not only to "wen-being", but to "better-being", 
and thus the right to play a part in determining living conditions". Konate, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 11, at 11, para. 54. 
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whether or not a State has achieved that objective, any definition 
will have to be given enough flexibility to take into account the 
differing nature of each State's social and economic systems, and 
the need for the provision to stand the test of time. For example, it 
would not be appropriate for a precise figure to be given as a definition of "fair wages" in article 7(a)(i). Other human rights bodies have similarly asserted the dynamic nature of human rights 
obligations. 162 However at present, many of the provisions within 
the Covenant remain excessively general. The main problem that 
faces the Committee in defining those standards, is establishing a 
normative balance that reflects both predictability and flexibility. 
VII) "PROGRESSIVE ACHIEVEMENT" 
The dominant characteristic of obligations concerning 
economic, social and cultural rights must be their "progressive" 
nature. Although more recently such rights have been included in 
the African Charter on the same basis as civil and political 
rights, 163 they are generally considered to be incapable of 
immediate implementation owing to the considerable expense 
involved in their realization. All major instruments relating to 
economic, social and cultural rights provide therefore for 
implementation in a piecemeal fashion. 164 The requirement in the 
ICESCR that the rights be realized progressively can be contrasted 
with the undertaking in the ICCPR to "respect and to ensure" the 
rights recognized in the Covenant. 165 Considerable debate has 
centred upon whether the obligation in the ICCPR is in itself 
immediate. 166 Particular emphasis has been placed upon the 
162 With regard to the ECHR see, Tyrer Case, Eur. Court H. R., Series A, 
Vol. 26, Judgement of April 25 1978, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1. 
163 African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples'Rights, (1981), 21 I. L. M. 
59. 
164 Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on 
Human Rights speaks of progressive achievement. O. A. S. Treaty Series No. 69, 
Nov. 17 1988. Article 20 of the European Social Charter (1961), allows States 
Parties to select which articles (over and above a minimum) they consider 
themselves bound to. 
165 See, Buergenthal, supra, note 20. 
166 With the view that civil and political rights are resource dependent 
themselves and therefore capable only of progressive implementation, see, 
Jhabvala F., "Domestic Implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights". 32 Neth. I. L. R. 461 (1985). Contra, Schwelb E., "Notes on the Early 
Legislative History of the Measures of Implementation of the Human gs 
Covenants", in I Ren6 Cassin Amicorum Discil2ulorumque, 301 (1969); 
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economic consequences of implementation of civil and political 
rights. Alston and Quinn comment in this vein: 
"the reality is that the full realization of civil and 
political rights is heavily dependent both on the 
availability of resources and the development of the 
necessary societal structures. The suggestion that 
realization of civil and political rights requires only 
abstention on the part of the state and can be achieved 
without significant expenditure is patently at odds 
with reality". 167 
The practice of the Human Rights Committee seems to bear out the 
conclusion agreed during the drafting process that "the notion of 
implementation at the earliest possible moment was implicit in 
article 2" of the ICCPR. 168 
Whereas the European Social Charter provides for the 
immediate implementation (with a few exceptions such as article 
12(3)) of a selected number of rights, 169 the ICESCR and the 
Protocol to the Inter-American Convention require the 
progressive implementation of all of the rights. The difference is 
one of emphasis in that the Social Charter concentrates upon the 
full realization of a selection of rights, whereas the ICESCR gives 
legal recognition to steps being taken towards the full realization 
of all the rights. Not only does the ICESCR require action to be 
taken immediately over the whole set of rights, it also has regard 
to the process by which the rights are realized. 
Concern was expressed during the drafting of the Covenant 
that reference to progressive achievement would allow States to 
Schachter 0., supra, note 72, at 324. A debate on this issue is to be found in 
Correspondence in the Human Rights Quarterly: Humphrey J., "Letter to the 
Editor", 6 Hum. Rts. Q., 539 (1984); Jhabvala F., "Letter to the Editor", 7 
Hum. Rts. Q,, 242 (1985); Iwasawa Y., "Letter to the Editor", 7 Hum. Rts. Q., 
565(1985). 
167AIston and Quinn, supra, note 6, at 172. 
168 UN Doc. A/5655, para. 23,18 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item. 48), (1963). It might be argued that a similar comment could be made about the 
obligation in article 2(l) ICESCR notwithstanding the reference to available 
resources. 
169 Article 20, European Social Charter (1961). At minimum, States parties 
are obliged to consider themselves bound by at least five specified articles and 
not less than 10 articles altogether. Some States have accepted obligations 
relating to all of the rights in the Charter. See generally, Harris D., The European 
Social Chartur, (1984). 
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postpone the realization of the rights indefinitely170 or entirely 
avoid their obligations. 171 The majority however did not agree 
with this view; it was felt that implementation should be continued 
"without respite"172 so that full realization could be achieved "as 
quickly as possible". 173 These concerns have been reflected by the 
Committee in its General Comment No. 3, where it states: 
"the fact that realisation over time, or in other words 
progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant should 
not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of 
all meaningful content. It is on the one hand a 
necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of 
the real world and the difficulties involved for any 
country in ensuring full realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the 
phrase must be read in the light of the overall 
objective, indeed the raison d'etre, of the Covenant 
which is to establish clear obligations for States 
parties in respect of the full realisation of the rights in 
question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that 
goal. "174 
Thus, far from viewing the phrase "progressive realisation" as a 
let-out clause, the Committee has sought to give it a meaning that 
supplements the meaning of other phrases within article 2(l). 
According to its analysis, States may not delay in their efforts to 
realise the rights, 175 and indeed they must take the course which 
would achieve that objective in the shortest possible time. 
170 UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 61, at 20. 
171 Chile, E/CN. 4/SR. 273, at 8 (1952). The Eastern European countries 
were concerned that the references to resources and progressive achievement in 
article 20) created "so many restrictions and exceptions that its entire 
significance would evaporate". Ukraine, E/CN. 4/SR. 233, at 9 (1951). 
172 Egypt, E/CN. 4/SR. 233, at 10 (1951). The replacement of the words "by 
stages" with "progressive" during the drafting was thought to have this effect on 
the meaning of the article. 
173 Volio (Costa Rica), A/C. 3/SR. 1202, at 338, para. 27 (1962). It should be 
noted however that the Costa Rican amendment for the establishment of a general 
time-limit for implementation of the rights was rejected. Opponents felt that 
States should be entitled to proceed according to a time scale determined by their 
own resources. See, Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 118 1, at 237, para-26 (1962). 
174 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 10, at 85. 
175 See also, Alston. ) E/C. 12/1990/SR. 21, at 7, para. 21. 
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Ine obligation thus outlined would appear to require a 
continuous improvement of conditions over time without 
backward movement of any kind- in what may be described as a 
form of ratchet effect. The Committee comments in this regard: 
"... any deliberately retrogressive measures... would 
require the most careful consideration and would need 
to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the 
rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context 
of the full use of the maximum of available 
resources. "176 
Notably the Committee does not present retrogressive measures as 
primafacie violations of the Covenant, even where they are 
deliberate. It does, however, suggest that any retrogressive step 
would need to be "fully justified". Two forms of justification 
appear to be envisaged by the Committee. First, where the State is 
suffering an economic recession such that, even by utilising "the 
maximum of available resources", a deterioration of the situation 
is inevitable. Secondly, where a retrogressive measure is taken for 
the purpose of improving the situation with regard to the "totality 
of the rights in the Covenant". The Committee, according to this 
second point, appears to legitimise "trade-offs" between rights. It 
might be open for a State, for example, to deliberately increase the 
number of unemployed if the benefits were better wages and a 
higher standard of living for the majority of workers. 
It is submitted, however, that this approach provides States 
with undue lee-way and conflicts with a number of principles that 
underpin the Covenant. First, any retrogressive measure would 
represent a "limitation" on the enjoyment of the rights and 
accordingly should be justified in relation to article 4. This 
requires inter alia that any such limitation must be "determined by 
law" and must promote the "general welfare in a democratic 
society". Secondly, despite the wording of article 4, the Covenant 
was principally intended for the protection of the rights of the 
individual. As such, it cannot be governed solely by strict 
utilitarian principles. Indeed the Committee itself has often 
stressed that the Covenant is a vehicle for the protection of the 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society. 
Certainly some adverse effects may flow from 
well-intentioned measures, but efforts should be made to mitigate 
those effects to the greatest degree possible. However, where 
retrogressive measures were the result of deliberate policy, the 
Committee would do better to consider it a prima facie violation 
176 General Comment NO. 3, supra, note 10,, at 85, para. 9. 
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of the Covenant in absence of further justificatory evidence. 
Admittedly the Committee comes close to this position but does so 
in an excessively tentative manner. 
It is apparent from the terms of the Covenant that the 
principal, but not exclusive, 177 constraint upon the immediate 
realisation of the rights will be the lack of economic resources. It 
follows that where possible, States should achieve the rights 
immediately. This applies in the case of those rights that are not 
dependent for their realisation upon the presence of adequate 
resources, and where the State concerned clearly has adequate 
resources to take the relevant steps. This approach was apparent in 
the drafting of article 2(l). There, the fear that the article would 
become an escape clause for developed States178 was opposed by 
the view that each State must ensure the rights "except in 
circumstances where retarded economic development made that 
impossible". 179 According to this view, developed States are under 
an obligation to implement the provisions of the Covenant 
immediately, the progressive nature of the obligation applying 
only to those States that lack sufficient resources to do so 
themselves. 180 
The Committee however has not taken the view that 
developed States should be bound to implement the obligations 
immediately. On the contrary it has stressed that it can not be 
assumed that the rights are fully realized in developed countries 
despite their economic strength. 181 Indeed it has been unwilling to 
177 In addition, States will have to overcome matters such as existing 
structural impediments within the social and economic system and personal 
ignorance and prejudice. 
178 E. g. Lebanon, UN Doc. E/CNA/SR. 271, at 11 (1952). 
179 Yugoslavia, F, /CN. 4/SR. 233, at 5 (1951). Alston and Quinn have noted 
that supporters of the idea of progressive achievement "viewed it not as an 
escape hatch for states whose performance failed to match their abilities 
... 
(but) 
simply as a necessary accommodation to the vagaries of economic 
circumstances". Supra, note 6, at 175. 
180 This is the view of Kartashkin V., "Covenants on Human Rights and 
Soviet Legislation", 10 H. R. L. J. 97, at 98-99 (1977). In this vein the UK 
representative commented rather ambiguously that the word "progressively" "did 
not in any way mean that States whose social development was adequate would 
not be bound by the obligations laid on them in the Covenant". E/CNA/SR. 237, 
at 10 (195 1). 
181 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 8, at 6, para. 22; Neneman, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 20, at 5, para. 21. 
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accept statements of government representatives claiming that the 
rights are fully implemented in their country. 182 
The Committee has emphasised, on the other hand, that even 
developed States have specific problems that limit their ability to 
secure the rights for the whole of the population. As such there has 
been an awareness that the high cost of welfare institutions. 183 
ageing populations, 184 and rising unemployment185 can represent 
significant problems for developed countries. 186 The dynamic 
approach of the Committee as to the objectives in the Covenant187 
has led it to require information on the "progress made"188 and the 
problems encountered in the realization of the rights even in 
respect to developed countries. As will be noted below, the 
Committee has similarly not accepted the dominance of economic 
considerations as an excuse for avoidance of a State's commitment 
under the Covenant. 
Whereas failure to act may clearly be identified as a breach 
of State responsibility, in the majority of cases it will be 
particularly difficult for the Committee to evaluate whether or not 
a State has taken the appropriate course of action. Outside the 
difficulties of measuring progressive achievement, whether or not 
a situation improves will not be conclusive as regards State 
responsibility. If the situation deteriorates (for example with an 
increase in numbers of homeless families), that has to be directly 
attributable to State action or inaction for a violation of the 
Covenant to be established. Even where the State was directly 
responsible, the Committee suggests that it will not necessarily find 
a violation of the Covenant. On the other hand, if the situation 
182 See the Committee's reaction to the Austrian representative's statement 
that its domestic situation was fully in conformity with the Covenant. 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 4, at 2, para. 3. 
183 The Committee expressed some concern over the expense of social 
welfare institutions in Sweden. E/C. 12/1988/SR. 9. 
184 This was the reason given by the Polish representative as the main 
obstruction to the implementation of Poland's new social policy in 1989. 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 5 at 2, para. 5. 
185 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 14, at 9, para. 30. 
186 E. g. Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 4, para. 13. 
187 See below, text accompanying notes 159-162. 
188 Article 16 requires that States submit reports on the measures adopted and 
the progress made in achieving observance of the fights in the Covenant. The 
notion of progress is central to the obligations of States under the Covenant. 
Sparsis, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 10, para. 58. 
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improves, it is not necessarily the case that the State will have 
taken the appropriate path. For example, it may have been able to 
achieve more in the given circumstances. To intervene at this 
stage, it is clear that the Committee will have to consider the 
possible alternative courses of action open to the State (including 
the allocation of resources) and weigh up the competing priorities. 
Here it is particularly difficult for the Committee to evaluate State 
action without becoming entirely prescriptive as to the course of 
action to be taken. 
VHI) "RIGHTS RECOGNIZED" 
Under a strict reading of the Covenant, the general clause in 
article 2(l) should apply only to those "rights recognized" in the 
Covenant. A certain number of provisions either do not contain 
the word "recognize" or fail to refer to a "right", suggesting that 
they should fall outside the scope of its application. 
With regard to the former, articles 3 and 8 refer to an 
undertaking to "ensure"; articles 13(3) and 15(3) to an undertaking 
to "respect"; and article 2(2) requires States to "guarantee" the 
exercise of the rights without discrimination. Such articles contain 
no mention of the word "recognize". It might be argued that as 
such articles do not contain this essential "trigger word", they are 
no longer covered by the terms of article 2(l) and therefore must 
be implemented immediately. This conclusion is supported by the 
fact that the terms "respect" and "ensure" are to be found in article 
2(l) ICCPR which requires immediate realisation. 189 Similarly the 
obligation to "guarantee" suggests an undertaking considerably 
more stringent than that found in article 2(l). 190 However, 
although it was recognised during the drafting of the Covenant that 
article 8 was to be implemented immediately, it was less clear 
whether this was also intended to be the case for articles 13(3), 
15(3) or 2(2). 191 
189 The obligation to "respect" has been interpreted to be an aspect of the 
general obligation implying State abstention. See above, text accompanying 
notes 20-27. 
190 The term "guarantee" was rejected in the drafting of article 2(l) as being 
too "onerous in the circumstances". Nissot (Belgium), E/CN. 4/SR. 272, at 10 (1952). 
191 Denmark (ýAr Sorensen) commented that only trade union rights were of 
immediate application. E/CNA/SR. 236, at 21 (1951). A Chilean amendment (E/CN. 4/L. 62/Rev. 2) for the immediate application of article 7(a)(i) providing 
for equal remuneration for work of equal value was rejected. E/CN. 4/SR. 28 1, at 
14(1952). 
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r" 
I he Committee has referred to the immediate realisation 
inter alia of articles 3,8,13(3), and 15(3). 192 To a large extent, 
these provisions would appear to be capable of immediate 
realisation. Whether or not article 2(l) is said to apply to these 
provisions, it is submitted that priority has to be given to the 
specific terminology within the substantive articles themselves. 
Accordingly, it would not be open for States to rely upon the 
terms of article 2(1) to delay the application of those provisions. 
A similar concern relates to articles 10 and 14 which make 
no reference to "rights". 193 Article 14 on the one hand, is a 
contingency provision that specifies a specific time period within 
which States should adopt a plan for the progressive 
implementation of the principle of compulsory primary education. 
There is no room in this case for the provision to be implemented 
in a progressive fashion. 
On the other hand, article 10 refers to special protection that 
"should" exist for the family, mothers and children. it is arguable 
that the use of the word "should" implies nothing more than a 
moral obligation upon States to undertake protective measures. 
The Covenant however, was drafted specifically with the intent to 
put into binding fon-n some of the provisions found in the UDHR. 
It can not be assumed that its provisions do not possess legal force 
unless there are overriding indications otherwise. 194 More 
conclusively however, neither the Committee nor any of the States 
parties, have made any differentiation between article 10 and the 
other rights in terms of their legally binding nature. 
Given the legal nature of such an obligation, the immediacy 
of implementation is particularly clear in relation to article 10(l) 
and 10(3). These provisions, relating to the protection of the 
family and of children, are particularly reminiscent of articles 23 
and 24 ICCPR and should perhaps be treated in a similar manner. 
Article 10(2) however seems to be the exception. It refers to the 
provision of paid leave or social security benefits for working 
mothers during childbirth, and thus requires State financial input, 
192 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 10, at 84, para. 5. 
193 These articles reflect the great emphasis placed upon obligations in the 
terms of the Covenant. The representative of the ELO noted during the drafting 
that the ICESCR reflected a middle road between the citation of a number of 
rights on the one hand and the establishment of government obligations on the 
other. E/C. 14/AC. 14/SR. 1, at 32 (195 1). 
it * 194 See,, Bemhardt R., "Treaties 
, 
in, EncycIpRedia of Public Intemational 
Law, Vol. 7,459, at 460 (1984). 
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placing it within the category of rights that were intended to be 
implemented progressively. 
The mere fact that article 10 makes no specific reference to 
"rights" does not prevent those provisions being treated in a 
similar manner to the other provisions in the Covenant. The 
Committee in its reporting guidelines refers to "rights" in article 
10,195 and specifically to the right to enter into marriage with full 
and free consent. 196 It is to be assumed that as article 2(1) was 
intended to outline State obligations with respect to all the 
substantive articles, it should also apply to article 10 
notwithstanding the lack of specific reference to "rights". 
Although article 2(l) refers to the "rights recognised" in the 
Covenant, this should be interpreted as including the rights both 
specifically and implicitly recognised. Thus even where the 
substantive articles provide that the States should "ensure" a right, 
it could be said that they should, at the very least, recognise that 
right. This would lead to the more satisfactory conclusion that 
article 2(1) does indeed apply to all the substantive rights within 
Part III of the Covenant. It does not however require that such 
rights should all be applied in a progressive manner. As seen 
above, the realisation of the rights should be taken "without 
delay". In cases where the realisation of the rights is not impeded 
by lack of resources, they should be put into effect immediately. 
IX) "TO THE MAXIMUM OF ITS AVAILABLE 
RESOURCES" 
Perhaps the most overstated characteristic of economic, 
social and cultural rights is their reliance upon economic 
resources. It has been the major consideration in differentiating 
between economic, social and cultural rights from civil and 
political rights, and was the primary justification both for allowing 
States to implement the rights in a progressive manner and for 
having a reporting system as the means of supervision. 
As noted above, the fact that the implementation of the 
rights was considered to be contingent upon economic resources, 
did not, in the drafters eyes, constitute an excuse for States to 
delay in the realisation of the rights. 197 It was merely a 
recognition of the fact that many States did not have sufficient 
195 Reporting Guidelines, UN Doc. E/1991/23, Annex IV, 98-99, UN 
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), (1991). 
1 gro Ibid, at 97. 
197 See above, text accompanying note 174. 
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resources to undertake the large-scale action required by the Covenant immediately. 
On a general level the Committee has shown that the 
economic situation of a country will be taken into consideration in 
its evaluation of State reports. 198 In particular it has found itself 
bound to use different yardsticks to judge the efforts of States with 
varying economic circumstances. 199 It has thus resorted to the use 
of national benchmarks as an initial indicator of State compliance 
with the obligations in the Convention. 200 As such, State's are 
given a degree of discretion in the assessment of what resources 
are available. 201 This does not mean, however, that the Committee 
will defer entirely to State assessments of the situation, or that it 
has no right to express opinions on the adequacy of govenunental 
budgetary appropriations. 202 
It was apparent even in the drafting of the Covenant that a State's resources were not limited merely to those which it 
198 A "contextual approach" has sometimes been advocated. Badawi El 
Sheikh, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 7, at 4, para. 13; Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 12, at 4, 
para. 18. 
199 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 8, at 3, para. 5; Konate, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 6, para. 36. Rather ambiguously Texier has also 
commented the "the Committee did in fact use the same criteria to evaluate the 
efforts made by countries, but it took account of their levels of development 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 23, at 11, para. 103. 
A differentiation should perhaps be made on between qualitative and 
quantitative criteria. Whereas it is possible to evaluate State performance on the 
same qualitative criteria of homelessness for example, the quantitative aspect will 
vary considerably according to the social and economic position of the country 
concerned. However it is particularly difficult to separate the two forms of data, 
particularly as quantitative criteria are dependent upon qualitative assumptions. 
Moreover it is difficult to imagine that a particular set of considerations can be 
used universally to describe the notion of poverty for example. 
In reality the Committee has not stipulated the use of particular qualitative 
criteria, such as the P. Q. L. I. for example, but it is assumed that a certain amount 
of comparison will be made between countries on whatever measure of 
assessment that a State chooses. For human rights studies using such data see 
e. g., Park H., "Human Rights and Modernization: A Dialectical Relationship", 2 
Uni. H. R.,, 85 (1980); Dasgupta P., "Well-Being and the Extent of its Realization 
in Poor Countries", 100 The Economic Rev. No. 400,1 (1990). 
200 See e. g. Rattray, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 19, at 7, para. 41. 
201 See above, note 59. 
202Such a view has been criticised by Alston and Quinn, supra, note 6, at 
178-9. 
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provided for the purpose. 203 The evaluation of what resources are 
considered to be available was thus an objective one. The non- 
absolute nature of State's discretion in this regard has been 
underscored by the approach of the Committee which has 
concerned itself to an extent with issues of government 
expenditure. 204 There is some evidence that members of the 
Committee will evaluate whether a State is complying with its 
obligations by assessing whether the proportion of G. N. P. or 
G. D. P. spent on public services is adequate. 205 However the 
various demands for public expenditure obviously have to be 
carefully weighed, a process in which the Committee would seem 
reluctant to interfere. 206 Its policy has been centred more upon 
promoting democratic participation in the decision-making process 
and the prioritisation of action in favour of the vulnerable and 
disadvantaged. 207 
203 A US proposal (E/CN. 4/L. 54/Rev. 1) was to include the words "for their 
purpose" after "maximum of available resources", to stress that a State is only 
expected to use "the maximum which could be expended for a particular purpose 
without sacrificing essential services". Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 271, at 3 (1952). The amendment was rejected primarily because of its narrow scope in 
that it might give governments room to argue that minimal allocations are 
sufficient. See e. g. Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 271, at 4 (1952). 
204 That the Committee has not made any really clear statement on this point 
is perhaps due to the extremely sensitive nature of the issue. As the Danish 
representative said in the drafting of the Covenant, "It would be unrealistic to 
attempt to dictate to States how they should allocate their resources in that 
respect". E/CNA/SR. 236, at 20 (1951). 
205 For example one member of the Committee intimated that he felt that an 
expenditure of only 5% of a State's G. N. P. on social security was inadequate. 
Neneman, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 11, para. 52. Comparative analysis is often 
used to assess the adequacy of expenditure. See e. g. Neneman, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 9, para. 5 1; ibid, 1990/SR. 44, at 11, para. 5 1. 
206 See e. g. Wimer Zambrano, E/C. 12/199 l/SR. 15, at 3, para. 6. It was 
suggested by an expert from UNDP that if a State allocated 20% of its budget to 
military expenditure and only 5% to education, there were grounds for thinicing 
that there was a violation of the Covenant, Schulenburg (United Nations 
Development Programme), E/C. 12/199 l/SR. 2 1, at 11, para. 56. Indeed the 
UNDP stresses in its 1990 report that "many countries spend a high proportion 
of their budgets and GDPs on defence, offering great potential for switching 
resources towards the social sectors", UNDP, Human Develgpment Roort 
1990, at 76 (1990). Committee members have suggested that ihis is an area in 
which the Committee might progress in future, Alston, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 21, at 
11, para. 56. 
207 Limburg principle 28 reads: 
"In the use of the available resources due priority shall be given to 
the realisation. of rights recognized in the Covenant,, mindful of 
100 
More clearly, cases where the proportion of a particular State's G. D. P. spent on social and economic services has declined, 
have been critically examined by the Committee. 208 It has 
questioned the increase in spending in other sectors such as defence209 and has implied that where there is no apparent justification for such a reduction the State might be considered to 
have violated its obligations under the Covenant. 210 Although this 
may be an appropriate approach, it must be stressed that evaluating State performance solely by input would be misconceived as it fails 
to take account of the extent to which it was received by the needy. 
As noted above, the Committee has recognised the need for 
resources to be utilised in an effective manner. 211 
When assessing the amount of money available it is clear 
that the Committee is prepared to take into account not only 
domestic resources but also any international resources that may 
be used by the State concerned. 212 In addition it is considered that 
a State is under an obligation to seek international assistance in 
times of crisis. 213 The issue remains nonetheless as to the 
circumstances in which a State may refuse international aid. 
T11e Committee however is careful not to allow States to 
overplay the problems of development. 214 It has adopted the 
the need to assure to everyone the satisfaction of subsistence 
requirements as well as the provision of essential services. " 
Supra, note 54, at 26. 
208 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 7, para. 44. 
209 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 2, para. 25. 
210 Ibid. It is unlikely that the Committee will accept the argument that a 
government wishes to decrease public expenditure to improve the economy. This 
might well lead it into collision course with governments that espouse such a 
philosophy. 
211 See above, text accompanying notes 176-9. 
212 See e. g. Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 7, at 3, para. 7; Simma, ibid, SR. 11, at 
3, para. 11. This conforms to paragraph 26 of the Limburg Principles which 
states: 
... Its available resources' refers to both the resources within a 
State and those available from the international community 
through international cooperation and assistance. " 
Supra, note 54, at 26. 
213 See e. g., Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 9, para. 55. Alston 
argues that this is particularly the case where widespread starvation would 11 otherwise occur. Alston P., "International Law and the Human Right to Food 
in Alston P. and Tomasevski K(eds), Ilie Right To Food, 9, at 43 (1984). 
214 See e. g. Marchan ROmerO, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 8, para. 36. 
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philosophy that economic hardship should bring considerations of 
economic, social and cultural rights into particular focus. This 
approach has been forcefully argued by one member of the Committee: 
"'Me Covenant had sometimes been described as a 
'good weather instrument' which was a product of the 
exaggerated optimism of the 1960's about the 
possibility of sustained economic growth. It was stated 
to be losing importance because of current world- 
wide economic conditions. 11at attitude was based on 
false reasoning: just as conditions of political unrest 
constituted the decisive test for the relevance of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
so, in time of economic crisis, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
should assume its most important function- that of a 
last ditch defence for the most vulnerable. "215 
As such the Committee has stressed that debt-servicing 
problems, 216 austerity programmes, 217 economic recession, 218 or 
simple poverty, 219 although to be considered, can not exempt a 
State from its obligations under the Covenant. Indeed some 
members have gone so far as to say that the Committee does not 
concern itself with matters of economic development. 220 Such an 
approach has been characterised by two main principles. 
First, as was stated by the Committee in its General 
Comment: 
it 
... 
even where the available resources are 
demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a 
State party to strive to ensure the widest possible 
enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing 
circumstances. "221 
The assumption that underlies such a position is that in cases such 
as these, there still remains scope to improve the position of the 
disadvantaged by more effective and equitable use of existing 
215 Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 15, at 3, para. 7. 
216 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 21, at 9, para. 33. 
217 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 17, at 7, para. 3 1. 
218 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 15, at 3, para. 10. 
219 E/C. 12/1990/CRP. 1/Add. 7, at 12. 
220 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 11, para. 59. 
221 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 5, at 86, para. 11. 
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resources. 222 Thus members of the Committee have advocated 
methods such as taxation223 and agrarian reform224 to combat 
poverty in countries experiencing economic hardship. 225 Indeed 
one member of the Conunittee argued that a State could only 
absolve itself of its responsibility for improving the well-being of 
the disadvantaged by claiming special circumstances and invoking 
article 4.226 Outside the achievement of any substantive progress, 
the Committee still expects States, as a minimum, to undertake the 
basic procedural obligations of monitoring the situation, and 
devising strategies and programmes for the realisation of the 
rights as provided in General Comment No. 1.227 Undertaking such 
basic obligations have been considered necessary to demonstrate 
good faith on the part of the State concerned. 228 
This principle reflects a particular approach to the question 
of economic development. It seems to be the position of the 
majority of the Committee that the process of economic growth 
222 The Committee has expressed significant interest in the question of 
equality as one of the objectives of the Covenant. See e. g. Sparsis, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 12, para. 63; E/C. 12/1990/SR. 18, at 13, para. 75. 
A State experiencing economic difficulties would equally be expected to 
secure those rights that are not contingent on resources. 
223 See, Butragueno, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 13, at 9, para. 43. 
224 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 13, at 9, para. 33. 
225 The question of redistribution on a large scale is quite controversial. As a 
method for realization of economic, social and cultural rights on its own it is 
criticised on the basis that it "might produce disincentives to production and 
attendant dislocations to the point where the position of the least advantaged 
might in fact be lowered instead of raised towards the full-scale implementation 
of socio-economic rights. " Andreassen B-A., Skalnes T., Smith A. and Stokke 
H., "Assessing Human Rights Performance in Developing Countries: The Case 
for a Minimum Threshold Approach to the Economic and Social Rights", in 
Andreassen B-A. and Eide A. (eds), Human Rights in Developing Countries 
1987\88,333 at 342 (1988). Other commentators, recognizing the political 
sensitivity of full scale redistribution, have argued for a hybrid strategy of 
redistribution during growth to be implemented in an incremental fashion. See, 
Donnelly J., "Human Rights and Development: Complementary or Competing 
Concerns? ", in Shepherd G. and Nanda. V. (eds), Human Rights and Th 
World Develgpment, 27, at 42-44 (1985). 
226 He continued to remark that the implementation of an austerity 
programme could not "exempt the government from its responsibility to promote 
the well-being of the poorest". Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 17, at 7, para-31. 
227 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 5, at 86, para. 11. 
228 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 3, at 3, para. 7. Underdevelopment is not 
the only cause for special treatment, other cases can be natural disasters and 
wars. Fofana, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 4, at 5, para. 22. 
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should be combined with the realisation of human rights. 229 The 
idea that certain "trade offs" can be made is implicitly rejected. 230 
For example in the process of development it is held that 
economic, social and cultural rights cannot be sacrificed in favour 
of economic growth. 231 That the Committee has adopted much of 
this thinking is evident in its General Comment No. 2 where it 
remarked that: 
"Adjustment programmes will often be unavoidable 
and that these will often involve a major element of 
austerity. Under such circumstances, however, 
endeavours to protect the most basic economic, social 
and cultural rights become more, rather than less, 
urgent. States parties to the Covenant, as well as the 
relevant United Nations agencies, should thus make a 
particular effort to ensure that such protection is, to 
229 A certain number of the Committee have however questioned whether the 
protection of economic, social and cultural rights is indeed compatible with 
economic development One member, for example commented that: 
"The solutions designed to ensure that States fulfilled their 
obligations under the Covenant were not always suited to the 
needs of individual countries: in some cases, for instance, the 
over-protection of economic rights might make the debt problem 
even worse. 19 
Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 2, at 5, para. 20. Cf. also, Rattray, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 17, at 17, para. 90. 
230 Donnelly identifies "needs", "equality" and "liberty" trade-offs. Simply 
speaking, the "needs trade-off' is one which justifies high levels of absolute 
poverty in the short run to minimize the economic and human cost in the long 
run. The "equality trade-off' recognizes the economic benefits of maintaining 
income inequality during periods of growth. Finally the "liberty trade-off ' sees 
the suspension of various civil and political rights as being helpful to the 
establishment of an effective development policy. He argues that such 
"categorical trade-offs of the conventional wisdom are not merely unnecessary 
but often harmful to both development and human rights". Donnelly J., supra, 
note 225, at 27-29. See also, Goodin R., "The Development-Rights Trade-Off: 
Some Unwarranted Economic and Political Assumptions, " 1 Uni. H. R., 31 (1979). 
231 The idea that benefits from greater growth might "trickle down" to the 
disadvantaged sectors of the population has been generally dismissed. See e. g., 
McChesney A., "Promoting the General Welfare in a Democratic Society: 
Balancing Human Rights and Development", 27 Neth. T. LR, 283 (1980); 
Tomasevski, supra, note 22, at 153. 
The Committee noted in its General Comment No. 2 (1990) that "no 
specific development co-operation activity can automatically be presumed to 
constitute a contribution to the promotion of respect for economic, social and 
cultural rights. Many activities undertaken in the name of "development" have 
subsequently been recognized as ill-conceived and even counter productive in 
human rights terms. " Supra, note 17, para. 7. 
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the maximum extent possible, built-in to programmes 
and policies designed to promote adjustment. Such an 
approach, which is sometimes referred to as 
"adjustment with a human face" requires that the goal 
of protecting the rights of the poor and vulnerable 
should become a basic objective of economic 
adjustrnent. "232 
According to this approach, it is indefensible that the poorer 
segments of society should suffer most during economic crises. 233 
It does operate on the assumption however that economic growth 
can be achieved without such sacrifices. 234 
The second basic principle underlined by the Committee, 
which relates closely to the first, is that States are required to 
provide, as a minimum, for the basic needs of the population. 235 In 
its General Comment No. 3, the Committee stated: 
"... the Committee is of the view that a minimum core 
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is 
incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, 
a State party in which any significant number of 
individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of 
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and 
housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, 
primafacie, failing to discharge its obligations under 
the Covenant. 236 
232 General Comment No. 2, supra, note 17. See also, General Comment 
No. 3, supra, note 5, at 86, para. 12. 
233 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/S R. 15, at 3, para. 10. 
234 See, UNICEF Adjustment with a Human Face, Protectine the Vulnerable 
and Promoting Gro Comea. G. A., Jolly R., and Stewart F. (eds), (1987). 
The Committee also implicitly denies the need for a "liberty trade-off '. Its 
recognition of the interdependence of the two categories of rights would lead one 
to assume that it is no more justifiable to sacrifice civil and political rights for the 
purpose of development. Thus in its General Comment No. 2 it stressed that UN 
agencies involved in development issues should "do their utmost to ensure that 
their activities are fully consistent with the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights". For an analysis of the role of civil and political rights in development 
see, Howard R., "The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence From Sub- 
Saharan Africa", 4 Hum. Rts. Q., 467 (1983). 
235 Sparsis has commented that "no State could use its low level of economic 
and social development as a pretext for failing to respond to the basic necessities 
of its population". E/C. 12/1987/SR. 4, at 2, para. 3. 
236 General Comment No. 3, supra,, note 5,, at 86, para. 10. 
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It is apparent that this "minimum threshold approach"237 does not 
entail the division of the rights according to their priority, 238 but 
rather that each right should be realised to the extent that provides 
for the basic needs of every member of society. 239 These 
minimum standards should be achieved by all States, irrespective 
of their economic situation, at the earliest possible moment. 240 All 
available means should be utilised including, if necessary, 
international assistance. 241 
What is less clear is whether these standards are 
international or State-specific. 242 The universal nature of the 
rights in the Covenant suggests that a common core should be 
established for application internationally. 243 The current practice 
of the Committee, in requiring States to establish benchmarks of 
poverty for example, and to identify the disadvantaged sectors of 
the population, suggests that in the short term at least, State- 
specific minimums are the only viable options. 244 There is some 
evidence however, that the Committee intends to establish 
international standards in fUtUre. 245 
237 See generally, Andreassen B-A. et al, supra, note, at 340. Eide A., 
"Realization of Social and Economic Rights and The Minimum Tbreshold 
Approach" 10 H. R. L. J., 35, at 43-47 (1989). 
238 There has been some opposition within the Committee to establishing a 
category of rights that relate to basic needs on the grounds that it undermines the 
interdependence of civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights. 
See e. g. Konate, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 4, at 5, para. 19. 
239 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 8, para. 37. 
240 Alston has endorsed paragraph 25 of the Limburg principles which reads: 
"States parties are obligated, regardless of the level of economic 
development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights 
for all. ft 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 8, para. 40. 
241 See, Taya, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 9, para. 42. 
242 Neneman for example, remarked that "it was rather out of place to speak 
of water, heating and electricity in relation to Masai huts in Africa" and as such it 
was not possible to have universal indicators when speaking of economic, social 
and cultural rights. E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2 1, at 10, para. 42. Andreassen et al, speak 
of country-specific thresholds "measured by indicators measuring nutrition, 
infant mortality, disease frequency, life expectancy, income, unemployment and 
underemployment etc. " Supra, note 225, at 341. 
243 See Tomasevski, supra, note 22, at 151. 
244 See above, text accompanying notes 86-7. 
245 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 4, at 9, para. 43. 
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In its General Comment No. 3, the Committee implies that 
failure to provide for the basic subsistence needs of the population 
may be considered a prima facie violation of the Covenant. 11is 
points to an interesting and as yet unexplored aspect of article 
2(l). 246 'Ibe availability of resources has been seen alternatively as 
a limit on the obligation of the State to implement the rights in full. 247 or as a conditional factor in determining what the State is 
obliged to achieve. 248 This is of considerable importance with 
regard to the question of where the "burden of proof' lies in 
determining whether or not a State has violated its international 
obligations. 249 The former view conceives of the non-realization 
of the rights as a prima facie violation for which a defence of lack 
of resources could be pleaded. The latter sees the obligation itself 
being contingent upon State resources from which a violation can 
only be said to have occurred if the State has not taken measures 
consistent with its resources. 
The general approach of the Committee, with its utilisation 
of national benchmarks and its reluctance to establish actual 
violations. 250 has been to view the obligations themselves as being 
contingent upon the presence of resources. It would appear 
however that this approach has been radically revised by the idea 
of "minimum core obligations". However, in its General 
Comment, the Committee goes on to state that "any assessment as 
to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation 
must also take account of resource constraints applying within the 
246 See also, Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 11, para. 5 1. 
247 See, Fofana, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 4, at 5, para. 22. Badawi El Sheikh, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 9, para. 35. Alston commented in this vein that the 
ICESCR "could be ratified and enter into force even at a time when the 
government was not fully in compliance with the obligations laid down therein". 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 5, para. 19. 
248 Alston and Quinn have remarked that "It is the state of a country's 
economy that most vitally determines the level of its obligations as they relate to 
any of the enumerated rights under the Covenant". Supra, note 6, at 177. 
249 The difficulties in assessing the realization of the rights has been 
recognized by Tomasevski. She maintains that they have increased "by the 
blurring of the distinction between the inability of a government to implement its 
human rights obligations, and its breach of them". Supra, note 22, at 137. 
250 One member of the Committee has commented in this respect that "The 
Committee had not yet established any objective yardstick for determining in 
respect of any particular country whether or not there had been violations of the 
Covenant". Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 15, at 5, para. 2 1. 
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country concerned". 251 'Mis seems to imply that the question of 
resources enters into the discussion at the point of determining 
whether or not the minimum core obligation has been satisfied. 
Indeed, the debate within the Committee clearly showed that it was 
not intended to establish a "presumption of guilt". 252 
It is submitted that there is no way of reading the General 
Comment (in the light of the preceding debate) as anything but 
contradictory upon this point. The General Comment clearly 
mentions the fact that failure to provide for the basic needs of the 
population would amount to a prima facie violation of the 
Covenant. It goes on to state that. 
"... In order for a State party to be able to attribute its 
failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations 
to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate 
that every effort has been made to use all resources 
that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a 
matter of priority, those minimum obligations ". 253 
This must be read as establishing a "presumption of guilt" 
independent of resource considerations. If otherwise, it becomes 
pointless to speak of either minimum core obligations or prima 
facie violations. 
The clear appeal of this approach is that the Committee 
avoids the problems of measuring progress against resource 
availability, of speculating as to alternative courses of action, or of 
acquiring evidence of State responsibility. In cases where 
significant numbers of people live in poverty and hunger, it is for 
the State to show that its failure to provide for the persons 
concerned was beyond its control. 
Nevertheless there are a number of problems not yet 
explored by the Committee. First, there is the obvious problem of 
establishing minimum thresholds for the rights that may be 
operated on an international basis. It remains to be seen whether 
the Committee has the ability to produce standards of sufficient 
precision and flexibility. Secondly, in placing the emphasis on 
it minimum" core obligations for the fulfilment of what might be 
termed "basic needs", the Committee will primarily direct its 
attention to the actions of developing States. That the developing 
States will be treated differently from the developed States may 
open the Committee to the criticism that it is not being entirely 
251 Ibid. 
252See, Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 48, at 9, para. 43. 
253 General Comment No-3, supra, note 5, at 86, para. 10. 
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even-handed. Finally, this approach may obscure the fact that 
much of the responsibility for poverty and deprivation in the 
world lies with the developed States' approach to trade and 
development. In that sense, responsibility should be placed upon 
the international community and not merely confined to the 
it it victim State 
. 
X) "INDIVIDUALLY AND THROUGH 
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND 
CO-OPERATION. ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC AND 
TECHN 
As we have seen, the need for international assistance is 
already foreseen to some extent by the idea that "available 
resources" in article 2(l), refers not merely to national resources 
but also international ones. 254 There seems to be a general 
understanding that the full realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights in developing countries, is to some extent dependent 
upon the provision of international assistance. 255 Although the 
primary obligation must be seen to be upon the State to do 
everything within its power to realise the rights within the 
254 At a textual level this has parallels with articles 11 (1), 11 (2), 22 and 23. 
Article 11 (1) provides that States recognize the importance of international co- 
operation based on free consent in the realisation of the rights to adequate food, 
clothing, housing and the continuous improvement of living conditions. Article 
11(2) requires that States take measures individually and through international co- 
operation, towards the realization of the right to be free from hunger. Article 22, 
although primarily a procedural provision, recognises the role of United Nations 
organs and specialized agencies in the provision of technical assistance to States 
parties. Finally article 23 provides that the States Parties agree that the 
achievement of the rights recognised in the Covenant includes inter alia the 
furnishing of technical assistance. 
Such provisions specify little beyond the requirements for co-operation 
and technical assistance referred to in article 2(l). As noted earlier, the reiteration 
of passages from article 2(l) in the substantive articles following has no specific 
consequence. On a broad reading of article 2(l) then, it would follow that these 
references add little to the existing State obligations. 
255 This seems to have been the concern of the drafters in including the 
provision on international co-operation. Cassin commented in this respect: 
"[B]y providing for recourse to international co-operation instead 
of allowing the enjoyment of certain rights to be put off, it fined 
the gap between what States could in fact do and the steps they 
would have to take to meet their obligations under the Covenant. "
E/CNA/SR. 216, at 6 (1951). 
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Covenant, 256 it is recognised that lack of resources might oblige 
some States to look to the international community for assistance 
to that end. 257 
Although there seems to be agreement that the rights in the 
Covenant are contingent to a degree, on the provision of 
international assistance, the nature, scope and obligatory nature of 
such assistance is unclear. The Committee, in its General Comment 
No. 3 has done little in the way of elaborating upon the nature of 
the obligation. It states: 
"The Committee wishes to emphasise that in 
accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, with well-established principles of 
international law, and with the provisions of the 
Covenant itself, intemational co-operation for 
development and thus for the realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States. 
It is particularly incumbent upon those States which 
are in a position to assist others in this regard. The 
Committee notes in particular the importance of the 
Declaration on the Right to Development adopted by 
the General Assembly in its resolution 41/128 of 4 
December 1986 and the need for States parties to take 
full account of all of the principles recognised therein. 
It emphasises that, in the absence of an active 
programme of international assistance and 
co-operation on the part of all those States that are in 
a position to undertake one, the full realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights will remain an 
unfulfilled aspiration in many countries. 11258 
2% The Mexican representative noted during the drafting of the Covenant 
that: 
"Economic development had to be based above all on the rational 
and efficient use of a country's own resources and on the hard 
work of the people; international economic assistance could only 
be supplementary and was mainly a means of counter-acting 
economic maladjustments arising from external causes". 
Mexico (Mr De Santiago Lopez), E/CNA/SR. 1204, at 346, para. 20, (1962). 
257 The mere lack of international assistance however does not excuse a State 
from its obligation to take steps towards the realization of the rights. See above. 
Ile Chilean representative in the drafting of the Covenant, whilst noting that 
international assistance might be necessary for accelerated development, added 
that States were "obliged to take steps individually- whether or not international 
assistance was forthcoming". E/CN. 4/SR. 1203, at 342, para. 11 (1962). 
258 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 5, at 87, para. 14. 
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Article 55 of the U. N. Charter specifies as one of the purposes of 
the United Nations the promotion of "higher standards of living, 
full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress 
and development". 259 Under article 56, member States pledge 
themselves "to take joint and separate action in co-operation with 
the organization" to this end. These principles have been further 
expanded in the "Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". 260 Not only 
is the Charter vague as to the meaning of international 
co-operation, but the Declaration does not seem to elucidate much 
further. 261 All that might be concluded from the provisions of the 
Charter is that "there is a clear commitment to do something for 
the achievement of the purposes mentioned in article 55; there is 
certainly no right to do nothing". 262 
It is apparent from the discussion prior to the adoption of 
the General Comment, that it was felt mention should be made of 
the Declaration on the Right to Development263 as reflecting the 
context in which economic, social and cultural rights are to be 
2-% Article 1(3) of the Charter similarly states as one of the main purposes of 
the United Nations "to achieve international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character". 
260 GA Resn. 2625 (XXV), (Oct. 24 1970) 25 UN GAOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. 28), (1970). 
261 Although expanding in greater detail the areas in which co-operation is 
required, including in particular human rights, it does not elucidate the nature or 
the scale of co-operation envisaged. Arangio-Ruiz comments that the provisions 
in the Declaration are purely "reiterations in different words of the statement hat 
States should co-operate. " Arangio-Ruiz G., The UN Declaration on Friendly 
Relations and the System of the Sources of International Law, at 143 (1979). 
Alston and Quinn conclude that the Declaration "attests implicitly to the absence 
of any consensus among States as to the precise meaning of the duty to co- 
operate. " Alston and Quinn, supra, note 6, at 18 8. 
262 Verwey W., The Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
and the Realization of the Right to Development and Welfare, at 22 (1980). See 
also, Van Hoof F., "Problems and Prospects with Respect to the Right to 
Food", in Van Dijk P. et al. (eds), Restructuring the International Economic 
Order. The Role of Law and Lawyers, 107, at 117 (1987). 
2W See, The Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Resn. 41/128, (Dec. 4 1986),. For recent studies on the right to development see, Van Boven 
T., "Human Rights and Development- Rhetorics and Realities", in Nowak M., 
Steurer D. and Tretter H-(eds), Festschrift ftir Felix Ermacor , 575 (1988); TOrk D., "'Ibe Human Right to Development", in Van Dijk P., Van Hoof F., Koers 
A. and Mortelmans K(eds), Restructuring the International Economic Order: 
The Role of Law and Lawyers, 85 (1986); Rich R., "The Right to Development: 
A Right of Peoples? ", in Crawford J., The Rights of Peoples, 39 (1988). 
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achieved. 264 The Committee would thus appear to be concerned 
about the international structural constraints that impede the full 
realisation of all human rights, and recognises the existence of a 
link between the requirement of international assistance in the 
Covenant, and the demands for a New International Economic 
Order. 265 As was remarked by one member of the Committee, 
"such phenomena as extreme poverty were not produced in a 
vacuum but reflected a particular international economic 
situation". 266 However, beyond being a broad indication of the 
Committee's general approach, the reference to the Right to 
Development does little to elucidate the precise obligations 
incumbent upon States parties pursuant to the duty to co-operate 
internationally. 
Article 2(l) speaks of "international assistance and co- 
operation, especially economic and technical". It is not clear 
whether the terms "assistance" and "co-operation" have discrete 
meanings. Neither is it obvious whether the terms "economic and 
technical" refer to both forms of international action or merely to 
"co-operation". The Committee has not attempted to explain the 
phrase. It is submitted that "co-operation" is the wider term 
providing for mutual action directed towards a common goal (including mutual-assistance), whereas "assistance" implies the 
provision or transfer of some "good" from one State to another. 
Action, whether co-operation or assistance, in the economic and 
technical fields, would appear to be desirable but does not exclude 
the possibility of other forms of international co-operation. 
Article 23 provides an indicative definition of the 
international action foreseen by article 2(l). It includes "the 
264 See e. g. Nlratchkov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 8, para. 39. 
265 The Mexican representative commented for example, during the drafting 
process, that what was required of international co-operation was "permanent 
international machinery for preventing sudden and excessive fluctuations in the 
prices of primary commodities, which could be disastrous for the developing 
countries". Santiago Lopez (Mexico), E/CNA/SR. 1204, at 346, para. 20 (1962). 
See generally, Ferrero R., The New International Economic Order and the 
Promotion of Human Rights, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1983/24/Rev. 1. 
Paragraph 3 of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order reads: 
"The political, economic, and social well-being of present and 
future generations depends more than ever on co-operation 
between all the members of the international community on the 
basis of sovereign equality and the removal of the disequilibriurn 
that exists between them". 
GA Resn. 3201 (S-VI), (May 1 1974), 
266 Konate, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 21, at 4, para. 3. 
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conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the 
furnishing of technical assistance and the holding of regional 
meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of consultation 
and study". 267 Although all of these matters are of relevance to 
article 2(l) (especially the need for technical assistance), there is 
no mention of the most fundamental form of action, namely 
economic assistance. 
The precise nature of the obligations in this field may be 
usefully analysed by reference to the tripartite typology shown 
above. 268 It may be seen that the obligations to respect, protect and 
ensure operate at the international level just as they do at the 
national level. 269 'Ibus States could be said to have an initial duty 
to restrain themselves from any action that might impede the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights in other 
countries. 270 The Committee has underlined such an obligation, 271 
particularly in relation to the work of the international lending 
agencies. 7hus, in its General Comment No. 2, the Committee 
addressed itself to the issue of the adverse effects of structural 
ad ustment programmes, imposed by the international lending 
agencies, on the realisation of human rights. In particular it 
commented in paragraph 9 that "international measures to deal 
with the debt crisis should take full account of the need to protect 
economic, social and cultural rights through, inter alia, 
international co-operation". 272 In as far as the intemational 
community as a whole has an obligation to take cognisance of 
human rights in its interactions, it is axiomatic that States Parties 
have a similar duty to respect the realisation of the rights in other 
countries. 
With regard to the duty to protect, States would have a duty 
to ensure that all other bodies subject to its control, respect the 
267 Other references to international action may be found in articles 11 (2) and 
23. 
268 See above, text accompanying notes 20-46. 
269 Eide, supra, note 14, at 40; Alston, supra, note 
, 
at 43-45. 
270 This might operate at the level of respecting the self-determination of 
other peoples and their sovereignty over natural resources. Eide also includes 
respect for shared resources and access to a global pool of scientific endeavour. 
Ibid, at 41-42. 
271 A duty to respect the realization of the rights in other countries was 
mentioned by ý& Eide in his address to the Committee at its third session. 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 10, para. 41. It was endorsed by at least one member of 
the Committee. See e. g. Alvarez-Vita, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 21,, at 8,, para. 30. 
272General Comment No. 2, supra, note 17, at 88-89, para. 9. 
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enjoyment of rights in other countries. Thus it has been suggested 
that States have a duty to regulate the action of domestically-based 
corporations to ensure respect for the rights in other countries. 273 
Although the Committee has paid little attention to the activities of 
such corporations, 274 it has recognised this form of obligation as 
regards the international lending agencies. In its General Comment 
No. 2, where the Committee stressed the need for lending agencies 
to respect the basic rights of the population, it addressed not just 
the lending agencies themselves, but also the States parties to the 
Covenant that participate in, and support the work of those 
agencies. 275 Similarly, in its reporting guidelines, the Committee 
requests States to indicate whether any effort is made to ensure 
that when participating in development co-operation, it is used to 
promote the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. 276 
By far the most controversial issue with regard to the issue 
of international co-operation is that which relates to the obligation 
to fulfil. This is often posited in terms of whether there exists an 
obligation on the part of the more wealthy States to give aid to the 
less affluent countries. During the drafting of the Covenant, Chile 
claimed that "international assistance to under-developed countries 
had in a sense become mandatory as a result of commitments 
assumed by States in the United Nations". 277 This was almost 
universally opposed by the other representatives of all the 
groupings involved. 278 The agreed sense of the provision on 
273 Alston, supra, note 
, 
at 44. For the effect of such corporations see, 
Andersen-Speekenbrink C., "The Legal Dimension of socio-cultural effects of 
private enterprise", in De Waart P., Peters P. and Denters E. (eds), International 
Law and Development, 283 (1988). 
274 But see, Wimer Zambrano, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 2 1, at 8, para. 32. 
275 General Comment No. 2, supra, note 17. 
276 Reporting Guidelines, supra, note 195. 
277 E/CN. 4/SR. 1203, at 342, para. 10 (1962). 
278 E. g. Greece, U. N. Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1204, at 346, para. 14 (1962); USSR, 
U. N. Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1203, at 342, para. 14 (1962); Saudi Arabia, U. N. 
Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1203, at 341, para. 5 (1962); France, U. N. Doc. 
A/C. 3/SR. 1205, at 352, para. 12 (1962). A similar debate arose over the 
Declaration on the Right to Development. Many of the Western States voted 
against or abstained from voting inter alia because of the implication that 
development was to be achieved through the transfer of resources from the 
developed to the developing world. See e. g. statement of the U. K. on behalf of 
the European Community: 
"While the circumstances of the developing countries have 
prompted many aid initiatives on their behalf, this does not at 
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international economic co-operation was that developing States 
were entitled to ask for assistance but not claim it as a legal 
right. 279 The text of article 11 bears out this conclusion. In 
recognizing the role of international co-operation in the realization 
of the rights, it stipulates that it should be based upon "free 
consent". 280 
Nevertheless, members of the Committee have stressed that 
it was not enough for States to refrain from action that Miured 
other States, they should also make positive efforts to promote the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights. 281 This does not 
mean that developed States are required to meet the needs of the 
poorer States, 282 but rather that they are under a duty to provide 
some form of assistance to the developing world. 
In practice, questions have been asked of Sweden, 283 
Norway, 284 the Netherlands285 and Czechoslovakia286 as to the 
extent of their co-operation with of other countries. Members of 
the Committee have also questioned the adequacy of some aid 
programmeS. 287 There is no evidence, however, that the 
Committee expects a specific form of aid to be given, nor does it 
present confer to them a "right" in the strict sense of the word. 
Instruments such as the international development strategy 
provide a fi-amework for international action but constitute 
guidelines rather than legally binding obligations". 
UN Doc. A/41/536, at 16, para. 13 (1986). 
279 Paragraph 33 of the Limburg principles maintains that international co- 
operation and assistance should be based on the sovereign equality of States. 
280 There is sound reasoning behind this position. On the one hand it would 
be a breach of sovereignty on the part of the wealthy State to be required to 
provide aid to a particular country. On the other hand the recipient State should 
not be obliged to accept aid if the aim of the donor country was to exploit the 
relationship to its own economic advantage. This point was made by the 
representative of the Congo during the drafting of th, e Covenant. U. N. 
Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1181, at 237, para. 30 (1962). 
281 See, Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 21, at 8, para. 30. 
282 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22, at 14, para. 87; Muterahejuru, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 11, para. 52. 
283 See, Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 7, para. 28. 
284 See, Alston, E/C. 12/198 8/SR. 13, at 12, para-69. 
285 See, Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 14, at 15, para. 62. 
286 See, Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 14, at 12, para. 38. 
287 See e. g. Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 12, at 12, para. 67. 
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prescribe to whom that aid should go. 288 More attention seems to 
have been placed upon the utilisation of aid once it is received. 289 
Indeed the reporting guidelines merely request information as to 
the role of international assistance in the full realisation of the 
rights (with the exception of article 8). 290 
It is apparent that the current practice in the provision of aid 
to developing countries is quite unsatisfactory from the point of 
view of the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. 
First, in terms of the quality of aid, considerable proportions of 
world aid go to middle- and high-income countries; many "aid 
programmes" have a tenuous link with development; and much aid 
is "tied" to the donor country either in the sense of being 
conditional upon the operation of a trade agreement or being 
linked to the donor country's own firms and exporters. 291 
Secondly, in terms of the quantity of aid, few developed States 
have actually achieved the widely accepted ODA target of 0.7% of 
GNP. In fact in a number of developed countries official aid is less 
than half that figure. 
Whilst there would appear to be considerable scope for 
strengthening States' external obligations in light of these facts, it 
is an area in which States are unlikely, in the foreseeable future, to 
agree to specific demands on the amount or distribution of aid to 
third countries. It is considered, nevertheless, that the Committee 
should begin by looking in more detail at the amount of aid 
provided, and at the manner in which it is distributed. It does not 
have to do so with a view to setting immediate standards but rather 
as an indication of its concern. If it does wish to start imposing 
indicative criteria as to the amount of aid that should be provided 
by developed states, note could be made of the comments of the 
World Bank in its 1990 report: 
"Real growth in aid of only 2 percent a year is an 
unacceptably weak response to the challenge of global 
poverty. The international community needs to do 
better- much better. At a minimum, it should ensure 
288 Shelton argues however, by reference to human rights instruments and 
general principles of law, that there is a duty on States to provide famine 
assistance and contribute to a global food reserve system in the long run. Shelton 
D., "The Duty to Assist Famine Victims", 70 Iowa L. Rev., 1279 (1984-5). Cf. 
MacCalister-Smith P., International Humanitarian Assistance, 67-9 (1985). 
289 See e. g., Taya, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 9, para. 42. 
290 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 195, at 91,94,96,99,103,106,107, 
108, and 110. 
291 World Bank (IBRD), World Development Raort 1990 127-8 (1990). 
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that aid does not fall as a proportion of the donors' 
GNP. "292 
Indeed, even given the vague nature of the obligation to co-operate 
internationally, it would be a clear signal to the Committee that a 
State was not committed to its obligation to assist other States, if 
the amount of aid it provides to other States declines over a 
number of years. 
XI) CONCLUSION 
Article 2(l) was adopted principally as a compromise 
proposal satisfying those who wished to establish binding State 
obligations as regards the economic, social and cultural rights in 
the Covenant, whilst having the necessary flexibility to take into 
account the resource constraints that might impede the immediate 
full realisation of the rights. It is, however, a fairly unsatisfactory 
article in so far as the convoluted nature of its phraseology, in 
which clauses and sub-clauses are combined together in an almost 
intractable manner, makes it virtually impossible to determine the 
precise nature of the obligations. It is hardly surprising that most 
commentators focus merely upon the phrase "with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights", whilst 
ignoring for the most part, the other phrases that accompany it. 
However, given that article 2(1) is central to the definition 
of State obligations with respect to the rights in the Covenant, it is 
the key, not only to the implementation of the substantive articles 
but also to the role of the Committee as a supervisory body. Any 
progress made by the Committee in developing the value of the 
Covenant as a human rights guarantee is conditional upon a clear 
understanding of the precise nature of the State obligations found 
in article 2(1). 
The Committee was quick to recognise this fact and fairly 
early on, with the assistance of the influential Limburg principles, 
came to an understanding as to the broad obligations found in 
article 2(1). This interpretation, which has been encapsulated in its 
General Comment No. 3, has provided the framework for all of its 
work since. The general comment states a number of important 
principles upon which State action should be based. 
In summary, the Committee has considered that States are 
required to take immediate, deliberate, concrete and targeted steps 
towards the realisation of the rights. Whilst legislation is often 
highly desirable and sometimes indispensable, it is not sufficient in 
itself to dispose of State obligations with respect to the Covenant. 
2921bid, at 136. 
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In particular, emphasis should be placed upon the provision of judicial remedies at the national level. States will, however, be 
given a degree of discretion in the deciding what steps are deemed 
to be appropriate. Notwithstanding the progressive nature of the 
obligation, States are required to ensure the satisfaction of, at the 
very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights. Similarly, in times of resource scarcity, States are under an 
obligation to strive for the widest possible enjoyment of the 
relevant rights with particular emphasis being placed upon the 
position of vulnerable members in society. Finally the Committee 
has emphasised the obligation upon States to co-operate 
internationally towards the full realisation of the rights. 
Whilst the General Comment provides a useful textual 
analysis and draws a conceptual picture of the state obligations as 
regards the rights in the Covenant, the principles remain 
generalised and require considerable more detail for it to be 
possible to predict, in a given situation, whether or not a State is 
complying with its obligations under the Covenant. It is clear that 
the Committee should not be unduly prescriptive, but it needs to be 
in a position whereby it is able to evaluate whether or not a State 
has taken the appropriate course of action, and whether it has done 
so to the utmost extent of its resources. 
Particular problems that are immediately apparent are those 
of defining and enforcing the minimum core content of the rights 
and determining when a State has taken sufficient measures to 
dispose of its obligations under the Covenant. First, as regards the 
minimum core content of the rights, it remains to be seen whether 
the Committee has the ability to produce standards of sufficient 
precision and flexibility to take into account the different situations 
world-wide. It might also be questioned whether instituting such a 
standard will not, in fact, serve to focus the Committee's attention 
on the activities of the less affluent countries whilst at the same 
time ignoring the position of the wealthy States. 
Secondly, the Committee faces considerable technical 
difficulties in evaluating whether or not a State has taken the 
appropriate course of action. Not only does it have to find a way 
of accurately measuring progress as regards the enjoyment of the 
rights (particularly at the individual level), but it also has to 
determine whether or not that progress was adequate. It is clear 
that to intervene at this stage, the Committee will have to consider 
the possible alternative courses of action open to the State (including the allocation of resources) and weigh up the competing 
priorities without becoming entirely prescriptive. 
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VALIDITY AND DIRECT EFFECT 
OF THE COVENANT 
I) INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental aim of all human rights treaties is to ensure the 
operation of the standards they contain within the municipal legal 
orders of the States parties. Although much emphasis is commonly 
placed upon the international supervisory mechanisms, as far as the 
individual is concerned, the primary consideration will be the extent to 
which the treaty has effect within the domestic legal system. 1 Ideally, 
international treaty standards should operate within the domestic legal 
system, and should be enforceable through judicial remedies. 2 However, 
in many cases, the principle of legislative sovereignty interposes 
between the ratification and implementation of treaty obligations with 
the effect of limiting the degree to which the individual may rely upon 
those international standards in domestic courts. State practice illustrates 
that the supremacy of the legislative body is ensured either through 
rules which restrict the operation of international law in domestic 
courts ab initio, or through rules that distinguish between treaty 
obligations that require further legislative implementation and those that 
may be relied upon by the courts directly. Whereas the former rules 
relate to the domestic validity of treaties, the latter relate to the direct 
effect of treaty provisions. 3 Each matter will be dealt with separately 
below. 
1 Brudner A., "The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants on 
Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework", 35 Uni. Toronto L. J. 219, at 220 (1985); 
Opsahl T., "Human Rights Today: International Obligations and National 
Implementation", 23 Scand. Stud. L., 149, at 153 (1979); Leary V., International 
Labour Conventions and National law, 36 (1982). 
2 As Tomuschat has commented: 
"... the standards elaborated at the international level should be conveyed 
without any substantial loss to the national level where human beings are 
in need of the Idnd of protection which the relevant international 
instruments purport to provide to them. Failing reliable channels and 
devices for such a transmission, human rights risk being reduced to 
purely political rhetoric". 
Tomuschat C., "National Implementation of International Standards on Human 
Rights", Can. H. R. Y 31, at 32 (1984/5). 
3 For a distinction between these concepts see, Winter J. A., "Direct 
Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community 
Law", 9 C. M. L. R., 425 (1972). 
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H) DOMESTIC VALIDITY 
A) DOMESTIC VALIDITY GENERALLY 
According to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, States parties 
are under a legal obligation to perform their treaty obligations in good 
faith. 4 The requisite changes to domestic law therefore should be made 
on., or pnor to, ratification of the treaty concerned. This is an 
obligation of result which allows each State a measure of discretion as 
to the means by which the treaty obligations are to be given effect in 
domestic law. 5 The State may not, however, invoke domestic law as an 
excuse for avoiding its international obligations. 6 
If a treaty becomes international law for a State upon ratification 
of or accession to that treaty, it does not necessarily become domestic 
law. That ratification or accession may be "only one condition of its 
validity". 7 There are a number of methods by which a treaty might be 
given domestic effect, but little accepted terminology with which to 
describe each one. Perhaps the clearest typology is that adopted by Van 
Dijk who identifies three basic means of giving effect to treaties on the 
domestic plane: adoption, incorporation and transformation. 8 
In States that operate a system of "adoption" (otherwise known as 
"automatic incorporation" 9), international law is treated as part of the 
same legal order as national law in accordance with the "monist 
view". 10 Accordingly, treaty provisions automatically become operative 
in domestic law through the operation of some constitutional provision, 
4 See, article 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U. N. T. S. 
331 (1969). See also, Exchange of Greek and Turkish Lopulations Case (Advisory 
Opinion), P. C. I. J. Rep., Series B, No. 10,20-21 (1925). 
5 Van Dijk P., "Domestic Status of Human-Rights Treaties and the Attitude of 
the Judiciary- The Dutch Case", in Nowak M., Steurer D. and Tretter H. (eds), 
Progress in the Spirit of Human Rights, 634 (1988); Schachter 0., "The Obligation to 
finplement the Covenant in Domestic Law", in Henkin L. (ed), ne International Bill of 
Lights, 311 (1982). 
66 Article 27, Vienna Convention. 
7 Holloway K., Modem Trends in Treaty Law, 248 (1967). 
8 Van Dijk, supra, note 5, at 634. 
9 Sorensen M., "Obligations of a State Party to a Treaty as Regards its 
Municipal Law", in Robertson A. (ed), Human Rijzhts in National and International 
Law, 11, at 14 (1968). 
, 
10 On ltmonism" and "dualism" in international aw see, Brownlie I., Pringiples 
of Public Intemational- Law, 32-34 (4th Ed 1990). 
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yet maintain their international character. 11 This is to be seen in the 
case of France, 12 Belgium, 13 the Netherlands14 and the US15. 
A number of other States (Germany16 and Italy17 for example), 
operate a similar system of adoption but require, in addition, the 
approval of the legislative body or an "order of execution" prior to 
ratification. This is often referred to as a system of "quasi-automatic 
incorporation". 18 The legislative approval has been seen to have two 
functions: it authorises the government to commit the State to the treaty 
obligations, and it simultaneously transforms or incorporates the terms 
into the domestic legal system. 19 As in States applying the system of 
adoption, whether or not those provisions will be applied as domestic 
11 It has to be noted however, that even in cases of "adoption", certain treaties 
may nevertheless require legislative implementation to be put into effect. These are 
commonly called "non-self-executing" treaties. 
12 See, de la Rochere J., "France", in Jacobs F. and Roberts S. (eds), The 
Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, 39 (1987). 
13 Maresceau M., "Belgium", in Jacobs F. and Roberts S. (eds), The Effect o Treaties in Domestic Law, 1 (1987). 
14 See generally, Schermers H. G., "Netherlands", in Roberts S. and Jacobs 
F. (eds), The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, at 109 (1987); Van Dijk, supra, note 
5, at 63 1; Erades L. and Gould W., International Law and Municipal Law in the 
Netherlands and in the United States, 297 (1961). 
15 See generally, Jackson J., "United States of America", in Jacobs F. and 
Roberts S. (eds), The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, 141 (1987); Iwasawa Y., 
"The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis", 26 
V. J. I. L., No. 3,627 (1986); Burke K., Coliver S., De La Vega C. and Rosenbaum S., 
"Application of International Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts", 18 
Tex. I. L. J. 291 (1983); Erades and Gould, supra, note 14, at 297; Leary, supra, note 
1, at 55. 
16 Frowein J., "Federal Republic of Germany", in Jacobs F. and Roberts 
S. (eds), The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, 63 (1987). 
17 Gaja G., "Italy", in Jacobs F. and Roberts S. (eds), The Effect of Treaties in 
Domestic Law, 87, at 103 (1987); La Pergola A. and Del Duce P., "Community Law, 
International Law and the Italian Constitution", 79 A. J. I. L., 598 (1985). 
18 Leary, supra, note 1, at 37. It should be noted that such States are principally 
"dualist" in their approach, yet operate very similarly to States with "monist" systems. 
See, Morgenstern F., "Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International Law", 27 
B. Y. I. L., 42 (1950). 
19 Van Dijk, supra, note 5, at 635; Frowein, supra, note 16, at 65. Seidl 
Hohenveldern notes however that the approval of a treaty before ratification cannot give 
the treaty domestic validity as "that treaty obviously cannot produce effects in the 
municipal sphere before it becomes valid internationally". Seidl Hohenveldern I., 
"Transformation or Adoption of International Law into Municipal Law", 12 I. C. L. Q., 
88, at 105 (1963). 
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law (in other words have "direct effect"), will depend upon their "self- 
executing" character. 
In the case of States that act strictly upon a "dualist view" of 
international law, treaties as such have no validity in domestic law, 
although they might be relevant to the interpretation of statutes or the 
development of the common law. 20 The treaty provisions must be either 
incorporated or transformed into the domestic legal system and applied 
as national law. Whereas in cases of incorporation, the treaty provisions 
become part of domestic law as they stand, 21 in cases of transformation 
the treaty provisions are translated into terms of domestic law. This 
may be done by amending or supplementing existing legislation without 
specific reference to the relevant treaty provisions. 22 In States that 
operate on this basis, such as the UK23 or Denmark, 24 consideration 
will be given to the nature and effects of the treaty concerned in 
deciding whether it should be incorporated or transformed. 25 
The theoretical issues encompassed by the monist-dualist debate 
have given rise to a tendency to overstate the differences between the 
20 In the UK see, Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd. [1983] 2 A. C. 751, 
at 771, Diplock L. J.: 
"The words of a statute passed after the treaty has been signed and 
dealing with the subject matter of the international obligation of the 
United Kingdom are to be construed, if they are capable of bearing such 
a meaning, as intended to carry out the obligation, and not to be 
inconsistent with it. " 
Ibe Courts will thus presume that Parliament intended to legislate in conformity with 
the UK's international obligations. However, they will only have recourse to the text of 
the treaty concerned, in cases where domestic legislation is ambiguous. See, R 
v. Sec. of State for the Home Department, ex Parte Brind,, [1991] 1 A. C. 696, at 747- 
748 (Lord Bridge). 
21 See e. g., The UK Merchant Shipping (International Labour Conventions) 
Act, 1925,15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 57, which reproduces two International Labour 
Conventions in its Schedules. 
22 See e. g., The UK Maritime Conventions Act, 1911,1 &2 Geo. 5 c. 57, 
which was entitled "An Act to amend the law relating to Merchant Shipping with a view 
to enabling certain Conventions to be carried into effect". 
23 Mann F., Foreign Affairs in English Courts, (1986); Higgins R., "United 
Kingdom", in Jacobs F. and Roberts S. (eds), The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, 
123 (1987); Roodt C., "National Law and Treaties: An Overview", 13 S. A. Y. I. L., 72, 
at 82 (1987/8). 
24 Gulmann C., "Denmark", in Jacobs F. and Roberts S., The Effect of 
Treaties in Domestic Law, 29 (1987). 
25 The language and form of the agreement, and the coverage of existing 
domestic law will be of importance. 
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various means of glvm*g effect to treaties. 26 On the one hand, in systems 
of adoption, if the treaty is considered to be non-self-executing, 
implementing legislation will be essential. On the other hand, even in 
dualist systems where transformation may be the norm, it is not 
uncommon for treaties to be incorporated wholesale into domestic law. 
An incorporated treaty will only differ from one that is adopted in so 
far as it will take the form of domestic law. 27 
It would appear that for the implementation of a treaty, the 
constitutional approach of a particular State may pose a significant 
obstacle. The system of transformation has been specifically criticised in 
this respect. It is asserted that the transformation process allows the 
State to avoid implementing the provisions of the treaty concerned and 
as such is "incompatible with good faith in international treaties". 28 
Moreover, transformation may in effect render international guarantees 
negligible through distorting the nature and purpose of the treaty 
provisions, and by leaving the implementation to the vicissitudes of 
domestic rules that may, or may not, give the individual the exact legal 
position which the treaty intended to grant him or her. 29 It has been 
noted, in the context of international human rights law, that domestic 
implementation assumes importance principally when a disparity exists 
between international law and municipal law. As such, the process of 
transformation "seems to render international guarantees powerless 
precisely when they are needed most". 30 
However, as Leary has pointed out, "national governments have 
been slow to perceive that automatic incorporation does not guarantee 
effective national application of treaties". 31 Even where a treaty has 
been adopted, its judicial enforcement will remain dependent upon the 
26 See e. g., Jacobs F., "Introduction", in Jacobs F. and Roberts S. (eds), The 
Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, at xxiv-xxvi, (1987). 
27 This might have significance with respect to human rights treaties in that the 
supervisory bodies may seek to develop the substantive content of the treaties 
themselves. 
28 Pescatore P., "Conclusion", in Jacobs F. and Roberts S. (eds), The Effect of 
Treaties in Domestic Law, 282, (1987). 
29 Winter, supra, note 3, at 431. 
30 Brudner, supra, note 1, at 223. States may repair such incompatibility 
through the enactment of further amending legislation. A case in point would seem to 
be the UK Contempt of Court Act 198 1, which was introduced, in part, as a response 
to the European Court of Human Right's finding in the Sunday Times Case, Eur-Court 
H. R., Series A, Vol. 30, Judgement of 26th Apr. 1979, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245. It 
might be noted however that subsequent changes in the law do nothing to remedy the 
initial violation. 
31 Leary, supra, note 1, at 3. 
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attitude of the courts. Only in cases where the treaty is seen to be self- 
executing or directly-effective, will the individual be able to rely upon 
its provisions to seek judicial remedies. The role of the courts is also 
crucial in cases of transformation. There, it is open to the courts to 
interpret national legislation in light of the State's international 
obligations to the degree that the deficiencies of the transformation 
process may largely be overcome. That this has not occured in practice 
is principally due to the conservatism of the courts concerned. 32 
Notwithstanding the State-specific nature of the implementation 
systems, it is apparent that States may commit themselves to a particular 
method of incorporation with respect to a particular treaty or a 
particular system of international law. Thus, according to the European 
Court of Justice, the relationship between Community law and the legal 
orders of Member States, is of a monist nature. 33 
B) THE DOMESTIC VALIDITY OF THE COVENANT 
The Covenant does not provide for any specific means by which it 
should be given the force of law in the domestic legal system. Attempts 
to include a specific provision in the draft Covenant (when it was a 
single document) providing that it should be considered non-self- 
executing, were resoundingly defeated. 34 This did not mean that there 
was an obligation to incorporate the Covenant, rather "[i]t simply 
confirmed the prevalent view that the question of incorporation vel non 
should be left to national law subject only to the requirement that 
parties fulfil their obligations under the Covenant". 35 Commentators are 
almost unanimous in their opinion that the ICCPR entails no obligation 
32 For example in the Brind Case, the UK House of Lords were arguably 
unduly restrictive in deciding that the ECHR could not control the exercise of executive 
discretion. Supra, note 20. 
33 See, Van Gend En Loos, Case (26/62), [1963] E. C. R., 1 at 12. 
34 See, ihabvala F., "Domestic Implementation of the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights", Neth. I. L. R. 461, at 463-4 (1985); Schachter 0., supra, note 5, at 
313-314. 
35 Schachter, supra, note 5, at 314. 
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to incorporate its provisions in domestic law. 36 There is nothing in the 
terms of the ICESCR to suggest that it should be any different. 
The practice of States in giving effect to the Covenant's 
provisions in domestic law is mixed. 37 In a number of States, such as 
Sweden, )38 Canada, 39 the UK, 40 the Covenant has been "transformed" by 
amending and supplementing, if necessary, existing legislation prior to 
ratification. In other cases however, the Covenant, as an international 
treaty, has been adopted into domestic law. This appears to be the 
situation inter alia in Afghanistan, 41 Costa Rica, 42 Ecuador, 43 
36 See e. g., Schachter, supra, note 5, at 313; Jhabvala, supra, note 34, at 463; 
Tomuschat, supra, note 2, at 39; Graefrath B., "How Different Countries Implement 
International Standards on Human Rights", Can. H. R. Y., 3, at 8 (1984/5). The 
position seems to be the same with respect to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Thus in the Swedish Engine Drivers' Case, Eur. Court H. R., Series A, Vol. 20, 
Judgement of 6 Feb. 1976, (1979-80) 1 EHRR 637, the Court stated: 
"... neither Article 13 nor the Convention in general lays down for the 
Contracting States any given manner for ensuring within their internal law the 
effective implementation of any of the provisions of the Convention". 
37 In the majority of cases, States have not provided sufficient information to 
answer even this very basic question. 
38 In Sweden, the courts or other judicial authorities can only apply 
international instruments if they have been incorporated into Swedish law by an act of 
Parliament or, in rare cases, by a special law. However, the normal method is to amend 
or rectify the legislation in force to ensure that it is in conformity with the instrument in 
question. The ICESCR had not been incorporated as such, and on ratification, the 
relevant legislation had been reviewed and no major adjustments had been deemed 
necessary since the provisions of the Covenant were already basically in conformity 
with Swedish legislation. Danielsson (Sweden), E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 2, para. 4. 
39 See, de Montigny Marchand (Canada), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 2, para. 2. 
40 The UK representative commented before the Committee: 
"... it was not the practice of the United Kingdom to give the force of law to the 
provisions of international treaties to which it was a party. Its approach was rather to 
ensure that domestic legislation was consistent with those treaties and would enable it 
to perform the obligations which it had undertaken by signing them and, if necessary, 
to adopt legislation to that effect". Britton (UK), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 17, at 5, para. 17. 
41 See, Wahidi (Afghanistan), E/C. 12/1991/SR. 4, at 4, para. 21. 
42 See, Rhenan Segura (Costa Rica),, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 38, at 15, para. 85. 
43 See, Apunte (Ecuador), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 39, at 2, para. 6. 
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Luxembourg, 44 Argentina, 45 Colombia, 46 Mexico, 47 Cyprus, 48 and 
Zaire. 49 
One commentator has argued that the ICESCR is not "suited it to 
incorporation, as it "confines itself to stating promotional obligations 
which are not intended to confer subjective rights", 50 Quite apart from 
the practice of States (outlined above) which seems to contradict such an 
assertion, the statement may be criticised on two counts. First, whether 
or not a treaty is "suited" to incorporation depends more upon the 
approach of domestic courts in distinguishing between self-executing 
and non-self-executing treaties than upon the nature of the obligations 
themselves. In those States where treaties are commonly adopted or 
incorporated, the courts will generally apply strict standards for giving 
the provisions direct-effect. It is thus only in those States that do not 
operate such a "vetting" system that stringent criteria will be imposed in 
determining whether or not a treaty will be incorporated. Secondly, 
even in the latter case, it cannot be maintained that the Covenant, being 
a human rights treaty by name, was not intended to confer subjective 
rights. 51 
Given the discretion open to States as to the method by which they 
may give effect to the Covenant in domestic law, it would follow that 
the Committee should concern itself with those procedures only in so 
far as it affects the realisation of the rights. The Committee has 
generally made no comment on failure to incorporate the Covenant 
wholesale into domestic legal systems. )52 but rather has limited itself to 
enquiring as to the degree to which the rights are protected in the 
relevant State's law. 
However, in the case of Chile, although the Covenant had been 
ratified, it had not been duly published in the Official Gazette which 
appeared to be a condition for giving treaties their domestic validity. 53 
This was criticised by one member of the Committee, who commented 
44 See, Weitzel (Luxembourg), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 33, at 8, para. 29. 
45 See, Regazzoli (Argentina), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 18, at 4, para. 14. 
46 See, Rivas Posada (Colombia), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 12, at 9, para. 62. 
47 See, Gonzalez Martinez (Mexico), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 6, at 4, para. 15. 
48 See, Marlddes (Cyprus), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2, at 3, para. 9. 
49 See, Ngimbi (Zaire), E/C. 12/1988/SR. 19, at 2, para-6. 
50 Tomuschat, supra, note 2, at 40. 
51 See below, text accompanying notes 114-127. 
52 But see, Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 35, at 11, para. 43. 
53 Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 9, para. 45. 
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that there was "no justififcation for delaying formal implementation of 
the Covenant". 54 It is possible that Chilean law might be entirely 
consistent with its obligations under the Covenant, in which case the Committee's criticism might be considered to be premature. However, Chile's failure to comply with its own procedures for giving effect to international treaties does appear to be a breach of good faith. In 
particular this would be so if an individual were to be deprived of a domestic law remedy that could potentially exist if the Covenant were 
given full domestic validity. 
HI) DIRECT EFFECT 
A) DIRECT EFFECT GENERALLY 
In assessing the effective implementation of a human rights treaty, 
the means by which a treaty has been given effect in the domestic legal 
system is only of indirect interest. As has been commented: 
"... the formal domestic status of the Convention is not 
of decisive importance for its effective 
implementation; what really matters is the attitude of 
the judiciary towards the Convention and their 
opinion about the division of powers between the 
legislature and the judiciary. "55 
It is essentially the degree to which international treaty norms are 
given effect by the municipal courts that is of primary importance. 
Here the notion of "directly effective" or "self-executing" treaties 
has some significance. There has been little common agreement 
over the use of the terms "directly effective", "directly 
applicable", or "self-executing ". 56 It is important, however, to 
distinguish between a treaty's domestic validity and the degree to 
which it is capable of being invoked before the courts. 57 The fact 
that a treaty provision has validity in the domestic legal system 
does not necessarily mean that it is enforceable in the courts. As 
noted above, where treaties are adopted into domestic law (the 
provisions of which can be said to be directly applicable), the 
54 Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 5, para. 19. 
55 Van Dijk, supra, note 5, at 631-2. See also, Leary, supra, note 1, at 
37. 
56 See, Bossuyt M.,, "The Direct Applicability of International 
Instruments on Human Rights", 15 R. B. D. I., 317, at 318-9 (1980). 
57 Winter,, supra, note 3, at 425; Lasok D. and Bridge J., "Law and 
Institutions of the European Communities",, 301-2 (1987 4th Ed). 
127 
courts will look to whether the provisions are "self executing" to 
determine whether or not to rely upon them. 
In the following pages, the term "directly applicable" will be 
used to mean that the treaty provision has been adopted into 
domestic law, and therefore has the force of law in the domestic 
legal system. 58 The terms "directly effective" and "self-executing" 
will be used, as appropriate, to mean that the treaty, or relevant 
provisions, are capable of being enforced in the courts without 
further legislative or administrative intervention. 59 
It would appear that direct effect is not confined to cases 
where treaties are adopted into domestic law. Even in cases where 
a treaty is incorporated into domestic law, the question of whether 
or not the provisions are self-executing might arise. 60 Indeed the 
experience of Germany and Italy does show that the concept of 
direct effect is relevant even to States with a dualist approach to 
international law. 61 Certainly, it would seem appropriate for 
courts, when faced with an incorporated treaty, to decide whether 
the provisions are suited to judicial determination. ýffie fact that 
this is not common practice in some States, such as the United 
Kingdom, probably reflects their general preference for 
transformation rather than incorporation. 
B) THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In so far as the object of human rights treaties is to 
guarantee the individual some form of protection from the 
excesses of government, the provision of domestic law remedies 
would appear to be highly desirable. In the case of directly 
effective treaty provisions, not only are judicial remedies instantly 
available, but they also relate specifically to the international norm 
rather than to a domestic norm which may not be the same either 
in form or content. 
It would be rather too easy, however, to jump to the 
conclusion that endowing human rights treaty provisions with 
58 Iwasawa makes the distinction referred to above, but uses the term 
"domestic applicability" as meaning that the provision is capable of being applied 
without the need of further measures. Iwasawa, supra, note 15, at 632. 
59 This is a wider definition than that offered by Bossuyt for example. 
He defines a self-executing provision as being one which has been "adopted" (although he does not define that term closely) and is "self-sufficient". Bossuyt, 
supra, note 56, at 319. 
60 Iwasawa, supra, note 15, at 640; Tomuschat, supra, note 2, at 42. 
Clearly this is not the case with respect to treaties that have been "transformed". 
61 See, Morgenstern. ý supra, note 18, at 57; Gaja, supra, note 17. 
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direct effect is necessarily beneficial. From an international 
standpoint, direct effect encourages the domestic interpretation of international norms. There is nothing to guarantee that the 
interpretation adopted by a domestic court would coincide with 
either that of the treaty supervisory body62 or with those of other 
courts in other States. This may undermine the universal nature of 
the norm, and serve to weaken its content. 63 
At the domestic level, if a treaty is adopted or incorporated, 
national courts may have difficulty dealing with the concepts used by the treaty concerned which may be foreign to the legal system 
concerned. 64 As Leary has pointed out: 
"Legal scholars have pointed out the complications of 
introducing foreign legal concepts and techniques into 
a national legal system. The problem is particularly 
acute in the application of human rights treaties where 
the language used in the treaties may differ from the 
language employed in constitutional provisions 
concerning human rights". 65 
More seriously however, the direct application of human rights 
standards (especially in the field of economic, social and cultural 
rights) may involve the courts in matters of public policy. 
Certainly, in so far as the treaty provisions are of a general nature 
a certain amount of judicial activism will be inevitable. This could 
undermine the independence of such courts, make the appointment 
of their members a matter of political interest, and lead to 
questions as to the undemocratic control of decision-making. 66 
62 Alkema E., "The Application of Internationally Guaranteed Human 
Rights in the Municipal Order", in Kalshoven F., Kuyper P. and Lammers J. (eds), Essgys on the DevelUment of the International Legal 18 1, at 196 (1980). 
63 See, Myjer E., "Dutch Interpretation of the European Convention: A 
Double System? ", in Matscher F. and Petzold H. (eds), Protecting Human Rights 
in the European Dimension, 421, at 428-9 (1988). 
64 It is also relevant to note that treaties generally have more than one 
official language which might have considerable bearing upon the interpretation 
adopted. 
65 Leary, supra, note 1, at 103. 
66 See, Jacobs F., "The Convention and the English Judge", in Matscher 
F. and Petzold H. (eds), Protecting Human Rights in the European Dimension, 
273, at 279 (1988). Such arguments are similar to those opposing a Bill of 
Rights in the United Kingdom, see generally,, Zander M., A Bill of Rights?, (3rd 
ed. 1985); Wallington P. and McBride J., Civil Liberties and a Bill (1976). 
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Moreover, practice would seem to suggest that it is not 
necessarily the case that treaties will be implemented more 
effectively through direct effect. It has been noted that in the case 
of the Netherlands, ICERD has been applied more effectively 
through the process of transformation than the ECHR has through 
direct effect. 67 Certainly, where judges have a choice between 
implementing domestic legislation and a constitutional-style human 
rights treaty, the legislation will be preferred, not least because it 
is likely to be more specific. 68 
It is submitted, however, that such arguments are 
outweighed by the benefits of direct effect for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. First, as noted above, the application 
of human rights standards in domestic courts clearly provides for 
the most direct and effective form of remedy. Indeed, national 
courts would appear to be in a better position than their 
international counterparts to apply the provisions in their domestic 
context, and in doing so may generate a more realistic and suitable 
interpretation of the norms themselves. Additionally providing for 
domestic remedies in this manner would demonstrate good faith on 
the part of the State concerned; reduce the amount of publicity in 
cases of violation; and increase legislative and executive knowledge 
of their international obligations. 
As far as the role of the courts is concerned, it can only be 
said that legal guarantees of human rights, by their nature, 
presuppose judicial scrutiny of government action. 69 A principal 
rationale for the drafting of human rights treaty obligations 
following the Second World War, was to prevent the arbitrary 
infringement of the fundamental human rights of the individual 
under the pretext that it was the will of the majority as expressed 
in the instrument of government. On this basis, there can be little 
opposition to the protection of those rights by the judiciary. 
Whereas there might be objections to the judiciary undertaking a 
"legislative function" in the context of those treaty guarantees of 
rights that are excessively general, this is mitigated to some extent 
by the very nature of the self-executing doctrine which seeks to 
safeguard the legislative competence of parliament. In a number of 
situations, legislation will not only be appropriate, but also 
necessary, to give fall effect to the treaty provisions. 
67 Alkema, supra, note 62, at 188. 
68 See, Tomuschat, supra, note 2, at 48. 
69 Jacobs, supra, note 66, at 279. 
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Q DIRECT EFFECT AND THE COVENANT 
As part of the Committee Is reporting guidelines, it 
specifically requests information as to whether the provisions of 
the Covenant it can be invoked before, and directly enforced by, the 
courts, other tribunals or administrative authorities... ". 70 Very 
little infortnation has been provided in response to this request and 
thus far no cases have been reported in which provisions of the 
Covenant have been given direct effect. All discussions with the 
Committee on the issue have centered merely upon the potentiality 
of direct effect. 
A number of those States that have adopted the Covenant 
into domestic law, have stressed before the Committee, that that 
fact alone does not mean that the Covenant may be relied upon by 
an individual in the courts. Some States, whilst noting that certain 
rights are "operational" (such as the right to education), have 
considered that others (like the right to housing) require 
intervention by public authorities and therefore could not be 
invoked as individual rights. 71 Other States, however, have denied 
the direct-effect of the Covenant as a whole. In those cases it has 
been argued that the nature of the rights72 and the object and 
purpose of the Covenant, 73 affirmed its non-self-executing 
character. 
In the case of Luxembourg however, a number of members 
of the Committee were dissatisfied with the explanation offered by 
the government representative as to why the Covenant was not self- 
executing in domestic law. The representative referred inter alia to 
the intentions of the drafters, the purpose and subject-matter of the 
Covenant., 74 the nature of the obligations, 75 and the view of the 
Council of State at the time of accession to the Covenant. 76 
Members of the Committee argued that the Covenant was more 
than merely a series of reciprocal obligations, and should be seen 
70 Reporting Guidelines, ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), Annex IV, at 89, UN 
Doc. E/C. 12/1990/8, (199 1). 
71 See e. g. Strassera (Argentina), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 19, at 3, para. 9; 
Gonzalez Martinez (Mexico), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 9, at 5, para. 14. 
72 See, Walkate (Netherlands), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 14, at 3, para. 8. 
73 See, Weitzel (Luxembourg), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 33, at 8, para-29. 
74 See, Weitzel (Luxembourg), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 35, at 2, para. 4. 
75 Ibid, at 11, para. 44. 
76 See, Weitzel (Luxembourg), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 33, at 8, para. 29. 
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to represent an objective standard containing individual rights, 77 a 
number of which were self-executing. 78 
This debate encouraged the Committee, in its General 
Comment No. 3 (1990), to assert that certain provisions within the 
Covenant (it cited in particular articles 3,7(a)(i), 8,10(3), 
13(2)(a), 13(3), 13(4) and 15(3)) were capable of immediate 
application. It concluded: 
"Any suggestion that the provisions indicated are 
inherently non-self-executing would seem to be 
difficult to sustain". 79 
On the face of it, the Committee would not seem to be in a position 
to make decisions as to the degree to which the provisions in the 
Covenant are self-executing. In contrast to the question of the 
domestic validity of treaties, as a rule, 80 it is for the national 
authorities themselves to decide whether or not a provision is self- 
executing. 81 
However, as will be shown below, national courts generally 
have considerable lee-way in deciding what provisions may be 
given direct effect. In so far as those courts have to examine the 
provisions of the Covenant in the exercise of their discretion, the 
77 See, Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 34, at 9, para. 64. 
78 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 34, at 7, para. 46; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 34, at 9, para. 64; and E/C. 12/1990/SR. 36, at 9, para. 37. 
79 General Comment No. 3, E/1991/23, Annex IH, at 84, para. 5, UN 
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), (1991). 
80 In the exceptional case of the European Communities the direct effect 
of provisions is provided by the treaty itself Moreoever the ECJ itself is 
competent to decide whether a provision is directly applicable or not through its 
preliminary ruling procedure under article 177 of the EEC Treaty. 298 U. N. T. S. 
150. Human rights treaty bodies do not have this power to make preliminary 
rulings and therefore cannot intervene in the process. With regard to the ECEM 
see, Bossuyt, supra, note 56, at 321-322. 
81 As one commentator stated: 
"The definition of self-executing treaties, which is essentially a 
problem of the enforcement of treaties, is a matter to be 
determined by the municipal law of a given state, interpreted with 
due consideration of the constitutional history of the State, the 
organisation of its government, and, indeed, of the political 
currents of a given period". 
Evans A. E., "Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of America", 30 
B. Y. I. L. 178, at 193 (1953). See also, Winter, supra, note 3, at 428; Iwasawa, 
supra, note 15, at 650; Leary, supra, note 1, at 39. 
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Committee may provide its own interpretation of the provisions as 
a means of assisting and influencing the national courts. 82 
D) THE CRITERIA FOR DIRECT EFFECT 
That the question whether or not a treaty provision has 
direct effect is one for the domestic courts to decide has meant that 
different criteria are utilised in different countries. Nevertheless, 
the intention here is to analyse some of the common criteria in 
relation to the Covenant provisions to determine whether, in 
principle at least, those provisions may be directly relied upon by 
domestic courts. 
In general, domestic courts have looked to whether the 
provision confers a right upon private citizens that may be applied 
by the courts directly without recourse to further implementation 
through legislative or administrative intervention. To some extent 
this seems to suggest that the degree to which a provision will be 
considered self-executing is dependent upon the presence of an 
existing "cause of action": ubi remedium, ibi jus. Although 
criticised by certain commentators,, 83 it does mean that a human 
rights treaty provision is only likely to be considered 
self-executing if a similar constitutional or legislative right is 
already guaranteed by judicial remedies. 
From the practice of a number of States and institutions, 
including the US, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, 
Germany and the EEC the following criteria seem to have been 
utilised: whether the provision relates to private citizens; whether 
the provision is capable of judicial enforcement; the purpose of the 
treaty; the intentions of the creators of the treaty; the existence of 
domestic procedures for enforcement; the nature of the 
obligations; the availability of alternative enforcement procedures; 
the necessity of further implementation; the precision and detail of 
the text; the language of the agreement; the class and subject 
matter of the agreement; and the amount of discretion given to the 
means of implementation. 
82 Tomuschat comments with regard to the ICCPR: 
"Since the Human Rights Committee, the body primarily 
entrusted with responsibility for ensuring compliance with the 
CCPR, sees no obstacle against inferring directly enforceable 
obligations from the CCPR, national authorities would lack any justification for adopting a more reluctant attitude". 
Tomuschat, supra, note 2, at 42. Such arguments would apply equally to the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
83 E. g., Iwasawa, supra, note 15, at 648, note 98. 
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A number of the more commonly utilised criteria will be 
considered in the following section. Reference will be made to US 
and EEC practice despite having little direct relevance to the 
Covenant, on the basis that it demonstrates a fairly well-developed 
approach to the concept of direct-effect. 84 Particular emphasis 
will, however, be placed upon the case-law of the Netherlands 
which is the State in which the courts have paid most attention to 
economic and social rights in general, and the Covenant in 
particular. 
1) The Intention of the Parties 
In the United States, the courts have frequently looked to the 
intent of the treaty-drafters in determining the direct-effect of the 
provisions. Thus, in Sei Fujii v. California, 155 Judge Gibson 
commented: 
"... in order for a treaty provision to be operative 
without the aid of implementing legislation and to 
have the force and effect of a statute, it must appear 
that the framers of the treaty intended to prescribe a 
rule that, standing alone, would be enforceable in the 
courts". 86 
Although there is a tendency for courts to look to the intent of the 
contracting parties as to whether or not the provision should be 
self-executing 
. 
87 it is very rare for treaties to indicate either 
positive or negative intent in this regard. Certainly as far as the 
Covenant is concerned there is no explicit provision that refers to 
its domestic application, nor was the matter considered during the 
drafting of the Covenant. Indeed, whether or not States parties 
were actually concerned about the domestic application of the 
84 The concept of the self-executing and non-self-executing treaty was 
first developed in the US in Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 US (2 Pet. ) 253 (1829). Since then, the US has developed a considerable body of jurisprudence. 
Similarly, the notion of direct effect has been a key concept in the evolution of 
the EEC. 
85 Supreme Court of California, 38 Cal. 2d 718,242 P. 2d 617, (1952). 
86 Ibid, at 620. This is also the case in Belgium. There, in Thonon 
v-Belgjan State [Cass. April 21,1983,1985 R. C. J. B. 221, the Belgian Court of 
Cassation referred inter alia to the intentions of the contracting parties as a 
determinant of the treaty's direct effect. Cited in, Maresceau, supra, note 13, at 
16. 
87 Jackson, supra, note 15, at 151. 
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treaty, 88 it would be highly unusual for trenchantly "dualist" States 
such as the UK to have specifically agreed to the direct effect of 
the Covenant's provisions. 89 
In the absence of explicit statements of intent, the US courts 
have generally looked to objective indications in the text itself. 90 
In particular note has been made of the purpose of the agreement 
and the language used. Given the uncertainty of actual intent, it 
would seem to be a rather fictitious pursuit to infer such intent 
from the wording of the Covenant itself. 91 The Dutch Supreme 
Court has adopted a more realistic approach in considering intent 
only in so far as it is manifest in the text or the travaux 
preparatoires. Thus in Netherlands Railways v. TransDort Union of 
the Federation of Netherlands Trade Unions9-2 the Supreme Court 
held: 
"Whether or not the contracting parties intended 
Article 6(4) of the ESC to have direct effect is not 
important since it cannot be inferred either from the 
text or from the history of the Charter that they 
agreed that Article 6(4) could not have direct 
effect". 93 
Accordingly, in absence of any manifest intention, the court went 
on to analyse the content of the provision to determine its effect. 
Occasionally, courts look to the intent of the executive in 
ratifying the treaty concerned. Thus in one case, the Dutch 
Supreme Court referred to a Government statement made in 
Parliament during the process of approval of the Covenant, to the 
effect that the Covenant's provisions were not to be considered self- 
executing. 94 Nevertheless, practice suggests that it is unlikely that 
88 One commentator at least considers that States were not concerned 
about the domestic application of the ICESCR. See, Iwasawa, supra, note 15, at 
654. 
89 See, Reisenfeld S., "Tbe Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and 
GATT: A Notable German Judgement", 65 A. I. I. L., 548 at 550 (1971). 
90 See e. g., Froylova v. U. S. S. R. 761 F. 2d, 370 (7th Cir. 1985). 
91 Cf. lwasawaý supra, note 15, at 655. 
92 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, RvdW (1986) No. 120, in, 18 
Neth. Y. I. L., 389 (1987). 
93, Neth. Y. I. L.,, ibid, at 392. 
94 The State of the Netherlands v. L. S. V. B. [The National Union of 
Students], Supreme Court, 14th April, 1989, AB, at 207 (1989), in 21 
Neth. Y. I. L., 362 at 369 (1990). See also, Heringa. A., "Social Rights in the 
Dutch Legal Order", Working Paper at 4, (1991). 
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courts in most States wiR consider such executive statements as 
conclusive. 95 
2) Tbe Precision and Detail of the Language EMDloved. 
In Sei Fujii2! ý and later in the Frovlova Case97 the Supreme 
Court of the United States found articles 55 and 56 of the UN 
Charter to be too broad and general to be considered 
self-executing. Similar considerations have been decisive in 
Swiss98 Italian, 99 Belgian., 100 and Dutch101 cases. It is clear that in 
theory, the generality of a legal non-n does not impede judicial 
decision-making per se. The decision so made might require the 
courts to indulge in a certain amount of "judicial legislation" in the 
interpretation of the norm, but it is a decision nevertheless. The justiciability of a particular issue depends, not upon the generality 
95 See generally, Iwasawa, supra, note 15, at 666-669. With respect to a 
US Department of State proposal that if the Covenants were to be ratified they 
should be said to be non- self-executing see, Craig M., "The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and U. S. Law: Department of State 
Proposals for Preserving the Status Quo", 19 I. C. L. Q., 845 (1978). 
96 Judge Gibson stated that the provisions of the Charter "lack the 
mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an intent to create justiciable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification". Sei Fuiii 
supra, note 85 at 621-622. 
97 Supra, note 90, at 74. 
98See, Banque de Credit Internationale c. Conseil DEtat du Canton de 
Geneve Chambre di Droit Administratif, 13 Oct. (1972), ATF 98 1b 385. Cited 
(and translated) in, Leary, supra, note 1, at 68. There the court stated that the 
direct effect would be given if the treaty provision "is sufficiently precise to be 
applied as such in a particular case and to provide the basis for a concrete 
decision". The court went on to comment that "this is not the case with a treaty 
provision which announces a programme or lays down general principles which 
should guide the legislation of contracting states'. 
99 See, Leary, supra, note 1, at 70. In re Laglietti 69 Rivista di Diritto 
Internazionale, 143 at 145 (1986), the Court of Cassation stated: 
"... the norms of the European Convention on Human Rights- 
apart obviously from those provisions the content of which, after 
the use of the habitual methods of interpretation, is to be 
considered so general that it does not express sufficiently specific 
rules- are directly applicable in Italy". 
Cited (and translated) in, Gaja, supra, note 17, at 104. 
100 See, Verhoeven J., "Trait6s-Applicabilit6 Directe", 24 R. B. D. I. 306 
(1991). 
101 In The Netherlands v. L. S. V. B. the court rejected the claim that 
article 2(l) ICESCR had direct effect inter alia because it was too general (by the 
fact it covered all the rights granted under the Covenant). Cited in, 21 
Neth. Y. I. L.,, 362, at 369 (1990). 
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of the norm concerned, but rather upon the authority of the body 
making the decision. Thus it is apparent that in a number of cases, 
national courts have undertaken to apply constitutional provisions 
of an exceedingly broad and general nature. 102 
The perceived jurisdictional authority of the courts is of 
crucial importance. It is commonly considered that the judiciary 
should not attempt to usurp the function of the legislature by 
applying provisions that would normally require further 
legislative irnplementation. 103 Certainly, if legislation already 
exists, the Courts will not be obliged to take on such a creative 
role. To a great extent, the degree to which courts will apply 
general provisions is dependent upon the amount of existing 
legislation and the traditional role of the courts in the 
constitutional system. 
It has to be accepted that certain provisions of the Covenant 
are very general, such as article 11 (the right to an adequate 
standard of living). However this is not exclusively so: domestic 
court practice has shown (albeit in different contexts) that the basic 
principles contained in article 7(a)(i) (equal remuneration for 
work of equal value), article 8(l)(a) (the right to form and join 
trade unions), and article 8(l)(d) (the right to strike), for example, 
are capable of direct application. Moreover, as the Committee 
continues to develop the substantive content of the rights, an 
increasing number of elements within the rights may be found to 
be sufficiently precise to be self-executing. 
An important question is raised here, namely the extent to 
which domestic courts will apply a single element of a provision 
where other elements are clearly not self-executing. An example 
might be the right to work, found in article 6 of the Covenant. 
This is read not merely as imposing an obligation to achieve full 
102 See e. g., The 14th Amendment of the US Constitution (equal 
protection of the law). See, Schachter 0., "The Charter and the Constitution: The 
Human Rights Provisions in American Law", 4 Vand. L. R., 643 (195 1). 
Tomuschat comments: 
"It is the current tendency in many countries for judges not to 
hesitate to base their decisions on the most general and abstract 
principles of their legal order". 
Tomuschat, supra, note 2, at 44. Zander argues that rights which are phrased in 
vague and general terms are "more an advantage than a disadvantage". He 
maintains that detailed solutions have to be left to the courts to work out. VAlilst 
recognising that general terminology might lead to a degree of uncertainty, he 
considers that it gives people a chance to argue their case and allows the rights to 
be interpreted in a dynamic manner. Zander, supra, note 
, 
at 38. 
103 Cf. The Brin Case, supra, note 20. 
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employment, but also as containing a prohibition of forced 
labour. 104 Whereas the former element would clearly seem to 
require implementing policies on the part of the government, there 
is nothing, outside the imposition of penalties, to prevent the 
courts enforcing the prohibition of forced labour directly. 
Commentators have found no objection to applying elements of a 
provision separately: 
"Simply because a provision requires future 
negotiation or legislative action does not, however, 
render it non-self-executing if the provision also 
creates specific obligations or proscribes certain 
acts ". 105 
The matter is less clear where the two elements are not specifically 
defined in the text itself, but are to be found merely in the jurisprudence of the Committee. Again with reference to article 6, 
this could be the case with respect to the prohibition of arbitrary 
dismissal. It is indisputable that the Committee's interpretations of 
the provisions of the Covenant are not legally binding on the States 
parties. However, to the extent they might come to reflect the 
agreement of the States parties as to the meaning of the provisions, 
they could be seen to have some legal significance in intemational 
JaW. 106 
3) The Nece5sity of Legislation 
It is a universally accepted principle that a treaty provision 
will not be self-executing if further implementing legislation is 
required by the authorities concerned. 107 By implication, this 
104 See below, Chapter 5. 
105 Burke et al,, supra, note 15, at 302. See also, Iwasawa, supra, note 
15, at 668. In the case of Gabrielle Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 1), (Case 43M), [1976] E. C. R., 455, the European Court of Justice distinguished between direct 
and indirect discrimination under article 119 of the EEC Treaty. Whereas the 
former was capable of being detected "on the basis of a purely legal analysis of 
the situation", the latter required in certain cases "the elaboration of criteria 
whose implementation necessitates the taking of appropriate measures at 
Community and National level". 
106 See, Meron T., Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations, 
10(1986). 
107 Paust J., "Self-Executing Treaties" 82 A. M. L. 760, at 764 (1988); 
Winter, supra, note 3, at 429. - Jackson, supra, note 15, at 150. 
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would mean that treaties may be self-executing where existing 
legislation is adequate for their enforcement by the courts. 108 
It has often been argued accordingly that a provision calling 
for domestic implementation (through legislation) indicates that 
the treaty is not to be considered directly applicable. 109 Thus, as 
under article 2(l) of the Covenant, States Parties are called upon 
to take the necessary measures "including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures", the Covenant could be considered non- 
self-executing. However, it would seem that the matter is not quite 
so simple. First, as one commentator has noted: 
"A domestic implementation clause merely reinforces 
the customary international rule that a State which has 
contracted a valid treaty is bound to take every 
measure necessary to give full effect to the treaty". 110 
Such references to legislation could thus be interpreted to refer to 
the domestic validity of the treaty rather than its domestic 
application. 111 Certainly as far as the ICESCR is concerned, there 
is no reason to assume that legislation is required in every case. 
Rather, the provision should be interpreted to require legislation 
only to the extent that the rights are not already sufficiently 
protected and where legislation is the appropriate means for 
ensuring that protection. 112 As the Committee comments in its 
General Comment No. 3: 
"Among the measures which might be considered 
appropriate, in addition to legislation, is the provision 
of judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, 
in accordance with the national legal system, be 
considered justiciable". 113 
108 Evans, supra, note 81, at 186. In the case of Warren v. U. S., 340 
U. S., 523 at 526 (195 1), the Supreme Court held that article 2(2) ILO 
Convention No. 55 was directly applicable because the general maritime law 
already recognized the exceptions allowed under the treaty. 
109 See, Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic Case 517 F. Supp. 542 (D. D. C. 198 1). Tomuschat argues that the reference to "legislation" in article 2(2) 
ICCPR was intended "to emphasise that States should play an active role in 
ensuring the relevant rights, explicitly discarding a naive belief that the CCPR 
amounted to a self-executing treaty". Tomuschat, supra, note 2, at 42. 
110 Iwasawa, supra, note 15, at 660. 
111 This would apply in particular to the UK, where treaty provisions are 
generally "transformed" into domestic law. 
112 Cf Craig, supra, note 95, at 86 1. 
113 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 79, at 84. 
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It cannot be sustained, then, that the reference to legislation in 
article 2(l) of the Covenant automatically makes the individual 
provisions non-self-executing. 114 As has been noted, the crucial 
factor is not the call for implementation, but rather the precision 
of the rule invokedI15 and the degree to which it is already 
implemented in the domestic legal system. 
4) The Subject Matter of the Treaty 
There has been a tendency in the US courts at least, to 
classify treaties as self-executing or otherwise according to their 
subject matter. 116 Thus where the subject matter of a treaty falls 
within the exclusive powers of Congress then that treaty win be 
considered non-self-executing. 117 However, the crucial question in 
such cases is not really the subject matter, but rather whether 
financial appropriations are required. 118 Indeed, it has been 
asserted that treaties should not be dealt with entirely on the 
question of their subject matter, rather each provision should be 
dealt with separately. Numerous examples may be found where 
although a treaty is generally non- self-executing, a specific 
provision is considered to be directly effective. 119 Accordingly, 
the direct effect of provisions of the ICESCR should not be denied 
merely because they do involve certain questions of public policy (such as the provision of housing); each provision should be 
considered upon its merits. It cannot be maintained that every 
provision requires financial appropriations from the treasury. 
5) Rights and Duties of the Individual 
In a number of cases, courts have looked to the wording of 
the provision concerned to determine whether it is of a nature such 
114 It was recognised by the Dutch Supreme Court that the wording of 
article 2(l) did not automatically imply that the substantive provisions were non- 
self-executing, D. Hoogenraad v. Organisation for Pure Research in the 
Netherlands. Supreme Court, 20 April 1990, RvdW (1990) No. 88, cited in 22 
Neth. Y. I. L. 376 at 378 (1991). 
115 Iwasawa, supra, note 15, at 662. 
1166 See e. g., Leary, supra, note 1, at 57. 
117 Se e. g., Evans, supra, note 8 1, at 187. 
118 Craig, supra, note 93, at 859; Evans A., "The Self-Executing Treaty 
in Contemporary American Practice", in De Lege Pactorum: Essays in Honour of 
D tI I Wilson R. R. ", a, at 17 (1970). 
119 See below, text accompanying note 127. 
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that individuals may benefit from it. 120 Clearly, a provision that is 
addressed to State organs will not provide a basis for individual 
action in the courts. 121 On the other hand, it has been asserted that 
where the rules create private rights they will be prima facie self- 
executing. 122 The Dutch Constitution is particularly clear in this 
case. Under article 93, provisions of treaties "the contents of 
which may be binding on everyone" have direct effect. 123 Thus 
obligations directed solely to State organs could not be said to be 
"binding on everyone". 
It might be assumed that human rights treaties would 
automatically be considered as providing for private rights in this 
sense. However, that has not always been the case. For example, in 
Germany the prevailing view is that the European Social Charter 
is not self-executing as the provisions generally lay down 
obligations for States and their legislatures rather than 
individuals. 124 Similarly in the Netherlands, the Supreme Court 
has taken the view that the European Social Charter is generally 
non- self-executing by the fact that its provisions require the 
Contracting Parties to introduce regulations. However, it has 
found article 6(4) to be an exception in that it provides that States 
"recognise" the right of workers and employers to collective 
action in cases of conflicts of interest" 
* 
125 
It might be argued that the ICESCR suffers from the same 
problem. Whereas provisions of the ICCPR refer directly to the 
rights of the individual, those in the ICESCR are phrased in terms 
120 See, Reisenfeld, supra, note 89, at 552. 
121 See, Iwasawa, supra, note 15, at 684. 
122 Jackson, supra, note 15, at 150. 
123 See, Van Dijk, supra, note 5, at 636; Heringa, supra, note 92, at 3; 
Drzemczewski A., European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law, 86- 
92(1983). 
124 Frowein, supra, note 16, at 70. Part In of the Appendix to the 
European Social Charter (196 1) is understood to have specifically excluded the 
possibility of direct effect. It reads: 
"It is understood that the Charter contains legal obligations of an international 
character, the application of which is submitted solely to the supervision 
provided in Part IV thereof" 
125 Netherlands Railways v. Tranýport Union of the Federation of 
Netherlands Trade Unions et al. supra, note 92, at 392. However Frowein 
argues that article 6(4) should be seen as non- self-executing otherwise it would 
be inconsistent with article 5 (freedom of association). Frowein, supra, note 16, 
at 70. 
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of State obligations. 126 Similarly there are a number Of Provisions 
in the latter that specifically outline the process of implementation (such as article 6(2)). On this basis, the Dutch Supreme Court has 
found the wording of article 8(l)(d)127 and article 13(1)128 of the 
Covenant to be conclusive as to their non-executing character. 
Such decisions however, do display a certain prejudgement 
of the issues involved. It is hard to deny that the object and 
purpose of the ICESCR and the European Social Charter is to 
provide for individual rights in the economic and social fields. 
That those rights are framed in terms of State obligations does not 
deprive them of that central attribute. Indeed, if provisions of the 
ICCPR were to be read in conjuction with the general terms of 
article 2(l), they too could be said to be framed in terms of State 
obigations. Indeed, this is an inescapable conclusion given the fact 
that such treaties are primarily inter-State agreements. This has led 
one commentator to argue that the fact that a provision is 
grammatically addressed to the States Parties "is not considered a 
reliable criterion for determining whether a given provision is 
directly applicable". 129 
That the Dutch courts have demonstrated a particular lack of 
consistency is apparent in two respects. First, the decision relating 
to article 6(4) of the European Social Charter could equally apply 
to many of the rights in the ICESCR in that the pattern of wording 
is almost identical. 130 Secondly, in a more recent case, the Dutch 
Central Appeals Court, whilst finding that article 7(a)(i) of the 
ICESCR (equal remuneration for work of equal value) did not 
have direct effect in the particular circumstances before it, 
suggested that if the alleged unequal remuneration occurred in a 
framework "which has such a clear structure and involves such 
patently unequal remuneration... the direct effect of Article 7(a)(i) 
126 See, in particular, articles 10 and 14 which make no mention of 
"rights" of the individual. 
127 WAK. v. Public Prosecutor Supreme Court, 6 Dec. 1983, NJ (1984) No. 557, cited in, 16 Neth. Y. I. L., 526, at 528 (1985). 
128. Netherlands v. L. S. V. B., supra, note 101. 
129 Iwasawa, supra, note 15, at 684. 
130 Compare for example: 
Article 6(4) ESC: "... the Contracting Parties... recognise... the right of workers 
and employers to collective action 
...... Article 7 ICESCR: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work... " 
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of the Covenant cannot reasonably be refused". 131 That no mention 
was made of the wording of the provision, which has been so 
decisive in other cases, underlines the fact that it is realistic to 
argue that provisions of the ICESCR may be considered as 
"binding upon everybody" and therefore self-executing. 
6) Negative Obligations 
It follows from the rule that self-executing treaty provisions 
should not require further measures of implementation, that those 
provisions that establish negative obligations or prohibitions, are 
prima facie good candidates to be directly effective. 132Even 
where individual rights and duties are spelt out, it would seem that 
the courts will. sometimes look, in addition, to the positive or 
negative nature of the obligations to determine their direct 
effect. 133This has been evident in bothUS134and EEC135 case 
law. More particularly, with the exception of a more recent 
case, 136 the courts in the Netherlands have tended to discount the 
possibility of the direct effect of Covenant articles on the basis of a 
general reading of article 2(l) of the Covenant, which provides 
that the rights be implemented by positive State action in a 
progressive manner. 137 
However, to decide upon a provision's direct effect merely 
on the positive or negative nature of the obligation is somewhat 
arbitrary. For example, in so far as a prohibition requires 
horizontal application (that is inter-individual application), there is 
a necessity for the existence of requisite sanctions and enforcement 
measures by the State. Moreover, even if a right requires the 
131 The Board of the Teaching Hoýpital at the Universijy of Amsterdam 
v. F. W. and MC. C. H. G. Central Appeals Court, 16 Feb. 1989, AB (1989) 
. 
164, cited in, 21 Neth. Y. I. L. 375, at 377 (1990). See also, Heringa, supra, 
note 92, at 4-5. 
132 Leary, supra, note 1, at 58. 
133 Jackson, supra, note 15, at 152. 
134 Froylova v. U. S. S. R., supra, note 90. 
135, Van Gend en Loos, supra, note 33, where the E. C. J., in co .9 
the self-executing nature of article 12, it mentioned that "The wording of Article 
12 contains a clear and unconditional prohibition which is not a positive but a 
negative obligation 
...... 
136 See above, note 114. 
137 See e. g., S. W. M. B. v-Mayor and Aldermen of Arnhem, Central 
Council of Appeal, 1 Nov. 1983, NJCM-Bulletin, 22 (1983), cited in, 16 
Neth. Y. I. L., 501, at 504 
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establishment of certain State structures (thus being a positive 
obligation), but those structures already exist, the right may be 
safely considered self-executing. 
The matter is even less clear if it is accepted that all human 
rights possess tripartite obligations, namely the obligation to 
respect, to protect and to fulfil. Under this approach, elements of 
rights which might be considered prima facie progressive in 
nature, will be capable of immediate implementation to the extent 
that they contain a prohibition upon the State. As one commentator 
has noted: 
"... there is no qualitative difference between negative 
and positive provisions. It is merely a difference of 
degree: the former is more likely to be directly 
applicable than the latter because it is more likely to 
be precise". 138 
This has certainly been the approach of the Committee, which has 
strongly maintained the possibility of immediate implementation of 
certain provisions, notwithstanding the progressive application 
clause in article 2(l). 139 Indeed, that there are exceptions to the 
general rule of progressive application has been recognised by the 
Dutch courts. 
IV) CONCLUSION 
Although technically it is beyond the competence of the 
Committee to concern itself with the precise manner in which 
States give effect to their obligations under the Covenant, it cannot 
be denied that the modalities of implementation have a significant 
impact upon the extent to which the individual may enjoy the 
rights under the Covenant. The most effective method of ensuring 
the enjoyment of human rights is undoubtedly to provide the 
individual with appropriate remedies at a national level. The 
concept of direct effect is of considerable importance in this 
context in so far as it is a mechanism through which the individual 
may rely directly upon the terms of the treaty in asserting his or 
her rights before national courts. 
It has to be noted that direct effect is not the only means by 
which treaty provisions might be given force in domestic courts. A 
largely unexplored area in this work has been the extent to which 
treaty provisions might be used in the interpretation of domestic 
138 Iwasawa, supra, note 15, at 675. 
139 Supra, note 79. 
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legislation and in the development of the common law. 140 
Although the use of treaty provisions in the interpretation of 
domestic norms has considerably potential, it does not provide the 
individual with an independent cause of action. This is particularly 
significant in the context of economic, social and cultural rights 
which are rarely to be found as constitutional rights and even 
when they are, have generally been deemded incapable of 
providing the individual with a cause of action in the courts. 
This does not augur well for the direct effect of provisions 
in the Covenant. So long as domestic courts maintain the 
traditional view that economic, social and cultural rights in general 
are not "justiciable", they are unlikely to consider the provisions in 
the Covenant as being self-executing. In turn, it is primarily the 
failure of national courts to give judicial consideration to 
economic, social and cultural rights, that has meant that those 
rights have remained largely inchoate. It is in the Committee's 
interest, not only from the point of view of ensuring the 
effectiveness of the guarantees in the Covenant, but also from the 
point of view of developing the normative content of the rights in 
the Covenant, that the rights be given direct effect. 
Ultimately, the direct effect of the Covenant's provisions 
will depend upon the extent of existing legislation and the 
traditional constitutional position of the courts which renders it 
virtually impossible to predict to what degree a particular 
provision might be self-executing. Nevertheless, although not all 
the possible criteria have been analysed here., it is clear that there 
can be no overriding presumption that the economic, social and 
cultural rights in the Covenant are not self-executing. 
It is arguable that those rights in the Covenant, that are not 
dependent for their implementation upon State financial resources, 
are prima facie good candidates for being given direct effect. One 
might cite for example, freedom from forced labour (article 6), 
freedom from arbitrary dismissal (article 6), the right to join and 
form trade unions (article 8), the right to strike (article 8), 
freedom from arbitrary eviction (article 11), the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of food or medical attention (articles 11 and 
12), the right to choose schools for one's children (article 13(3)), 
the right to establish and direct educational institutions (article 
140 To the writer's knowledge, there are no United Kingdom cases in 
which the Covenant has been mentioned. It is notable, however, that article 11 of 
the Covenant was relied upon in two US cases regarding equal access to higher 
education, see, Re Alien Children Education Litigation 501 F. Supp. 544, (S-D-Tex. July 211980); Tayyari v-New Mexico State Universi1y, 495 
F. Supp. 1365 (D. N. M. Aug-19 1980). 
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13(4)) and freedom for scientific research and creative activity (article 15(3)). In addition, although having certain resource 
implications, the rights might be generally given direct effect to 
the extent that they are read in conjunction with article 2(2) which 
prohibits discrimination in the exercise of those rights. 141 
For those States that do recognise the concept of self- 
executing treaty provisions, perhaps the greatest obstacle has been 
the excessively strict manner in which criteria have been 
applied142 and the almost summary fashion in which the courts 
have dealt with economic and social rights in general and the 
Covenant in particular. A more sophisticated relativist approach 
would recognise the degree to which such rights are capable of judicial implementation rather than to dismiss them out of hand. 
The Committee, whilst not being competent to rule as to the 
self-executing nature of rights, may exercise some influence on 
domestic courts in so far as those courts need to interpret 
provisions of the Covenant. In that sense, bold statements by the 
Committee are not unwarranted. Nevertheless, if the Committee 
wishes to influence domestic courts in this manner, it will have to 
develop a sophistication that is currently lacking. In particular, 
given that many of the rights within the Covenant have been 
identified as incorporating a mixture of obligations (respect, 
protect and fulfil), the Committee will have to be more precise as 
to what exact right or obligation is to be considered directly 
effective. 
141 The rights to equal pay for equal work, and equal remuneration for 
work of equal value in Article 7(a)(i) are also relevant here. 
142 Van Dijk, supra,, note 5, at 639. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: NON-DISCRIMINATION 
AND EQUALITY 
Article 2 (2) 
"The States Parties to the Present Convenant undertake to 
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be 
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other statusit. 
Article 3 
"The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the 
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, 
social and cultural rights setforth in the present Covenantif. 
I) INTRODUCTION 
As a human rights instrument, the manifest purport of the 
Covenant is to protect the fundamental rights of every person by 
virtue of their humanity. That human rights are seen to derive 
from the innate and common nature of every human being means 
that they are possessed by every person to an equal extent. As the 
Preamble stresses, the Covenant is based upon an idea of the "equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family". The 
concept of "equal rights" is confirmed in the Covenant in a general 
manner by the fact that the rights pertain to "everyone". More 
specifically however, article 3 makes express reference to the 
equal rights of men and women. 
References to equality may also be found in a number of 
other provisions in the Covenant. Article 7 refers to "equal 
remuneration for work of equal value", to "equal pay for equal 
work" and to "equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted". 
Similarly, article 13 provides that "higher education shall be made 
equally accessible to all". However, it follows from the structure 
of the Covenant that the most important provision as regards the 
promotion of equality or of equal rights within the Covenant is 
article 2(2). In that provision, recognition of a concept of equality 
is to be discovered in a negative formulation prohibiting 
discrimination. 
It could be said that the dual concepts of non-discrimination 
and equality deriving from article 2(2) "constitute the dominant 
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single theme of the Covenant. "1 This is true not merely by virtue 
of the fact that human rights reflect the common innate dignity of 
every human being, but also by the fact that the implementation of 
the Covenant is marked by a redistributive philosophy. 
II) THE 
-CONCEPTS 
OF NON-DISCRIMINATION AND 
EOUALITY 
The idea of equality has been peculiarly resistant to 
definition and, over the centuries, has been attributed with all 
forms of meanings and characteristics. For example, it is common 
enough to find references to "equality of treatment", "equality of 
access", "equality of result or achievement", "equality of 
opportunity", "absolute equality", "relative equality", "precise 
equality", "formal equality", "de facto equality" and "de jure 
equality". Despite the inconsistencies in terminological usage and 
the continuing disputes over certain peripheral issues, a number of 
basic principles are generally accepted. 
The idea of human rights assumes that all human beings 
have some basic commonly shared characteristics and that as a 
result they should be viewed and judged as members of the human 
race rather than as members of a particular group. The 
recognition of these shared qualities gives rise to a principle of 
equality which requires that all persons be treated with equal 
respect. Thus "certain forms of state and governmental behaviour 
which consistently exploit or degrade men and deny both the 
possession of the shared qualities and 'the moral claims that arise (therefrom)' by certain groups while conceding and indeed 
recognising them in the case of others should be excluded". 2 
1 Ramcharan B., "Equality and Nondiscrimination", in Henkin L. (ed), 
The International Bill of Rights, 246 (1981). In saying this he was referring to 
the ICCPR; as we shall see however this is also true for the ICESCR. 
2 Polyviou P., The Egual Protection of the Laws 11 (1980). Sieghart 
comments in this vein: 
"The primary characteristic which distinguishes 'human' rights 
from other rights is their universality: according to the classical 
theory, they are said to 'inhere' in every human being by virtue of 
his humanity alone. It must necessarily follow that no particular 
feature or characteristic attaching to any individual, and which 
distinguishes him from others, can affect his entitlement to his 
human rights, whether in degree or in kind, except where the 
instruments specifically provide for this for a clear and cogent 
reason- for example, in restricting the right to vote to adults, or 
in requiring special protection for women and children. " 
Sieghart P., The Intemational Law of Human Rights, 75 (1985). 
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Recognition has to be paid to the fact that although people 
have certain common characteristics, they nevertheless possess 
independent attributes and qualities (whether innate or assumed) 
which may legitimately be taken into account in the distribution of 
goods, services and advantages. It is commonly asserted here that 
equality demands that those who are equal be treated in an equal 
manner, 3 and that those who are different should be treated 
differently. 4 The fundamental question here is what considerations 
are deemed to be legitimate justifications for differential 
treatment. 
One commentator has usefully categorised such justifications 
into two groups: differentiations based upon "character and 
conduct imputable to the individual" (such as industriousness, 
idleness, lawfulness, merit, and carelessness)5; and differentiations 
based upon individual qualities which are relevant to social values (such as physical and mental capacities and talent). 6 However, these 
criteria do not exhaust all the possible justifications for differential 
treatment in every circumstance. 
The achievement of an equitable balance between identical 
and differential treatment, however, may be approached from 
either a positive or a negative vantage point. In positive terms it 
might be said that everyone should be treated in the same manner 
unless some alternative justification is provided. On the other 
hand, in negative terms, it might be said that differences in 
treatment are legitimate except upon a number of expressly 
prohibited grounds. 
3 Ramcharan commented in this light: "Equality... means equal treatment 
for those equally situated". Ramcharan, supra, note 1, at 252. Cf. also, Vickers 
: 6.11 
47 (1980). J., "Majority Equality Issues of the Eighties", Can. H. R. Y 
4 This derives essentially from the Aristotelian principle of distributive 
justice, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Bk. 5, (Trans. Ross W., 1925). See also, 
Dworkin, who distinguishes between "equal treatment" and "treatment as an 
equal", Dworkin R., Taking Rights Seriously, xii (1977). Vierdag notes 
however that an essential element of proportionality exists in determining the 
extent of different treatment. He therefore concludes that non-discrimination 
requires: 
"Equal treatment of equals and unequal treatment of unequals in 
proportion to the inequality tv 
. Vierdag E., The Concept of Discrimination in International Law, 7 (1973). 
5 For example a State may legitimately disqualify convicted criminals 
from the exercise of certain rights on the basis of their own actions. 
6 Ramcharan, supra, note 1, at 253. These have been termed by another 
commentator as "natural endowments". Raphael D., Justice and Lil&M, 48 (1980). 
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Ilie principle of non-discrimination approaches the matter 
of equality from the negative standpoint. 7 It is primarily a legal 
technique employed to counteract unjustified inequality. 8 The 
concept of non-discrimination is, however, only a limited means to 
pursue equality. First, it operates upon the presumption that 
differential treatment is legitimate unless based upon a proscribed 
ground. Even in such a case, differential treatment is only prima 
facie discriminatory. Secondly, the concept of non-discrimination 
is merely a procedural principle (or an obligation of conduct), 
governing the treatment of people as equals. 9 It may be 
conditioned by, but certainly does not recognise itself, a wider 
concept of equality that may take cogniscence of factual social 
inequalities. 10 In particular, non-discrimination tends to 
concentrate upon the prohibition of differential treatment and does 
not take account of the fact that differential treatment may actually 
be required in certain circumstances. 
The notion that people are "equal" may give rise to claims as 
to different fon-ns of equality. At one extreme, it might be 
interpreted as "equality of consideration" recognising merely that 
7 The most coherent discussion of the notion of discrimination in legal 
terms is to be found in Judge Tanaka's dissenting opinion in the South West 
Affica Cases (Second Phase). I. C. J. Rep. 1966,6 at 284-316. 
8 Partsch comments that the creation of the legal norm of 
non-discm. mnation was primarily aimed at avoiding the uncertainties of the 
notion of equality. He goes on to say: 
"The basic consideration in favour of this negative approach is to achieve 
a higher degree of clarity and certainty in arriving at equality 
Partsch K., "Fundamental Principles of Human Rights: Self-Determination, Equality 
and Non-Discrimination", in Luard E., The International Protection of Human Rights, at 
69 (1957). Similarly-the P. C. U. commented in the Minorijy Schools in Albania Case, (1935) P. C. I. J., Ser. A/B, no. 64: 
"Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind; whereas equality 
in fact may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to attain a 
result which establishes an equilibrium between different situations. " 
9 Some commentators see the object of the non-discrimination clauses as 
being the promotion of "equality of treatment". See e. g. Klerk Y., "Working 
Paper on Article 2(2) and Article 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights", 9 Hum. Rts. Q., 250, at 255 (1987). 
10 Cf. Meron T., "The Meaning and Reach of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination", 79 
AJ. I. L. 283, at 286 (1985). For the view that equality and non-discrimination 
are merely positive and negative formulations of the same idea see, Dinstein Y., 
"Discrimination and International Human Rights", 15 Isr. Y. H. R-, 11, at 19 (1985); Bayefsky A., "The Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination in 
International Law", 11 H. R L--. L, 1, at 1-2 (1990). 
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everyone should have their claims considered. II Essentially this is 
no more than saying that those claims exist. At the other extreme, 
equality can be seen as "equality of result", 12 in which there should 
be a numerically equal distribution of goods, services and 
advantages. This is universally considered to be neither desirable 
nor possible. 13 
Between these two extremes may be found claims as to 
"equality of opportunity". In a weak sense this may be interpreted 
as allowing everyone to develop their capabilities and pursue their 
interests without unjustified restrictions. A stronger sense of 
equality of opportunity, however, requires that opportunity be 
made meaningful and effective through, in particular, the removal 
of external barriers that affect the acquisition of benefits and 
distribution of social "goods", and through the positive promotion 
of maximum opportunity (for example through training). 14 The 
notion of equality here demands differential treatment on the basis 
of initial de facto inequality. 15 Efforts to maximise equality of 
11 Polivou, supra, note 2, at 12; Raphael, supra, note 6, at 5 1. 
12 Also referred to as absolute equality, material equality, or equality of 
satisfaction. 
13 If this approach was taken then the policy of maintaining reasonable 
differentiations between people in terms of merit or virtue, for example, is 
untenable. See, Flew A., Equality in Liberty and Justice, 177 (1989). 
14 An example of the necessity of different treatment is the provision of 
special access facilities for the physically disabled in educational facilities. 
Clearly if they were to be treated "equally" there would be no grounds for 
building special ramps or lifts. This would effectively deprive them of access to 
educational opportunities that are open to others. Vickers comments in this 
respect: 
"If we interpret equal treatment as identical treatment regardless of the 
different needs of individuals, few equality goals will be realized and 
most equality rights will exist simply on paper. " 
Vickers, Supra, note 3, at 58. 
15 The question of different treatment is particularly problematic with 
regard to minorities. On the one hand the social disadvantagement of such 
groups might require a long term integrationalist stance emphasising equality of 
treatment. On the other hand, notions of cultural independence and self- 
determination argue in favour of different treatment. Schachter distinguishes 
between races and ethnic groups: ff "In respect of race, one should follow a "universalist-integrationalist 
policy (eliminating distinctions) whereas in regard to ethnic groups a 
pluralist solution, based on the separate but equal doctrine, can be justified and achieved". 
Schachter 0., "How Effective are Measures Against Racial Discrimination? " 4 H. R. J., 
293, at 296 (1971). 
Capotorti argues that the essential difference between the protection of minorities 
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opportunity have commonly involved the imposition of 
redistributionalist taxation policies to finance social welfare 
programmes for the advancement of vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups in society. 
Whereas there is acceptance of the idea that the benefits of 
individual development may be distributed to reduce material 
inequality, the idea of utilising "suspect" criteria to direct such a 
distribution is more controversial. In particular the institution of 
affmnative action policies which aim to ensure some equalisation 
of result has been subject to considerable criticism. 16 
HI) EOUALITY IN THE COVENANT 
A) THE TEXT OF THE COVENANT 
It is very much apparent that a notion of equality runs 
through the heart of the Covenant. In so far as the Covenant 
demands the creation of State-welfare institutions and benefits (for 
example for the provision of housing, food, clothing and social 
security), it is openly redistributionalist. 17 Certainly the Covenant 
does not envisage an absolute equalisation of result in the sense of 
achieving an equal distribution of material benefits to all members 
of society, but it does recognise a process of equalisation in which 
social resources are redistributed to provide for the satisfaction of 
the basic rights of every member of society. 18 As an ideal then, an 
and non-discrimination is that the former requires the maintenance of certain differential 
treatment to allow them to continue developing their own characteristics. Capotord F., 
Study On the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic. Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, E/CNA/Sub. 2/3 84/Rev. 1, at 4 1, para. 242 (1979). However he seems not to 
recognize that failure on the part of the State to protect the right to cultural identity of 
minorities is also a question of discrimination. 
Indeed, Sigler confounds the argument further by asserting that the definition of 
a minority as: 
"any group category of people who can be identified by a sizable 
segment of the population as objects for prejudice or discrimination or 
who, for reasons of deprivation, require the positive assistance of the 
State. A persistent nondominant position of the group in political, social, 
and cultural matters is the common feature of the minority". 
Sigler J., Minorily Rights: A Comparative Analysis, 5 (1983). 
16 See below, text accompanying notes 203-23 1. 
17 It is arguable that all the rights (possibly with the exception of articles 
9 and 13) are achievable in a purely free-market setting through economic 
growth. 
18 As Raphael stated: 
"-differential distribution according to need implies a belief in a 
right to a certain Idnd of equality. The man who is said to be in 
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uneven distribution of material benefits is only tolerable in so far 
as the satisfaction of the basic economic, social and cultural rights 
of every member of society is already achieved-19 On a broad 
view, the objectives of the Covenant are underlined by the idea of 
equality of opportunity in its strongest sense. 
Both the text of the Covenant and the intentions of the drafters appear to bear out this conclusion. The idea of equality of 
opportunity is specifically recognised in articles 7(c) and 13(2)(c). 
Article 7(c) in particular, specifies that the only legitimate 
considerations in achieving equality of opportunity for promotion 
are seniority and competence. 20 States would thus appear to be 
under an obligation to eliminate all other barriers to promotion 
that might exist both de jure and de facto. In particular this might 
require the adoption of positive measures to promote the 
opportunities of groups in society that are under-represented in 
higher management positions. That positive measures may (and 
indeed should) be taken on behalf of certain groups in society is 
confirmed by the text of articles 10(2) and 10(3) of the Covenant 
which provide for special measures of protection to be accorded to 
mothers before and after childbirth and to children especially in 
the workplace. 
Article 3 itself is not so clear in this respect. It provides for 
the "equal right" of men and women to the enjoyment of all rights 
in the Covenant. This might be interpreted as saying no more than 
that men have no greater claim to the enjoyment of the rights than 
women. However, it is clear that the drafters intended the 
provision to have more substance. Although article 3 did not 
require absolute equality of treatment or result., 21 there was 
need falls below a level of benefits which is taken to be the right 
of all. When special provision is made for him, this is an attempt 
to bring him, so far as possible, up to the level of what is due 
equally to all. " 
Raphael, supra, note 6, at 85. 
19 The principle of non-discrimination would, however, still operate in 
this fielcL 
20 Article 13(2)(c) requires that higher education be "equally accessible to 
0, on the basis of capacity". It is not as specifically stated here that capacity 
should be the only consideration. 
21 McKean comments: 
"Some representatives considered that the paragraph might be 
taken to decree an 'absolute' or 'precise' equality or 'identity of 
treatment' but others urged that what was being sought was an 
effective equality in fact- not the abolition of differences between 
the roles of men and women in marriage, but rather the equitable 
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certainly a feeling that factual equality should be increased. As the 
USSR representative commented, the Third Committee was 
"elaborating principles of de jure equality; from these principles 
would arise the defacto equalization of human rights". 22 He 
continued, "... equality of rights went further than mere non- 
discrimination; it implied the existence of positive rights in all the 
spheres dealt with in the draft Covenant". 23 
It might be argued from the presence of article 3 that the 
concept of equal rights only applies in relation to the position of 
women. However, there is no reason to approach article 3 in such 
a restrictive manner. Not only is the scope of the 
non-discrimination provision considerably wider, the presence of 
article 3 merely reflects the preoccupation of the United Nations at 
the time of drafting, with the issue of sexual equality. 24 
B) THE APPROACH OF THE COMMIT7EE 
The approach of the Committee towards the realisation of 
the rights in the Covenant is marked by its insistence upon a 
process of equalisation. Thus the Committee has recognised that 
the first step in the realisation of the rights in the Covenant is the 
identification of disadvantaged sectors of the population. 25 Those 
groups should be the focus of positive State action aimed at 
securing the full realisation of their rights. That the Committee 
considers that action should be prioritised in favour of the 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society affirms that it 
considers that the full realisation of the rights will not be achieved 
merely through economic growth, but rather through providing 
for a more equal enjoyment of the rights. 26 Indeed, to the extent 
that the Committee relies upon State-specific benchmarks or 
indicators, the definition of disadvantagement becomes a relative, 
distribution of rights and responsibilities". 
McKean W., Equalijy and Discrimination under International Law, 182 (1983). 
22 USSR, UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1183, para. 10, (1962). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Klerk, supra, note 9, at 256. 
25 This is stated as being one of the aims of the reporting process. See, 
General Comment No. 1, UN Doc. E/1 989/22, Annex HI, at 87, UN ESCOR, 
Supp. (No. 4), (1989). 
26 For a criticism of such an approach see, Flew, supra, note 13, at 182- 
209. He argues instead for the issue of poverty, for example, to be dealt with 
through a process of economic growth. 
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as opposed to a universal, or absolute, definition. In such a 
situation, measures to combat disadvantagement may be seen to be 
openly redistributionalist in nature. 27 
If a process of equalisation. is considered to be a means by 
which States should achieve the full realisation of the rights, it is 
difficult to assess the degree to which the Committee is really 
concerned with the question of equality. For example, if a State 
builds special homes for persons with physical disabilities, that 
might alternatively be seen as a step towards the realisation of the 
right to housing, or as a measure aimed at achieving real equality 
of access to adequate housing. 
Nevertheless, the concept of equality is relevant outside the 
achievement of specific levels of enjoyment of economic, social 
and cultural rights. Thus it might be considered that even where 
the minimum core content of the rights is achieved for all persons, 
the State is under an obligation to ensure that everyone has 
equality of opportunity or access to higher levels of enjoyment of 
the rights concerned. 28 
In addition to its action in relation to discrimination, which 
will be dealt with below, members of the Committee have made 
numerous references to equality of access and opportunity. 29 In 
doing so, Committee members have tended to rely upon the factual 
situation in dealing with the question of discrimination. 30 Members 
have further enquired as to State policies designed to remedy 
27 The rejection by the Committee of development approaches that stress 
growth over poverty alleviation reinforces the conclusion that a link between 
disadvantagement and equality underlies its methodology. 
28 This is relevant to the discussion of whether article 2(2) is subordinate 
or autonomous, see below, text accompanying notes 158-175. 
29 See e. g., Alston, F. /C. 12/1990/SR. 31, at 3, para. 10; Jimenez 
Butragueno, ibid, SR. 43, at 8, para. 4; Rattray, E/C. 12/199 l/SR. 11 
, 
at 8, 
para. 45. 
30 For example it was commented that a higher proportion of 
unemployed women in a State suggested a certain amount of inequality in 
education and training, see e. g., Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 10, 
para. 4; Neneman, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 7, para. 29. Similar concern has been 
expressed over situations where the number of girls in education is lower than 
that of boys, see e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 14, at 7, para. 40; Alston, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 8, para. 48; Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 3 1, at 4, para. 13; 
Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 3, at 11, para. 5 1. 
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situations of de facto inequality, 31 and have looked for 
improvements in the position over time. 32 
However, to determine the extent of equality of opportunity 
in terms of the result achieved, seems to confuse the notion of 
equality of opportunity or access with equality of result. 33 As 
Nickel comments: 
"Success in providing equal opportunities will have to be judged in ways that... require reference to the presence of 
quality programs to educate and protect against 
discrimination. Statistical measures of outcomes may be 
useful as practical guides, but they will not serve as criteria 
of success". 34 
It is clear that the Committee does not countenance the creation of a 
situation of absolute equality of result. It has emphasised, in particular, 
the necessity of some autonomy for ethnic minorities to ensure the 
enjoyment of their own culture, 35 and has placed emphasis on the 
individual right to pursue his or her own development. 36 As one member 
stated: 
"'Full' realisation of the economic, social and cultural 
rights recognised in the Covenant did not mean 
equalling out for all persons in the areas concerned 
but the fact that everyone was entitled, de facto, to the 
equal opportunity to enjoy his rights with dignity". 37 
However, although the Committee does attempt to draw a 
distinction between the concepts of equality of opportunity and 
equality of result, the problem essentially lies in the means by 
31 See e. g., Sviridov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 20, at 2, para. 2; Alston, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 31, at 3, para. 10. 
32 See e. g., Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 11, at 2, para. 5. 
33 Some commentators have taken the view that the full realization of 
equality of opportunity is to be determined by whether "the allocation of the good 
in question in fact works out unequally or disproportinately between different 
sections of society; if the unsuccessful sections are under a disadvantage which 
could be removed by further reform or social action". Williams B., "The Idea of 
Equality", in Williams B. (ed), Problems of the Sel (1973). 
34 Nickel J., "Equal Opportunity in a Pluralistic Society", in Paul E., Miller F., 
Paul J., and Ahrens J. (eds), Equal 01212ortunitý, 115 (1987). 
35 See e. g., Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 1 1, at 10, para-54. 
36 Indeed one member, in stressing the necessity of protective action for women 
during and after pregnancy, commented that "they should not be excessively protected in 
every sphere of activity" 
- 
Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 16, para. 25. 
37 Taya, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 9, para. 42. 
156 
which former is to be measured. 38 The Committee already does 
take note of legislative and educational programmes to combat 
discrimination in addition to statistical data, 39 but it is doubtful 
whether analysis of this information alone would take it any closer 
to assessing real equality of opportunity and access. 40 
It would appear then that the Committee must, as it does at 
present, take cogniscence of material inequality between groups in 
society as evidenced in statistical data. It should, however, be 
aware that the ultimate objective is not to establish some numerical 
distribution in the enjoyment of the rights, but rather to ensure 
that there is sufficient equality of opportunity. 41 Accordingly, not 
every difference in the distribution of benefits will necessarily be 
evidence of inequality of opportunity. The Committee will have to 
exercise some discretion in establishing causality. 
IV) ARTICLE 2(2): NON-DISCRIMINATION 
The only indication as to the precise meaning of non- 
discrimination in the drafting of the Covenant was provided by a 
discussion over whether the term "discrimination" or the term 
"distinction" should be used. There, an overwhelming majority42 
endorsed a three-power amendment (Argentina, Italy and Mexico) 
to replace the word "distinction" with the word "discrimination". 43 
The stated purpose was to confirm that certain distinctions may be justified to promote the position of certain backward and 
underpriviledged sectors of the population. 44 The word 
38 This is partially due to the fact that "equality of opportunity and 
access" is a form of equality of result in its widest sense: it does envisage an 
ideal situation towards which non-discimination policy should i- 
39 See e. g., Neneman, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 10, para. 49. Rattray, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 12, para. 66; Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 42, at 11, para. 50. 
40 Indeed the problem facing the Committee is not one of access to 
information regarding State policy and legislation, but rather the way in which 
such policies are cartied ouL 
41 There is some evidence that certain members of the Committee are 
aware of the shortcomings of statistical evidence in the determination of 
discrimination. E. g. Neneman, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 7, para. 29. 
42 76-2,13 abstentions. UN Doc. A/5365, at 22,17 UN GAOR, Annex, (Ag. Item. 43), (1962). 
43 UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 1028/Rev. 2 (1962). 
44 There were also fears that the guarantee of rights without distinction 
would also prevent States from place any restrictions inter alia on the rights of 
aliens to take up employment in a country. The replacement of the word 
distinction be discrimination was intended to avoid such ambiguity. UN Docs. 
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discrimination seemed to convey more accurately the requirement 
that the distinction be of an unjustified nature or arbitrary. That 
this decision was not of any decisive importance is borne out by 
the fact that during the drafting of the ICCPR the term distinction 
was not altered. 45 In that case it was made clear that not all 
distinctions would be forbidden. 46 Similarly, in the drafting of 
article 3 there is some evidence that not an differences in 
treatment would be considered illegitimate. McKean comments: 
"Some representatives considered that the paragraph might 
be taken to decree an 'absolute' or 'precise' equality or 
'identity of treatment'but others urged that what was being 
sought was an effective equality in fact- not the abolition of 
differences between the roles of men and women in 
A/C. 3/SR. 1182, at 241 (1962); A/C. 3/SR. 1202, at 338 (1962); and 
A/C. 3/SR. 1203,, at 341 (1962). 
45 The representative of Italy in particular held out in favour of the term. 
discrimination because: 
"There were cases in which the law was justified in making 
distinctions between individuals or groups, but the purpose of the 
article was to prohibit discrimination, in any sense of 
unfavourable and odious distinctions which lacked any objective 
or reasonable basis". 
Italy, A/C. 3/SR. 1099, para. 10 (1961). 
46UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1258, paras. 244-245 (1963); UN 
Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1259, para. 249 (1963). See also, Klerk, supra, note 9, at 252. 
Mckean comments that the change in attitude from that taken with regard to the 
ICESCR was largely due to the change in composition of the Committee in the 
interveneing time. McKean, supra, note 21, at 149. The use of the word 
"distinction" is also suprising considering article 4 ICCPR refers to 
"discrimination". 
An important exchange of views took place over the meanings of 
"distinction" and "discrimination" with regard to article 26 ICCPR (draft article 
24). It was pointed out that the law was justified in making reasonable 
differentiations in the treatment of certain groups of individuals such as minors, 
aliens or persons of unsound minds. See, UN Docs. A/C. 3/SR. 1097-1102, (1962). Discrimination in this sense did not mean distinctions of a favourable 
kind (negative discrimination), nor did it include private individual preferences. 
McKean, supra, note 21, at 139-140. 
McKean comments that article 2(l) ICCPR "does not prevent the 
drawing of distinctions on the grounds of merit or capacity, nor does the equality 
principle require identical treatment for all, or forbid relevant and reasonable 
distinctions". Indeed article 25 ICCPR seems to recognize that it is only 
11 unreasonable restrictions" that qualify as discrimination. Similarly, objections to 
the phrase "equality before the law" in article 26 ICCPR, were dispelled by the 
argument that it was a procedural and not substantive equality that was sought, 
which did not preclude reasonable differentiations between individuals or groups 
of individuals. 
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marriage, but rather the equitable distribution of rights and 
responsibilities ". 47 
it would appear that the drafters understood the term "discrmi miation" to 
mean an unjustified differentiation in treatment. Indeed this point has 
been emphasised by the European Court of Human Rights in the Belgian 
Linguistic Case,. 48Here the French text of article 14 used the term 
"distinction". The Court held that the article "does not forbid every 
difference in treatment in the exercise of the rights and freedoms 
recognized". 
However, during the drafting of the Covenant, a number of 
references were made to "discrimination in its classical juridical 
meaning"49and to "discrimination... in international usage". 50 It seems 
to have been suggested that there existed a specific juridical meaning of 
the term "discrimination" as used in the Covenant. 51 It is possible that 
reference was being made to the ILO Convention Concerning 
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (ILO 
No. 111)52and the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in 
Education53, both of which contain definitions of discrimination. 
Certainly, if a clear international test for discrimination in all fields were 
47 McKean, supra, note 21, at 182. 
48 Case "Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in 
education in Belgium" (Merits), Eur. Court H. R., Series A, Vol. 6, Judgement of 23 July 
1968, (1979-80) 1 EHRR 578. 
49 Pakistan, A/C-3/SR. 1102, para. 4, (196 1) 
50 Argentina, A/C-3/SR. 1184, para. 7 (1962). 
51 Ramcharan argues with regard to the provisions of the ICCPR, that the status 
of the concept of non-discrimination in international law has effect both as to the 
permissibility of derogations from the principle in the Covenant, but also to the 
determination of State compliance with its obligations under the Covenant. Ramcharan, 
supra, note 1, at 250. 
52 Adopted 25 June 1958, entered into force 15 June 1960,362 U. N. T. S. 32. 
Article 1(l) reads: 
tj in a. An "For the purposes of this Convention the term "discrimina. on" cludes: y 
distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, 
political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or t impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation' 
. 
53 Adopted 14 Dec. 1960, entered into force 22 May 1962,429 U. N. T. S 
. 
93. 
Article 1(l) reads: 
"For the purposes of this Convention the term "discrimination" includes any distinction, 
exclusion, limitation or preference which, being based on race, colour, sex, language, 
religionl. political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic condition or birth, 
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education". 
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established, it would have considerable relevance to the interpretation of 
article 2(2). 54 
The definitions of discrimination provided in the above mentioned 
Conventions may also be compared with those in the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)55 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 56 Their similarities have led 
certain commentators to conclude that a universal "composite concept of 
discrimination can be discerned in the various instrumentS57: 
54 This is particularly so if the principle of non-discrimination is thought to have 
the status of customary international law. 
In the Barcelona Traction Cast the ICJ included among the obligations of states 
erga omnes "the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person 
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination". ICJ Rep., (1970), at 3. 
Similarly in its Advisory Opinion onNamibi (1971) the ICJ stated that "to establish... 
and to enforce distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on 
grounds of race, colour, descent or national origin... constitutes a denial of fundamental 
human rights" and "is a flagrant violation of the purposes of the Charter". Advisory 
Opinion, I. C. J. Rep., (1971), at 16. 
Reference to other international instruments is also suggested in paragraph 41 of 
the Limburg Principles which states: 
"In the application of article 2(2) due regard should be paid to all relevant 
international instruments including the Declaration and Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination". 
9 Hum. Rts. Q,,, 122, at 127, (1987). 
55 Adopted 21 Dec. 1965, entered into force 4 Jan. 1967,660 U. N. T. S., 195. 
Article 1(l) reads: 
"In this Convention, the term "racial discrimination" shall mean any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national of ethnic 
origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of humen rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life". 
56 Adopted 18 Dec. 1979, entered into force 3 Sept. 1981. GA Resn. 34/180,34 
UN GAOR, Resns, Supp. (No. 46) at 193, (1980), 1249 U. N. T. S. 243. Article 1 reads: 
"For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimination against women" 
shall mean any distinction, exclusion or retriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field". 
57 The outline of such a definition has been accepted by the Human Rights 
Committee in its General Comment on article 2(l) ICCPR where it stated that the term 
discrimination: 
"Should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all 
persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. " 
General Comment No. 18 (37), UN Doc. A/45/40, at 174, para. 7,45 UN GAOR, 
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1) a difference in treatment, 
2) which is based upon certain prohibited grounds, 
3) and has a certain purpose or effect, 
4) in selective fields. 58 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights however, 
has not as yet established its own definition of the term "discrimination" 
in a General Comment. The only definition to be found in its work is in 
the reporting guidelines on the subject of article 6. There, the Committee 
requests States to provide it with information as to: 
"... any distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or 
preferences, be it in law or in administrative practices 
or in practical relationships, between persons or 
groups of persons, made on the basis of race, colour, 
sex, religion, political opinion, nationality or social 
origin, which have the effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of 
equality of opportunity or treatment in employment 
or occupation". 59 
The similarity between this definition and that adopted in other 
human rights contexts suggests that the Committee win approach 
the question of discrimination in the same manner. 
The four elements of discrimination will be dealt with separately 
below. 
A) DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
The Committee utihses the common terms to describe 
differential treatment. Ibey are "distinctions", "exclusions", 
of restrictions" or "preferences". Clearly any one of these terms 
would suffice to establish an action for the purpose of 
discrimination. The inclusion of the term "preferences" suggests 
that the action does not necessarily have to be directed against the 
group alleging discrimination, but may be effected through 
unreasonable promotion of one group at the expense of others. 60 
The crucial aspect is that these ternis are all relative, presuming a 
Supp. (No. 40), (1990). 
58 Schwelb E., '"I"he International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination", 15 I. C. L. Q., 996, at 1001 (1966). 
59 Reporting Guidelines, UN Doc. E/1991/23, Annex IV, at 91, para-3, 
UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), (1991). 
6BO It has to be pointed out that from the point of view of equality of 
opportunity, differential treatment may actually be required in certain 
circumstances. It is particularly in this respect that the principle of 
non-discrimination falls short of providing for equality. 
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one commentator has noted, "the discriminatory or equal 
treatment of one person must be measured by the relative 
treatment of somebody else". 61 
As was established during the drafting of the Covenant, 
differential treatment, although being a pre-requisite, is not in 
itself sufficient to establish a case of discrimination. The 
Committee's definition goes on to speak of actions that have the 
effect of "nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise of equality of opportunity... ". 62 Accordingly, 
differentiations in treatment are not to be considered 
discriminatory as long as they do not negatively affect the equal 
opportunities of other individuals or groups. This might be read as 
not preventing justifiable differentiations. However, by defining 
"discrimination" in terms of "equality of opportunity" does little to 
clarify the complex of issues. In the context of employment, for 
example, it has to be accepted that certain job requirements may 
indirectly limit the access to employment of certain groups (such 
as women in jobs that require heavy manual labour). 63 Similarly 
in some cases, preference may be legitimately given to members of 
specific racial groups for the purpose of authenticity. 64 
This matter has been underlined in other human rights fora. 
In the, Mauritian Women's Caseý55 the Human Rights Committee in 
finding a violation of articles 2(1) and 3 ICCPR, considered that a 
distinction based on sex was not in itself conclusive. The 
determining factor was that no "sufficient justification" had been 
given for such a distinction. 66 Similarly, the European Court 
found in the Belgian Linguistics CaseU that the principle of 
equality of treatment is violated "if the distinction has no objective 
and reasonable justification. " It went on to define what it 
considered to be reasonable: 
"The existence of such a justification must be assessed in 
relation to the aim and effects of the measure under 
61 Dinstein, supra, note 
, 
at 11. 
62 Supra, note 59. 
63 See below, Chapter 5. 
64 For example a theatrical production might require an actor of a specific 
Mcial. background. 
665 HRC Resn. 9/35, UN Doc. A/36/40, at 134,36 UN GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 40), (1981). 
66 Ibid, para. 9.2 (b) 2(ii) 3 
67 Supra, note 48. 
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consideration, regard being had to the principles which 
normally prevail in democratic societies. A difference of 
treatment in the exercise of a right laid down in the 
Convention must not only pursue a legitimate aim: Article 
14 is likewise violated when it is clearly established that 
there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised. "68 
That consideration is given to "principles that normally prevail in 
democratic societies" is underlined by the approach of the European 
Court of Human Rights in allowing a "margin of appreciation" to be 
given to States in the determination of "to what extent differences in 
otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law". 69 It has 
commented in this respect that "the scope of this margin will vary 
according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and its background". 70 
As far as the Committee is concerned, it has not readily addressed 
such issues. However, it has exercised a certain amount of restraint in 
making determinations of violations in relation to article 2(2). For 
example, in both the cases of Iran and of Afghanistan the Committee 
gave the State concerned some leeway as regards the compatibility of 
certain laws and practices, with the requirement of non-discrimination. 71 
In particular, despite the failure of the Iranian delegate to answer the 
questions of the Committee as to the access of Bahai's to university 
education in Iran, 72 the Committee failed to make any specific finding of 
violation. Whether or not the restraint in such cases is a result of lack of 
sufficient information or in anticipation of some justification, it does 
suggest hat the Committee in fact allows States a "margin of 
appreciation" in this regard. 
68 Ibid. 
69 That this may give rise to overemphasis of public interest in the determination 
of what is a justified distinction has been criticised by Van DiJk and Van Hoof. They 
admit nevertheless that the requirement of reasonableness deprives this objection of 
much of its force. Van DiJk P. and Van Hoof G., I'heM and Practice of the Eg=an 
-Convention on Human Ri ghts, 396 (4th Ed, 199 1). 
70 Inze v. Austria, Eur. Court. H. R., Series A, Vol 126, Judgement of 28 Oct. 1987, para. 41. However there has been little articulation of what constitutes those 
Circumstances, subject-matters or backgrounds in which the margin of appreciation will 
operate. Bayefsky, supra, note 10, at 18. 
71 For Afghanistan see, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 8, at 5, para. 2 1; 
For Iran see, Jimenez Butragueno,, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 45, at 3, paras 10- 11. 
72 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 42, at 13, para. 70. 
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B) PURPOSE OR EFFECT 
The Committee's definition of discrimination, refers, like the ILO 
Convention to the "effect" of that differential treatment. ICERD, 
CEDAW and the UNESCO Convention refer, in addition, to 
discrimination that has the "purpose" of impairing or nullifying the 
enjoyment of the rights concerned. 73 Although the Committee makes no 
reference to "purpose" this does not affect State responsibility for 
intentional but ineffective discriminatory measures. Thus the presence of 
discriminatory legislation would amount to a breach of the Covenant 
even if it were not enforced. Accordingly, members of the Committee 
criticised a legal provision in Zaire which required women to seek the 
permission of their husbands in order to work outside the home. The fact 
that permission was rarely denied was immaterial. 74 
In practice, the actual intention of the State concerned seems to be 
of little importance. It is clear that in the majority of States some form 
of discrimination is inherent in the civil, political, social, economic, and 
cultural traditions of that country. 75 A particular govenunent at any 
given juncture cannot be considered to have willed that situation whether 
expressly or impliedly. 76 The necessity of eliminating discrimination 
requires that the government take action to remedy circumstances for 
which it is not itself responsible. This is particularly clear in so far as 
States are obliged to eliminate discrimination between private 
individuals. 77 Thus, although discriminatory intention might be 
determined merely by the existence of discriminatory policies and 
73 As regards the ICCPR, there is some evidence that the practice of the Human 
Rights Committee suggests that a notion of forseeability has been incorporated in which 
some results would not be considered as the true consequences of discriminatory rules. 
Bayefsky, supra, note 10, at 10. 
74 See e. g. Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 2, para. 3. 
75 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 31, at 3, para. 10. 
76 There is the possibility that the "State,, is to be considered in an a-historical 
manner, unlike the notion of government. In this way the "State" could be said to have 
intentioned past discriminatory practices. However the confusion that might entail in the 
case of newly independent States suggests that this approach is probably not the most 
effective. 
77 See below, text accompanying notes 232-245. 
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legislation, 78 the Committee has not refrained from criticising 
governments on the basis of the de facto situation alone. 79 
'Me emphasis on the "effect" of policies rather than their intention 
also means that neutral measures will be considered "discriminatory" if 
in fact they negatively affect a group in society that may be deemed to be 
singled out for protection. As Judge Tanaka commented in the South 
West Africa Cases (Second Phase), 1966BD with regard to racial 
discrimination: 
"The arbitrariness which is prohibited, means the purely 
objective fact and not the subjective condition of those 
concerned. Accordingly, the arbitrariness can be asserted 
without regard to 
... 
motive or purpose". 81 
This form of discrimination, as found in certain jurisdictions, 82 has often 
been tern-ied "indirect discrimination". 83 Although a certain amount of 
recognition has been paid, by Committee members, to the notion of 
indirect discrimination, 84 no effort has been made to define the concept 
as yet. As a general principle, however, indirect discrimination is not 
established if only one person is adversly affected by the provision 
concerned- it must affect the group concerned proponderately or in a 
disproportionate manner. 
78 This is not conclusive in itself however as discrimination may operate as an 
unfortunate side-effect of a piece of legislation. In such a case a test of forseeability 
would have to be made to impute discriminatory intention. In this respect, it is difficult 
to concur with Meron's assertion that discriminatory intention is easy to establish. 
Meron, supra, note 10, at 287. 
79 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 16, at 7, para. 32. The P. C. I. J. advocated 
a similar conclusion in its advisory opinion relating to German Settlers in Poland (1923), 
P. C. I. J., Ser. B, No. 6: 
"Ilere must be equality in fact as well as ostensible legal equality in the sense of the 
absence of discrimination in the words of the law"; 
80 Supra, note 7. 
81 Ibid, at 293. 
82 It has been defined and most fully developed in the United States following 
the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U. S. 424 (1971). In the UK see, Race 
Relations Act 1976, sect. 1 (1)(b), Sex Discrimination Act 1975 sect. 1 (1)(b). 
83 The Commission of the EEC describes indirect discrimination as fOllOws: 
"There is a presumption of indirect discrimination as soon as an 
apparently neutral regulation in fact preponderently touches the workers 
of one of the sexes and this without the need to indicate the intention to 
discriminate. " 
European Commission Intermediate Report on Application of Directive No. 7917, (Com. 83), 793 (1984). 
84 See e. g., Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 5, at 10, para-58; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 8, para. 46. 
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An emphasis on the discriminatory "effect" of policies and 
programmes does raise two important points about the Committee's 
approach. First, it places some emphasis upon what might be termed 
"equality of result" as opposed to procedural equality. In effect, the 
principle of non-discrimination has been given a broad interpretation to 
embody ideas of equality of opportunity. Secondly, in so far as indirect 
discruinmiation may be established by reference to effects upon a 
particular group (for example a racial group), it might be said to give 
rise to a notion of collective rights. 85 
Q GROUNDS UPON WHICH DISCRIMINATION IS PROHEBITED 
Most non-discrimination provisions proscribe discrimination on a 
specified number of grounds, such as sex, race, or ethnic origin "to make 
clear that certain factors are unacceptable as grounds for distinction". 86 
As seen above, this does not mean that all distinctions made upon those 
grounds will necessarily be discriminatory, rather that they are "suspect 
classifications". At most, distinctions made upon these suspect grounds 
could be said to amount to prima facie discrimination, depending upon 
whether or not there is any reasonable justification. 
The list of "prohibited" or "suspect" grounds tends to vary from 
one treaty to another. It might be the purpose of the treaty for example, 
to deal with a specific type of discrimination, in which case, the grounds 
on which discrimination is prohibited are more restricted. 87 It is clear 
that the ICESCR, in containing a list of ten prohibited grounds, was not 
intended to be limited in such a way. Nevertheless, the question of 
whether the enunciated grounds are the only ones on which distinctions 
are prohibited, is not specifically addressed. 
1) Exhaustive or Illustrative 
The ten illegitimate grounds for discrimination, parallel those 
found in the UDHR. Additional grounds found in other Conventions are 
notably "association with a national minority", 88 "ethnic origin", 89 and 
85 It cannot be said to be a fully-fledged "collective right" however, as the group 
identity merely acts as a condition for the protection of the individual. It does not, for 
example, give rise to claims for a specific benefit to be granted to that group. 
865 Ramcharan, supra, note 1, at 252. 
87 Examples of this type of treaty are the Racial Discrimination Convention 
which is limited to distinctions made on the basis of "race, colour, descent, or national 
or ethnic origin", and the Discrimination against Women Convention which relates to 
distinctions "on the basis of sex". 
88 Article 14, European Convention on Human Rights (1950), 213 U. N. T. S. 
221. It is unlikely that this adds much to the prohibition of discrimination on the ground 
of national origin. See e. g., Dinstein, supra, note, at 12. 
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"disability ". 90 It seems unlikely, however, that the drafters wished to 
exclude these as possible grounds for discrimination. 
It could be argued on the basis of the principle expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, that the specification of some prohibited grounds for 
discrimination automatically excludes the possibility of adding other 
grounds. Indeed, the reference to discrimination "of any kind", found in 
the UDHR was dropped in the drafting of the ICESCR leading a 
commentator at the time to conclude that the enumerated grounds were 
intended to be exhaustive. 91 
Nevertheless, during the drafting of the ICCPR, certain proposals 
for grounds of discrimination were deemed unnecessary because they fell 
into the ambit of the expressions "discrimination on any ground" and 
"other status". 92 It would be logical to read the term "other status" in the 
ICESCR as having a similar open-ended meaning. Moreover, it has been 
asserted that, even though a three power amendment replaced the words 
"such as"93 with the phrase "as to", the lack of discussion that took place 
over the change indicates that the enumeration was intended to remain 
merely illustrative. 94 
If the grounds for discrimination are not seen as being exhaustive 
it might be suggested that any distinction can bring into operation the 
non-discrimination principle. 95 It would thus fall to the Committee to 
develop a rationale to justify under what circumstances and on what 
grounds different treatment is legitimate. The Committee has not in fact 
gone so far in its treatment of article 2(2). However, it has arguably 
extended its scrutiny of differential treatment to grounds other than those 
specifically enumerated. 
89 Article 2(1) Convention on the Rights of the Child, 28 I. L. M. 1448 (1989). 
90 Ibid. 
91 Bayefsky, supra, note 10, at 5. 
92 UN Doc. A/2929, para. 18 1,10 UN GAOR, Annexes, (Ag. Item 28), Pt-II, (1955). 
93 This phrasing is still to be found in article 2 UDHR and article 2(l) ICCPR. 
94 Klerk, supra, note 9, at 256. For the opinion that article 2 UDHR is 
illustrative see, Verdoot A., Naissance et Significance de la D6claration Universelle des 
Droits de Mornme 95 (1964). 
95 This was the Position adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Rasmussen v. Denmark Eur. Court H. R, Series A, Vol. 87, Judgement of 28 Nov. 1984. 
The Human Rights Committee does not seem to have adopted this approach with regard 
to article 26 however. Bayefsky, supra, note 
, 
at 6-7. 
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In addition to asking questions on the status of ethnic minorities, 96 
natural children, 97 women98 and men, 99 or discrimination on the basis of 
religious belief, 100 alternative political philosophies101 and class bias, 102 
it has directed itself to the situation of those in particular regional 
areas, 103 aliens, 104 (including the stateless, 105 migrant workers, 106 and 
96 E. g. Taya, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 16, at 4, para. 14; Alvarez Vita, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 14, at 6, para. 32; Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 18, at 13, para. 78; Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 10, para. 42. This could be seen to include indigenous 
populations, cf. Neneman, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 9, para. 49; Konate, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 7, at 4, para. 13; Bonoan-Dandan, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 10, para. 44. 
These groups should accordingly have the right to express themselves in their 
own language and enjoy their own culture. Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 9, para. 39. 
The maintenance of a separate identity is considered essential to indigenous populations. 
Assimilationist policies are therefore considered illegitimate. Alston, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 13, para. 71. 
97 E. g. Fofana, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 8, para. 39; Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 9, at 
6, para. 27; Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 8, at 2, para. 3; Fofana, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 7, at 3, para. 6. 
98 The Committee have asked numerous questions as to the position of women. 
As regards the legal situation of women see e. g., legal prohibition against discrimination 
against women, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 6, para. 23.; de jure and de 
facto differences between men and women, Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 8, at 7, 
para. 29.; equality under the law, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 8, at 8, 
para. 33.; different marriageable ages for men and women, Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 9, 
at 9, para. 4l.; Legislative measures to prevent dismissal of pregnant women, Mrachkov, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 6, para. 25. 
99 Especially in relation to paid leave to look after children, e. g. Jimenez 
Butragueno, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 4, para. 14. Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 10, 
para. 47; or the enjoyment of parental benefits, Jimenez Butragueno, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 18, at 3, para. 12. Also in respect to widower's pension, e. g. Alvarez 
Vita, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 6, para. 23. 
Unlike the Discrimination Against Women Convention, the prohibited ground of 
"sex" is not confined to the position of women. The presence of articles 3 and 10 
confirm however, that the position of women is of primary importance. 
100 E. g. Simma, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 11, at 10, para. 48. 
101 E. g. Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 11, at 12, para. 58. This includes the 
expression of opposition to the established political viewsý Sinuna, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, 
at 8-9, para. 40; Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 9, para. 45.. 
102 Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 7, at 5, para. 16. 
103 E. g. The treatment of populations in overseas and dependent territories: 
Daudi, E/C. 12/1987/SR 5, at 4, para. 15 (Netherlands Antilles); Badawi, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 8, at 2, para. 3 (Greenland and Faroe Islands); Mrachkov, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 12, at 13, para. 73 (French Overseas Territories). The position of rural 
populations: Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 7, at 6, para. 43; Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 7, 
at 2, para. 2; Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2. ) at 1 L, para. 67. Poor urban populations: Texier, F, /C. 12/1989/SR. 12, at 10, para. 50. 
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refugees, 107) unmarried couples and parents, 108 people with AIDS, 109 
the physicallyl 10 and mentally disabled, 111 homosexuals, 112 the poor, 113 
and the elderly. 114 
It has to be borne in mind, however, that the Committee, in asking 
questions on the situation with regard to such groups, is not necessarily 
attempting to discover elements of discrimination, but rather merely 
assessing the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Thus de 
facto differences in the enjoyment of rights between different regions 
would not normally be considered a matter of discrimination. 
Nevertheless, in centering its attention on these social groups, the 
Committee appears to consider that possible additional grounds exist 
under which discrimination is prohibited, such as health, nationality, 
disability, poverty, age and sexual orientation. 
Of these possible grounds, there would seem to be little reason to 
object to the inclusion of grounds such as health, 115 disability, 116 or 
104 See below, text accompanying notes 121-140. 
105 E. g. Texier, E/C. 12/198 8/SR. 10, at 12, para. 66; Badawi El Sheikh, 
E/C. 12/198 8/SR. 11, at 3, para. 15. 
106 E. g. Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 12, para. 61; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 34, at 4, para. 22. 
107 E. g. Taya, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 6, para. 27; Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 
5, para. 22; Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 7, at 2, para. 5. 
108 E. g. Wimer Zambrano, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 11 
, 
at 12, para. 60; Texier, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR 14, at 16, para. 70; Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 3, para. 8. 
109 E. g. Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 20, at 3, para. 10; Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 9, 
at 5, para. 25; Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2, at 10, para. 56; Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 34, 
at 5, para. 25. 
110 E. g. Deaf children, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 8, at 11, para. 52. 
111 See e. g., Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 20, at 4, para. 13. 
112 E. g. Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 16, at 18, para. 95. 
113 E. g. Neneman, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 9, para. 43; Texier, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 16, at 9, para. 44. 
114 E. g. Butragueno, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 14, at 3, para. 13; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 6, at 4, para. 18; Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 5, 
para. 7 1. 
115 Reaction to the discovery of HIV/AJDS has entailed many instances of 
discri*m: ination in the field of economic, social and cultural rights. It is considered that 
denials of education, marriage, social services and empoyment go far beyond those 
measures necessitated by the nature of the infection. See e. g., UN Doc. 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1990/9, at 6-8, paras. 30-40; "AIDS and Discrimination", 41 I. C. J. Rev., 
35-49 (1988); Center for Human Rights, Roort of an International Consultation on 
AIDS and Human Riehts (1989). 
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age. 117 Clearly, this does not mean that all differences in treatment based 
upon such grounds are discriminatory. For example, it is accepted in a 
number of States that the elderly might be deprived of their right to 
work through compulsory retirement. 118 It does mean that differences justified on such grounds will be subjected to a stricter level of scrutiny 
than others. 
On the other hand, the posited grounds of sexual orientation, 
poverty and nationality all present difficulties with respect to their 
inclusion which will be discussed below: 
a) Sexual Orientation 
The acceptance of equality with regard to those with alternative 
sexual orientations is clearly subject to a great deal of controversy. It is 
submitted that, in principle, there is no conceivable reason why the 
extent of a person's enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights 
should depend, in any respect, upon their sexual orientation. However, 
the fact that homosexuality is still illegal in a number of countries 
suggests that there is, as yet, no agreement as to the moral position in this 
regard. 119 
It is open for the Committee to make its own view of the matter 
clear, but it would undoubtedly encounter difficulties if it attempted to 
bind States to ensuring non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation. Nevertheless, if the Covenant were to be interpreted as a 
"living instrument" with dynamic standards that reflect the moral and 
legal developments within the States parties, 120 it might be possible for 
sexual orientation to be established as a prohibited ground for 
discrimination at some stage in the future. 
116 The Committee's interest in disability issues is underlined by the proposal of 
Mr DespouY, the Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, that the Committee monitor legal standards 
to protect disabled persons. E/C. 12/1990/SR. 49, at 3, paras. 10-11 
- 
117 Vickers, supra, note 3, at 52. See also, UN Doc. E/C. 12/199 1/WP. 1 
118 On this point see, Alston, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 9, at 6, para. 24. 
119 The European Court of Human Rights however has recognised an increased 
tolerance of homosexual behaviour in the European context. Accordingly, it found the 
imposition of criminal sanctions to be in breach of the right to privacy under article 8 of 
the ECTIR. Dudgeon v. United Kingdo 
, 
Eur. Court H. R., Series A, Vol. 45, 
Judgement of 22 Oct. 1981, (1981) 4 EHRR 149. 
120 Cf. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court HR, Series A, Vol. 26, Judgement 
of 25 Apr. 1978, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1. 
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b) Nation 
With regard to nationality as a prohibited ground for 
discrimination, it should be noted that article 2(2) rules out 
discrimination on the grounds of national origin but not on the basis of 
nationality. 121 Indeed article 2(3) specifically allows limitations to be 
placed upon the enjoyment of the rights of non-nationals in the case of 
developing States. 122 Lillich draws the conclusion that the ICESCR "does 
not embody a general norm of non-discrimination against aliens". 123 
However, an interesting "interpretative declaration" was made by 
Belgium upon ratification: 
"With respect to article 2, paragraph 2, the Belgian 
Government interprets non-discrimination as to 
national origin as not necessarily implying an 
obligation on States automatically to guarantee to 
foreigners the same rights as to their nationals. The 
terms should be understood to refer to the elimination 
of any arbitrary behaviour but not of differences in 
treatment based on objective and reasonable 
121 Whereas "nationality" refers to the position of aliens and migrant workers, 
"national origin" seems to relate to the ethnic or racial origin of the individual irrespective 
of their nationality. For a discussion of the differences between the terms see, comments 
of Lord Simon in Ealing London Borough Council v. Race Relations Board [1972] AC 
342, at 362-3. Cf. Kartashkin V., "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" in Meron 
T. (ed), Human Rights in International Law, 111, at 131 (1985). Schwelb concurs in 
this view in commenting that "national origin" relates to present and past "nationality" in 
an ethnographic sense. He also comments that with respect to the term "nationality" in its 
legal sense, only previous nationality is a prohibited ground for discrimination. 
Schwelb, supra, note 58, at 1007. 
122 It might be argued on the basis of article 2(3) that this does not entitle 
developed countries to discriminate in such a manner and that in any case differentiations 
may not be made with regard to non-economic rights, Lillich R., The Human Rights of 
Aliens in ConteMpgM International Law, 47 (198 1). 
The definition of economic rights in itself is unclear. It is assumed that they are 
rights "that enable a person to earn a living or that relate to that process". Dankwa E., 
"Working Paper on Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights", 9 Hum. Rts. Q, 230, at 240 (1987). McKean comments with respect to 
article 2(3): 
"the term 'developing country' is not defined, and the language used is 
unconscienably vague. It must therefore be regarded as an unfortunate 
inclusion in a covenant of this nature and likely to cause invidious and 
unreasonable distinctions to be made against aliens on the ground of their 
foreign nationality". 
McKean, supra, note 21, at 201. 
123 Lillich, ibid, at 48. He continues however: 
"It must be emphasised that this conclusion is not tantamount to stating that international 
law now authorises discrimination against aliens in these areas. All one may conclude is 
that this particular instrument is not in and of itself the source of such a general norm of 
non-discrimination. " 
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considerations, in conformity with the principles 
prevailing in democratic societies. "124 
Whilst overtly being intended to limit the scope of obligations as 
regards non-nationals, the declaration in fact confirms that the 
term "national origin" is to be read in a wide sense to include non- 
nationals. It then merely reiterates the idea that not an differences 
in treatment will necessarily amount to discrimination. 
Some members of the Committee however have tended to 
assume that any differentiation in treatment between nationals and 
non-nationals is principally illegitimate. 125 One member's 
interpretation of article 2(3) reinforces the view that the only 
exception to this rule is to be found in relation to economic rights 
in developing countries. 126 At times individual Committee 
members have limited their attention to the provision of social 
benefits, health care and education, 127 but often they have gone 
further to include employment rights. 128 
Criticism of such differential treatment has gone to the 
extent of violations being found in a number of cases. For example 
with regard to the French report, one member considered the fact 
that a disabled adults' allowance was only payable to French 
nationals was contrary to article 2.129 Similarly it was considered 
124 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General as of 31 
Dec. 1991. UN Doc. STALEG/SER. E/10,, at 123 (1991). 
125 The Limburg Principles state: 
"As a general rule the Covenant applies equally to nationals and 
non-nationals". 
Limburg Principles, supra, note 54, at 127, para. 42. 
126 It was commented with respect to a provision in the Austrian report (E/1984/6"`/Add. 17, para. 49(b)) that if foreigners in Austria did not receive the 
same benefits as nationals, it would be contrary to article 2(3) as it was not a 
developing country. Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 4-5, para. 13; Badawi 
El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 4, at 8, para. 45. 
127 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/19871SR. 12, at 5, para. 16. 
128 One member commented thus that measures taken under Jordanian 
law to restrict the employment of foreigners were contrary to the 
non-discrimination clauses of the Covenant. Konate,, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 10, 
para. 5 1. 
129 Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 12, at 12, para. 61. This conclusion in 
itself was somewhat suspect given the French declaration on ratification 
regarding restrictions on aliens' rights to social security and employment. It was 
argued that the provision should be considered in light of articles 9 and 2 read 
together, as there was no declaration in respect to article 2, there was a breach of 
the provisions of the convention. Alvarez Vita, F, /C. 1 V1 989/SR. 13, at 9, 
para. 38. That this did not represent the view of the Committee as a whole is 
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that the restrictions upon the trade union rights of non-nationals in 
Costa Rica constituted a violation of the Covenant. 130 It is notable 
however that such statements do not represent a Committee 
consensus, 131 and that certain members feel the question has not 
been debated sufficiently in the Committee. 132 
The general reluctance of the Committee to commit itself to 
defending the equal treatment of aliens would seem to be a result 
of the force of State practice. 133 For example, many States 
reporting to the Committee operate different systems of social 
security in relation to non-nationals, 134 particularly where 
reciprocal agreements are in force. 135 In addition it is somewhat 
unlikely that States would consider themselves bound by a 
provision forcing them to eliminate any restrictions on the 
employment of aliens 136 
reflected in the Committee's concluding observations which merely state that "the 
observation was made 
...... 
UN Doc. E/1989/22, at 35, para. 160 (1989). 
130 See, Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 12, para. 52. 
131 This was made particularly clear in the Costa Rican case. Alston, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 50, at 4, para. 28. 
132 Mr Simma commented that he hesitated to concur with ý& Alvarez 
Vita regarding the Costa Rica question "since the Committee had not debated the 
point sufficiently". He continued, "It should be made clear that the view was not 
that of the Committee as a whole". E/C. 12/1990/SR. 50, at 4, para. 29. 
133 It might also be noted that the Committee on the Elin-dnation of Racial 
Discrimination has tended to allow the differential treatment of non-nationals. 
Meron, supra, note 10, at 312. 
During the drafting of article 26 ICCPR, it would seem that States were 
not ready to accept that aliens should have equal rights as citizens. See, 
Ramcharan, supra, note 1, at 263. 
134 See e. g. Luxembourg, E/C. 12/1990/CRP. 4/Add. 4, at 5, para. 16. 
Netherlands, E/C. 12/1989/5, E/1989/22, at 4. 
135 Cf Mahalic D. and Mahalic J., "The Limitation Provisions of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination", 9 Hum. Rts. Q., 74, at 78 (1987). It might be difficult to 
establish then that a State must not discriminate against a particular nationality 
even if that were to be considered inequitable. See contra, Lerner N., The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 30 (1980). 
136 It might be noted that Article 1(2) of the Racial Discrimination 
Convention provides that its non-discrimination provisions do not apply to 
distinctions, exclustions or restrictions made by a State party between citizens 
and non-citizens. 
Whereas restrictions are usually accepted on the empoyment of aliens, 
this is not so with respect to the conditions of employment. A number of ILO 
Conventions operate in this area: e. g. the Nfigration for Employment Convention (Revised) of 1949 (No. 97), 120 U. N. T. S. 7 1; and the Migrant Workers 
173 
However, these facts alone do not necessarily imply that the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination is totally 
iffelevant. For example, in the majority of cases, differential 
treatment is justified on the basis of economics. 137 It is open for 
the Committee to determine the validity of the differential 
treatment of aliens by assessing whether it is motivated by sound 
economic reasons or mere prejudice. 138 In this respect one 
member of the Committee commented that the Jordanian report: 
"seemed to indicate that foreigners were penalized solely 
because they were foreigners, rather than because they 
threatened the employment opportunities of Jordanian 
nationals 
-in short, that foreigners were the object of discrimination". 139 
If this approach is adopted by the Committee, it could be said that even 
though equality of treatment is not necessarily prescribed, discrimination 
on the basis of nationality is by no means legitimate. The question for the 
Committee is to what extent differential treatment is legitimate. 
Moreover, even if non-nationals are not entitled to equal treatment 
in all respects, it is important to stress that this does not deprive them of 
all rights under the Covenant. Certainly, in so far as the Covenant 
establishes the rights of "everyone" non-nationals would have a right to 
the enjoyment of the minimum core content of those rights. Thus in 
practice, the Committee will censure situations where aliens enjoy few 
rights and are the object of exploitation. 140 
c) Wealth 
The general limitations upon the poor to equality of access or 
opportunity with regard to empoyment, education, culture or housing 
have led some commentators to regard "wealth" as an additional ground 
(Supplementary Provisions) Convention of 1975 (No. 143), 1120 U. N. T. S. 77. 
137 See, Lillich, supra, note 122, at 123. 
138 It is by no means axiomatic that aliens are prejudicial to the economy 
of a State. See, Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 2, para. 2. Meron comments in 
this light: 
It can perhaps be argued that economic constraints may justify 
limiting some entitlements (such as welfare or health care) to 
citizens, but limiting employment-related benefits would not be 
supportable under this rationale". 
Meron, supra, note 10, at 312. 
139 Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 2, para. 2. 
140 Members of the Committee expressed great concern over the position of 
Haitian workers on sugar plantations in the Dominican Republic. See e. g., Texier, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44, at 13, para. 54. 
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upon which discrimination is prohibited. Hence the Czechoslovakian 
representative commented before the Committee that: 
"The fact that some persons might be prevented from 
enjoying certain rights because they did not have the means 
to do so could be regarded as de facto discrimination". 141 
The Committee does seem to be concerned about extreme inequalities in 
wealth142and inadequate action being taken on the part of the poor. 143 
Recognition has also been made of the particular disadvantage of the 
poor in the area of access to culture. 144Some members have occasionally 
made an express recognition of the link between poverty and 
discrimination. 145 
Ihe ma or problem with regard to positing "wealth" as an 
independent ground of discrimination is that the majority of cases of 
such discrimination will involve a simultaneous violation of article 2(2) 
and one of the substantive articles of the Convention. The independent 
utility of the non-discrimination provision becomes apparent only when 
the State has gone further than it is obliged to under the provisions of the 
Covenant. 146A case in point might be the establishment of special 
schools for the academically gifted. If access to such a school was 
restricted to males only or members of a minority ethnic group, article 
2(2) would quite legitimately be invoked. However, to restrict access to 
the wealthy by the requirement of fee-payment would rarely be 
considered discriminatory. 147ne fact that access to many higher social 
"goods" often depends upon economic wealth suggests that "wealth" itself 
141 E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 10, para. 40. 
142 Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 12, para. 63; Sparsis, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 16, 
at 17, para. 92; Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 8, at 10, para. 43. Simma commented in 
relation to the Columbian report that the Committee had to address itself to the 
underlying causes of difficulties, mentioning "in particular the lack of equality... and the 
apparent lack of concern of the upper classes for the problems of the most vulnerable". 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 13, at 11, para. 47. 
143 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 11, at 5, para. 24. 
144 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 16, at 9, para. 44. 
145 One member thus commented in regard to the vast disparities in wealth, that 
"Santiago is a city of apartheid". Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 10, para. 50. 
1466 Assuming that the right is "autonomous" in nature. See below, text 
accompanying notes 158-175. 
147 It could be attacked on different grounds however. For example if the 
establishment of such a school drew finances away from projects that were aimed at the 
relief of poverty and disadvantagement, the State might be criticised for confusing its 
priorities. 
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is often a legitimate ground for differential treatment and for that reason 
could hardly be considered "suspect". 148 
2) The Suspect Nature of Classifications 
Given the emphasis that race, 149 sex150 and religionl51 have been 
accorded on the international plane, it might be argued that, in assessing 
the legitimacy of differential treatment, actions based upon such grounds 
might be given stricter scrutiny. 152 This might be appropriate given the 
extraordinary prominence given to racial discrimination in international 
148 With respect to wealth classifications in the US see, Polivou, supra, note 2, 
at 437-444. 
149 For evidence of the international community's interest in Racial 
Discrimination see, The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of 
the Crime of Apartheid, G. A. Resn. 3068,28 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30), at 166, 
U. N. Doc. A/9030, (1973), 1015 U. N. T. S. 243; The Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G. A. Resn. 1904,18 U. N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15), 
at 35, U. N. Doc. A/5515, (1964); The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, supra note 55. 
150 Evidence of the interest of the international community in the status of 
women see, The Convention on the Political Rights of Women, GA Resn. 640,7 UN 
GAOR, Supp. (No. 20), at 27, UN Doc. A/2361, (1952), 193 U. N. T. S. 135 (1953); The 
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, (1957), 309 U. N. T. S. 65; The 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, GA 
Resn. 2263,22 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), at 35, UN Doc. A/6716, (1967); The 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra, 
note 56. 
151 Bayefsky, supra, note 
, 
at 19. See generally, Benito E. (Special 
Rapporteur), Elimination of all forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion 
anLbglief, (1989). 
152 This appears to be the position under the ECHR. See, Abdulaziz, Cabales 
and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court HR, Series A, Vol. 94, Judgement of 28 
May 1985, (1985) 7 EHRR 47 1, where the court stated (para-7 8): 
"... the advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the 
member States of the Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons 
would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the grounds of 
sex could be regarded as compatible with the Convention. " 
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case law, 153 and the emphasis on sexual discrimination in the Covenant. 154 
As far as the Committee is concerned the position of women has 
been given by far the most consideration. Questions are invariably asked 
as to equality before the law, 155 equal rights, 156 and factual differences 
in the position of women in relation to men. 157 To this extent, the 
Committee could be said to exercise a particularly strict test as to 
differentiations de jure and de facto on the basis of sex. That the 
Committee as a whole has never actually established a State to be in 
violation of the Covenant on this basis is probably more a reflection of 
the lack of sufficient information than the weakness of its standards. 
The main failing of the Committee thus far is that it has not 
established any clear test for evaluating differences in treatment upon the 
155 See above note 98. 
156 See e. g., the right of women to chose their own spouse, Rattray, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 8, at 7, para. 26; Kouznetsov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2, at 12, para. 72.; the 
authority to start a business or open a bank account, Jimenez Butragueno, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 9, at 6, para. 24; differential retirement ages, Sviridov, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 5, para. 18. Simma, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 3, para. 8.; the right to 
administer their own assets, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 8, at 8, para. 33.; 
restrictions on the employment of women, Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 11, 
para. 53. 
157 See e. g., the number of women unemployed, Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR-6, at 
12, para. 66. Neneman, E/C. 12/1987/SR-7, at 7, para-29; access of women to Social 
security, Rattray,, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 13, para. 69; the proportion of women receiving 
technical training, Konate, E/C. 12/19 87/S R. 7, at 2, para. 3; the percentage of women 
employed in the public sector, Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 3, para. 7; the 
proportion of women in higher education, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 8, para. 36; the percentage of women in management positions, Alvarez Vita, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 5,, at 10, para. 62; the existence of training and support for women's 
cooperatives, Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 6, at 10, para. 45. 
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'Ibe main failing of the Committee thus far is that it has not 
established any clear test for evaluating differences in treatment upon the 
grounds enumerated in article 2(2). It is submitted that in so far as the 
list of prohibited grounds is open-ended, virtually any difference in 
treatment is open to scrutiny by the Committee. The virtue of having 
specifically stated grounds, however, is not to prevent review of 
differentiations on other grounds, but rather to establish that certain 
classifications are prima facie suspect and therefore win be subject to 
more detailed scrutiny. As an initial step then, it would be necessary for 
the Committee to establish what classifications it sees as falling within the 
realm of article 2(2), and the test by which State action will be reviewed. 
D) THE SCOPE OF THE NON-DISCRIMINATION PROVISION 
Some guarantees of non-discrimination only operate in relation to 
specific, narrowly defined areas such as the ILO or UNESCO 
Conventions. 158 Article 2(2) ICESCR, in contrast, is applicable to a 
much broader range of rights. It provides that the guarantee of non- 
discrimination should operate in relation to all the economic, social and 
cultural rights enunciated in the Covenant. However, by specifically 
referring to the rights in the Covenant, article 2(2) would appear to be a 
partially subordinate provision, prohibiting discrimination only in so far 
as it relates to matters covered by those rights. 159 Indeed, there is little 
evidence that article 2(2) was intended to be wholly "free-standing" or 
"autonomous", in the sense of article 26 ICCPR. 160 
158 The IILO Convention is limited to discrimination in employment and the 
UNESCO Convention to discrimination in education. 
159 Article 3 similarly relates to "all economic, social and cultural rights set forth 
in the present Covenant". As a matter of comparison, it is thought that the ICCPR non- 
discrimination clause is limited to those rights recognized by that Convention. 
Ranicharan, supra, note 1, at 257. This is also the practice of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Thus in the Sunday Times Case, Eur. Court H. R., Series A, Vol. 30, 
Judgement of 26 Apr. 1979, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245, the Court reaffmined that "Article 
14 safeguards individuals, or groups of individuals, placed in comparable situations, 
from all discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the other 
normative provisions of the Convention and Protocols". 
160 Article 26 IC! CPR has been interpreted as operating as an "autonomous right" 
whose application was "not limited to those rights which are provided for in the 
Covenant", see, General Comment, supra, note 57. Thus, in practice, the HRC has dealt 
with matters outside the strict context of civil and political rights, see e. g., Broeks 
v. Netherlands, 2 Selected Decisions HRC, 196 (1987). Cf. Scott C., "The 
Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of 
the International Covenants on Human Rights", 27 Osg. H. L. J. 769, at 851-859 (1989); 
Opsahl T., "Equality in Human Rights Law with Particular Reference to Article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", in Nowak M.., Steurer D., and 
Tretter H. (eds), Prouess in the Spirit of Human Rights, 51 (1988). 
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According to the traditional definition of discrimination adopted 
by a number of international treaties, the test for whether an action is 
discriminatory can be determined by whether it has a negative effect on 
the realization of the rights protected. For discrimination to have 
occured, the difference in treatment must have the effect of "nullifying" 
or "impairing"161 the recognition, enjoyment or exercise162 of human 
rights. As such, a violation of the non-discrimination provision will 
inevitably involve a simultaneous violation of one of the substantive 
articles. It might appear, accordingly, that such non-discrimination 
provisions are essentially superfluous. 163 
Tbree arguments mitigate against such a conclusion. First, even 
though there often exists a distinct correlation between covert 
discriminatory situations and general social stratification of power, 
wealth, prestige and education, it is important to recognize that 
discrimination is not merely a consequence of that stratification, but also 
a cause. 164 As such the recognition and elimination of discrimmi ation is 
central to the improvement of the well-being of such groups. Secondly, 
recognition of historical discrimination can serve to justify and even 
require positive and affirmative action programmes. 165 Finally, to the 
extent that the principle of non-discrimination may give rise to claims to 
positive State action in the realisation of equality of opportunity, the 
fulfilment of basic needs alone would not necessarily sufficiently dispose 
of State obligations with respect to disadvantaged groups. 
161 ILO Convention, the Racial Discrimination Convention, and the 
Discrimination against Women Convention. The UNESCO Convention only includes 
the term "impairing". On the basis that "nullifying" is the narrower term, meaning not 
merely a restriction on the enjoyment of a right, but the total denial of that right, 
"impairment" can be said to cover the same field. 
162 The meaning of all of these three terms is unclear, particularly as to any 
differences between them. It is presumed that "recognition" refers to the ability of an 
individual to know or identify his or her rights. If, as can be assumed, States are under 
an obligation to disseminate information and inform people of their rights, then a failure 
to do so for an identifiable section of the population could be said to be discriminatory 
under this leg of the definition. 
"Enjoyment" can be said to refer to the defacto realization of the rights in the Covenant. 
Finally "exercise" perhaps relates most closely to the ability of each individual to enforce 
their rights through judicial or administrative remedies. 
163 Flew argues in this respect that the relief of poverty cannot be achieved 
through the promotion of equality but solely through growth and the production of 
wealth. Equality and non-discrimination thus retain little justification in his view. Flew 
A., supra, note 13, at, 182-189. 
164 Schachter, supra, note 15, at 296. 
165 Ibid. at 295. 
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The position under the European Convention is interesting in this 
regard. That a violation can occur merely by the discriminatory exercise 
of a particular right has been recognised by the European Court in the 
Belgian Linguistic CaseL6_6 where it held with respect to the ECHR: 
"Article 6 of the Convention does not compel States to 
institute a system of appeal courts. A State which does set up 
such courts consequently goes beyond its obligations under 
Article 6. However it would violate that Article, read in 
con unction with Article 14, were it to debar certain persons 
from these remedies without a legitimate reason while 
making them available to others in respect of the same type 
of actions. "167 
The Court appears to want to give the non-discruinination provision a 
degree of independence without implying that it operates outside the 
realm of the rights contained within the Convention. 168 Certainly, the 
Court has been trenchently opposed to dealing with economic, social and 
cultural rights. 
A number of points suggest that article 2(2) is a strictly 
"subordinate" non-discrimination clause. First, as a provision that lies in 
part III of the Covenant, it is not deemed to be a right in itself but a 
"service provision" outlining obligations in relation to the substantive 
articles in part M. Secondly, it expressly states that it refers to the 
166 Supra, note 48. 
167 This passage has been interpreted variously by commentators. Dinstein 
argues that the court implied that the non-discrimination provision was free standing- 
that there could be a violation of article 14 without there being a corresponding violation 
of any other article. Dinstein, supra, note 10. On the other hand Bayefsky comments that 
this case underlines the fact that the discrimination clause has no independent existence 
in that the violation only occurred in conjunction with the substantive articles. Bayefsky, 
supra, note M, at 4. 
It is interesting to note the view of Judge Fitzmaurice in the National Union of 
Belgian Police Case, Eur. Court HR, Series A, Vol. 19, Judgement of 27 Oct. 1975, (1979-80) 1 EHRR 578, where he argued that article 14 was subordinate in that it only 
applied insofar as it related to a State obligation under the ECHR. 
168 This is underlined by its decision in Inze v. Austria supra, note , para. 36, 
where it stated: 
"Art. 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its 
protocols. It has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the 
"rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of 
Art. 14 does not presuppose a breach of one or more of such provisions- and to this 
extent it is autonomous- there can be no room for its application unless the facts of the 
case fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter". 
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"rights enunciated in the present Covenant". 169 However neither of these 
factors establish whether or not the rather looser form of subordination 
adopted by the European Court will be operative in the case of article 
2(2). 
Despite references to articles 2(2) and 3 as independent rights, 170 
there is little evidence to suggest that the Committee views article 2(2) as fully autonomous in the sense of article 26 ICCPR. 171 Indeed any 
reference to violations of civil and political rights has been justified by 
their impact on economic, social and cultural rights. 172 Given the more 
extensive supervisory mechanisms of the Human Rights Committee it 
would be unnecessary and duplicitous for the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights to enter into a review of discrimination in the 
field of civil and political rights. 
On the other hand, several considerations suggest that the 
Committee is not ready to assign a strictly subordinate role to article 
2(2). First, in dealing with questions of discrimination the Committee has 
not confined itself to rights explicitly laid down in the Covenant. 173 
Secondly, it has clearly interpreted the notion of non-discrimination as 
one which calls for equality of access and opportunity. 174 It is this notion 
169 In its General Comment No. 18 (37) b/, c/, the Human Rights Committee 
implies that article 2(l) ICCPR is indeed subordinate. In referring to article 26 it states 
that it "does not merely duplicate the guarantee already provided for in article 2 but 
provides in itself an autonomous right. " As a result "the principle of non-discrimination 
contained in article 26 is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the 
Covenant". Supra, note 57, at 175, para. 12. 
170 This might be the inferred from the grouping of such provisions together 
with the substantive rights in General Comment No. 3, ESCOR, Supp. 3, Annex III, at 
84, para. 5, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1990/8, (1991). 
171 See above, note 160. 
172 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 42, at 12, para. 57. 
173 For example, the Committee has considered questions such as: the authority 
of women to start a business or open a bank account, Jimenez Butragueno, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 9, at 6, para. 24; differential retirement ages, Sviridov, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 5, para. 18, Simma, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 3, para. 8; the right of 
men to paid leave to look after children, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 4, 
Para. 14, Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 10, para. 47; persecution of the Bahai's, 
Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 42, at 11, para. 56. 
174In the Committee's guidelines adopted at its fifth session, reference is made 
to equality of opportunity in relation to article 6, and equality of access with regard to 
articles 11 and 13. Supra, note 59. 
Meron comments that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
has dealt with distinctions on the grounds of race in a similar manner. He concludes that 
"the'common lawof the Convention is based on the notion of equality, rather than on 
its definition of racial discrimination". Meron, supra, note 10, at 291. 
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of equality, as noted above, 175 that has coloured the Committee's general 
approach to the implementation of the rights. To see non-discrimination 
as an objective as opposed to a procedural principle is to confer upon it 
an individual status. 
The approach of the Committee would seem to be close to that of 
the European Court. Whilst it will not concern itself with matters that do 
not fall within the general scope of economic, social and cultural rights, 
it will not confine itself to combatting discrimination only in those areas 
where a violation of the substantive rights occurs. It is submitted that this 
is a suitable and balanced approach. To extend the scope of the provision 
beyond of economic, social and cultural rights would not only lead to 
possible conflicts with other human rights organs, but would impose too 
great a burden of work upon the Committee. On the other hand, to 
restrict the provision to a subordinate status would deprive it of any 
substantive value. 
V) STATE OBLIGATIONS 
A) IMMEDIATE OR PROGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION? 
Whereas the obligation under article 2(l) ICESCR is progressive 
in nature, this does not seem to be the case as regards article 2(2). The 
fact of its physical separation from article 2(1) and the inclusion of the 
word "guarantee" draw one to the conclusion that States are under an 
obligation to eliminate discrimination immediately. 176 This was the 
interpretation advocated during the drafting of the Covenant, 177 and has 
been endorsed in the Limburg principles, 178 and in the practice of the 
Committee. The Committee expressly stated that it considered articles 
175 See above, text accompanying notes 29-32. 
176 Klerk argues this point from the fact that the progressive implementation 
provision of article 2(l), only applies to the substantive articles in Part 1111. Article 2(2) is 
not subordinate to the other provisions in part III. Klerk, supra, note 9, at 261. 
M The Lebanese proposal to include the word "guarantee" was prefeffed to that 
of the representative of France, which provided for progressive implementation. 8 UN 
ESCOR (274th mtg), at 13, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 274, (1952). 
A proposal to amalgamate the first two paragraphs of article 2 [UN 
Doc. A/C. 3/L. 1054 and Add. 1, (1962)] was considered unacceptable in the Third 
Committee. 17 UN GAOR, C. 3, (1206th mtg), paras. 10-13,11 UN 
Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1206,, (1962). 
178 Paragraph 35 reads: 
"Article 2(2) calls for immediate application and involves an explicit 
guarantee on behalf of the States parties. It should, therefore, be made 
subject to judicial review and other recourse procedures". Supra, note 54, at 127. 
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2(2) and 3 as being "capable of immediate application by judicial and 
other organs in many national legal systems. "179 
It would seem quite apparent that States are capable of eliminating 
most de jure discrimination immediately. There is certainly little justification for introducing new legislation or administrative practices 
that are discriminatory. 180 The most important factor appears to be the 
contention that the elimination of de jure discrimination does not involve 
significant economic expenditure. Thus in the case of Zaire, which was 
criticised for having a law that required women to ask permission from 
their husbands to work outside the home, it was felt that the question of 
economic development was irrelevant. 181 Klerk argues, that even in 
times of economic crisis "the introduction or the continuation of 
discriminatory practices can never be 'compatible with the nature of 
these rights"'. 182 Accordingly, the promotion of the general welfare can 
not be achieved at the expense of one section of society. 
"Non-discrimination is not a favour that can be granted only in a time of 
a growing economy". 183 
However, it would be wrong to suggest that the elimination of 
discrimination will always be capable of being achieved immediately. 
First, it is undoubtedly true that certain forms of corrective action win 
inevitably involve considerable financial expenditure. For example, the 
elimination of discrimination as regards retirement ages or remuneration 
in ernployment184 may involve employees being paid more for longer 
periods of time. Secondly, a distinction between de jure and de facto 
discrimination should be established. 185 Whereas the former may be 
eliminated by the creation and enforcement of relevant legislation, the 
existence of de facto discrimination, as evidenced through material 
inequalities and individual prejudice, is a matter that cannot be overcome 
overnight. Longer-term social and educational programmes are needed 
to eliminate de facto discrimination in a progressive manner. It is 
179 General Comment No. 3, supra, note, at 4, para-5. 
180 Klerk, supra, note 9, at 262; This was also the conclusion of the Third 
Committee, 17 UN GAOR,, Annex, (Ag. Item 43), para. 64, UN Doc. A/5365, (1962). 
181 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 6, para. 36. 
182 Klerk, supra, note 9, at 263. 
183 Ibid, at 264. 
184 See below, Chapter 6. 
185 Cohen has drawn a similar distinction. He sees action to eliminate elements 
of discrimination in policies, programr: nes, procedure and criteria as "corrective action"; 
whereas action to give disadvantaged groups equal standing with the majority he calls 
it compensatory action". Cohen C., "Affin-mative Action and the Rights of the Majority", 
in Fried L., Minorities: Community and Identily, 353, at 355 (1983). 
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relevant to note here that the specialised instruments on discrimination 
all imply that States are entitled to eliminate discrimination gradually. 186 
This conclusion is more evident in so far as States are required to combat 
discrimination by third parties, and to achieve equality of opportimity. 
B) THE TYPE OF ACTION REOUIRED 
As regards de facto discrimination, 187 legislative action must be 
considered a necessary first step in any policy. Members of the 
Committee have looked towards legislative measures as evidence of a 
State's commitment to eliminating discrimination. 188 Tbus one member 
commented that: 
"'Ibe Covenant did not automatically imply that legislation 
was an indispensable component of a policy designed to 
eliminate discrimination in employment, for example. 
However, it was evident that, if that were the interpretation 
adopted by Governments, the burden of proof would he 
with those Governments, which would therefore be expected 
to show that the non-legislative measures that they had taken 
effectively ensured the elimination of discrimination and 
that it was not essential to take legislative measures. " 189 
It is evident that any legislative measures taken, to be effective, should be 
accompanied by judicial remedies. 190 The provision of such remedies 
seems to be particularly appropriate given the duty to "guarantee" the 
exercise of the rights without discrimination. 
186 ELO Convention, art. 2; UNESCO Convention arts 3 and 4; and ICEDAW, 
art 2. ICERD article 2(l) also appears to allow for progressive implementation, but in 
article 5 requires States parties to "guarantee" equality before the law. Cf. Yilmaz-Dogan 
v. Netherlands, CERD Report, 43 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 18), at 59 (1988). 
187 Action to combat de jure discrimination merely involves repealing the 
offending legislation or administrative directive. See e. g., Jimenez Butragueno, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 42, at 16, para. 86. 
188Questions have been asked as to legal prohibition against discrimination 
against women, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 6, para. 23; and legislative 
measures taken to prevent dismissal of pregnant women, Mrachkov, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 6, para. 25. 
189 Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 3, para. 8. 
190 Members of the Committee have thus asked inter alia: what penalties are 
provided for violations of non-discrimination laws in employment, Simma, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 2, para. 3; how many decisions have been made regarding 
discrimination in housing, Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2, at 11, para. 63; What effective 
remedies exist in the courts for women, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 19, at 4, 
para. 12. 
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Although legislation is certainly important, it will not necessarily 
be completely effective. As suggested above, those aspects of 
discrimination which relate to social attitudes can not be eliminated 
immediately merely through the enforcement of relevant legislation. 
Here, other measures, particularly educational and social, are more 
appropriate. 191 It has been suggested in the Committee that States are 
expected to undertake programmes to combat the discriminatory 
attitudes and prejudices of the population. 192 In particular, action should be directed towards the elimination of stereotypes whether racial, 
religious, sexual or other. 193 
The need to take measures beyond legislative action is particularly 
evident in the pursuit of equality of opportunity. Inequality of 
opportunity is often the result of inequality in the economic condition of 
various groups in society, of social and cultural expectations that affect 
potential development, or of differences that result from the education 
and training recieved. Thus action in favour of real equality of 
opportunity calls for extensive measures in the whole field of economic, 
social and cultural rights, particularly as regards education, vocational 
training, and social promotion and protection. 194 As one member of the 
Committee recognised: 
"'Iliere was... a need to transcend the formal approach to 
equality in order to gain insight into the obstacles to equality 
in daily life, and the arrangements made through education, 
for instance, to make sure that equality really was 
achieved". 195 
On the one hand, this requires the removal of any impediments that 
might stand in the way of equality of opportunity. 196 On the other hand, 
it also necessitates that certain positive steps are taken to promote the 
position of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society. The degree 
to which such aff-mnative action measures are necessary will be discussed 
191 A memorandum of the Secretary General recognized that: 
"It is clear that forms of discrimination which deny legal rights may and 
should be fought by legal measures, while those which comprise merely 
social treatment must chiefly be fought by education and by other social 
measuresit. 
UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/8, at 2 (1947). 
192 See e. g., Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 14, at 6, para. 32. 
193 See e. g., Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 1ý/1990/SR. 16, at 8, para. 37. See also, 
Valticos N., International Labour Law, 111 (1979). 
194 Ibid. 
195 Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 16, at 9, para. 40. 
1W See e. g., Jimenez Butragueno 
, 
E/C. 12/199 1/SR-4, at 13, para. 67. 
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below. It is clear nevertheless that legislative measures alone will not be 
sufficient in such cases. 197 
Q AFFIRMATIVE AND PROTECTIVE ACTION 
A distinction has occasionally been drawn between affirmative and 
protective measures. Affirmative measures are those taken to enable 
disadvantaged sectors of the population to assert their right to equality of 
opportunity. 198 Protective measures, on the other hand, are meant to 
protect inherently vulnerable groups such as children and those with 
physical or mental disabilities, whose vulnerability is not temporary in 
nature. 199 There is some evidence for such a distinction being made in 
the Covenant itself. Article 10 provides for special measures of 
protection for the family, 200 mothers before and after childbirth, 201 and 
children. 202 The legitimacy of affirmative action and of protective action 
outside the specified contexts however, has to be read into the provisions 
of article 2(2). 
1) The Obligation to take Affirmative Action. 
As noted above, the concept of discrimination itself suggests that 
only those who are situated equally must be treated equally. 203 It is 
implicit that differential treatment is on occasions legitimate. The 
principle of equality, however, goes further in requiring differential 
treatment to combat defacto discrimination. 204 Despite no reference to 
197 See e. g. Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 10, at 8, para. 43. 
198 This is sometimes known as "positive" or "reverse discrimination". Such 
terminology is most often used by opponents of affirmative action. It will not be used 
here as it is somewhat contradictory given the definition of discrimination described 
above. 
199 Dinstein, supra, note 
, 
at 15. However other commentators do not make 
such a distinction, see, Mckean who notes that article 10 ICESCR provides for 
protective action for children and mothers. He argues that it recognizes that such 
measures of protection "in order not to be discriminatory must be temporary" 
- 
McKean, 
supra, note 21, at 152. 
200 Article 10(l). 
201 Article 10(2). 
202 Article 10(3). 
203 See above, text accompanying notes 3-4. 
204 Capotord emphasizes that while the quesitons of non-discri'mination and 
minority protection are distinct in that the the former requires uniform treatment and the 
latter special treatment, they are in fact ff two aspects of the same problem: that of fully 
ensuring the equal rights to all persons". Supra, note 15, at 14. See also, McKean, 
supra, note 21, at 142. 
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affirmative action in the text of the Covenant, it is clear from the travaux 
preparatoires that such measures were not intended to be considered 
discriminatory. 
In the drafting of the Covenant an Indian proposal suggested the 
inclusion of an explanatory paragraph reading: 
"Special measures for the advancement of any socially and 
educationally backward sections of society shall not be 
construed as 'distinction' under this article"205 
The Indian member argued that the principle of non-discrimination: 
"raised certain problems in the case of the particularly 
backward groups still to be found in many under-developed 
countries. In his country, the constitution and the laws 
provided for special measures for the social and cultural 
betterment of such groups; measures of that kind were 
essential for the achievement of true social equality in highly 
heterogeneous societies. He felt certain that the authors of 
the draft Covenant had not intended to prohibit such 
measures, which were in fact protective measures... He 
therefore thought it essential to make it clear that such 
protective measures would not be construed as 
discriminatory within the meaning of the paragraph. "206 
The proposal was finally withdrawn, it having been made clear that the 
Goldstein argues that "even in the unusual cases in which equality requires 
differential treatment, it is still limited to that: ie., differential, not preferential, treatment 
is required. " Goldstein S., "Reverse Discrimination- Reflections of a Jurist", 15 
Isr. Y. H. R., 28, at 30 (1985). It is unclear exactly what he means by such a distinction 
as it might be argued that any difference in treatment involves some form of preference. 
A more valid distinction could be drawn between differences in treatment that are 
intended to promote a vulnerable group in a general sense and those that aspire to 
achieving some numerical representation. The latter aspires to a form of absolute 
equality, whereas the former may be so constructed to allow for the intercession of 
individual choice, presenting less of a restriction upon the rights of members of the 
majority. 
205 UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1182, para. 17 (1962). As an alternative he sought the 
insertion of an explanatory statement in the report. 
Similarly, a Belgian proposal (UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 1030, (1962)) to add a clause to 
article 2(2) explaining that the prohibition did not extend to protective measures taken on 
the basis of age and sex, was withdrawn on the basis that this was understood in the 
terms of the Three-Power Amendment. UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1204, para. 29 (1962). 
206 UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 118 3, paras. 12,29 (1962). It was clear however in 
spealdrig of "protective measures" the Indian representative, in commenting that such 
measures were essentially temporary, meant affmnative action. UN Doc. 
A/C. 3/SR. 1257,,, para. 18 (1963). 
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ribree-Power Amendment implicitly included this understanding. 207 As a 
matter of comparison, article 1(4) CERD and article 4(l) CEDAW do 
contain explicit statements to the effect that affirmative action measures 
may be taken. 208 
Even if the travaux preparatoires do recognise the legitimacy of 
affirmative action, there is little indication outside the scope of article 
3,209 that such positive measures are in fact required. Facing a similar 
situation as regards the ICCPR the Human Rights Committee has made a 
positive statement in this regard. In its General Comment 4/13 it stated in 
relation to articles 3,2(l) and 26 of the ICCPR that the prevention of 
discrimination "requires not only measures of protection but also 
affirmative action designed to ensure the positive enjoyment of rights. 
This cannot be done simply by enacting laws". 210 On this basis, 
commentators have argued that States are indeed obliged to take 
affirmative action for the benefit of disadvantaged groups. 211 
The Committee has directed a number of questions towards the 
issue to aff-mnative action especially as regards people with physical 
disabilitieS212 and ethnic or racial minorities. 213 In doing so it seems to 
accept the legitimacy of such action even if there is a residual concern 
207 This is the import of the discussion over the use of the term "discrimination" 
as opposed to "distinction". See above, text accompanying notes 42-46. 
During the drafting of Article 27 ICCPR, relating to the rights of minorities, it 
was recognized that differential treatment might be granted to them to ensure real equality 
of status with the other elements of the population. UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note, at 
181. 
208 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
recommended that "States Parties make more use of temporary special measures such as 
positive action, preferential treatment or quota systems to advance women's integration 
into education, the economy, politics and employment". General Recommendation 5, (7th Sess. 1988), at 109, UN Doc. A/43/38, (1988). 
209 See, UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1182, para. 11 (1962). 
210 General Comment 4/13,36 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 40), at 109, UN Doc. 
A/36/40, (198 1). See also, ILO Convention, article 2; UNES CO Convention, article 4; 
CERD, article 2(2); CEDAW, article 3. 
211 See e. g., Ramcharan, supra, note 1, at 261. 
212 See e. g., Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 4, para. 15; Fofana, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 11, at 4, para. 19; ibid, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 4, at 12, para. 64. 
213 Questions have been asked as to: measures taken to ensure ethnic balance in 
schools., Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 10, at 10, para. 59; special treatment given 
to racial minorities in employment, Wimer Zarnbrano, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 20, at 10, 
para. 45; special measures taken to ensure respect for cultural life of the gipsy 
community, Texier,, E/C. 12/198 8/S R. 14, at 7, para. 4 1; Alvarez Vita, 
E/C. 12/199 l/SR. 11, at 13, para. 75. 
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over the effect such action may have on the economy. 214 Nevertheless, it 
has not explicitly recognised the obligatory nature of affirmative action. 
it could be argued that the Committee implicitly recognises such an 
obligation through its requirement that States concentrate upon the 
situation of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society. 215 This is a 
matter that ideally should be made clear in a future General Comment. 
2) The Form of Affirmative Action. 
It is clear that affirmative action in the field of economic, social 
and cultural rights can take a number of forms. At one extreme it might 
involve merely the provision of special benefits to disadvantaged groups 
such as advice, training, housing or food. At the other extreme 
affirmative action might take the form of quota systems in public 
employment, education, or employment training. 
As regards the first form of affirmative action, there seems to be 
little reason to reject policies that involve selective distribution of 
resourceS216 or special facilities for the promotion of disadvantaged 
groups. 217 However, much criticism has been directed at affirmative 
action which envisages the distribution of benefits on the basis of 
"suspect classifications", particularly through the imposition of "quota 
systems". It is reasoned that it involves a process of discrimination 
against those who are deprived of employment, for example, as the result 
of a requirement of numerical representation, 218 for which reason they 
may engender hostility and resentment. 219 It is also possible that a person 
from one disadvantaged group may be deprived opportunity as a result 
of such a system. 220 Perhaps most conclusively, quota systems advocate a 
form of absolute equality that takes little account of the notion of 
individual choice. 
Members of the Committee have given little indication of what 
forms of positive measures they consider to be legitimate. Cognisance 
214 See e. g., Neneman, E/C. 12/198 8/SR. 18, at 2, para-5. 
215 As noted above, this conclusion depends upon whether the action is seen to 
be directed towards the realisation of the rights themselves or at achieving equality of 
opportunity. See above, text accompanying notes 25-28. 
216 Goldstein accedes to this which he considers as an integral part of the 
political process, supra, note 204, at 3 1. 
217 This is not always viewed as affmnative action in its true sense, as the action 
may be justified on the basis of present disadvantagement rather than past 
discruimination. 
218 Cohen, supra, note 185, at 356; Schachter, supra, note 15, at 295. 
219 Schachter, supra, note 15, at 305. 
220 Goldstein, supra, note 204, at 39. 
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has been made of a wide range of training and fiscal measureS221 but no 
objection has as yet been made regarding the imposition of quotaS. 222 
It is submitted that the Committee should at least assess the nature 
and extent of any affirmative action measures by reference to the 
purpose for which they were instituted. Not only should such action 
conform to the necessity of promoting equality of opportunity, its extent 
should also be proportionate to the measure of existing 
disadvantagement. Consideration should thus be given to other possible 
courses of action that do not involve the apportionment of benefits on the 
basis of "suspect classifications". 7he imposition of quotas might be justified as an extreme measure to remedy a particularly urgent situation 
of disadvantagement that is closely associated with defacto 
discrimination against one social group. It should be remembered 
nevertheless, that such affirmative measures are to be instituted as a 
temporary expedient, and should not form part of a permanent strategy. 
3) A Case of Protective and Affirmative Action: Minority Groups. 
The question of protective and affirmative action is particularly 
problematic with regard to ethnic and racial minorities. On the one hand 
the social marginalisation of such groups might justify affirmative action 
with a view to integrating them within the State-development process. On 
the other hand, the need to maintain their cultural independence and self- 
determination argues in favour of protective measures being taken to 
ensure development outside that of the majority. 223 
Arguably, the Covenant itself does recognise the different needs of 
ethnic minorities particularly as regards their cultural identity. Although 
article 15 merely states that everyone has the right to "take part in 
cultural life", a recognition of legitimate differences in belief and 
tradition is to be found in articles 13(3) and (4). Under those articles, 
parents have the right to establish and choose schools other than those 
established by the public authorities. Similarly, the reference to self- 
determination in article 1 of the Covenant might be interpreted as 
implying that minorities have a right to pursue their own "economic, 
221 Questions have been asked inter alia as to: subsidies to allow poor access to 
cultural life, Neneman, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 9, para. 43; training and support for 
women's cooperatives, Simma, F, /C. 12/1989/SR. 6, at 10, para. 45. 
M Quotas referred to have included: measures to ensure ethnic balance in 
schools, Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 10, at 10, para. 59; a law reserving two 
percent of jobs for the disabled, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 4, 
para. 15. 
223 See generally, Thornberry P., "Self-Determination, Nfinorities, Human 
Rights: A Review of International Instruments", 38 LIC. L. Q., 867 (1989); Sohn L., 
"The Rights of Minorities", in Henkin L. (ed), The International Bill of Rights, 270 (1981). 
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social and cultural development" without excessive interference from the 
authorities. 224 Although these provisions would appear to stress freedom 
from State interference in the maintenance of an independent identity, 
the question remains as to the extent to which the Covenant places 
positive obligations upon States to promote the cultural rights of 
minorities. 
The Committee quite clearly supports the adoption of positive 
measures in favour of minorities in so far as they are disadvantaged. In 
addition however, despite the obvious pitfalls in defining "ethnic 
minorities" for the purpose of taking protective measures, 225 Committee 
members have endorsed the idea that ethnic minorities are entitled to 
some form of independence and consequently protective measures. 226 It 
is considered that ethnic groups and indigenous populations should 
accordingly have the right to express themselves in their own language, 
enjoy their own culture, 227 and establish their own educational 
institutions if they choose to do SO. 228 In addition, members have 
224 As the Human Rights Committee stated with respect to article 27 ICCPR: 
"... the rights protected by article 27 include the rights of persons, in 
community with others, to engage in economic and social activities which 
are part of the culture of the community to which they belong. " 
UN Doc. A/45/40, Vol. ][[, App. A, para. 32.2 (1990). 
225 See, Sigler and Caportati, supra, note 34. 
It may be noted here that the institution of protective measures in favour of ethnic 
minorities can be assimilated only as a group right. This is not the case for other actions 
under article 2(2). A difference can be made between rights that fall upon the individual 
as a result of his or her membership of a group, and rights that belong to the individual 
who is to be identified by means of a group membership. Thus one member of the 
Committee commented with regard to a reply of the representative of Iran: 
"The delegation's statement about the definition of minorities raised an 
interesting legal point but failed to address the real issue. Whether or not 
minority rights were treated as group rights was irrelevant to the 
existence of the rights of individual members of those groups. " 
Alston E/C. 12/1990/SR. 43, at 8, para. 42. 
226 E. g. Taya, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 16, at 4, para. 14. A similar conclusion can be 
found in analysis of the work of the Human Rights Committee with respect to article 27. 
CholewinsId R., "State Duty to Ethnic Nfinorities: Positive or Negative? ", 10 
Hum. Rts. Q., 344 (1988). 
227 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 9, para. 39 
228 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 16,, at 10, para. 54. Judge Tanaka 
conunented in respect of minorities that the notion of equality before the law 
"prohibits a State to exclude members of a minority group form 
participating in rights, interests and opportunities which a 
majority population group can enjoy. On the other hand, a 
minority group shall be guaranteed the exercise of their own 
religious and education activities. This guarantee is conferred on 
members of a minority group, for the purpose of protection of 
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generally been critical of attempts to assimilate such groups into the 
mainstream, 229 one member going so far as to make note of their right 
to self-determination. 230 The Committee however, has not made any 
clear statement as to the obligation of States to take positive action to 
ensure that that separate cultural identity was maintained. 231 
D) THIRD PERSONS 
In contrast to article 2(l)(d) ICERD and articles 2(b), (e) and (f) 
of CEDAW which require the State to bring an end to racial 
discrimination by any persons, group, or organization, the Covenant 
makes no reference to discrimination between private individuals. 
Similarly, the travaux preparatoires make little specific mention of an 
obligation on the part of States to ensure non-discrimination between 
private individuals. 232 It is only possible to infer such an obligation from 
references to defacto equality. 233 
That States undertake to it guarantee" the exercise of the rights 
without discrimination, however, suggests that the obligation does extend 
beyond merely the control of public bodies. Indeed, to the extent that 
States are required to control private activity in relation to the 
substantive articles (for example to ensure safe and healthy working 
conditions), article 2(2) should also apply. One commentator concludes 
their interests and not from the motive of discrimination itself. By 
reason of protection of the minority this protection cannot be 
imposed upon members of minority groups, and consequently 
they have the choice to accept it or not. 
Supra, note 7. 
229 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 13, para. 7 1; Alvarez Vita, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 16, at T, para. 29. Recognition of certain problems have been identified 
however. Tbus Mr Wimer Zambrano commented: 
"Recognition of indigenous languages, which reflected a concern to 
respect the traditions and the cultural identity of different indigenous 
populations, nevertheless ran counter to another objective of equal 
importance in countries of Latin America, the desire to achieve 
assimilation" 
E/C. 12/`1990/SR. 18, at 14, para. 89. 
230 See, Konate, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 10, para. 52. 
231 Cf. Article 27 ICCPR, which has been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee as obliging States to take positive steps to ensure the enjoyment of the 
cultural rights of minorities. See, McGoldrick D., "Canadian Indians, Cultural Rights 
and the Human Rights Committee", 40 I. C. L. Q., 658 (1991). 
232 Klerk, supra, note 9, at 266. 
233 See above, text accompanying notes 12-16. 
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that "under Article 2(2) and 3 states are equally obliged to prohibit 
others to practice discrimination in public life". 234 
The Committee has expressed some interest in the need to protect 
the rights of individuals against possible violations by other 
individuals, 235 and has in particular looked towards control of the 
private sector. No distinction is made as regards article 2(2). Although 
there is certainly greater concern as regards the activity of public 
bodies, 236 members of the Committee have thus looked towards the 
operation of non-discriminatory norms between private groups and 
individuals such as in private sector employment237 and health care. 238 
Even if it is accepted that the obligation in article 2(2) is not 
restricted to public bodies, some consideration needs to be given to the 
extent to which States are under a duty to regulate the actions of private 
individuals. There is clearly a tension here between individual freedom 
or privacy and the demands of combatting discrimination. 239 As Henkin 
notes: 
"That racial discrimination is often private discrimination 
means that efforts to eliminate it meet resistance from 
competing values of individual right which also have 
attractive claims in human dignity". 240 
During the drafting of article 26 ICCPR it was made clear that individual 
preferences or the exercise of individual choice, were not to be subject to 
legal regulation. 241 However matters of everyday life, such as housing, 
transport, restaurants, and employment were deemed to be capable of 
234 Klerk, supra, note 9, at 267. 
235 For the operation of the concept of "drittwirkung", see above, Chapter 2, 
text accompanying notes 28-42. 
236 For example many questions are directed exclusively at public employment, 
see e. g., Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 3, at 11, para. 5 1. 
237 Questions have been directed towards: differences of retirement ages in the 
Private sector, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 8, para. 39; equal access of 
women to employment in the private sector. Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 8, para. 46; 
and maternity leave for women in private sector, Mrachkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 8, at 7, 
para. 30. 
238 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2, at 10, para. 61. 
239 Meron interpretes the right of association as restricting the scope of the 
Principle of non-discrimination "so as to protect strictly personal relations from its 
reach". Meron, supra, note 10, at 294. 
240 Henkin L., "National and International Perspectives on Racial 
Discrimination", 4 H. R. J. 11 263, at 265 (1971). 
241 Saudi Arabia, UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1099, para. 18 (196 1); Paldstan, UN 
Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1102, para. 4 (1961). 
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control by the State. 242 Ramcharan concludes rather generally that 
"certain types of discrimination by individuals, other than in personal 
and social relationships, would violate the guarantees of the Covenant 
and that a state party is under an obligation to take measures against such 
forms of discrimination". 243 The task is clearly one of defining the 
threshold between the exercise of individual choice and the control of 
discriminatory behaviour in public life. 
Within the scope of the Covenant there are a number of areas in 
which the State might be obliged to ensure non-discrimination. For 
example, access to private employment or training, the rental of private 
accomodation, admission to trades unions or private educational 
establishments, access to privately owned cultural facilities (such as 
theatres or cinemas). Whilst it might be said that there is a prima facie 
case for regulating the activities of all such institutions and individuals, it 
has to be recognised that there is also a need to protect the intimate and 
personal activities of individuals in their association with others. For 
example, it would not be appropriate for the State to intervene in a 
landlord's choice as to who to have as a lodger in the same house. 
Meron's conclusion is particularly evident here. 
"While certain private and interpersonal, associational 
relations would be insulated from the reach of the 
Convention, the activities of large private entities and of 
basically unselective organisations would be regarded as 
publicly available goods and services". 244 
According to this view, the degree of intervention should reflect the size 
and selectivity of the organisation concerned. 
The Committee has not, at this stage, made any attempt to 
rationalise the competing demands in this area. For example, in one case 
the Austrian representative noted that there was a problem of 
discrimination in the private sector as "wages were freely agreed 
between employer and employee and because of the high value attached 
to the independence of the social partners". 245 Although apparently 
negating any State responsibility for discrimination in the sphere of 
private sector employment, this statement was rather superficially 
accepted by the Committee without comment. 
It is submitted that the Committee needs to address these complex 
problems with more precision with a view to establishing some principle 
to describe State obligations as regards discrimination between private 
242 USSR, UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1098, para. 6 (1961). 
243 Ramcharan, supra, note 1, at 262-263. 
244 Meron, supra, note 10, at 295. 
245 Berchold (Austria), F, /C. 12/1988/SR. 4, at 3, para. 11. 
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individuals and bodies. As a minimum, the Committee needs to ensure 
that States themselves are aware of the competing principles and have 
laws and regulations that reflect a balanced approach. 
VI) CONCLUSION 
Although the concepts of non-discrimination and equality are 
arguably central to the implementation of the Covenant, they have been 
given remarkably little attention either in the drafting of the Covenant or 
in the practice of the Committee. Given the complexity and controversial 
nature of the issues involved, there is manifestly a need for the 
Committee to make some clear statement as to its position. In particular, 
attention needs to be paid to the notion of equality of opportunity in so 
far as it is seen as being a relevant objective of the Covenant. This is so 
not merely by virtue of the fact that it gives rise to claims for 
affirmative and protective action, but also to the extent that it poses 
problems of measurement. 
In relation to the principle of non-discrimination, the Committee 
appears to have adopted a position analogous to that of other human 
rights bodies. It has interpreted article 2(2) in a relatively broad manner 
both as to its scope ratio materiae and ratio personae. Although the 
article is not deemed to be entirely autonomous in the sense of article 26 
ICCPR, it covers both direct and indirect discrimination by public 
authorities and private individuals. Similarly, the article is not limited to 
those "suspect" classifications specifically enumerated, but may also 
cover other unreasonable differentiations. 
. 
Even here however, there is room for greater specificity. 
Although it is clearly necessary for article 2(2) to apply beyond the 
restricted classification of grounds upon which discrimination is 
prohibited, the Committee needs to establish what additional grounds it 
considers to be "suspect" and the level of scrutiny with which it will 
evaluate differentiations. As regards regulation of the activities of 
private individuals a balance has to be struck between the demands of 
individual choice and freedom and the necessity of combatting 
discrimination in the longer-term. As suggested, the Committee should 
look initially to ensure that States reflect such a balance in their laws and 
administrative practices. 
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Article 6 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right to 
work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain 
his living by work which he fi-eely chooses or accepts, and will take the 
appropriate steps to safeguard this right. 
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to 
achieve thefull realization of this right shall include technical and 
vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques 
to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development andfull 
and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental 
political and economic fileedoms to the individual. 
I) INTRODUCTION 
Despite the statistical existence of unemployment in every country 
in the world, work continues to be "an essential part of the human 
condition". 1 For many, it represents the primary source of income upon 
which their physical survival depends. Not only is it crucial to the 
enjoyment of "existence rights" such as food, clothing or housing, 2 it 
affects the level of satisfaction of many other human rights such as 
education, culture and health. Article 6, however, is not so much 
concerned with what is provided by work (in terms of remuneration), 
or the conditions of work, but rather in the value of employment itself. 
It thus gives recognition to the idea that work is an important element in 
maintaining the dignity and self-respect of the individual. 
H) THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 
Ihe initial idea of including an article on the right to work was 
discussed in the General Assembly's Third Committee in 1950.3 The 
Socialist States argued for the inclusion of such an article on the basis 
that it formed one of the "cornerstones of modem society"4 and gave 
1 Sieghart P., The Lawful Rights of Mankind, 123 (1986). 
2 See, Tomes I., "The Right to Work and Social Security", 8-9 Bull. Czech. L 
192, at 196 (1967-8); Van der Ven J., "The Right to Work as a Human Right 11,11 
Howard L. J., 397, at 405-406 (1965). 
3 UN Docs, A/C. 3/SR. 289-91,297-99,5 GAOR, C. 3,289th-9 1 st and 297th- 
99th mtgs, (1950). 
4 Hoffmeister (Czechoslovakia), A/C. 3/SR. 299, para. 33 (1950). 
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other rights "a foundation in reality". 5 In particular it was felt that the 
right to work was essential in the context of the right to life as 
providing the "means towards living". 6 
In the following year, a number of proposals were made 
concerning an article on the right to work in a Working Group of the 
Commission on Human Rights. 7 These, together with a number of other 
proposals, were considered by the Commission on Human Rights at its 
seventh session in 1951.8 The Commission draft was then reviewed by 
the General Assembly's Third Committee in 1956 which produced the 
final version of the article. 9 
Lr A) A GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT TO WORK 
The initial proposals fell into three main groups. First, the 
Socialist States made proposals in which the State would "guarantee" or 
it ensure" the right to work. 10 Secondly, some Westem States proposed 
that States should "promote conditions" under which the right to work 
might be realised. 11 Finally, certain other States proposed a 
compromise formula in which it was merely stated that everyone should 
have the right to work12 (a decision on whether or not the obligation 
should be progressive being deferred until the adoption of a general 
clause). It became apparent that many States would not accept an 
obligation to It guarantee" the right to work in the sense of ensuring full 
employment or eliminating unemployment. In particular, it seems to 
have been felt that such a guarantee would bind States to a centralised 
system of government in which labour was under the direct control of 
the State. 13 
5 Panyushkin (USSR), A/C. 3/SR. 297, para. 54 (1950). 
6 Afhan (Iraq), A/C. 3/SR. 298, para. 64, (1950). 
7 E/CN. 4/AC. 14/2, at 3 (195 1). 
8 E/CNA/SR. 205-7 and 216-218, (1951). 
9 UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 709-713 (1956). 
10 See e. g., US SR proposal, E/CN. 4/AC. 14/2, at 3, (195 1). 
11 Ibid, proposals of USA, Denmark and Egypt. 
12 Ibid, proposal of Yugoslavia. See also, proposal of ELO, 
E/CN. 4/AC. 14/2/Add. 1, (1951). 
13 Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 269, at 6, (1952); Later she commented: 
"... it was difficult to see how democratic States could guarantee 
absolutely and by their own action the right to work to all persons 
without becoming totalitarian States. "
E/CN. 4/SR. 275, at 11, (1952). 
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It was made clear that in many countries, the achievement of the 
right to work was dependent upon the economic climate in which it 
operated. External constraints relating to the international trade 
situation or a lack of raw materials14 made the achievement of the right 
to work contingent upon international action as well as a particular 
national economic or social policy. 15 In that light it was generally 
considered that the right to work could only be achieved in a 
progressive manner. 16 More extremely, some felt that a guarantee of 
the right to work was in fact impossible at any stage. 17 
In using the stock formula in which the States Parties "recognise" 
the right to work the drafters clearly placed article 6 within the 
compass of article 2(l) which provides for the progressive realisation 
of the right. 18 However, whilst rejecting the term it guarantee ", the 
delegates seemed to be concerned primarily with the obligation to 
achieve fall employment. It is unclear from the drafting whether it was 
intended that all aspects of the article, such as the obligation to refrain 
from imposing forced labour, were intended to be progressively 
implemented. 
B) OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN HIS LIVING 
The ma ority of proposals that ained broad support utilised the i9 
tenn "opportunity to gain his living by work" in some form. 19 This 
specific wording was proposed in order to underline the fact that the 
individual must be able to earn a living wage. 20 It was criticised, 
however, because it was seen to limit the concept of work to that which 
14 See, Rossel (Sweden), E/CN. 4/SR. 216, at 6, (1951). 
15 See, Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 275, at 12, (1952). 
16 See e. g., Bowie (UK), E/CNA/SR. 206, at 10, (195 1); Sorensen (Denmark), E/CNA/SR. 207, at 10, (1951); Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 276, at 6, (1952). 
17 See e. g., Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 269, at 4, (1952); Hoare (UK), 
E/CNA/SR. 278, at 8, (1952). 
18 That article 6 was to be governed by the general implementation clause was 
the reason for the rejection of additional articles on the implementation of the right to 
work. See e. g. UN Doc. E/2256, at 16-17,14 ESCOR, Supp-4, (1952). 
19 See e. g., Proposal of France, E/CN. 4/576; proposal of ELO, 
E/CN. 4/AC. 14/2/Add. 1. 
20 See, Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 216, at 27, (1951). 
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generated income, 21 and because the question of remuneration fell more 
clearly within the scope of article 7.22 
Although inclusion of the phrase did have considerable support, 
the main controversy lay over the precise relationship between the right 
to work and the opportunity to gain one's living by work. The original 
proposal accepted at the Commission's seventh session linked the right 
to work with the opportunity to gain one's living by the phrase "that is 
to say". 23 Although it was argued that the concepts in fact described two 
separate rights, 24 the majority felt that the opportunity to gain one's 
living was, in part at least, a definition of the right to work. 25 A Greek 
amendment to alter the phrase to read "the fundamental right to work, 
which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his 
living by work"26 was ultimately adopted, 27 it being felt that the right 
to work "did not mean simply the right to remuneration but the right of 
every human being to do a job freely chosen by himself, one which 
gave meaning to his life. "28 Although the other elements within the 
right to work were unfortunately not spelled oUt., 29 the discussion 
implies that it includes, at least, the right not to be arbitrarily deprived 
of work of any kind, whether remunerative or otherwise. 
There was some underlying confusion as to the exact nature of 
State obligations that were implicit in the right to gain a living through 
work. Some States seem to have considered that the opportunity to work 
21 See, Yu (China), E/CNA/S R. 216, at 25, (195 1). 
22 See, Azmi Bey (Egypt), E/CN. 4/SR. 216, at 29, (1951). 
23 Article 20 of the draft covenant read: 
" Work being the basis of all human endeavour, the States Parties to the 
Covenant recognize the right to work, that is to say, the fundamental 
right of everyone to the opportunity, if he so desires, to gain his living 
by work which he freely accepts. " 
UN Doc. E/1992, Annex 1, at 23, ECOSOC OR, 13th Sess., Supp. 9, (1951). 
24 See, Pazhwak (Afghanistan), A/C. 3/SR. 709, at 137, para. 28 (1956). 
25 See e. g., Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 709, at 137, para. 34 (1956); 
Ponce (Ecuador), A/C. 3/SR. 71 1, at 148, para. 12 (1956). 
26 UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 536. A similar amendment was to use the word "as" in 
place of "that is to say". See Mufti (Syria), A/C. 3/SR. 709, at 137, para. 31 (1956). 
27 42 votes to ten with 13 abstentions. The word "fundamental" was deleted 
from the final version. UN Doc. A/3525, at 4, para. 28,11 UN GAOR, Annexes, C. 3, 
Ag. Item 31, (1956). 
28 Thierry (France), A/C. 3/SR. 709, at 138, para. 37 (1956); See also, Mufti (Syria), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 144, para. 42 (1956). 
29 Cf Marriott (Australia), A/C. 3/SR. 71 1, at 150, para. 36, (1956). 
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obliged the State to provide work for all who wished to do so. 30 Other 
States, however, considered that the opportunity to work merely 
implied that the State should restrain itself from preventing persons 
from working. 31 A general reading of the debate would suggest that a 
position of compromise was reached that enabled the word 
"opportunity" to be included by consensus. 32 Whereas market or mixed 
economy States would not accept an obligation to provide employment, 
as suggested above, they could accept a position where they were 
responsible for developing employment opportunities. 33 Presumably the 
development of employment opportunities could be achieved either 
directly through State employment or indirectly by developing the 
economic conditions for increasing private sector employment. 
Q FREE CHOICE IN EMPLOYMENT 
A certain tension between a guarantee of the right to work and 
free choice in employment was identified in the early stages of 
drafting. 34 It was considered inconceivable that everyone should be 
provided with work of their own choosing by the State. If the State was 
obliged to provide employment, it could not be required to cater 
entirely for individual choice but would obviously limit job 
opportunities according to the requirements of the country's economic 
development. 35 Some States accordingly suggested that free choice of 
employment should be qualified for the purpose of maintaining fun 
employment. 36 The majority, however, looked to the primacy of free 
choice over the achievement of full employment through the provision 
of labour by the State. 37 
30 See e. g., Azkoul (Lebanon), E/CN. 4/SR. 268, para. 8, (1952); Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), E/CN. 4/SR. 277, para. 11, (1952). 
31 See e. g., Nisot (Belgium), E/CN. 4/SR. 268, para. 8, (1952); Pazhwak (Afghanistan), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 141, para. 7, (1956). 
32 E/CN. 4/SR. 218, para. 7, (1952). 
33 See, Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 144, paras 37-38, (1956). 
34 See e. g., Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), E/CNA/SR. 205, at 11, (1951); Bowie (UK), E/CNA/SR. 206, at 10, (1951); Rossel (Sweden), E/CNA/SR. 216, at 6, (1951). 
35 See, Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/AC. 14/SR. 3, at 15-16, (1951). 
36 See e. g., Valenzuela (Chile), E/CNA/SR. 206, at 23, (195 1); Ahmed (Pakistan) A/C. 3/SR. 709, at 138, para. 39, (1956). 
37 The USSR representative objected, for example, that free choice could be 
used to justify unemployment and the lack of measures to combat it. Morosov (USSR), 
E/CN. 4/SR. 218, at 7, (1951). 
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There was considerable concern that the right to work should 
contain some indication that forced labour or slavery should be 
illegal. 38 It was pointed out that the prohibition of forced labour was 
irnplicit in the concept of a "right to work" which could be invoked or 
not, as a matter of choice, 39 and that it was already covered by article 5 
of the Covenant. 40 Nevertheless proposals were made to include the 
phrase "of his own choice"41 or "who so desires"42 to indicate this 
concern. The latter term was the one chosen initially, together with the 
stipulation that work be freely accepted. 43 The term "choice" was 
rejected on the basis that it might have implied that governments 
undertook to find the employment of everyone's choosing. 44 The 
inclusion of both the terms "desires" and "freely accepts" seemed to 
stress that people should not only be free from coercion in their choice 
of occupation but also be at liberty not to work at all. 
However at a later stage the position was reversed. The term 
"desires" was deleted in favour of the phrase "work which he freely 
chooses or accepts". 45 One justification for the deletion of the term 
"desires" was that it might be seen as a legitimisation of "social 
parasitism". 46 For those States that instigated the change, work was not 
38 See e. g., Simarsian (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 216, at 18, (1951); Sender (ICFrU), E/CN. 4/SR. 216, at 19, (195 1). 
39 See, Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), E/CN. 4/SR. 216, at 20, (195 1); Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 216, at 27, (195 1). Cassin later commented: 
"Article 20 [later article 6] contained both the positive and negative 
aspects, like the word 'droit' itself Inherent in that word was the notion 
that it could be exercised voluntarily; otherwise it would be an 
obligation. Equally inherent was the notion of the ability to exercise the 
right. " 
He went on to argue that there was therefore no need to include the words 
11 opportunity" or "desires" within the text. E/CN. 4/SR. 268, at 9, (1952). 
40See e. g., Malik (Lebanon), E/CNA/SR. 217, at 11, (1951). 
41 See e. g., Mehta (India), E/CNA/SR. 216, at 24, (1951). 
42See e. g., Sorensen (Denmark), E/CN. 4/SR. 216, at 9, (1951). 
43UN Doc. E/1992, Annex 1, at 23, supra, note 23. It would seem that the 
inclusion of the term "freely accepts" was similarly intended to prohibit forced labour. See, Simarsian, E/CN. 4/SR. 217, at 10, (1951). 
44 See, Myrddin-Evans (IOLO), E/CN. 4/SR. 216, at 29, (1951). 
45 UN Doc. A/3525, at 3-4, paras 25 and 28, supra, note 27. 
46 See, Aznar (Spain), A/C. 3/SR. 709, at 137, para. 30, (1956); Jaramillo 
Arrubla (Colombia), ibid, at 138, para. 44; Nestor (Rumania), A/C. 3/SR. 712, at 153, 
para. 7, (1956). One member of the Third Committee felt he could not support the term 
"desires" as it was at variance with his States'vagrancy laws. Rivas (Venezuela), 
A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 143, para. 21, (1956). 
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merely a right but also a duty. 47 Fortunately, however, the possibility 
that the individual might be obliged in law to take up some form of 
employment, as seems to be implied here, was not subject to full 
agreement. First, a number of States emphasised that the concept of a 
right to work did not allow for the possibility of a co-existent duty to 
work. Secondly, if work must be freely accepted as article 6 requires, it 
is difficult to see how a duty to work could ever be enforced. It was 
thus the presence of the phrase "freely accepts" which was generally 
considered to prohibit forced labour, that led to the deletion of the 
word "desires" as being essentially redundant. 48 
The term "chooses", far from carrying the implications assigned 
to it in the Commission's debate, was merely intended to strengthen the 
existing meaning of the article. In the final analysis it seems that the 
term "chooses" covered the right to choose a trade or profession whilst 
the term "accepts" covered the right to accept or refuse an offer of 
employment. 49 As such the alterations did not substantially change the 
meaning assigned to the original Commission version of the article. 50 
Despite opposition, 51 the article seems to have been adopted on the 
strength of this analysis. 
D) FULL EMPLOYMENT 
Despite the rejection of proposals for a guarantee of the right to 
work, there remained considerable support for the inclusion of a 
reference to full employment. 52 This led a contemporary commentary 
to conclude that the presence of paragraph 2 seemed to include the right 
to be provided with work, in addition to the right not to be prevented 
47See e. g., Aznar (Spain), A/C. 3/SR. 709, at 137, para. 30, (1956). That there 
might be some conflict between the free choice of work and the duty to work was dispelled by one member: 
"... the obligation to work and freedom to work were in no way 
incompatible. Men ought to work, but they should be free to choose 
their trade or profession. " Jaramillo Arrubla (Columbia), A/C. 3/SR. 709, at 138, para. 44, (1956). How an 
obligation to work and a freedom not to accept work can be reconciled is unclear. This 
somewhat dubious reasoning was not followed in that delegates' later statements. Cf. A/C. 3/SR. 712, at 154, para. 14, (1956). 
48 See e. g., Aznar (Spain), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 141, para. 4 (1956); De Almeida (Brazil), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 142, para. 11 (1956) 
49 See, Jaramillo Arrubla (Colombia), A/C. 3/SR. 712, at 154, para. 14, (1956). 
50 Cf, Cheng (China), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 144, para. 35, (1952). 
51 See e. g., Elliot (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 712, at 154, para. 8, (1956). 
52 See e. g., Fischer (WFTU), E/CN. 4/SR. 217, at 4, (195 1); Whitlam (Australia), E/CN. 4/S R. 277, at 10, (1952); see generally, UN Doc. E/2256, para. 110, 
ECOSOC OR, 14th Sess., Supp-4, (1952). 
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from working. 53 However, the debate on paragraph 1 does not seem to 
bear this out. Any such right to employment was to be viewed in 
relation to the State obligation to secure full employment in a 
progressive manner, which in itself was conditional upon the economic 
development of the country concerned. 
In recognising "full employment" as merely being a method of 
implementation, 54 a proposal to include it in a second paragraph to 
article 6 extended into a debate on the more general question of whether 
specific implementation clauses should be included within the 
substantive portion of the Covenant. Even following the adoption by the 
Commission of a second paragraph relating to full employment, certain 
members advocated its deletion. 55 It was argued that it was better to 
state the principle of the right to work in general terms leaving the 
specifics of implementation to the ILO. Additionally, not only was it 
illogical to insert specific implementation clauses in some articles and 
not others, 56 but also the proposals were limited and indeed self- 
evident. 57 However it was felt that in order for the Covenant to go 
-beyond the UDHR58 it was necessary for the specifics of implementation, beyond those found in article 2,59 to be spelt out where 
possible. 60 As far as article 6 was concerned, more detailed standards 
53 UN Doc. A/2929, ibid, at 103, para. 2. 
54 It was noted that full employment could either be seen as a means for 
ensuring the right to work or as a separate goal. See, Azkoul (Lebanon), 
E/CN. 4/SR. 276, at 13, (1952). 
55 UK Amendment, A/C. 3/L. 534. 
56 See, Elliot (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 7 10, at 143, para. 26, (1956). 
57 See, Elliot (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 709, at 137, para. 29, (1956); Shipley (Canada), 
ibid, para. 32; Thierry (France), ibid, at 138, para-38. 
58 It was felt that without paragraph 2, article 6 would not differ substantially 
from the UDHR. Abdel-Ghani (Egypt), A/C. 3/SR. 7 10, at 143, para-20, (1956). In 
particular some States seemed to be driven by the rather erroneous idea that without 
paragraph 2 States would not be bound inter se with respect to article 6. See e. g., 
Ponce (Ecuador), A/C. 3/SR. 71 1, at 148, para. 13; Pudlak (Czechoslovakia), ibid, at 
149, para. 19. 
59 See, Eustathiades (Greece), A/C. 3/SR. 7 10, at 143, para. 29, (1956). 
60 See, Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 144, para. 38, (1956); 
Massoud-Ansari (Iran), A/C. 3/SR. 71 1, at 149, para. 3 1. 
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had been established in ILO instruments, 61 and had already gained 
general acceptability on the international plane. 62 
So for the majority, the question was not the inclusion of a second 
paragraph relating to full employment, but what elements should be 
referred to therein. It was made clear that the obligation to achieve full 
employment was only one method of securing the right to work, 63 even if considered the most important. 64 This point was made apparent in the 
final version of article 6 which stipulates that the steps to ensure the 
right to work "shall include" the obligation to achieve fun employment. 
Paragraph 2 thus is not an all inclusive paragraph. 
1) Economic DevelODment 
There was general agreement that the achievement of full 
employment was dependent upon the structure and economic 
development of each country. 65 On the other hand, proposals to make 
reference to the technical means for ensuring full employment, 66 in 
particular the need for it economic expansion" or "development", 67 were 
subject to opposition. It was argued that a reference to development 
might leave the way open for States to avoid their obligationS68 and that 
it would duplicate and even limit article 2.69 In response it was 
submitted that a reference to economic expansion or development was 
indeed necessary, 70 being justified by the text of articles 55 and 56 of 
61 See, Vlahov (Yugoslavia), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 142, para. 9, (1956). 
62See, Morosov (USSR), A/C. 3/SR. 710, at 142, para. 15, (1956). 
63See, Hoare (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 278, at 8, (1952). 
64See, Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 216, at 11, (1951). 
65 See e. g., it was commented that the aims of article 6 would only be achieved 
ti only in so far as the States provided every opportunity for employment and ensured a 
stable economy in which only temporary unemployment would be possible". Sender (ICFrU), E/CN. 4/SR. 276, at 9, (1952). See also, Roosevelt (US), E/CNA/SR. 276, 
at 6, (1952); Santa Cruz (Chile), ibid, at 8. 
66 See, Juvigny (France), E/CNA/SR. 276, at 11, (1952); Cassin (France), 
E/CNA/SR. 278, at 4, (1952). 
67 In the end the preference was for the word "development". Cf. 
E/CN-4/SR. 278, at 13, (1952). 
68 See, Azkoul (Lebanon), E/CNA/SR. 276, at 12, (1952); Kovalenko, (USSR), E/CN. 4/SR. 278, at 3, (1952). 
69 See e. g., Rossel (Sweden), E/CNA/SR. 277, at 3, (1952). 
70 See, Waheed (Pakistan), E/CNA/SR. 277, at 6, (1952). 
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the UN Charter. 71 That mention should be made of economic 
development was finally accepted by the Commission. In the Third 
Committee however, despite certain reservations, 72 it was decided that 
development should not be limited to the economic field, and that social 
and cultural development should also be mentioned to give the article 
fuller expression. 73 
It would seem that the inclusion of the reference to economic, 
social and cultural development, not only highlights the perceived 
interdependence of article 6 and the other articles within the Covenant, 
but also re-emphasises that article six is intended, in part at least, to be 
progressively implemented. 
2) National and International Programmes 
In the light of the external considerations that bear upon a 
particular country's economic development, it was also proposed that 
article 6 should refer explicitly to "national and international 
programmes to achieve economic development. 74 Although members 
were in accordance with the intentions of the proposal, 75 concern. was 
expressed as to the precise obligations that ensued76 and the limitative 
effect they might have on article 2.77 Delegates seem to have been 
satisfied finally by an assurance that on the basis of article 2, national 
and international action was implicit in the proposal and therefore did 
not have to be explicitly mentioned. 78 
3) Legislative Measures 
Sirnilarly a suggestion that article 6(2) should refer to legislative 
measures was rejected on the basis that it was not entirely clear how full 
71 See, Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 277, at 3, (1952). 
72 See e. g., Marriott (Australia), A/C-3/SR. 71 1, at 150, para. 34, (1956); 
Cheng (China), A/C. 3/SR. 712, at 154, para. 10, (1956). 
73 See, Pazhwak (Afghanistan), A/C. 3/SR. 709,, at 137, para-28, (1956); Mufti (Syria), ibid, para. 3 1; Ponce (Ecuador), A/C. 3/SR. 71 1, at 148, para. 12, (1956). 
74 See, Santa Cruz, E/CN. 4/SR. 276, at 8, (1952). 
75 See e. g., Rossel (Sweden), E/CN. 4/SR. 277, at 3, (1952). 
76 See, Hoare (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 276, at 10, (1952); Azkoul (Lebanon),, 
E/CN-4/SR. 276, at 12, (195 1). 
77 See, Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 277, at 7, (1952). 
78 See, Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 277, at 8, (1952). Nevertheless the 
provision was rejected by only a very small minority of six votes to five with seven 
abstentions. 
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employment could be ensured in that manner. 79 This does not discount 
the possibility that legislation might be necessary on occasions. 
Moreover, the context of the debate would appear to restrict this 
conclusion to the achievement of full employment, and not for example, 
the prohibition of discrimination in employment. 
4) Productive EMDIOyment 
At a number of stages during the drafting of article 6 it was often 
submitted that work should be productive. 80 Although little discussion 
took place over the inclusion of this word in the final. stages, it seems to have been intended to prohibit the adoption of social projects of little 
significance merely to draw in the unemployed for the purpose of 
maintaining full employment. 
5) Fundamental Political and Economic Freedoms 
The US proposal to achieve full employment "under conditions 
ensuring fundamental political and economic freedoms to the 
individual" had a certain amount of support. 81 This proposal reflected 
the concern of Western States that full employment was not an objective 
to be imposed through totalitarian means at the expense of democracy 
and freedom. 
It was argued that the term "freedoms" should not be limited to 
fundamental ones, but should be expanded to include all political and 
economic freedoms. 82 However it was countered that the purpose was 
to safeguard only those freedoms which were fundamental in relation to 
79 Chile proposed that States should adopt legislation at a suitable time 
guaranteeing full employment. Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 275, at 11, (1952). The 
Chilean amendment was criticised for emphasising legislative measures as a means for 
securing full employment. Azkoul (Lebanon), E/CNA/SR. 276, at 12, (1952); Mehta (India), E/CNA/SR. 277, at 7, (1952). 
80 See, Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 216, at 24, (1951); Fischer (V; FTU), 
E/CN. 4/SR. 217, at 4, (195 1). This must be distinguished from the proposal that the 
right to work should be limited to "socially useful" work, which was suggested as a 
recognition that society requires its members to undertake work that contributes to the 
general well-being. See, Whitlam (Australia), E/CNA/SR. 217, at 12, (195 1); Ciasullo (Uruguay), ibid, at 10; Yu (China), ibid, at 12.. There was a certain amount of 
opposition to the term "socially useful" as it was thought it might be open to abuse by 
States. Myrddin-Evans (ILO), E/CN. 4/SR. 217, at 16, (195 1). 
81 See, Azkoul (Lebanon), E/CN. 4/SR. 276, at 12, (1952); Rossel (Sweden), 
E/CN. 4/SR. 277, at 3, (1952). One participant suggested thus that States should seek to 
prevent further unemployment and achieve full employment under conditions satisfying 
material needs and with "respect for freedom and the safeguarding of moral and 
spiritual value. " Sender (ICFIU), E/CN. 4/SR. 276, at 10, (1952). 
82 See, Pazhwak (Afghanistan), A/C. 3/SR. 709, at 137, para. 28. 
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the right to work and not just any freedom, 83 and that to include all 
freedoms was too vague and might sanction abuse. 84 It is submitted that 
this was a meaningless debate. Nowhere was it defined what freedoms 
were considered to be "fundamental", or which ones were considered to 
relate to the right to work. Perhaps all that could be concluded from the 
discussion is that the phrase was intended to prohibit "trade-offs" 
between the right to work and other civil and political rights. 
6) Steps to be Taken 
As suggested above there were questions over the extent to which 
the various proposals modified article 2(l) itself. It was made clear that 
the purpose of article 6(2) was not to limit article 2 but rather to outline 
certain conditions which were required for the full attainment of the 
right to work. 85 The inclusion of the words "steps to be taken" 
confirmed the intention that article 6(2) should merely be an 
elaboration of the general implementation provision in article 2(l). 86 
However, it should be made clear that not all the steps were 
conceived of as existing on the same theoretical level. For example, the 
reference to development was included only in so far as it related to the 
achievement of full employment. On the other hand, although full 
employment must be seen as method of implementing the ri ht to work, %ý, 9 it was also be presented as a goal in its own right. 87 
E) ABILITY 
A number of proposals were made to the effect that the right of 
access to work should be made subject to the limitations of aptitude, 
ability and qualifications. Although there were no real objections to 
such a proposal, it did not gain any significant support. The proposal to 
include a reference to ability is particularly interesting to the extent that 
it might be seen to draw upon the notion of equality of opportunity. 
Whilst non-discrimination in employment could fall within the terms of 
article 6 read in conjunction with article 2(2), the stipulation of certain 
limitations within article 6 would have suggested that a positive rather 
83 See, Eustathiades (Greece), A/C. 3/SR. 709, at 138, para. 35. 
84 See e. g., Rivas (Venezuela), A/C-3/SR. 7 10, at 143, para. 22, (1956); Diaz 
Casanueva (Chile), ibid, at 144, para-38. 
85 See, Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 277, at 8, (1952). 
86 The US proposal was accordingly amended by the Lebanese proposal to 
become the new joint amendment E/CNA/L. 95. 
87 For a discussion on the interrelationship between the substance of the rights 
and their means of implementation see above, Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 61- 
64. 
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than a negative approach should be taken. In other words instead of 
outlining the cases in which discrimination is illegitimate, it would 
reverse the situation and provide only for the cases in which 
discrimination is legitimate. 
IID THE APPROACH OF THE COMMI 
A) A GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT TO WORK 
The specific wording of article 6 (which utilises the term 
"recognise"88), supported by the travaux preparatoireS89 and a number 
of commentators, 90 clearly dismiss the idea that the right to work 
should necessarily be "guaranteed". Nevertheless, a number of the 
Committee members have looked towards a legal guarantee of the right 
to work. 91 
-One member has even argued that such a guarantee should 
be formally enshrined in the Constitution. 92 However, it is difficult to 
envisage how such a guarantee should operate. 
A guarantee of the right to work would seem to imply that the 
State should provide a job for every person who is available for and 
willing to work. To correspond to the requirements of human dignity, 
such a guarantee would have to ensure that the type of work suited the 
skills and aptitudes of the individual worker concerned, and that the 
individual be given the right to refuse employment. Inevitably, the 
institution of such a guarantee would involve considerable control of the 
labour market and expenditure. It is clear that even in those States that 
do "guarantee" the right to work, it is generally conditional upon the 
needs of society, off-set by a duty to work and implemented through the 
88 The term "recognise" is seen as being an indication that the provision is 
considered to fall within the confines of article 2(l), see above, Chapter 2, text 
accompanying note 189. 
89 See above, text accompanying notes 10- 18. 
90 See e. g., Van den Berg G. and Guldenmund R., "The Right to Work in East 
and West" in Bloed A., and Van Dijk P. (eds) Essgys on Human Rights in the Helsinki 
Process, 103 at 111 (1985). See also with respect to the UK, Hepple B., "A Right to 
Work" 10 Ind. L. J. 65 at 73 (198 1). It is also interesting to note that the International 
Labour Conference decided not to provide for a guarantee of the right to work, see., 
Mayer J., "The Concept of the Right to Work In International Standards and the 
Legislation of ILO Member States" 124 I. L. R., 225 at 239 (1985). 
91 See e. g., Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 3, para. 10; Mratchkov, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 18, at 4, para. 11; Neneman, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 11, at 5, para. 27. 
92 See, Kouznetsov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 15, at 6, para. 27. The form which such 
an expression should take in the Constitution however was not established. 
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political framework as opposed to law. 93 The situation is even less 
favourable in market economies where control of labour is insufficient 
and in developing countries where lack of resources constrain the 
institution of such a guarantee. Thus in those States where reference to 
the right to work may be found in their constitutions, it is expressly of a 
long-term and promotional nature. 94 
In contrast to the occasional reference to a "guarantee" by 
individual members, the Conunittee as a whole seems to have taken a 
more reserved attitude towards the right to work. As one member 
noted, "it was clear that the right to work could be implemented only if 
work was available". 95 Accordingly, the Committee has looked towards 
the implementation of policies and measures aimed at ensuring that 
there is "work for all who are available for and seeking work". 96 The 
clearly progressive nature of the obligation indicates that the Conunittee 
views article 6, at least as far as the obligation to secure full. 
employment is concerned, as falling squarely within the terms of article 
2(1). 
B) ELEMENTS OF THE RIGHT TO WORK 
Despite the fact that a guarantee of the right to work is not 
realistic, it would be superficial to view article 6 merely as requiring 
the progressive achievement of full employment. That full employment 
is merely referred to in article 6(2) as one of the steps to achieve the 
full realisation of the right to work suggests that other elements are 
implicit in the right which have yet to be spelt out. A right to work in a 
broader sense seems to encompass two general areas of concern: a right 
to enter employment and a right not to be unjustly deprived of 
employment. 97 As far as the former is concerned, it includes all matters 
that affect access to work such as levels of unemployment, 
non-discrimination and equal opportunities, vocational guidance and 
93 See, Hepple B., "Security of Employment", in Blainpain R. (ed), 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations at 475 (3rd Ed 1987). 
94 Mayer, supra, note 90, at 237-8. 
95 Sparsis, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 7, para-31. 
96 Revised guidelines regarding the form and content of reports to be submitted 
by States parties under article 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), Annex IV, 88 at 90, UN 
Doc. E/1991/23, (1991). 
97 For example, the Constitution of Luxembourg provides in Article 11 for a 
right to work. This has been interpreted as providing for free choice of employment, 
free access to employment and freedom from discrimination. See, UN 
Doc. E/1990/5/Add. 1, at 2, para. 3. 
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training, and education. The latter field on the other hand concerns 
employment security and in particular security against unfair dismissal. 
Further elements of the right to work are specifically stipulated in 
article 6 which provides that the right to work "includes the right of 
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely 
chooses or accepts". The reference to the opportunity to gain one's 
living suggests that a minimum remuneration should be provided that 
satisfies basic needs. This finds more precise recognition in article 7. 
The reference to freely chosen work seems to provide for a "right not 
to work" which implies a prohibition of forced labour, and even 
perhaps legitimises a right to strike. 
In the next section, the three main elements of the right to work 
namely, access to employment, freedom from forced labour, and 
security in employment will each be discussed in turn. 
1) Access to Employment 
a) Full Employ ent 
Although article 6(2) was conceived of as being an 
"implementation clause" in as far as it outlined state obligations as 
opposed to individual rights, 98 there is no doubt that it forms an 
indissoluble element in the achievement of the right to work. This is 
more apparent if it is considered that the "steps" outlined in the 
Covenant form partial definitions of the "rights". 99 Whereas full 
employment might be posited as a precondition to the full realisation of 
the right to work, it must be conceded that an individual's right to work 
is not necessarily conditional upon the existence of full employment. 
It is apparent that the Committee expects there to be some degree 
of unemployment in every State with which it deals. Thus, as far as the 
Committee was concerned, there was considerable scepticism as to 
Czechoslovakia's assertion that unemployment was non-existent, 100 
particularly in view of the existence of a system in Czechoslovakia to 
assist the unemployed. 101 In the context of economics, however, it is 
generally conceded that the notion of "full employment" does not mean 
the total absence of unemployment. Forms of unemployment have 
traditionally been devided into three categories: frictional 
unemployment, cyclical (or demand-deficiency) unemployment and 
98 See above, text accompanying notes 54-64. 
99 See above, Chapter 2 text accompanying notes 61-64. 
100 See e. g., Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 5, para. 21. 
101 See, Simma, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 9, para. 41; Texier, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 10, para. 50. 
210 
structural unemployment-102 Whereas cyclical and structural 
unemployment are matters of serious public concern, 103 frictional 
unemployment represents the number of people between jobs and as 
such is not a reflection of the inadequacy of the labour market, but 
rather of employment mobility. Given that a measure of unemployment (in a general sense) is inevitable, it is surely appropriate for the 
Committee to define what it understands by the term "full employment" 
and the extent to which it considers it to be a realistic objective. 104 
Here the text of the article is instructive. In outlining the steps to 
be taken to achieve the realisation of the right to work, article 6(2) does 
not speak merely of full employment, but rather of "policies and 
techniques to achieve... full and productive employment". The 
achievement of full employment then is not something that the article 
actually requires. Rather, what is required is a policy that directs itself 
towards that end. 
It is clear from the Committee's comments upon article 2(l) that 
an essential precondition to the formulation of precise and effective 
policies is an accurate evaluation of the present situation. 105 Thus 
according to the Committee's guidelines, States are required to produce 
information on the "situation, level and trends of employment, 
unemployment and underemployment". 106 In practice members of the 
Committee have also expected States to offer some form of explanation 
for the current level of unemployment107 and further information on 
the nature of the unemployment (for example the amount of long-term 
unemployment) 108. In addition information is requested as to the level 
of unemployment with respect to specific categories of workers., and it 
102 See e. g., Scott M. and Laslett R., Can We Get Back to Full Employment?, 
10-11 (1978). Other definitions also include seasonal unemployment, see, Worswick 
G., "Summary", in Worswick G. (ed), The Concept and Measurement of Involuntuý 
Unemployment 305 (1976). 
103 "Cyclical unemployment" is generally considered to be a result of deficiency 
of demand for labour; "structural unemployment" is unemployment that results from 
imperfections in the labour market (such as a mismatch between training and labour 
demand). 
104 It was traditionally considered that an unemployment level of abour 3% was 
consonant with full employment. For a discussion of "target rates" of unemployment 
see, Blackaby F., "The Target Rate of Unemployment", in Worswick G. (ed), The 
Concept and Measurement of Involuntgy UnemployMent, 279 (1976). 
105 See above, Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 75-77. 
106 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 96, at 90. 
107 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 6, para. 23; Sviridov, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 5, para. 16. 
108 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 6, at 5, para. 20. 
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has offered as examples "women, young persons, older workers and 
disabled workers". This corresponds to the obligation to identify 
vulnerable or disadvantaged persons, groups, regions or areas with 
regard to employment. 109 Such areas of concern will clearly vary from 
country to country and the State will have considerable discretion in 
identifying them. Nevertheless members of the Committee have 
generally looked for information on the employment situation of each 
of the above groups and occasionally on the situation of particular 
ethnic groups. 110 Any information provided should be placed in the 
context of the situation both five and ten years previously. 111 
Accurate and useful measurement of unemployment, however, is 
subject to serious difficulties. Whereas unemployment may be estimated 
with relative ease in developed States, in developing States, which have 
a smaller percentage of the working population in wage employment (many being self-employed) and have less well-developed social security 
systems, unemployment is considerably more difficult to measure. In 
addition, in developing States, the figures of unemployment are likely to 
disguise serious underemployment (in the sense of employees having 
insufficient work). 112 Although the Committee has begun to tackle the 
question of statistical indicators in general, 1 13 it has not as yet done so 
in the context of full-employment. 
As noted above, on the basis of their evaluation of the situation, 
States are expected to pursue a policy with the aim of ensuring that 
there is work for all who are available for and seeking work. 114 The 
precise nature of such a policy has not been specifically provided for by 
the Committee although reference is made to ILO standards in this area, 
109 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 96, at 90. 
110 The following questions are exemplary: What was Jamaica doing to reduce 
the high unemployment rate, particularly in the case of women? Neneman, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 11, at 5, para. 27. What measures was Canada taking to reduce the 
high level of unemployment especially among women and children? Mratchkov, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 7, para. 36. What were the trends of unemployment among 
young women and ethnic groups? Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 8, para. 43; 
Neneman, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 9 para. 49. 
111 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 96, at 90. 
112 See, Squire C., Employment Policy in DevelpMiLng Countries 58-65 (1981). 
113 See below, Chapter 9. 
114 Such an obligation is sometimes Constitutionally entrenched, e. g. Panama, 
E/1984/i/Add. 19, at 2. 
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particularly the Employment Policy Convention of 1964 (No. 122). 115 
One member has commented that the mere identification of four 
objectives of public policy was not a sufficient indication that an 
employment policy as envisaged by Convention No. 122 had been 
established. Such a policy "seemed to be required if a State wished to 
prove that it was making every possible effort to ensure full 
employment. "' 16 Beyond the question of the sufficiency of the policy 
concerned, members of the Committee have looked for both policies to 
combat unemployment in generall 17 and policies that are directed at 
assisting specific vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. 118 
There is room for the Committee to expand further upon the type 
of policy it expects. It is submitted that States should be expected to 
show that they have a coherent strategy of the short, medium and long- 
term which has as a central aim the achievement of full employment. In 
this respect it is arguable that a government policy that was directed at 
the achievement of economic growth at the expense of maintaining a 
permanent pool of unemployed would be in conflict with that States 
obligations under the Covenant. 119 
Similarly a stricter level of scrutiny should be directed at policies 
that relegate employment goals to long-term strategies. In this respect, 
those States that pursue a pure it monetarist" philosophy where the 
emphasis is upon the adoption of fiscal measures to reduce inflation and 
encourage investment, will be required to show that the short and 
medium-term effects are not unduly detrimental to the employment 
situation. 120 Although the reduction of inflation may be a precondition 
115 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 10, at 13, para. 82; Alston, 
E/C. 12/19 87/SR. 6, at 3, para. 10. The reporting guidelines provide for reference to the 
relevant parts of ILO Convention No. 122 to avoid repetition. Cf. IILO Employment 
Policy Convention (No. 122), 1964,569 U. N. T. S. 65. 
116 Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 3, para. 10. 
117 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 12, para. 57. 
118 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 6, at 5, para. 20. 
119 Compare the position under article 1 (1) of the European Social Charter, see, 
Harris D., The EpLoTean Social Charter at 23 (1984). 
120 The "monetarist philosophy" that underlay UK and USA economic policy 
in the 1980's was essentially a rejection of the Keynsian idea that governments could 
fix the level of unemployment through monetary and fiscal policies. It was asserted that 
such measures would lead to inflation and eventually a rise in unemployment. It was 
advocated instead that governments should concentrate on combatting inflation. If left 
alone, unemployment would settle at a "natural rate" which was determined purely by 
the nature of the labour market. See, Brittan S., Second Thoughts on Full EmDlo=nt 
P 15-22 (1975). 
Although the monetarist philosophy does not prevent measures being taken to 
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for the resumption of steady and stable growth, it should not be 
undertaken without measures to mitigate its adverse effect on 
employment. 121 
The Committee has in general paid considerable attention to the 
enjoyment of rights in the face of structural adjustment. 122 It has been 
argued in this context that those States that are suffering high levels of 
unemployment, whether as a result of structural adjustment or 
otherwise, should demonstrate that certain short-term policies are being 
taken with the specific aim of reducing unemployment and which are 
targeted at alleviating the situation of the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged and avoiding regional imbalance. A general or long-term 
policy in such a case would not be sufficient. 123 In addition, where 
there is a large informal sector, States should adopt, in addition to short- 
term relief strategies, a policy that has as its aim the full integration of 
the informal sector into the formal economic and social life of the 
nation. 
Whilst the text of article 6(2) does not require that full 
employment exist but rather that States pursue policies towards that end, 
the actual rate of unemployment will be significant in the Committee's 
evaluation of whether or not the State is committed to a policy to create 
high and stable levels of employment. There is no evidence yet that the 
Committee has established a "ceiling" above which unemployment 
should not rise except in extreme circumstances, although it is open to 
do so. However, it is clear that the higher the level of unemployment, 
the stricter the scrutiny of State policy undertaken by the Committee 
will be. Members of the Committee have quite rightly expressed 
particular concern over rising levels of unemployment124 and 
disproportionately high levels of unemployment among certain groups 
within a State. 125 Although such situations do not necessarily give rise 
to violations of the Covenant in themselves, it is clear that they are of 
improve training and flexibiltity in the labour market, it does present a considerable 
obstacle to the idea that full employment is a matter that can be achieved through 
government action alone. 
121 Cf. Report of the ELO Director-General, "Human Rights- A Common 
Responsibility" Int. Lab. Conf. 75th Sess. at 35 (1978). 
122 See, General Comment No. 2 (1990), ESCOR, Supp. (No-3), Annex HL at 
88, para. 9, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1990/3 (1990). 
123 Cf Mayerý supra, note 90, at 240; Van den Berg and Guldenmund, ibid, at 
112. 
124 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 6, para. 23; Sviridov, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 5, para. 16. 
125 See e. g., Neneman, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 9 para. 49. 
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serious concern to the Committee when evaluating whether a State was 
in fact pursuing an adequate policy. 
In accordance with article 6(2), the Committee has also expressed 
concern that employment should be productive and that measures should 
be adopted to this end. 126 It would appear to consider that policies 
merely aimed at producing high levels of employment with no apparent 
benefit to society are incompatible with the Convention. 127 That States 
should not undertake unproductive activities merely to boost 
employment is in line with the principle that they should utilise their 
resources efficiently towards the realisation of the rights in the 
Covenant. 128 Thus the view has been put forward within the ILO that 
increased productive employment is a vital factor in the realisation of 
other basic economic and social rights (or as the ILO puts it the 
fulfilment of basic needs). 129 
b) The Opportunity to Gain his Living by Work 
The reference to an opportunity to gain one's living in article 6 
seems to relate most closely to the right to favourable conditions of 
work, and in particular the right to fair wages found in article 7(a)(i). 
Although the Committee does request information in its reporting 
guidelines as to the proportion of the working population who hold 
more than one job in order to secure an adequate standard of living for 
themselves and their family, 130 a more detailed consideration of the 
matter has occurred under the aegis of article 7. 
c) Equal Access to Employment 
The right to work in article 6, read together with the prohibition 
of discrimination in article 2(2), would seem to prohibit discrimination 
as regards access to vocational guidance and training, access to freely 
chosen employment, and security of tenure in employment-131 In fact, 
whilst adopting the ILO definition of discrimination, the Committee has 
addressed itself to the question of discrimination in employment as a 
126 See, Reporting guidelines, supra, note 96, at 90. 
127 Whereas "false employment" of this kind should be discouraged, the 
Committee must take heed of the ILO policy to encourage States to time the undertaking 
of public works in such a way as to reduce industrial fluctuations and unemployment. 
ELO Unemployment Recommendation (No. 1), 1 Off. Bull. 419 (1919-20); ELO Public 
Works (National Planning) Recommendation (No. 51), 22 Off. Bull. 86 (1937). 
128 See above, Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 
- 
129 Valticos N., International Labour Law, 118 (1979). 
130 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 96, at 91. 
131 See generally, above Chapter 4. 
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whole. According to the reporting guidelines, the Committee is 
specifically concerned with "distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or 
preferences, be it in law or in administrative practices or in practical 
relationships, between persons or groups of persons, made on the basis 
of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, nationality or social 
origin, which have the effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise of equality of opportunity or treatment in 
employment or occupation. " 132 
It may be implied from the Committee's guidelines that equality 
of opportunity and treatment should be established for all individuals 
and groups within society. Quite clearly, any restriction that has the 
effect of unreasonably impairing the employment opportunities of 
members of a particular group would be contrary to the provisions of 
the Covenant. Thus a legal provision in Zaire which required women to 
seek the permission of their husbands in order to work outside the home 
was considered by certain members of the Committee to be a violation 
of the Covenant. 133 
It is apparent that a great number of States allow for distinctions 
to be made with regard to access to employment on the grounds of sex, 
national origin, political opinion, religion and sometimes race. 134 
According to the general principles of non-discrimination, although 
many of such distinctions may be considered to be "suspect", 
distinctions being made as to the inherent requirements of a particular job would not amount to discrimination. 135 The Committee accordingly 
requests information as to distinctions, exclusions or preferences based 
on one of the stipulated conditions which are not considered to be 
discrimination in that country "owing to the inherent requirements of a 
particular job". 136 In addition, it has requested information as to 
difficulties, disputes and controversies as to the application of such 
conditions. 137 
Again, the Committee has not been called upon to establish the 
legitimacy of certain job requirements. Its approach at this stage seems 
132 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 96, at 91. 
133 See, Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1988/SR-17, at 2, para. 3. 
134 See, Blainpain R., "Equality of Treatment in Employment" in Hepple 
B-(ed), Int. Encyclopedia of Comparative Law Vol. XV Labour Law, Chap. 10, at 17 (1990). 
135 See above, Chapter 2. Cfalso ILO Convention No. 111, article 1(2). IILO 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (ILO Convention 111), 
1958,362 U. N. T. S. 3 1. Valticos, supra, note 129, at 107. 
136 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 96, at 91. 
1371bid. 
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to be to engender debate at the national level as to the desirability of any 
such conditions. It is submitted that certain considerations should be 
borne in mind. First, such distinctions should be legitimate "only in the 
case of jobs which by their very nature involve a special responsibility 
to contribute to the attainment of the institution's objectives". 138 
Secondly, the legitimacy of such distinctions, especially as regards sex, 
change according to the prevailing social and moral mores of the time. 
In particular, measures of protection for example that restrict the 
employment of women in certain types of work (such as coal mines), 139 
are increasingly considered to be excessively paternalistic. 140 
Thirdly, whereas distinctions as to race might be legitimate for 
certain cultural purposes such as the employment of actors of a certain 
race to enhance realism, it is doubtful whether they should be utilised 
otherwise. As has been stated, "the term 'race' cannot be given a very 
precise scientific definition, the essential point being the way in which 
the persons concerned consider their differences". 141 Given the 
imprecise nature of such a concept and the possibilities for abuse, it 
would be better if any necessary distinctions, such as employment for 
"authenticity" 9 142 be made on the basis of national origin. Finally, 
although it is clear that restrictions will be placed upon foreign 
nationals and those of particular political persuasions on employment in 
certain higher civil service posts, such restrictions should be limited to 
posts that bear some relation to the security of the State, 143 and to the 
extent that those persons can not reasonably be relied upon. 144 
The legitimacy of restrictions on access to employment has arisen 
138 Rossillion C., "ILO Standards and Actions for the Elimination of 
Discrimination and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity in Employment", in 
Blainpain R. (ed), Equality and Prohibition of Discrimination in E=Ioymen at 27 (1985). 
139 See e. g., ILO Night Work (Women) Convention (No. 4) 1919,38 
U. N. T. S. 67. 
140 See, for example the UK denunciation of article 8(4) European Social 
Charter which provides for the regulation of the employment of women at night and the 
employment of women in underground mining. See also, Polson T., "The Rights of 
Working Women: An International Perspective", 14 L. M. L., 729, at 736-741 (1974). 
141 Valticos N., "International Labour Law", in Blainpain R. (ed), International 
E-ncvcloi2aedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, s. 246 (1977). 
142 Cf. The exception provided for in the UK Race Relations Act 1976, 
sect. 1 (1)(b) (ii). See e. g., Hepple B., "Great Britain ", in in Blainpain R. (ed), Eq uality 
and the Prohibition of Discrimination in Emi)lovment, 117 (1985). 
143 Cf. Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 22, at 5, para-18. 
144 Cf. ILO Convention No. 143. Valticos, supra, note 129, at 107-8. 
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particularly in the context of political affiliation. 145 In one case, a 
member of the Committee questioned the operation of the 
"Berufsverbot" laws in the F. R. G. whereby people were excluded from 
public service whose political views did not reflect enough fidelity to 
the "free democratic basic order". Relying upon information from an 
ILO report which indicated that certain people had been excluded from 
access to non-security-related jobs, such as teaching, merely because 
they had criticised the existing economic order in Germany, Professor 
Alston doubted the legitimacy of those restrictions. He concluded that 
"economic and social rights could be effectively recognised only if 
individuals were free to speak out openly". 146 
Members of the Committee have concerned themselves primarily 
with the position of women in the workforce. 147 However it is clear 
that the Committee is also attentive to discrimination on the grounds of 
race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or 
social origin. 148 A particularly pertinent point here is the degree to 
which aliens have a right to equal opportunity in employment. 149 It is 
readily accepted that foreign workers may be required to obtain special 
authorisations (or permits) in order to work. 150 Indeed the ELO has 
generally exercised a certain amount of restraint from prohibiting 
discrimination between nationals and non-nationals. 151 It might be 
argued that the Covenant, in specifically allowing for the differential 
treatment of non-nationals in the case of developing countries (under 
article 2(3)), impliedly excludes the possibility of restrictions being 
imposed upon equality of access to employment in the case of developed 
countries. 
A reservation on this point was entered by the UK on ratification. 
Accordingly it reserved "the right to interpret article 6 as not 
precluding the imposition of restrictions, based on birth or residence 
qualifications, on the taking of employment in any particular region or 
145 See e. g. Konate, E/C. 12/1991/SR-4, at 10, para. 55. 
146 Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 9, para. 45. The matter also arose in the 
context of the European Convention, see, Kosiek v. F. R. G., Eur. Court H. R., Series 
A, Vol. 105, Judgement of 28 Aug. 1986, (1987) 9 EHRR 328. 
147 See e. g., Sviridov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 5, para. 16; Rattray, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 12, para. 66; Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 3, at 1 
para. 5 1. 
148 See above, Chapter 4. 
149 Ibid, text accompanying notes 121-140. 
150 Blainpain, supra, note 134, at 26. An important exception is found in article 
48 EEC Treaty. 
151 Dao (ELO), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 18, at 5, para. 28. 
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territory for the purpose of safeguarding the employment opportunities 
of workers in that region or territory. "152 Similarly France has made a 
declaration to the effect that article 6 is "not to be interpreted as 
derogating from provisions governing the access of aliens to 
employment". 153 
It is open to question whether the French interpretative 
declaration is in fact a "mere interpretative declaration" or rather a 
"qualified interpretative declaration" that might be assimilated to a 
reservation. 154 Arguably, France was in fact relying upon its 
declaration as a condition for its acceptance of the obigations under 
article 6 in which case the declaration would have the force of a 
reservation. This appears to have been the view of the French 
delegation when addressing the subject before the Committee. There, a 
member of the Committee had raised the question of the compatibility 
of a French law that restricted the payment of disability benefits to 
French nationals, with article 2(2) of the Covenant. 155 In reply the 
French delegate referred to the declaration implying that it had 
modified the French obligations under the Covenant. 156 
As the Covenant makes no reference to reservations it is 
presumed that they are legitimate in so far as they conform to the rules 
of customary international law, which can be taken to be those in article 
19 of the Vienna Convention. 157 Neither reservation appears to be 
incompatible with the object or purpose of the Covenant, nor has any 
State objected to them. The effect of the UK and French reservations, 
which may be said to be tacitly approved, are to modify the obligations 
of those States under the Covenant in relation to other States parties. 158 
152 See, UN Doc. STALEG/SER. E/10, at 127 (1992). 
153 Ibid, at 124. 
1-54 Such a distinction was utilised by the European Court of Human Rights mi 
Belilos v. Switzerland, Eur. Court H. R., Series A, Vol. 132, paras 41-49, Judgement of 
20 Apr. 1988. 
155 See, Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 12, at 12, para. 61. 
1565 See, de Gouttes (France), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 13, at 10, para. 42. At a later 
stage France submitted a piece of "additional information" in which it specifically 
utilised the language of article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention in stating that the 
declaration "cannot be seen as contrary to the object and purpose of the Covenant". 
E/1989/5/Add. 1, at 6, para. 25. 
157 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969,1155 U. N. T. S. 331. 
158 Articles 20-21 Vienna Convention, ibid. An interpretative declaration, on 
the other hand, does not purport to modify the obligations under the Covenant but 
rather establishes an understanding of the relevant provision's meaning. Such a 
declaration, with the tacit acceptance of other States parties, might be seen to be an 
219 
They do not imply, however, that the provisions of the Covenant in 
general allow for such an interpretation. 
In so far as the UK and France considered it necessary to rely 
upon reservations to modify their obligations under the Covenant, it 
might be assumed that the Covenant otherwise prohibits discrimination 
against aliens with respect to employment. Given general State practice, 
however, this would be a difficult position to maintain. Members of the 
Committee have paid little attention to the complexities of the issues 
involved. Questions have been asked as to the employment possibilities 
of foreign workers (including refugees159) in the same manner as for 
other groups-160 However, when it comes to deal with the question in 
more detail the Committee might well find it difficult to adopt an 
interpretation that might prejudice the immigration policies of the States 
concerned. 
It is possible that article 4 might be utilised to some effect here. 
According to that article States are required to show that any 
restrictions they impose on the employment opportunities of foreign 
workers are determined by law and are "solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. " Although this 
would not prohibit discrimination as regards aliens wishing to work in 
the country concerned, it would mean that any restrictions imposed 
should be extraordinary and justified on the basis of the general 
welfare. 161 
Whereas article 6 is generally progressive in nature, the 
prohibition of discrimination is an immediate obligation. 162 In theory 
then, a State will be obliged to ensure that whatever Stage of realisation 
of article 6 it has achieved, there should be no vestiges of discrimination 
in that area. It is clear that the State is obliged to take the necessary 
legislative and administrative action (whether through enacting new 
measures or repealing old inconsistent ones) to ensure equality of 
treatment as to employment and the related spheres of education, 
vocational guidance and training. Although article 2(l) specifically 
instrument indicating the general interpretation of article 6 in accordance with article 
31(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention. 
159 See, Taya, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 6, para. 22; Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, 
at 12, para. 56. 
160 See e. g., Taya, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 6, para. 23. 
1161 The European Court of Human Rights has not deferred entirely to State 
immigration policies that might affect the enjoyment of the rights of non-nationals. See, 
Berrehab v. Netherlands, Eur. Court H. R., Series A, Vol. 138, Judgement 21 June 
1988, (1989) 11 EHRR 322. However, it is doubtful whether it would take such a 
position in the delicate area of employment. 
162 See above, Chapter 4, text accompanying notes 176-186. 
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leaves States with a certain amount of discretion as to what measures are 
appropriate, members of the Committee have placed a high priority on 
legislation in the field of discrimination. 163 
In addition, it is clear that the Committee expects States to take 
appropriate action to ensure observance of the principles of non- 
discrimination with respect to employment and vocational guidance 
under private control. 164 Various methods could be employed to 
achieve this end such as making the receipt of funds or licences 
dependent upon the observance of such principles. Committee members 
have also placed some emphasis upon the establishment of appropriate 
agencies to promote the application of the policy and provide for 
appropriate remedies. 165 
A point of some interest is the extent to which States are required 
to control trade union security measures (such as the closed shop), that 
might effectively limit access to employment through a requirement of 
union membership. It is possible to argue that such arrangements 
despite being discriminatory, have a legitimate purpose in ensuring the 
effectiveness of the trade unions concerned. However, although the 
Committee has not made any statement as to the legitimacy of closed- 
shop agreements, the Covenant, like other international instruments, 166 
does not expressly prohibit them. 
In accordance with its approach to non-discrimination 
generally, 167 the Committee has looked towards the achievement of de 
facto equality of opportunity. 168 Thus members of the Committee have 
expressed interest both as to the level and type of employment in 
different social groups. 169 There does appear to be some expectation 
that States take specific measures to develop the employment prospects 
163 See e. g., Sviridov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 4, para. 14. Alston, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 3, para. 8. 
164 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 8, para. 46; Muterahejuru, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 10, para. 46. 
165 For the ELO position, see, Valticos, supra, note 129, at 110. 
166 In the case of the European Social Charter, the text itself is neutral on the 
question of closed-shop agreements. The Committee of Independent Experts, however, 
has found union security agreements to be incompatible with article 5. See, 
Conclusions XI-1, at 78 (1989). 
167 See above, Chapter 4, text accompanying notes 26-41. 
168 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 3, para. 8. 
1669 See, Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 10, para. 46; Texier, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 6, at 5, para. 24. 
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of disadvantaged groups. As with the ELO, 170 it would seem that any 
such differences aimed at promoting equality of opportunity and 
treatment, would not be considered discriminatory. The ILO 
additionally has considered that specific quotas in employment are not 
necessarily discriminatory if their effect is to "secure an equilibrium 
between the different communities and ensure protection of minorities, 
or to compensate for discrimination against the economically less 
advanced population group". 171 Although it might be possible to infer 
from the Committee's general approach that affirmative action 
measures are legitimate, the necessity of taking those measures in the 
context of employment has not been clearly established. 
d) EMployment Services 
In contrast to the European Social Charter (article 1(3)), the 
Covenant does not specifically provide for the establishment and 
maintenance of employment agencies, nor has the Committee made 
mention of such an obligation in its reporting guidelines. Indeed 
individual members have only mentioned the matter infrequently. 172 
However, there is little doubt that the provision of placement services is 
crucial not only to the full exercise of the individual's right to freely 
chosen work of an appropriate nature, but is important as far as the 
effective use of human resources is concerned. That the State stands to 
gain from the maximisation of its human potential suggests that a right 
to employment placement services could be inferred from the obligation 
to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full 
and productive employment. 173 
e) Occupational T 
Article 6(2) provides that the steps taken to achieve the fun 
realisation of the right to work shall include "technical and vocational 
guidance and training programmes". It might be considered that the 
right to technical and vocational training would fall under article 13 
which establishes the right to education. In as far as article 6 provides 
for an individual right to technical and vocational guidance and 
170 See, Article 5, ELO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention (No. 111), 1958,362 U. N. T. S. 3 1. 
171 Valticos, supra, note 129, at 108. 
172 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/19 89/S R. 10, at 8, para. 40; Jimenez B utragueno, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 14, at 11, para. 32. 
173 The standards on the organisation of a public employment service are found 
in the IILO Employment Service Convention (No. 88) 1948,70 U. N. T. S. 85. 
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training, like article 13, it is logically of a progressive character. 174 
The ultimate objective is clearly for every individual to be given the 
opportunity for appropriate guidance and training with regard to their 
personal capacity and relevant employment opportunities. Such a 
service should be free or financially assisted in appropriate cases. 
At this early stage, the Committee has limited itself to requesting 
information as to the mode of operation and practical availability of 
such training programmes. Information is requested specifically as to 
the situation with respect to persons according to their race, colour, sex, 
religion, and national origin. 175 Members of the Committee have also 
been concerned with the financing of such schemes. 176 Although private 
training establishments were to be accommodated, it was felt that there 
should also be a central authority for evaluating the needs of 
industry177 and coordinating the activities of the public and private 
training schemes. 178 
2) Free Choice in Employment 
Article 6 provides that the right to work includes the opportunity 
to gain one's living by work which is freely chosen or accepted. 
Members of the Committee have stressed the need for free choice in 
employment, 179 but little has been said about how it should be ensured 
in practice. The Committee's guidelines merely suggest that there 
should be provisions ensuring freedom of choice. 180 In theory, the 
concept of freely chosen employment seemingly extends to ensuring the 
fullest opportunity for each worker to use his or her skills in a suitable job. 181 However, there is a possible tension between absolute individual 
choice and the limitedoptions that might be open to him or her in the 
174 Although the right to occupational training is to be implemented immediately 
under Article 10 of the European Social Charter, it would probably be too burdensome 
for many developing States. 
175 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 96, at 9 1. 
176 See e. g., Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 3, para. 11. 
177 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 7, para. 31. 
178 See, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 4, para. 9. For the ILO 
position in this area see, General Survey of the Committee of Experts, Human 
Resources Development: Vocational Guidance and Training, Paid Educational Leave, 
ELC 78th Sess, Report III (PtAB), (1991). 
179 See e. g., Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 7, para. 30; Alvarez 
Vita, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 21, at 12, para. 54; Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 6, para-24. 
180 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 96, at 90. 
181 See, Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 2, para. 2. 
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employment market. 182 It is not realistic to suggest, for example, that 
the State has to create work opportunities that correspond entirely to the 
wishes of individuals seeking work. 183 As the Austrian representative 
stressed before the Committee: 
"The right to work, understood as a right to a job or a 
specific job, was not included in the Austrian legal 
order, and it was impossible for the State to guarantee 
a certain job to a certain person in a certain place. 
Employment opportunities clearly depended on the 
economic situation. What could be guaranteed was the 
right to help in finding a new job and in overcoming 
the difficulties associated with unemployment. " 184 
An obligation to ensure freedom of choice can only imply that the 
State should provide appropriate employment training, guidance 
and placement services. These have already been dealt with 
above. 185 
However, as was made clear in the drafting of article 6, the 
reference to freely chosen and accepted employment was also 
considered to entail a prohibition of forced labour. 186 Such a 
conclusion may also be drawn from the term "opportunity" and 
indeed from the idea that a right to work implies simultaneously a 
right not to work. The ELO has dealt extensively with the question 
of forced labour particularly in Convention No. 29 of 1930187 and 
Convention No. 105 of 1957.188 ne latter Convention deals with 
various matters that are of relevance to the application of the right 
to work within the Covenant. It prohibits inter alia the use of 
forced labour as a method of using labour for purposes of 
182 See, Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 22, at 2, para. 2. 
183See, Sieghart P., Ziman J. and Humphrey J., The World of Science and the 
Rule of Law 71 (1986). 
184 Berchtold (Austria), E/C. 12/1988/SR. 4, at 3, para. 13. Similarly, as 
the Director-General of the ELO noted: 
"While this [freedom of choice] does not mean that work must be 
made available in accordance with individual preferences 
irrespective of a need for the services concerned, it implies the 
development of programmes to foster skills for the use of which 
opportunities can reasonably be expected to exist. " 
Report of the ELO Director-General, supra, note 121, at 33. 
185 See above, text accompanying notes 172-178. 
186 See above, text accompanying notes 45-5 1. 
187 ILO Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) 1930,39 U. N. T. S. 55. 
188 ll[, O Forced Labour Convention (No. 105), 1957,320 U-N-T. S 
- 291. 
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economic development and as a means of labour discipline (specifically for having participated in a strike). 
Tbe Committee as a whole has not made any specific 
references to the question of forced labour and does not make it a 
matter for general response in its reporting guidelines. Although 
there might be a general desire not to inpinge upon the work of 
the Human Rights Committee with respect to article 8 ICCPR, 
individual members of the Committee have not been so restrained 
in their approach. In one case in particular., great concern was 
expressed as to the position of Haitian workers in the Dominican 
Republic who seemed to be recruited by force and compelled to 
work for the entire sugar-cane harvest season. 189 
Whilst article 6(2) stipulates that among the steps to be taken 
to realize the right to work, States should create policies and 
techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural 
development, it is clear that the right to choose employment 
prohibits the adoption by States of measures such as the 
compulsory requisitioning of labour to achieve economic growth 
or full employment. 190 It is arguable, nevertheless, that States may 
rely upon the provisions of article 4 to justify compulsory labour 
in cases of emergency where the "general welfare" so demands. 191 
Tbus some States allow a certain amount of compulsion in 
employment in cases of force majeure. 192 However, any such 
exception would clearly have to be "determined by law" and 
proportionate to the emergency faced. 
Whereas the ELO has considered that compulsory 
employment training programmes or "youth schemes" are 
contrary to the prohibition of forced labour193 (with certain 
limited exceptions 194), article 6 does not seem to cover them to the 
same extent. In particular, free choice of employment appears to 
be confmied to cases of remunerative work alone, excluding those 
189 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44, at 12, para. 54. 
190 See, Valticos, supra, note 129, at 98. 
191 'Mis would broadly cover the exception found in article 8(c)(iii) 
ICCPR. 
192 Vallaro (Panama), E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 5, at 2, para. 5. 
193 See, Abolition of Forced Labour- General Survey by the Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 65th Sess. (1979). ILO 11.65/3 (4B), at 41. 
194 Special Youth Schemes Recommendation, 1970 (No. 136), 
para. 7(2)(a) and (b), in ILO, Intemational Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations (1919-1981), at 81 (1982). 
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schemes that provide for little or no remuneration. It might be 
argued that as article 6(2) provides that the pursuit of economic 
development should not infringe upon "fundamental political and 
economic freedoms" of the individual, youth schemes would be 
similarly prohibited. However, freedom from forced labour would 
be described more precisely as a civil right. 
Given the lack of textual clarity, it is open for the 
Committee to interpret free choice in employment as applying to 
all forms of employment whether remunerative or otherwise. In 
doing so, however, the Committee would have to consider how far 
it wishes to extend the scope of the Covenant. For example, this 
would bring in questions such as the legitimacy of forced labour as 
part of penal service. 195 It is submitted that as other institutions 
already deal with such questions, 196 it would be better for the 
Committee to confine itself to issues of work as a remunerative 
activity. 
In considering the report of Zaire, it was noted that the ILO 
Committee of Experts had commented on the requisitioning of 
medical practitioners and graduates and had emphasised the need 
to bring all legislation concerning civic service into conformity 
with the Forced labour Convention (No. 29 1930). 197 Members of 
the Committee relied upon this information to enquire into the 
general situation of forced labour in Zaire. 198 Following an 
assurance by Zaire that such requisitioning had been discontinued, 
the matter went no further. One might infer that the Committee 
will concern itself with issues of civic service199 (and presumably 
military service), but in absence of its own detailed standards, the 
Committee will initially draw upon those of the ILO in its 
195 This question did arise in the case of Panama, but only following the 
comments of the ILO representative, see, Swepston (ILO), E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, 
at 5, para. 21; Ucros (Panama), E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 13, para-61. 
196 See e. g., Article 8(3)(c)(ii) ICCPR. 
197 See, Dao (ILO), E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 9, para. 59. One of the 
exceptions to the prohibition of youth schemes relates to obligations of service 
that have been accepted as a condition of training. Ile Committee of Experts has 
considered that such an exception may operate only where there is full 
compliance with the forced labour conventions. 
198 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 8, para-45. 
199 For the approach of the European Commission on Human Rights in 
this area, see, Nedjati Z., Human Rights Under the European Convention, 73 (1978). 
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interpretation of the Covenant. 200 This was seemingly accepted by 
Zaire in the present case. 
According to the ILO, freely chosen employment would also 
seem to prohibit the use of compulsory labour as a means of 
labour discipline either to ensure the performance of a contract or 
as a punishment for breaches of labour discipline. Unlike the 
question of penal labour, this would appear to fall clearly within 
the realm of the Covenant. The Committee has not adopted any 
coherent policy on such a question and individual comments have 
only centered on the question of the right not to work in 
general. 201 It is submitted that the Committee should ensure that 
workers have the right to terminate contracts of employment (with 
reasonable notice in appropriate cases). In particular care should 
be taken when the law provides for the enforcement of the 
individual labour contract, especially where it is by use of criminal 
law. 202 
A similar concern relates to the right to strike. Although not 
necessarily relating to the right to terminate employment, 
excessive restrictions on the right to strike may well entail some 
form of coercion to work against the worker's better judgement. 203 The Committee has dealt with the question of the 
right to strike in the context of article 8 of the Covenant where it 
is specifically provided for. 204 
Perhaps the area that has concerned members of the 
Committee most is where States provide for a "duty to work". As 
noted above, certain members of the Cornmittee have stressed that 
the right to work implies a right not to work. 205 Accordingly a 
legally enforceable duty to work might well be in contravention of 
article 6 of the Covenant. 206 In many States, a duty to work may 
2W For the Committee's willingness to utilise ELO standards see, 
Konate, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 42, at 5, para. 18. 
201 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 21, at 13, para. 63. 
202 The enforcement of contracts of employment through criminal law 
has been considered to be contrary to the European Social Charter, see, Harris, 
supra, note 119, at 27. 
203 See, General Survey of the Committee of Experts, supra, note 193, 
paras 122-131; Ben-Israel R., International Labour Standards: The Case of 
Freedom to Strike, at 24-25 (1988). 
204 See below, Chapter 6, text accompanying notes 226-274. 
205 See, Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 21, at 13, para. 63. 
2065 See, Neneman, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 4, para. 23. 
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be Constitutionally defined, 207 yet remain merely a moral 
obligation without concomitant legal sanctions. 208 Members of the 
Committee have looked towards the precise legal value of such 
provisions when they are apparent, and have warned against the 
possible abuses to which the obligation to work could give rise. 209 
There is no evidence as yet, that the mere existence of such 
provisions will be considered to be contrary to the provisions of 
the Covenant. 
3) Guarantee Against Arbitrary Dismissal 
In providing for the right to work in article 6 it might 
reasonably be concluded that one element should be the right not 
to be arbitrarily deprived of work. 210 Indeed this would be the 
logical result of an obligation upon the State to respect and protect 
the right to work. Whilst the Committee as a whole has not made 
reference to such a right in the context of the right to work, 
individual members have been strong advocates of freedom from 
arbitrary dismissal. Indeed one member commented that "[w]ithout 
a fundamental guarantee against arbitrary dismissal, the right to 
work would be meaningless. "211 
The most commonly established rules on employment 
security provide that termination of employment should not take 
place unless there is a valid reason connected with the capacity or 
conduct of the worker or based upon the operational requirements 
of the undertaking concerned. 212 Members of the Committee have 
not indicated whether they will adopt this general principle, but 
have merely suggested that dismissals should not be "arbitrary". 
Members thus appear to expect States concerned to establish their 
207 See e. g. Yemen, E/1990/5/Add. 2, at 2, para. 3; Costa Rica (article 7 
of the Constitution), E/1990/5/Add. 3, at 2, para. 6; Panama (article 59 
Constitution of 1972), E/1984/6/Add. 19, at 2. 
208 Cf. General Survey on Forced Labour, supra, note 193, para. 45. 
209 See e. g., Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 13, para. 63; ibid, 
E/C. 12/1991/SR. 4, at 12, para. 66; Neneman, E/C. 12/1991/SR-3, at 8, para. 41. 
210 For the travaux. preparatoires on this point see above, text 
accompanying note 29. 
211 Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 3, para. 12. See also, 
Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 13, para. 63. 
212 Cf ELO Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 
Recommendation,, (No. 119) 1963, in ILO, International Labour Conventions 
And Recommendations (1919-1981), at 138 (1982). See also, Hepple, supra, 
note 93, at 478-480. 
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own rules governing whether or not a dismissal is "justified 119213 
but nevertheless will comment upon the adequacy of such rules. 
For example in considering the report of Trinidad and Tobago it 
was noted that the concept of "retirement in the public interest" 
appeared to involve "a risk of arbitrariness ". 214 
In certain circumstances the dismissal of an employee for 
arbitrary reasons might amount to discrimination. Thus in the case 
of Czechoslovakia, it was noted that a report of the ELO 
Cornmittee of Experts drew attention to fact that workers might be 
dismissed for shortcomings related not only to their professional 
skills, but also to their civic engagement, moral or political 
qualities. 'Me Committee pointed out that protection of workers 
against discrimination on the ground of political opinion should 
also be extended in respect of activities expressing opposition to 
established political principles. One member commented: 
"Even if the aim of the authors of Charter 77 had 
been to change the existing social order, in the 
absence of any indication that they sought to bring 
about that result by violent or unconstitutional means, 
such an aim should not constitute grounds for 
considering them as being beyond the protection 
afforded under article 2(2) of the'Covenant. "215 
It appears that the termination of employment on such grounds 
would amount to a violation of article 2(2) in conjunction with 
article 6. 
In the practice of a number of States, certain procedural 
safeguards are apparent. These may include the communication of 
reasons for dismissal to the employee; consultation with, or 
notification of the fact of dismissal to the relevant trades unions; 
and the provision of advance notice to the employees concerned in 
cases of contracts of indefinite duration. In cases of dismissal for 
serious misconduct, notice may not be required, but should only 
take place after a hearing and then only where the employer 
cannot be expected to take any other course. 216 Certain members 
of the Committee have made reference to these principles in their 
213 See e. g., Nlratchkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 12, para. 62; Mratchkov, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 21, at 10, para. 43. 
214 Marchan Romero, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 17, at 17, para. 89. 
215 Simma, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 9, para. 40. 
216 See, Hepple, supra, note 93, at 493-4; Kennedy T.., Eumean 
Labour Relations at 386 (1980). See also, Valticos, supra, note 129,, at 169. 
229 
questions. 217 In one notable case, a rule that the employer only 
had to give notice of dismissal or make redundancy payments to 
workers with more than ten years service was considered too 
restrictive. 218 However, nowhere has the Committee made 
reference to such principles in toto. 
The Committee's main cause for concern seems to have been 
that there should exist adequate safeguards to enable any worker 
who feels he has been un ustifiably dismissed to appeal, 219 or take i 
a case of judicial review, 220 against that decision to a court or 
some other independent body. Additionally members have stressed 
that the individual should be provided with some form of remedy 
for an invalid termination of contract, 221 which might take the 
fonn of compensation222 or reinstatement. 223 
The concept of workforce reductions may be distinguished 
from disciplinary dismissals in that it generally affects a larger 
number of employees and has more significant social and 
economic consequences for society as a whole. 224 As members of 
the Committee have only occasionally alluded to the specific nature 
of workforce reductions. 225 it is submitted that certain general 
principles may be borne in mind. First, whereas job security may 
be provided for it is not often of a uniform nature. As one 
conunentator noted: 
"Tbere is a hierarchy of ranks in the labour market 
from whole-time secure employment through less 
secure forms of whole-time employment, part-time 
217 See e. g., Did trade unions play any role in protecting workers from 
arbitrary dismissal? Sviridov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 4, para. 16. Did the concept 
of "grievous fault" exist in Czechoslovakia whereby workers could be dismissed 
without notice? Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 10, para. 49. 
218 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 11, at 15, para. 66. 
219 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 5, para. 22; Konate, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 22, at 3, para. 6; Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 4, para. 10; 
Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 12, para. 67. 
220 See, Rattray, E/C. 12/19 87/S R. 5, at 9, para-43. 
221 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 4, para. 12. 
222 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 12, para. 62. 
223 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 34, at 7, para. 47. 
224 See, Hepple, supra, note 93, at 479. 
225 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 5, para. 15; ý&atchkov, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 5, para. 30; Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 
8, para. 52; Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 18, at 5, para. 20. 
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employment, and casual and temporary work to 
continuous unemployment". 226 
Secondly, the lack of collective bargaining power in specific 
sectors of employment often entails that certain groups in society 
such as ethnic minorities, women and migrant workers are 
vulnerable to unemployment. Thirdly, in face of economic 
adjustment it is open for States to encourage the use of alternative 
methods to alleviate the pressure upon undertakings without 
recourse to workforce reductions. Such methods might include the 
reduction of the workforce through "natural wastage" or the 
reduction of working time. 
IV) CONCLUSION 
Although it is commonly assumed that a right to work 
means the right to be given the job of one's choice, it is manifestly 
clear, both from the travaux preparatoires and the approach of the 
Committee that this is neither realistic nor the principal utility of 
article 6. Similarly, the Committee has not been in a position to 
require that States achieve full employment at any particular point 
in their development. The Committee has not, as yet, come to an 
understanding as to the means by which unemployment might be 
monitored or what benchmarks might be utilised for assessing the 
adequacy of State performance. Rather, the Committee's current 
concern has been to ensure that States establish and pursue a policy 
that has as its main objective the achievement of full employment. 
The Committee has indicated, however, that article 6 
includes a number of other elements that derive from ensuring the 
individual the opportunity to work. Particular matters that have 
been identified by Committee members include the right to equal 
access to employment, the right to freedom from arbitrary 
dismissal and the right to freedom from forced labour. While this 
is an important development in itself, it is apparent that the 
Committee has some way to go before it may assume an effective 
monitoring role over article 6. 
T'he role of the Committee as an international supervisory 
body in relation to matters arising within article 6, as with articles 
7,8 and 9, will inevitably be secondary to that of the ILO. It is 
arguable that the Committee may have a minor role in reinforcing 
the supervisory processes of the ILO, but its main utility will be in 
so far as it addresses States that are not party to the relevant ILO 
Conventions, or where the Covenant standards are stricter. As 
such there is a pressing need for members of the Committee to 
226 Hepple, supra, note 93,, at 480. 
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have sufficient understanding and awareness of the relevant ELO 
norms and the degree to which article 6 duplicates or extends the 
protection offered by those ILO provisions. Ibis is also 
appropriate, not merely because of the necessity of maintaining 
institutional co-operation and compatible standards, but also 
because those ILO standards will reflect, to a large degree, the 
cuffent State practice of many of the States parties to the 
Covenant. 
At present, such knowledge is lacking in the Committee. 
Given the inadequate Secretariat servicing and generally poor level 
of participation by the ILO, there is clearly a need for individual 
Committee members to develop their own expertise in the area. As 
an initial measure, the Committee will have to establish the general 
scope of article 6. For example, it will have to decide the extent to 
which article 6 provides for the individual right to benefit from 
the services of employment agencies or the right to vocational 
guidance and training. 
Further, it will have to take a position with respect to those issues 
that are of particular delicacy, such as the legitimacy of 
restrictions on the access to employment for non-nationals (whether through work permits or otherwise), or non-union 
members (where pre-entry closed shop agreements exist). Finally, 
the Committee should endeavour to identify the extent to which the 
standards in article 6 extend the protection offered by existing ILO 
Conventions and for which States. 
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CONDITIONS OF WORK 
Article 7 
"The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment ofjust andfavourable conditions of work 
which ensure, in particular: (a) Remuneration which provides all workers as a minimum with: (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value 
without distinction of any kind, in particular women being 
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by 
men, with equal pay for equal work; (ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant; (b) Safe and healthy working conditions; (c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment 
to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than 
those of seniority and competence; (d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and 
periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public 
holidays. " 
1) INTRODUCTION 
In a broad sense, the right to just and favourable conditions of 
work in article 7 is an essential corollary of the right to work (found in 
article 6). On the one hand, if work is seen to be a necessary evil then 
humanity requires that the conditions under which it is undertaken are 
as tolerable as possible. If, on the other hand, work is seen to be a 
productive activity entered into as a matter of choice, then utility 
demands that the terms of employment are reasonable and attractive. 
Notwithstanding such considerations, some elements of article 7 (particularly the rights to rest and leisure) are of the most controversial 
of all economic, social and cultural rights-1 
Although the text of article 7 defines the right to just and 
favourable conditions of work to a greater extent than article 23 UDHR 
for example, it does so merely by establishing a number of other rights 
each of which requires greater specification. As with article 6 and 
article 8 however, the Committee has the benefit of being able to draw 
upon the great experience of the ILO in defining the precise meaning of 
terms within article 7. 
1 See, Sieghart P., The Lawful Rights of Mankind, 129 (1986). 
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11) THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 
The Commission on Human Rights discussed the provision on 
conditions of work at its 218th to 222nd, and 279th to 281st meetings in 
1951 and 1952.2 The draft article 7 was then finalised following a 
discussion in the Third Committee at its 713th to 719th meetings in 
1956.3 The discussion centred upon the following issues: 
A) ARTICLE 7: STATE OBLIGATIONS 
As with other articles, the discussion centered upon the degree to 
which the State could be said to be responsible for conditions of work. 4 
It was argued that the method of securing conditions of work depended 
upon the organisation of the industrial and economic system in each 
State. In the case of those States that operated a system of collective 
bargaining it would be impossible for the State to assume responsibility 
for matters that were negotiated by the trade unions, 5 especially as 
regards the right to equal pay. 6 Thus a USSR amendment7 to add a 
provision requiring the State to guarantee just and favourable conditions 
of work to all wage eamers, either through law or collective 
agreements, was rejected, albeit narrowly. 8 
Nevertheless it came to be accepted that the State did have some 
responsibility to improve conditions of work in a progressive manner. 9 
'11iis was particularly the case where the State itself acted as an 
employer in which it could play an exemplary role. 10 Opposition was 
maintained, however, to stipulating specific methods of 
implementation. 11 It was considered that although legislation did play a 
UN Docs. E/CN. 4/SR. 218-222 (1951); UN Docs. E/CN. 4/SR. 279-281 
(1952). 
3 UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 713-719 (1956). 
4 UN Doc. A/2929,10 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item 28 (Pt. Il), at 105, para. 10 (1955). 
5 See, Bowie (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 206, at 10 (1951); Roosevelt (USA), 
E/CN-4/SR. 279, at 12 (1952). 
6 See, Sorensen (Denmark), E/CN. 4/SR. 207, at 8 (1951); Boersma (Netherlands), A/C. 3/SR. 713, at 158, para. 12, (1956). 
7 E/CNA[L. 46, para. 4. 
8 It was rejected by nine votes to eight with four abstentions. 
9 See, Thierry (France), A/C. 3/SR. 715, at 173, para. 45 (1956). 
10 See, Rossel (Sweden), E/CN. 4/SR. 207, at 13 (1951); Bengtson (Sweden), 
A/C. 3/SR-713, at 160, para. 31 (1956).. 
11 See, Myrrdin-Evans (ELO), E/CN. 4/SR. 218, at 18 (1951); Pickford (ELO), 
E/CN. 4/SR. 279, at 14 (1952). 
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part in many countries, collective agreements were often more 
irnportant than legislation in the arena of conditions of work. 12 
B) ARTICLE 7(A): MINIMUM REMUNERATION 
There was considerable concern that the term "minimum 
remuneration it was too limitative and therefore unnecessary. 13 It was 
considered that the phrase would be used as a "ceiling" that might act as 
a check on further improvements, 14 and that it was inappropriate in 
relation to the concepts of fairness and equality which were also to be 
found in the article. 15 However agreement was finally reached 
primarily due to the value that the term "minimum remuneration" was 
seen to have for less-developed countries. 16 One member, moreover, in 
recognising the potential usefulness of the term with regard to future 
implementing bodies commented that "it seemed difficult to disregard 
an aspect of the matter that might give rise to a court action". 17 
In the Third Committee a number of States were concerned that 
the term it workers" only included industrial workers and was therefore 
somewhat restrictive. 18 It was argued in response that article 7 was not 
intended to cover the position of the self-employed or employers, 19 and 
that the term had been advocated on the basis that protection was to be 
restricted to wage-earners. 20 After noting that ILO practice was to use 
the term "worker" as a generic one including both industrial and 
commercial employees, 21 the provision was found to be generally 
acceptable upon the condition it was to be seen as including all 
12 See, Sender (ICFrU), F, /CN. 4/SR. 279, at 15 (1952). 
13 See, Manas (Comm. on Status of Women), E/CN. 4/SR. 279, at 6 (1952); 
Santa Cruz (Chile), ibid. at 7 (1952); Mehta (India), ibid. at 9 (1952); Pickford (ILO), 
ibid. at 14 (1952); Payro, (ILO), A/C. 3/SR. 714, at 164, para. 16 (1956); Marriott (Australia), ibid. SR. 716, at 176, para. 11 (1956). 
USee, Sender (ICFIU), E/CN. 4/SR. 279, at 15 (1952). 
15 See, Elliott (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 715, at 170, para. 13 (1956). 
16 See e. g., Ahmed (Paldstan), A/C. 3/SR. 716, at 177, para. 24 (1956). Rivas (Venezuela), ibid, at 178, para. 33 (1956). 
17 Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 279, at 11 (1952). 
18 See e. g., Massoud-Ansari (Iran), A/C. 3/SR. 717, at 182, para. 21 (1956). 
Pazhwak (Afghanistan), ibid, at 183, para. 26 (1956). 
19 See, Cheng (China),, A/C. 3/SR. 715, at 170, para. 23 (1956). 
20 See e. g.,, Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 717, at 183, para. 24 (1956). 
21 See, Payro (ILO), A/C. 3/SR. 717, at 183, para. 27 (1956). 
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categories of workers. 22 Surprisingly enough, the precise meaning of 
the ten'n remained somewhat obscure. On the basis that delegates wished 
to use the term in a wide sense, 23 it is assumed that it includes all those 
who work for a living (excluding those who work merely on a 
voluntary basis). In addition to wage-earners, this would also appear to 
cover the self-employed. 
Q ARTICLE 7(A)(1): FAIR WAGES AND EOUAL 
REMUNERATION 
It was proposed that wages should be fixed both in relation to the 
cost of living and the profits made from the undertakings employing the 
workers. 24 However, it was pointed out that a reference to the profits 
made would pose considerable problems especially in State-owned 
industries. 25 It might also legitimise reductions in wages in enterprises 
running at a loss and result in vastly different wages for simidar work 
across the public utilities. 26 Both proposals were ultimately rejected, 
although the reference to the cost of living was rejected by only a 
narrow margin. 27 
The main discussion centered upon the question of whether a 
specific reference should be made to women in the equal remuneration 
clause. It was argued that such a reference would be "dangerous" in that 
it implied that women were not covered by the original equality 
clauses, 28 that there was some disadvantage to employing women, 29 and 
that the phrase was in any case repetitious. 30 Thus a simple reference to 
it workers" or "everyone" which did not limit the principle to men and 
women was thought preferable. 31 
22 See, Pazhwak (Afghanistan), A/C. 3/SR-718, at 185, para. 4 (1956). 
23 UN Doc. A/3525,11 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item 31, at 6, para-44 (1956). 
24 See, Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), E/CN. 4/SR. 279, at 8 (1952). 
25 See e. g., Mehta (India), E/CN. 4/SR. 279, at 9 (1952). 
26 See, Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 279, at 11 (1952). 
27 It was rejected by six votes to five, with seven abstentions. 
28 See e. g., Bowie (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 6 (1951); Mehta (India), ibid, at 
9 (1951); Bengtson (Sweden), A/C. 3/SR. 713, at 160, para. 31 (1956); Pazhwak (Afghanistan), A/C. 3/SR. 714, at 163, para. 3 (1956); Macchia (Italy), A/C. 3/SR. 715, 
at 169, para. 6 (1956). 
29 See, Bowie (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 224, at 5 (195 1). 
30 See, Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 224, at 12 (1951). 
31 See, Bowie (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 218,, at 14, (1951). Ibid. SR. 222, at 6 (1951); Mossel (Sweden), E/CNA/SR. 279, at 9 (1952). 
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In contrast, it was felt necessary to reiterate the 
non-discrimination provision with regard to women to ensure that States 
actually apply it in practice since it was not yet a reality in many 
countries. 32 It was noted that the principle had been enshrined in the 
Charter of the UN and the UDHR, 33 and that it had been requested both 
by the General Assembly in Resolution 421(V)34 and by the 
Commission on the Status of Women35 that reference be made to the 
equal rights of women. 
It was noted by the UK that in practice it was forced to restrict 
the right to equal pay in order to combat inflation. The UK reasoned 
that if it was instituted, purchasing power would increase, reducing the 
amount of goods available for export and increasing the demands for 
imports. 36 Other States could not agree to such an argument. 37 Indeed, 
at a later stage one State commented that discrimination against women 
would eventually hinder the improvement of the general standard of 
living, through the lowering of the average wage level. 38 What became 
clear however was that States considered such economic arguments 
inconsistent with the nature of the provision. Action to combat inflation 
should not penalise one particular group in society, especially one that 
was already disadvantaged. 
D) ARTICLE WAAD: A DECENT LIVING 
A reference to "a decent living for themselves and their families" 
was adopted unanimously by the Commission at its eighth session. 
However in the Third Committee some States considered that a 
reference to remuneration that provides "a decent living" was redundant 
as being already covered by the notion of fair wages and the right to an 
32 See e. g., Kovalenko (Ukrainian SSR), E/CNA/SR. 280, at 11 (1952); 
Cheng (China), A/C. 3/SR. 715, at 170, para. 23 (1956); Gerlein de Fonnegra. (Colombia), ibid. at 171, para. 27 (1956); Novikova (Byelorussia SSR), ibid. at 172, 
para. 41 (1956). 
33 See, Bernadino (Dominican Republic), A/C. 3/SR. 714, at 164, para. 18 
(1956); Paulus (India), A/C. 3/SR. 714, at 165, para. 31 (1956). 
34 See, Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 224, at 7 and 12 (195 1). 
35 UN Doc. E/CN. 6/197. 
36 See, Hoare (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 280, at 6 (1952). 
37 See e. g., Mehta (India), E/CN. 4/SR. 280, at 8, (1952); Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), ibid. at 12 (1952); Figueroa (Chile), ibid. at 13 (1952). 
38 See, Rivas (Venezuela), A/C. 3/SR. 716, at 175, para. 8 (1956). 
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adequate standard of living. 39 On the other hand many States argued for 
its retention on the basis that remuneration should be such as to provide for the possibility of decent living conditions. 40 Some States considered 
it necessary to make some reference to living standards so as to 
emphasise that the term "remuneration" also covered matters that fell 
outside mere financial remuneration, such as social security benefits and 
cheap housing. 41 On this analysis the article seems to explicitly foresee 
the possibility of States supplementing low wages by State benefits to 
ensure reasonable living standards. However in that case the provision 
relating to "fair wages" seems to be deprived of full effect. 
E) ARTICLE 7(B): SAFE AND HEALTHY WORKING CONDITIONS 
A reference to working conditions "not injurious to health" was 
first proposed by Yugoslavia. 42 It was later taken up by the IOL043 and 
found its way with little discussion into the final text. 
F) ARTICLE 7(C): EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR PROMOTION 
During the Third Committee's discussion of the draft article, 
Guatemala sponsored an amendment to include a reference to equal 
opportunity in promotion. 44 Although certain States objected to such a 
provision on the basis that seniority and competence were not the only 
criteria on which promotion was based, 45 no other suggestions were 
made and the amendment was adopted by a majority decision. 
G) ARTICLE 7(D): REST, LEISURE AND REASONABLE 
LIMITATION OF WORKING HOURS 
Following a USSR amendment46, the general reference to rest 
and leisure was adopted by the Commission despite the contention that 
the phrase "reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic 
39 See e. g., Boersma (Netherlands), A/C. 3/SR. 713, at 158, para. 12, (1956); 
Macchia (Italy), A/C. 3/SR. 715, at 169, para. 6 (1956). 
40 See e. g., Eustathiades (Greece), A/C. 3/SR. 714, at 167, para. 41 (1956). 
41 See, Rivas (Venezuela), A/C. 3/SR. 716, at 173, para. 6 (1956); Marriott (Australia), ibid, at 176, paras 13 and 18 (1956). 
42 UN Doc. E/CNA/AC. 14/Add. 2, at 2. 
43 See, Myrrdin-Evans (ILO), E/CNA/SR. 218, at 18 (1951). 
44 UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 546 and Coml 
45 See e. g., Mufti (Syria), A/C. 3/SR. 715, at 174, para. 54 (1956). 
46 UN Doc. E/CNA/L. 46, para. 3. 
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holidays with pay" was considered to be more specific, 47 and indeed 
implied the notions of rest and leisure. 48 
Although a reference to limitation of working hours was 
generally acceptable, 49 some felt that the term "reasonable" was too 
ambiguous, vague and subjective. 50 It was proposed alternatively that 
working hours should be subject to "legal limitation". 51 Certain States 
responded that legal interference in this area would be opposed by 
national trade unionS52 and that it would leave too great a discretion to 
the State concerned. 53 Additionally it was noted that legal limitations 
would be particularly difficult to enforce with regard to agricultural 
workers, small farmers working their own land and small ships. In such 
cases the best method was collective bargaining. 54 
In the Third Committee Spain proposed that a reference be made 
to remuneration for public holidays. 55 It was argued however that this 
would give this aspect undue prominence at the expense of other equally 
important aspects such as vocational rehabilitation, individual or 
collective labour contracts and labour disputes; 56 that it was already 
covered by the term periodic holidays with pay; 57 and that it would 
Emit the right of trade unions to negotiate conditions of work. 58 On the 
other hand a number of States supported the amendment on the basis 
that public holidays were not covered by the term "periodic holidays". 59 
The phrase seems to have been adopted on this basis. 
47See, Bowie (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 218, at 14, (195 1). 
48 See, Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 279, at 12 (1952). 
49 It was considered that it was inappropriate for any precise figure to be given 
as a limit on the worldng week which was rather a matter for the implementing body to 
establish. Myrrdin-Evans (ILO), E/CNA/SR. 218, at 18 (195 1); ibid, at 20 (195 1). 
50 See e. g., Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 713, at 159, para. 19 (1956). 
51 See, Valensuela (Chile), E/CNA/SR. 218, at 16 (1951). 
52 See e. g., Sorensen (Denmark), E/CNA/SR. 218, at 16 (1951). 
53 See, Myrrdin-Evans (ILO), E/CN. 4/SR. 218, at 18 (1951); Simarsian 
(USA),, ibid, at 19 (1951). 
54 See, Sorensen (Denmark), E/CN. 4/SR. 218, at 21 (1951). 
55 UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 538 (1950). 
56 See, Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 713, at 159, para. 16 (1956). 
57 See, Abdel-Ghani (Egypt), A/C. 3/SR. 713, at 160, para. 27 (1956); Vlahov (Yugoslavia), A/C. 3/SR. 714, at 166, para. 33 (1956). 
58 See, Macchia (Italy), A/C. 3/SR. 715, at 169, para. 9 (1956). 
59 See, Mufti (Syria), A/C. 3/SR. 715, at 174, para. 54 (1956). 
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Despite a proposal that the article should refer to "annual" as 
opposed to "periodic" holidays, 60 the latter term was finally adopted on 
the understanding that it meant that workers should be given consecutive 
holidays of not less than two weeks' duration at least once a year. 61 
IID THE APPROACH OF THE COMMITTEE 
A) ARTICLE 7(A): MINIMUM REMUNERATION62 
According to article 7(a) every worker has the right to a 
minimum level of remuneration which provides them with "fair 
wages"63 and enough to ensure them (and their families) a decent 
living. 64 Although the term "fair wages" might appear to be 
synonymous with the idea that remuneration should as a minimum 
provide workers and their families with a decent living, the travaux 
preparatoires show an intention to distinguish between the two. 65 Each 
concept will be considered in turn. 
1) Fair Wages 
That wages should be "fair" suggests that they should be 
tv equitable" or "just". This goes considerably further than merely saying 
that wages should provide for the basic needs of all workers. The fact 
that the term "fair wages" is included in a section that also specifies the 
right to 11equal remuneration for work of equal value" lends weight to 
the idea that fairness requires wage rates to be set in accordance with 
the real social value of the employment. This is particularly relevent to 
the position of women in the workforce, whose value has often been 
underrated. 66 However, ) an assessment of wages merely in terms of the 
productive output of a particular form of employment would not 
necessarily be "fair". Certain forms of employment may not be 
60 Payro (ELO), A/C. 3/SR. 714, at 164, para. 15 (1956). 
61 Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR. 716, at 177, para. 29 (1956). 
62 Cf. UDHR, article 23(2) and (3); European Social Charter, article 4; ILO 
Mnimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention (No. 26), 1928,29 U. N. T. S. 3; ILO 
Mnimum Wage-Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) Convention (No. 99), 1951,172 
U. N. T. S. 159; and ELO Minimum Wage-Fixing Convention (No. 131), 1970,825 
U. N. T. S. 77. 
63 Article 7(a)(i). 
64 Article 7(a)(ii). 
65 See above, text accompanying notes 39-41. 
666 For the question of pay differentials between men and women see below, 
text accompanying notes 87-109. 
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intrinsically more "valuable" than others yet are undertaken at higher 
cost to the worker. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the term "fair wages" implies 
that the basic level of pay for each particular occupation should reflect 
the nature and circumstances of the work undertaken. Certain objective 
criteria such as the level of skill, the amount of responsibility, the 
amount of disruption to family life, the value of the productive output 
to the economy and the health and safety risks involved should be taken 
into account in determining whether the wages of a particular 
occupation could be said to be "fair". Certainly this would mean that 
wages rates should reflect, to a large extent, the value of the 
employment undertaken, but it would also mean that workers employed 
in dangerous occupations or who work unsociable hours, should be 
afforded sufficient remuneration to act as a recompense for the 
disruption to their family life or health. 
Unfortunately, the Committee has given no indication that it 
views the term "fair wages" in this light. The reporting guidelines 
merely make reference to minimum wages and equal remuneration. 
Indeed it is rare for Committee members to refer specifically to the 
right to "fair wages" at all. It is submitted that there is little 
justification, either on the basis of the travaux preparatoires or the text 
of article 7(a) itself, to view the term merely as a repetition of the 
concept of "minimum remuneration" for the purpose of providing a 
"decent living". "Fairness" requires reference to a range of socially 
relevant considerations over and above the economic value of the work 
undertaken, in the determination of the level of wages in a particular 
occupation. 
2) Minimum Wag s 
Whereas ILO instruments provide for minimum "wages", the 
Covenant refers to minimum "remuneration". It is clear from the 
travaux preparatoires that "remuneration" was considered to be a wider 
concept than "wages". 67 It is assumed that the drafters had in mind the 
distinctions operated by the ILO. According to ILO practice, wages are 
defined as sums to be paid under a contract of employment for work 
done or services rendered. The term "remuneration" includes, in 
addition, emoluments such as bonuses or benefits (in cash or kind) paid 
by the employer to the worker arising out of the worker's 
employment. 68 
67 See above, text accompanying note 41. 
68 See, General Survey of the Committee of Experts, Minimum Wages, I. L. C., 
79th Sess., Report IH (PtAB), 7-13 (1992). 
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In theory this distinction means that in calculating whether or not 
a worker has sufficient means to enjoy a decent life, consideration will be given to additional benefits or bonuses that might arise from his or her employment. There is no indication that the Committee is aware of 
such a distinction. Instead, the Committee has focussed its attention 
primarily upon the level of wages and particularly upon the 
establishment and maintenance of a system of minimum wages. 69 That the Committee considers the establishment of such a system 
as a priority in the realisation of article 7(a) is suggested by the detailed 
information that is requested in its reporting guidelines. 70 The 
guidelines indicate that the Committee expects the establishment of a 
system which conforms, in large part, to the ILO Minimum Wage- 
Fixing Convention of 1970 (No. 131)71 to which reference is made. It 
seems to be expected that a system,, as extensive as possible, be 
established which must be enforceable either in law or by means of 
some other sanction. Machinery should be set up to fix, monitor and 
adjust the level of the minimum wage, which should take into account 
the needs of the workers, their families and any relevant economic 
circumstances uch as the cost of living. Finally, the system as a whole 
should be subject to supervision and presumably enforcement where 
necessary. 72 
Individual members of the Committee have frequently looked to 
the establishment of a minimum wage to ensure the realisation of the 
right to just and favourable conditions of work. 73 In absence of a 
system of minimum wages, they have looked to the existence of other 
measures that would ensure that workers received "equitable 
remuneration geared to the cost-of-living index in order to enable them 
to lead a decent life". 74 It is apparent that the vast majority of States 
have established some form of minimum-wage legislation, and of those 
that have not, a number have established systems of wage protection 
69 For a discussion of the econon-dc effects of a minimum wage see, Craig C., 
Rubery J., Tarling R. and Wilkinson F., Labour Market Structure. Industrial 
Organisation and Low Pay, 96-141 (1982). 
70 Reporting Guidelines, ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), Annex IV, at 92, UN 
Doc. E/C. 12/1990/8, (199 1). 
71 Supra, note 62. 
72 Ibid, at 92. 
73 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 6, para. 24; Sparsis, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 7, para. 32. 
74 Fofana, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 6, para. 23. 
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through collective agreements. 75 Recognition is paid to the fact that 
wages are, and should be, determined through a collective bargaining 
process to some degree, 76 but it has been noted that "the minimum wage 
was mainly applicable in sectors where trade unions did not exist or 
were very weak". 77 There is no doubt thus, in the eyes of a number of 
members of the Committee, equitable remuneration is to be secured 
primarily through the institution of a compulsory minimum wage. 78 
This would appear to indicate that although article 7 speaks of 
"workers" in a general sense, it is not deemed to apply to the self- 
employed or employers. The Committee, however, has made no 
comment upon this question. 
As regards the operation of the system of minimum wages, 
members of the Committee have been concerned that there should be 
sufficient worker participation in the determination of standards. 79 
Although the natural choice would be to suggest the participation of 
trade unions in such a scheme, it has been pointed out that as trade 
unions were not prevalent in vulnerable sectors, an independent body 
should be set up to advise the government. 80 
Týhe final and perhaps most important issue is that the minimum 
wage should have sufficient enforcement. Clearly in those cases where 
the State itself is the employer, it should be easily enforced. However, in 
a number of developing countries it is apparent that enforcement 
remains a considerable problem. 81 It is submitted that the Committee 
should direct a certain amount of its attention to the question of whether 
there are adequate inspection services and sufficient sanctions for breach 
of the minimum wage standards. The approach of the Committee with 
respect to the establishment of a labour inspectorate will be dealt with 
below. 
75 Report of the Director-General of the ILO, Human Rights: A Common 
Responsibility, IILC 75th Sess., at 43 (1988). 
76 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 6, para. 18; Rattray, 
E/C. 12/1991/SR. 4, at 12, para. 62. 
77 Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 4, at 6, para. 32. 
78 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 10, at 12, para-79; Rattray, 
E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 9, para. 43. 
79 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 6, para. 18. 
80 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 4, at 6, para. 32. See also, General Survey, 
supra, note 68, at 65-99. 
81 See, Report of the Director-General, supra, note 74, at 43-44. Goldman A., 
"Settlement of Disputes over Interests", in Blainpain R-(ed), Cgml2arative Labour Law 
And Industrial Relations, 361 at 368 (3rd. Ed. 1987). 
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According to article 7(a)(ii), the level of remuneration should be 
such as to provide for a "decent living" for the worker and his or her family. The text indicates that the term "decent living" is to be read in 
light of the other provisions in the Covenant. Particular reference could be made to article 11 which refers to "an adequate standard of living 
More specifically however, the phrase a "decent living" appears to refer 
to those rights that depend for their enjoyment upon personal income 
such as the rights to housing, food, clothing, and perhaps health, 
education and culture. 
Members of the Committee have stressed that the minimum legal 
wage should at least meet the "basic needs" of workers and their 
families. 82 It appears to be expected that States establish their own 
standards and goals in this regard. As far as the ILO is concerned, the 
level of minimum wages should take into account not only the needs of 
the workers and their families (in which reference would be made to 
matters such as the general level of wages, the cost of living, social 
security benefits), but also economic factors such as the requirement of 
economic development, levels of productivity and the desirability of 
maintaining high levels of employment. 83 Although the Committee does 
refer rather generally to "economic factors" that might be taken into 
consideration, 84 its position in this regard is not clear. In particular, no 
indication is given as to whether economic considerations could justify 
setting the level of minimum wages below that which would provide for 
basic needs. 
As the general approach of the Committee has been to look 
towards a process of "equalisation" as regards the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights, 85 there is a possibility that it will 
look towards the adoption of a test similar to that operated under the 
European Social Charter. 71bere, the Committee of Independent Experts 
has established a "decency threshold" in which the lowest permissible 
wage in any sector of the economy is quantified as being 68% of the 
national average. 86 Although such a test is relatively easy to utilise it is 
essentially directed at equality of income distribution rather than the 
adequacy of income per se. The level of income advanced by the test, 
which is essentially a national standard, may well be insufficient to 
provide for basic needs in poorer countries and excessive in more 
82 See e. g., Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 34, at 6, para. 40. 
83 See, General Survey, supra, note 68, at 101-109. Valticos N., International 
Labour Law, at 130 (1979). 
84 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 69, at 92. 
85 See above, Chapter 4, text accompanying notes 25-26. 
86 See, Harxis D.,, The EuMpean Social Charter. ) 49-51 (1984). 
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wealthy countries. It may nevertheless be useful as a basic indicator 
when used in conjunction with other criteria. 
It has to be noted that the utilisation of minimum wage-fixing 
machinery is only a partial procedural means by which workers and 
their families might be ensured reasonable remuneration from 
employment. Although it might be open for the worker in the public 
sector to rely upon article 7(a)(ii) in a claim against the State as regards 
the inadequacy of his or her pay, the State cannot be seen to have the 
same responsibility for wages in the private sector. Thus for the 
impoverished worker employed in the private sector, the principle 
claim against the State will be that the wage-fixing machinery has 
insufficient coverage. Moreover, in so far as coverage is generally 
determined on the basis of sectors of the workforce, the claim win have 
to be conditioned by the individual's membership of a particular 
11vulnerable group". 
3) Equal Remuneration 
Article 7(a)(i) specifies as a general principle that all workers 
should be provided with "equal remuneration for work of equal value". 
More specifically, however, it provides that women should be 
guaranteed "equal pay for equal work". The concept of "equal pay for 
equal work" is the more restrictive of the two concepts in that it 
confmies the comparison to workers with the same job description in the 
same establishment. The concept of equal remuneration for work of 
equal value, however, like the "comparable worth" doctrine in the 
United States, 87 requires comparisons to be made between a wider 
range of jobs across the spectrum of the employment market. 88 
The rationale for extending the equal pay guarantee to work of 
equal value is that groups in society (particularly women) are 
vulnerable to low wage levels not merely because of direct 
discrimination as regards the pay they receive in the same job. The 
problem is rather that the employment market is often segregated, with 
women undertaking forms of employment that are less well protected 
by trade unions and traditionally undervalued by society. 89 To some 
extent this problem may be ameliorated by action to increase access to 
87 See, Benson M., "Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value", 15 Isr. Yrbk H. R., 
66 at 67-70 (1985). 
88 Cf. Valticos, supra, note 82, at 176. 
89 See, Rubenstein M., Egual Pay, (1984); Horrel S., Rubey I and 
Burchell B., "Unequal Jobs or Unequal Pay? ", 20 Ind. R. L. J., No. 3,176 (1989). 
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employment for women90 and by the protection of wages in vulnerable 
sectors of the labour market. However, even with the existence of a 
trully integrated and open employment market, there would still remain 
a need to ensure pay reflected the proper value of the work undertaken. 
It would appear that the concept of "equal pay for equal work" in 
the Covenant is narrower than that provided for in the IOLO Equal 
Remuneration Convention of 195191 or in the European Social 
Charter, 92 both of which refer to "equal pay for work of equal 
value". 93 However, the text of article 7(a)(i) makes clear that the term 
it equal pay for equal work" is merely one element of the more general 
concept of "equal remuneration for work of equal value". It has been 
concluded that "the wording of the provision mandates the application 
of the theory of comparable worth". 94 
The requirement of equal remuneration in the Covenant is 
broader than that found in other instruments in two respects. First, 
whereas ILO Convention No. 10095 and article 119 of the Treaty of 
Rome96 provide for equal pay specifically for men and women, article 
7(a)(i) applies to "all workers... without distinction of any kind". 
Secondly, the Covenant uses the term "remuneration" which is arguably 
broader than the term "pay". 97 Wide though its coverage may be, the 
Covenant gives no further instruction as to how the concept be reahsed. 
Although it is evident that the "work of equal value" concept is 
wider than, and includes, the concept of equal pay for equal work, the 
90 Cf. Para. 6, ILO Equal Remuneration Recommendation (No. 90), 195 1, ILO, 
Intemational Labour Conventions and Reconunendations (1919-1981), at 44 (1982). 
91 IOLO Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), 1951,165 U. N. T. S. 303. 
92 See, Harris, supra, note 85, at 53. 
93 In the practice of the European Communities, however, the concept of equal 
pay for equal work has been interpreted to include work "to which equal value is 
attributed". Council Directive 75/117,18 O. J. Eur. Comm. (L. 45), 19 (1975). See 
generally, Szyzczak E-, "Pay Inequalities and Equal Value Claims", 48 M. L. R. 139, 
at 140 (1985); Argiros G., "Sex Equality in the Labour Market and the Community 
Legal Order: An Attempt at an Appraisal", 11 Liv. L. R., No. 2,161, at 171-174 (1989). 
94 Benson, supra, note 86, at 71 (1985). 
95 Provisions on equal remuneration and on the decrease of differentials 
between rates of remuneration resulting from discrimination are also contained in the 
ILO Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention (No. 117), 1962,494 
U. N. T. S. 249. 
96 EEC Treaty (1957), 298 U. N. T. S. 11. 
97 For the difference between "remuneration" and "wages", see above, text 
accompanying notes 67-68. It is notable, however, that the European Court of Justice 
has interpreted "pay" in a broad manner. See, Argiros, supra, note 93, at 169-17 1. 
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Committee has tended to deal with the matters separately. 98 The reason 
for this is indicated by the text of article 7(a)(i) itself. Whereas States 
are required to it recongnise" the right to equal remuneration for work 
of equal value (thus implying progressive achievement), 99 they must 
"guarantee" the right of women to equal pay for equal work. Use of the 
term "guarantee" implies that full enjoyment of the right should be 
ensured immediately. Thus the Committee's reporting guidelines request 
information as to "infringements" of the principle of equal pay for 
equal work-100 
Whereas it might be assumed that the reference in article 7(a)(i) 
to "equal pay for equal work" applies only to women, the Committee 
has requested more general information as to infringements of the 
principle with respect to any person or group of persons. 101 A wider 
operation of the principle of equal pay for equal work may be justified 
by the fact that it is merely a specific element of the equal value concept 
which is to operate "without distinction of any kind". It has to be noted, 
however, that although a general legislative provision requiring equal 
pay might be sufficient in overt cases, if the Committee considers that 
"indirect" or "implicit" discrimination is to be prohibited, then the State 
will have to establish which groups are to be protected. 
The Committee gives no indication as to how the right to equal 
pay for equal work is to be guaranteed. Although it is clear that the 
State may guarantee equal pay where remuneration is subject to 
statutory control (such as in public undertakings), to effectively 
guarantee the right to equal pay in other areas States win have to 
provide for individual remedies. 102 The form such remedies may take 
would depend upon the structure and form of the existing wage-fixing 
mechanisms within the State concerned. It is submitted that it is 
indispensable for the Committee to enquire as to the existence of 
98 See e. g., Reporting guidelines, supra, note 69, at 92-93. 
99 See above, Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 189. 
100 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 69, at 92. There is some evidence that 
States themselves recognise that the principle of equal pay for equal work should be 
implemented immediately. Both Barbados and the UK have made reservations to the 
effect that they postpone the application of the principle of article 7(a)(i) in so far as it 
concerns the provision of equal pay to men and women for equal work, thus implying 
that article 7(a)(i) does indeed require States to immediately guarantee the principle of 
equal pay for equal work. UN Doc. E/C. 12/1988/1, at 7 and 18 (1987). 
101 Ibid. 
102 An example might be the UK Equal Pay Act 1970. See e. g., Palmer C. and 
Poulton K., Sex and Race Discrimination in Emplo_ ent, 91-125 (1987); Honeyball 
S., Sex. Employment and the Law 17-52 (1991). 
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mechanisms through which the right to equal pay for equal work may 
be effectively enforced. 
As regards the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal 
value, the Committee expects States to "promote an objective appraisal 
of jobs on the basis of the work to be performed". 103 Such an appraisal 
should take into account differences in income distribution not only 
within enterprises or sectors of the employment market, but also 
between "comparable jobs in the public and private sector". 104 It is 
interesting to note that the Committee has rather cautiously used the 
term "promote". Clearly the establishment of such a scheme across all 
forms of employment in all areas, would represent a monumental task, 
and would in any case present problems where the government does not 
traditionally interfere directly in the determination of wages in the 
private sector. 105 Although the Committee has occasionally implied that 
article 7(a)(i) as a whole is capable of immediate implementation, 106 the 
guidelines clearly suggest that any obligation to create a job evaluation 
scheme is merely progressive. 107 
Although the appraisal of job value should be "objective", the 
Committee has not itself established any criteria which should be taken 
into account. It is clear from the text of article 7(a) that the social utility 
of a particular job is not a sufficient criterion alone. As a minimum, the 
level of pay should be such as to provide all workers and their families 
with a decent living. 108 Moreover, that wages should be "fair" suggests 
that other considerations of justice should be taken into account. 109 It is 
submitted that to the extent to which it expects States to establish job 
evaluation schemes, the Committee should attempt to outline the general 
considerations that should be taken into account. 
103 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 69, at 93. 
104 Ibid. For the position of the ILO see, ILO General Survey, Equal 
Remuneration. 11LC, 72nd Sess., Report III (Part 4B), para. 22 (1986). 
105 Valticos, supra, note 82, at 177. The Committee of Independent Experts of 
the European Social Charter has experienced certain problems in this regard, see, 
Harris, supra, note 85, at 54-56. 
106 See above, Chapter 4, text accompanying notes 176-186. 
107 Cf also, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 10, at 12, para. 78. 
108 See above, text accompanying notes 67-86. For a discussion of the possible 
conflict between needs and equal pay see, Kdllstr6m K., "Article 23", in Eide A. et al (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A CoMMentga, 357, at 364 (1992). 
109 See above,, text accompanying note 66. 
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B) EOUALITY IN CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
Article 7(a)(i), in addition to providing for equal remuneration, 
establishes that women should be guaranteed "conditions of work not 
inferior to those enjoyed by men". It would seem nevertheless, from the 
existence of article 2(2) which prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment 
of the rights, that such a reference is unnecessary. Indeed the Committee 
has not viewed the provision as either adding to or subtracting from the 
general non-discrimination clause in any way. Whereas the concept of 
non-discrimination has been dealt with in more detail elsewhere, 110 it is 
pertinent to note that members of the Committee have been concerned 
primarily with the employment conditions of womenl 11 and migrant 
workers 112 (whether legally or illegally employed). 113 
Q SAFE AND HEALTHY WORKING CONDITIONS, 
Article 7(b) provides that everyone has a right to safe and healthy 
working conditions. This provision has significant overlap with article 
12 which provides for the right to health. Article 12(2) in particular 
provides in sub-section (b) for the improvement of all aspects of 
environmental and industrial hygiene, and in sub-paragraph (c) for the 
prevention,, treatment and control inter alia of occupational diseases. 
The Committee in its reporting guidelines requests information as 
to the legal or administrative provisions that prescribe minimum 
conditions of occupational health and safety. 114 There is no indication 
that the Committee expects States to have formulated a "coherent 
national policy" in line with article 4 of the ELO Occupational Safety 
and Health Convention 1981,115 although that Convention is 
mentioned. 116 
'Me Committee conceives of the right to safe and healthy working 
conditions as being open to progressive achievement to some extent. It 
asks specifically for information as to the categories of workers which 
are excluded either in whole or in part from the existing schemes, and 
110 See above, Chapter 4. 
111 See e. g., Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1987/SR-7, at 6, para. 25. 
112 See, Simma, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 3, para. 8; Jimenez Butragueno, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 4, para. 9; Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 6, at 5, para. 22; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 34, at 4, para. 22. 
113 See, Wimer Zambrano, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 7, para. 28; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 10, para. 44. 
114 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 69, at 93. 
8773.115 
ELO Occupational Safety and Health Convention (No. 155), 1981 Cmnd 
116 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 69, at 92. 
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looks for the progressive reduction in occupational accidents over 
time. 117 In so far as article 7(b) relates to article 2(l), it can be assumed 
that the Committee will look towards the establishment of policies 
directed towards the prevention of accidents and mijury to health. 
However, whilst the elimination of all accidents is clearly not 
possible, an obligation for States to establish national policies embodied 
in legislation that prescribe standards which apply to all employed 
workers 118 could be implemented immediately. The standards 
themselves certainly may be improved over time, as indeed they should 
be, but the establishment of a coherent national policy should be a 
minimum requirement for all States. The financial burden upon the 
State, and indeed on the undertaking concerned, in enforcing such 
standards is far outweighed by the human and economic costs of not 
doing so. 119 As has been noted by the ILO, "there is wide agreement 
that flexibility should have no place in standards aimed at ensuring 
safety and health at work". 120 
Members of the Committee have recognised the central role of 
legislation and regulations in this area. 121 Like the requirement in 
article 4 ILO Convention No. 155, members have asked about the extent 
of participation of workers in the establishment of such regulations, 122 
and as to whether the areas of risk have been evaluated and preventive 
measures designed-123 The Committee should also take note of the fact 
that the constant introduction of new technologies, substances and 
working methods means that the situation has to be constantly under 
supervision. 124 
Once States have established appropriate legislation and 
regulations as to safety and health at work, the most crucial aspect is the 
degree to which they are enforced. More often than not a labour 
inspectorate is mandated with the supervision of legislation regarding 
117 Ibid, at 93. 
118 The term "employed workers" could be considered to include those self 
employed who operate as independent contractors. See, Szubert W., "Some Considerations on Safety and Health at Work in Comparative Law", in Gamillscheg F. 
et al, In Memoriam: Sir Otto Khan-Freund, 701, at 713 (1980). 
119 Report of the Director-General of the IILO, Making Work More Human: 
lWorking Conditions and the Environment, IILC 60th Sess., at 23 (1974). 
120 Report of the Director-General, supra, note 74, at 47. 
121 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 6, para-25. 
122 See e. g., Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 5, para. 19. 
123 See e. g., Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 2, para. 4. 
124 Report of the Director-General, supra, note 74, at 47. 
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conditions of work and particularly safety standards. Although the 
Committee makes reference to the ILO Labour Inspection Convention 
of 1947 (No. 8 1) and the Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention of 
1969 (No. 129) in its reporting guidelines, 125 no further mention is 
made as to an obligation to establish labour inspectorates, or of their 
appropriate number, size or power once created. Given that 
inspectorates are often poorly organised, overworked and limited in 
their powers, 126 this is an area which perhaps deserves more 
consideration. 
Individual members of the Committee have, however, taken a 
certain amount of interest in the establishment and functioning of labour 
inspectorates, not only in the field of safety and health at work, but also 
with respect to general conditions of work. 127 Thus questions have been 
asked as to the organisation, size and range of functions of the labour 
inspectorate concerned, 128 the number of cases taken up by the 
inspectorate129 and the sanctions imposed for breach of the 
regulations. 130 
Given that there is a need for enforcement over a whole range of 
issues within article 7, it might be appropriate if the Committee were to 
suggest hat labour inspectorates be established to enforce the various 
regulations and assist or advise employers. Consideration could be given 
to the requirements laid down in 11LO Convention No. 81 where 
inspectorates must be independent and subject to central control. The 
inspectors themselves should have adequate training, facilities and 
powers, and be sufficient in number to undertake their work. 131 
Although it is beyond the powers of the Committee to lay down 
specific health and safety requirements that should be established in 
particular forms of employment, it clearly has a role to play in ensuring 
that adequate mechanisms exist to ensure the continued adjustment, 
improvement, and enforcement of standards relating to the working 
environment. 
125 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 69, at 93. 
126 Szubert, supra, note 118, at 708. 
127 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 10, para. 48. 
128 See e. g., Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 5, para. 30; Mratchkov, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 13, para. 63; Mratchkov, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 7, at 11, para-46. 
129 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 6, at 5, para. 19. 
130 Ibid, para. 21; Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 6, para. 25. 
131 See, Valticos, supra, note 82, at 214-219. 
251 
D) EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR PROMOTION 
Article 7(c) provides that everyone has the right to equal 
opportunity to be promoted "subject to no considerations other than 
those of seniority or competence". Whilst being linked with the right to 
work in article 6 and the right of women to equal conditions of work in 
article 7(a)(i), the right to equal opportunity in promotion is perhaps 
most closely related to article 2(2) which guarantees the exercise of the 
rights within the Covenant without discrimination. 
As has been noted elsewhere, the Committee has interpreted the 
general non-discrimination clause as requiring some form of de facto 
equality-132 Accordingly the Committee's reporting guidelines require 
the provision of information as to groups which do not currently enjoy 
equal opportunity in promotion. Specific steps are required to combat 
that situation and promote the opportunities for advancement of the 
disadvantaged sectors in society. 133 It is evident that the degree to which 
States succeed in this task will be assessed by how many persons within 
the disadvantaged groups enter into more responsible positions within 
society. 134 
The approach of individual members of the Committee suggests 
that the State has an obligation to establish objective norms to govern 
promotion possibilities in the public sector. 135 In relation to private 
sector employment, members have looked towards the adoption of 
legislation to guarantee equality of promotion opportunities. 136 It might 
be pointed out that such legislative measures would most probably take 
the form of a general non-discrimination provision which should be 
guaranteed by some form of individual remedy. 
E) REST AND LEISURE 
Article 7(d) provides for a general right to rest and leisure, and 
specific work-related aspects of that right, namely the reasonable 
Iiinitation of working hours, periodic holidays with pay and 
132 See above, Chapter 4. 
1n Reporting guidelines, Supra, note 69, at 93. Cf also, ILO Recommen ation 
No. 111, para. 2 which provides for equality of opportunity as to advancement in 
accordance with the individual's characters, experience, ability or diligence. ELO 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Recommendation (No. 111), 1958, in 
ILO, Intemational Labour Conventions and Recommendations 1919-198 1, at 49 (1982). 
134 Questions are regularly asked as to the number of women occupying 
positions of responsibility at work, see e. g., Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 3, 
at 11, para. 52. 
135 See e. g., Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 8, para-40. 
136 See e. g., Daoudi, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 4, para. 15. 
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remuneration for public holidays. Whilst it might be argued that a right 
to leisure implies an obligation on the State to promote or provide 
adequate leisure facilities, 137 the Committee has concentrated almost 
exclusively upon the reduction in working hours and the provision of 
paid holidays. 
That the Committee intends initially to rely upon the ELO 
standards in this field is apparent from the reference to the Weekly Rest (industry) Convention of 1921 (No. 14), the Weekly Rest (Commerce 
and Offices) Convention of 1957 (No. 106) and the Holidays with Pay 
Convention (Revised) of 1970 (No. 132). 138 It is particularly noticeable 
that in the area of remuneration for public holidays, where there is no 
relevant ILO Convention to apply, the Committee has made little 
comment. In addition to making reference to ELO Conventions, the 
reporting guidelines request, rather generally, information as to laws 
and practices relating to the various rights within article 7(d), factors 
and difficulties that affect the degree of realisation particularly as to the 
categories of workers which are excluded in law or practice from the 
enjoyment of the rights, and measures taken to improve the situation. 139 
It is notable that the Committee has made no mention of the Hours 
of Work (Industry) Convention of 1919 (No. 1), 140 the Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention of 1930 (No. 30), 141 or the Forty- 
Hour Week Convention of 1935 (No. 47). 142 One reason might be the 
limited number of States that have ratified those treaties. 143 Whether or 
not the Committee considers that these ILO standards are realistic, it 
would be appropriate for the Committee to make some form of 
statement as to what length of working week it considers suitable as a 
137 See, Melander G., "Article 24", in Eide A. et al (eds), The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: A CommentM, 379, at 380 (1992). 
138 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 69, at 92. ILO Weekly Rest (Industry) 
Convention (No. 14), 1921,38 U. N. T. S. 187; ELO Weekly Rest (Commerce and 
Offices) Convention (No. 106), 1957; ILO Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised) (No. 132) 1970, Cmnd 4706. 
139 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 69, at 93. 
140 ELO Hours of Work (Industry) Convention (No. 1), 1919,38 U-N-T-S 
17. 
141 ILO Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention (No. 30), 1930, 
39 UNTS 85. 
142 ELO Forty-Hour Week Convention (No. 47), 1935,271 U. N. T. S. 199. 
143 For example the Forty-Hour Week Convention (No. 47) of 1935 has only 
been ratified by 8 States. 
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general standard, 144and what would be considered excessive. The only 
statements made to this effect by individual members indicate that States 
should make efforts to reduce the length of the working week145and 
that a 54 hour working-week would in normal circumstances be 
considered excessive. 146 
It is submitted that the Committee should establish as a principle, 
in line with the approach of the ILO. 147that States should attempt to 
reduce the working week in a progressive manner. Clearly the extent to 
which States are capable of shortening the working week is dependent 
upon their social and economic situation and the degree to which it 
would affect productivity, competitiveness and the balance of trade. 
However, given the existing general differentials between States, a 
useful guideline for the Committee might well be the provisions of the 
ILO Reduction of Hours of Work Recommendation of 1962 (No. 116). 148 It recommends that States pursue a national policy 
designed to promote the principle of progressive reduction of normal 
hours of work with a view to attaining the standard of the forty-hour 
week. In the case of those States which operate an existing working 
week of more than 48 hours, immediate steps should be taken to reduce 
it to that level. 
By referring to the Weekly Rest Conventions, the Committee 
seems to imply that those obligations are operative as far as article 7(d) 
is concerned. Accordingly States have an obligation to ensure that 
employees, whether in public or private undertakings, shall enjoy a 
period of rest of at least twenty four consecutive hours in every seven 
days. Exceptions are provided for in certain defmed situations, but in 
such cases compensatory rest periods should be provided. Like the 
provision relating to the working week, it would be appropriate for the 
Committee to view this provision as a progressive one such that States 
should attempt to increase the period of weekly rest over time. 
Nevertheless, as the 11LO has discovered, the question of weekly rest has 
not generally been a serious problem. 149 
144For the ILO position see, General Survey of the Committee of Experts, 
Working Time: Reduction of hours of work, weekly rest and holidays with pay IILC 
70th Sess, Report IIII (PtAB), (1984). 
145 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 5, para. 26. 
146 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 7, para. 36. 
147 General Survey, supra, note 141, at 10. 
148 ILO Reduction of Hours of Work Recommendation (No. 116), 1962, in 
ILO, International Labour Conventions and Recommendations 1919-1981, at (1982). 
149Ibid, at 185. 
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As regards the right to holidays with pay, it was made clear in the 
drafting of article 7 that the term "annual holiday" was intended to 
mean that workers should be given, at minimum, consecutive holidays 
of two weeks duration once a year. 150 Although this is less than that 
provided for in the ELO Holidays With Pay Convention (Revised) of 
1970 (which provides for a three week holiday)151, it should clearly be 
made the basic standard. The Committee has yet to give this right some 
meaning. In addition to stipulating what it considers to be the minimum 
duration of annual holiday, the Committee will also have to consider the 
legitimacy of qualifying periods for, or the division of, holiday 
entitlements, and the means by which such standards are to be enforced. 
IV) CONCLUSION 
The broad and general terms of article 7, whilst lacking the 
specificity found in other instruments (such as the European Social 
Charter), do not suffer from the inherent limitations that such 
definitions might offer. For example, the general right to equal 
remuneration for work of equal value allows for a far wider application 
than other guarantees which restrict comparisons to the relative position 
of men and women. However, that the provisions have to be given more 
precise and meaningful detail places a considerable burden upon the 
Committee. 
7be fundamental characteristic of the right to just and favourable 
conditions of work is that it concerns the relationship between 
individuals (or bodies). Certainly the State might have direct 
responsibility for such matters in so far as it is an employer itself, but in 
most States now conditions of work are the subject of the private 
employment contract and stipulations of collective agreements. The 
effectiveness of the rights within article 7 are thus heavily dependent 
upon the operation of drittwirkung der grundrechte, or the horizontal 
application of rights. 152 
As it is rarely conceded that the State should interfere in the 
terms and conditions of every employment contract, State obligations 
will primarily involve establishing a minimum "floor" of rights (which 
should form the basis of every employment contract) and instituting 
mechanisms of enforcement. Although the Committee does face 
problems with establishing the exact level at which each right should be 
set, it does have a serious role to play in ensuring that basic procedural 
150 See above, text accompanying note 61. Cf. article 2(3) European Social Charter. 
151 See, General survey, supra, note 141, paras 151-259. 
152For a discussion of the notion of drittwirkung, see above Chapter 2, text 
accompanying notes 28-42. 
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obligations are undertaken. For example, it should at least examine the 
existence, coverage and operation of minimum wage machinery, labour 
inspectorates and wage evaluation schemes. Thus far, this element of its 
work has been seriously undervalued. 
Thus far, the Committee has made only a little headway in 
developing the substance of the rights. As with article 6, although the 
Committee is in the fortunate position of being able to draw upon the 
vast experience of the ILO in the area, there is little evidence of it 
having done so in a serious manner. There is clearly a need for the 
Committee to generate greater sophistication and more focused attention 
upon the various elements of article 7. Having said that, a brief glance at 
the number of ILO Conventions and Recommendations in the area (particularly in respect to health and safety at work) does give an 
indication of the extremely difficult task that faces the Committee in 
developing the normative content of the rights and assessing State 
reports in a meaningful manner. It is perhaps forttinate that the 
Committee only has to play a supportive role to the ELO in the area. 
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APTER SEVEN: TRADE UNION 
RIG 1 
Article 8 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: (a)The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the 
trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the 
organisation concerned, for the promotion and protection 
of his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be 
placed on the exercise of this right other than those 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public order 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (b)The right of trade unions to establish national 
federations or confederations and the right of the latter to 
form or join international trade-union organisations; (c)The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no 
limitations other than those prescribed by law and which 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public order or for the protection of 
the rights andfireedoms of others; (d)The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in 
conformity with the laws of the particular country. 
2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of laýtful 
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the 
armedforces or of the police or of the administration of the State. 
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the 
International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 
concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or 
apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees 
providedfor in that Convention. 
I) INTRODUCTION 
As is recognised in a number of human rights instruments, 
the right to join and form trade unions is a fundamental element 
1 The term "trade union rights" is used here as a generic term to describe 
the rights in article 8. Although the term is inaccurate in so far as many of the 
rights pertain to the individual and not the trade union, it is commonly used and 
understood in the wider sense. 
257 
of the right to freedom of association. 2 That it has been given 
specific legal recognition over and above other forms of 
association, is a reflection of the fact that "freedom of association 
for trade union purposes is a major postulate of democratic 
government in an industrial society. "3 However, the importance 
of protecting the right to form and join trade unions is more than 
merely a recognition that trade unions are a common form of 
association. Trade unions have historically played a crucial role in 
the protection of the rights and interests of workers. Identification 
of the instrumental value of trade unions in the realisation of 
other economic and social rights (particularly the right to just and 
favourable conditions of work4) is reflected in the value placed 
upon the rights of trade unions themselves in the Covenant (articles 8(l)(b) and (c)), as opposed to the rights of the 
individual trade union members. 
It is possible to argue that the right of trade unions to 
function freely may be readily inferred from the effective 
enjoyment of the individual right to freedom of association, and 
indeed might have been framed in those terms. As it is, article 8 is 
very much a hybrid of individual and collective rights. That 
tensions may arise between the rights of the individual and those 
of the collective is apparent in the experience of the European 
Court of Human Rights. 5 The fact that collective rights are 
specifically enumerated as opposed to inferred might make the 
resolution of such conflicts more difficult to attain. 
Article 8 is of particular importance in the Covenant as far 
as the Committee is concerned, as it represents a good benchmark 
against which the progress of the Committee in developing the 
nonns within the Covenant may be measured. It has many of the 
hallmarks of the rights enumerated in the ICCPR, being defined 
in comparable detail and being subject to immediate 
implementation. 
2 Cf. Article 22(l), ICCPR (1966); Article 11 (1), ECHR (1950). The 
UDHR, however, provides for the right to freedom of association (article 20) 
and the right to form and join trade unions (article 23(4)) in two separate 
articles. 
3 Jenks W., Human Rights and Intemational labour Standards, 50 (1960). 
4 For the role of collective bargaining in the realisation of the rights in 
arficle 7, see above, Chapter 6. 
5 See e. g., Young. James and Webster Cases Eur. Court H. R., 
vol. 44., Judgement of 13th Aug. 1981, (1982) 4 EHRR 38. 
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H) THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 
During the drafting of the Covenant, 6 there was 
considerable opposition to the inclusion of an article relating to 
trade-union rights. It was contended that the right of association 
was already provided for in the draft Covenant (and article 20 
UDHR) and that the inclusion of an article on trade-union rights 
was unduly repetitious. 7 Certain States also considered it unjust to 
single out trade unions above other forms of association such as co- 
operative societies. 8 
In response it was argued that to reduce trade union rights 
merely to the right of association would run counter to historical 
developments where trade-union rights had been embodied in a 
number of legislative texts in their own right. 9 Even if the right to 
association was extended it would still be inadequate, 10 
particularly as it had too many restrictions and gave inadequate 
protection to trade unions. 11 Emphasis was placed upon the idea 
that "trade unions were a necessary instrument for implementing 
economic, social and cultural rights"12 and therefore an "essential 
condition" for the guarantee of economic rights in general, 13 and 
especially as regards the right to satisfactory working 
conditions. 14 It was noted, moreover, that the right to join and 
6 Proposals for an article on trade union rights were discussed in the 
Commission at its seventh and eighth sessions, and later in the General 
Assembly's 'Mird Committee. See, UN Doc. E/CN-4/SR. 203-4,206-8,218, 
224-6 (1951); UN Doc. E/CN. 4/SR. 298-300 (1952); UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 719- 
726 (1956). See generally, UN Doc. A/2929,10 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item 28 (Pt-H), 106-107 (1955); UN Doc. A/3525,11 GAOR, Annexes, Ag. Item 31,8- 
12, paras 54-75 (1956). 
7 See e. g., Whitlam (Australia), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 9-10 (1951); Mehta (India), E/CN. 4/SR. 224, at 23 (1951). 
See e. g., Sorensen (Denmark), E/CN. 4/SR. 224, at 24 (1951). 
9 See, Fischer (WFI'U), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 4 (195 1). 
10 See, Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 9 (1951); Morosov (USSR), ibid, at 15 (1951). 
11 See, Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), E/CN. 4/SR-298, at 10 (1952). 
Ironically, the restrictions in the article on freedom of association were included in the final version of article 8. 
12 Malik (Lebanon), E/CN. 4/SR. 298, at 8 (1952). 
13 JeVreMovic (Yugoslavia), E/CN. 4/SR. 298, at 9 (1952). 
14 See, Chaudhuri (Pakistan), A/C. 3/SR. 719, at 199, para. 19 (1956). 
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form trade unions had already been given recognition in the 
UDHR. 15 
Further arguments against the inclusion of a provision 
relating to trade-union rights were made on the basis that they 
were essentially "prejudicial to the general conception of human 
rights", 16 in that they related to only one category of persons17 
and were collective in nature. It was responded that the right to form and join trade unions was "open to interpretation" as an individual right. 18 In any case, there was no problem with 
introducing rights that belonged to communities because they were 
nevertheless fundamental-19 Indeed, as was noted in the report of 
the Third Committee in 1956, it was not "fitting", "on the one 
hand to grant the right to form and join trade unions and, on the 
other, to deprive unions of their rights to function and join in 
national and international federations. "20 
The early drafts of the article were of a single paragraph, 
containing only an expression of the right to join and form trade 
unions. It was assumed that further detailed elaboration would be 
undertaken at a later stage by the ELO. However, following 
pressure from the Latin American and Socialist States, the article 
was expanded in the Third Committee, where the discussion 
moved from what rights should be included in article 8 to what 
limitations should be imposed on the rights. 
The final text, although subject to agreement, was not 
entirely satisfactory for all concerned. On the one hand a number 
of States clearly preferred the initial general provision drafted by 
the Commission. 21 On the other hand, those who looked for a 
more detailed article were disappointed that it be subject to so 
many restrictions. 22 The fact that all the proposals that remained 
at the voting stage were adopted, reflects the concern that the 
article be acceptable to as many States as possible. It is considered 
15 Article 23(4). Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 225,, at 13 (1951). 
16 Sorensen (Denmark), E/CN. 4/SR. 224, at 24 (1951). 
17 See e. g., Mehta (India), E/CN. 4/SR. 224, at 23 (195 1). 
18 See, Malik (Lebanon), E/CN. 4/SR. 224, at 23 (1951). 
19 See, Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 224, at 23 (1951). 
20 UN Doc. A/3525, supra, note 6, at 9, para. 66. 
21 See e. g., Vlahov (Yugoslavia), A/C. 3/SR. 726, at 227, para-27 (1956); Basavilbaso (Argentina), ibid, para. 28 (1956). 
22 See e. g., Castaneda (Mexico), A/C. 3/SR. 726, at 227, para. 30 (1956); 
Morosov (USSR), ibid, para. 33 (1956). 
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that this was achieved, however, by sacrificing the coherence of 
the article as a whole. 
A) ARTICLE 8(l): THE OBLIGATION TO ENSURE 
It was generally agreed that "progressive implementation 
could not be invoked in the case of trade union rights because no 
expenditure was necessary on the part of the State. "23 The State 
action required was one of self-restraint or non-interference. 24 As 
was commented in the debate within the T11ird Committee: 
"... the Commission had decided that some of the 
rights in that Covenant should be the subject of an 
obligation which would be definite and immediate, 
and not progressive in character. Article 8 was such 
an article since it required States to "undertake to 
ensure" the right. ýFhat obligation was the same as the 
one in article 21 of the draft Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. "25 
It was clear that in utilising the word "ensure" in preference to the 
standard term. "recognise", the drafters intended that the article 
should not fall within the terms of article 20). 
However, there was some indication among members of the 
Third Committee that although immediate, the obligation extended 
ftu-ther than merely State restraint. Mention was made of the need 
for positive action by the State to promote trade unionism among 
workers, 26 particularly with respect to countries in which trade- 
union organisation was obstructed by low levels of development. 27 
B) ARTICLE 8(l)(a): THE RIGHT TO FORM AND JOIN 
TRADE UNIONS 
"Tbe right of everyone to form trade unions... " 
As far as the Commission was concerned, article 8 was not 
23 Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), E/CN. 4/SR. 298, at 10 (1952). 
24 Malik (Lebanon), E/CN. 4/SR. 298, at 11 (1952). 
25 Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 720, at 197, para. 20 (1956). Draft article 21 
is now article 22 ICCPR. 
26 See, Diaz Casanueva, A/C. 3/SR. 720, at 195, para. 3 (1956). 
27 See, Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 720, at 196, para. 6 (1956). 
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intended to cover the rights of employers. 28 However in the Third 
Committee this question gave rise to considerable debate. It was 
pointed out that whereas the English, Chinese and Russian terms 
for "trade unions" were understood to refer to workers' 
organisations only, the French term "syndicats", and the Spanish 
term "sindicatos", both included employers' associations. 29 
Notwithstanding these semantic difficulties, there was little 
real discussion as to whether it was proper for employer's 
associations to be included in the definition. A number of States 
did indicate that the term should be read its broadest sense30 as 
used in the ILO Convention of 1948,31under which both workers 
and employers would be covered. 321ndeed it was even argued that 
organisations of employers were essential to economic 
development. 33 However, despite the unsatisfactory situation 
resulting from the adoption of a text which meant different things 
to different States, 34 a proposal that a declaration be made as to 
the scope of the provision was not adopted. 35 
In the absence of any clear statement as to the scope of the 
article it would seem that the matter was intended to be left to the 
ratifying States. 36 Although, as noted above, some States 
considered that the protection extended to employers' associations, 
there is evidence that a number of States voted for the provision 
28 The Secretary-General comments: 
"Article 8 was not intended to govern the rights of employers. It 
was stated that independent professional workers should be 
entitled to form professional organisations and that the rights of 
co-operative associations would not be prejudiced by their not 
being mentioned in the Covenant. " 
UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 6, at 106, para. 17 (1953). 
29 UN Doc. A/3525, supra, note 6, at 10- 11, para-73. 
30 See e. g., Azkoul (Lebanon), A/C. 3/SR. 724, at 218, para. 14 (1956). 
31 See, Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 208, para. 26 (1956). 
32 See, Delhaye (Belgium), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 208, para. 24 (1956). 
M See, Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 725, at 222, para. 8 (1956). 
34 See, Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 725, at 221, para. 7 (1956). 
(1956). 35 For the proposal see, 
Chairman, A/C. 3/SR. 723, at 215, para. 49 
36 See e. g., Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 723, at 215, para. 50 (1956); 
Delhaye (Belgium), A/C. 3/SR. 724, at 217, para. 2 (1956). 
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on the understanding that it was limited to workerst 
organisations. 37 
2) "... the trade union of his choice... " 
The phrase "of his choice" was included primarily to ensure 
the free exercise of the right to form and join trade unions. 38 
However, it was noted that the phrase might be interpreted as 
implying that individuals have the right to join any trade union 
irrespective of whether or not they have fulfilled the conditions of 
membership. If enforced, this would result in a considerable 
limitation on the freedom of trade unions to lay down their own 
organisational rules. 39 
Accordingly it was suggested that the phrase "subject only to 
the rules of the organisation concerned" be included. 40 This 
proposal was criticised as being unnecessary, 41 and even 
potentially harmful, in that States might be prevented from 
controlling inequitable trade union rules. 42 In particular it might 
enable trade unions to circumvent article 8 by establishing rules 
which would nullify rights specified in that article. 43 
The adoption of the proposed wording seems to indicate that 
whilst trade unions are free to establish their own conditions of 
membership, such conditions are subject to an element of State 
control in so far as is necessary to ensure that the rights within 
article 8 of the Covenant are respected. An obvious case in point 
would be to ensure that such rules of entry are not discriminatory. 
3) 
... 
for the promotion and protection of his economic and social 
interests. "
In the Conunission, the political activity of trade unions was 
a matter of some concern to a number of States. 44h was 
37 See e. g., Knox (Denmark), A/C. 3/SR. 726, at 225, para. 7 (1956); 
Kowalikowa. (Poland), ibid, at 226, para. 13 (1956). 
38 UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 6, at 106, para. 14. 
39 See, Bowie (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 226, at 9 (1951); Chaudhuri (Pakistan), A/C. 3/SR. 719, at 191, para. 21 (1956). 
40 See, Currie (Canada), A/C. 3/SR. 721 
, 
at 20 1, para. 16 (1956). 
41 See e. g., Bratanov (Bulgaria), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 206, para. 8 (1956). 
(1956). 
42 See e. g., Serrano (Philippines), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 207, para-16 
43 See, Mufti (Syria), A/C. 3/SR. 726,, at 225, para. 9 (1956). 
44 See e. g., Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CNA/SR. 225, at 13-14 (1951). 
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considered necessary to include a provision in the Covenant 
restricting trade union activity to the protection of workers' 
"economic and social interests" so as to avoid them concerning 
themselves with purely political matters. 45 
Those who opposed the provision noted that it was "only 
natural" that trade unions have a role in the formulation of social 
and economic policy given their influence over the economy of the 
CoUntry, 46 and that they should participate in the implementation 
of social legislation. 47 Such a provision was "extremely 
dangerous" in that it might be used as a pretext for taking 
measures against representative unionS48 and could mandate the 
formation of employer monopolies. 49 Belgium argued in 
particular, that the right to form and join trade unions was 
absolute and should not be made dependent on the purpose sought 
by the individual. 50 
States supporting the proposal explained that although 
discussion of economic and social matters was clearly within the 
powers of trade unions, they should not interfere with policy- 
making at a regional and national level which ought to be 
undertaken through the normal democratic channels. 51 The 
addition, in the Third Committee, of the word "promotion" 
widened the range of activities envisaged for trade unions to the 
extent that all States seem to have been satisfied. 52 
It would appear, from the discussion above, that trade 
unions may undertake a broad range of activities in the protection 
and promotion of workers' interests. The main restriction 
envisaged, was that trade unions should not involve themselves in 
purely political activities. Apparently this would not exclude them 
from creating links with, or giving allegiance to, certain political 
parties, but would prohibit action that was aimed at the subversion 
45 See, Eggermann (IMCIU), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 18 (1951). 
46 Pattet (ICFIIJ), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 21 (1951). 
47 See, Fischer (ViFrU), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 25 (1951). 
48 Fischer (WFI'U), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 26 (195 1). 
49 See, Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), E/CN. 4/SR. 298, at 9 (1952). This of 
course is on the assumption that the provision extends to employers. 
50 See, Delhaye (Belgium), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 208, para. 24 (1956). 
51 See, Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 22 (1951); Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 300, at 7 (1952). 
52 The provision was finaHy adopted by 47 votes to one with 19 
abstentions. UN Doc. A/3525, supra, note 6, at 11, para. 74. 
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of the democratic processes. This does not fully resolve, however, 
the question of whether strikes aimed at bringing down a 
government would be entirely legitimate. 
4) Restrictions 
A reference to article 16 (now article 22 1CCPR) appeared 
in the early version of article 8 adopted at the Commission's 
seventh session. 53 It was later argued that, even if a specific cross- 
reference was not acceptable, as article 8 was to be implemented 
immediately like article 22 ICCPR, it should be subject to the same 
restrictionS54 (found in article 22(2) and (3)) with the exception of 
the reference to public health. 55 On the other hand certain States 
argued that such limitations would run counter to the provisions of 
ILO Convention No. 87,56 and that in any case the limitations had 
already been dealt with in article 4.57 However, it was pointed out 
that Article 4 had not yet been discussed and therefore could not 
be relied upon, 58 especially as it was not clear whether article 4 
would in fact operate with respect to article 8.59 In any case a 
general limitations clause did not prohibit specific ones where 
appropriate. 60 
11is discussion of permissible restrictions upon the right to 
form and join trade unions, although rather summary in nature, 
does give some indication of the intentions of the drafters. First, 
for a definition of the various terms used such as "national 
security" or "democratic society" reference may be made to the 
travaux preparatoires of article 22 ICCPR. Secondly, to the extent 
that article 8(l)(a) is already subject to specific limitations, it 
appears that it is excluded from the scope of article 4. This point is 
53 See, UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 6, at 106, para. 16. 
54 See, Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 720, at 197, para. 21 (1956); Currie (Canada), A/C. 3/SR. 721, at 201, para. 15 (1956). 
55 See, Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 719, at 191, para. 23 (1956). 
56 See e. g., Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR. 719, at 191, para. 28 (1956); 
Morosov (USSR), ibid, at 192, para. 31 (1956). 
57 See, Morozov (USSR), A/C. 3/SR. 719, at 192, para. 31 (1956); Diaz 
Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 720, at 196, para. 5 (1956); vlahov (Yugoslavia), 
ibid, at 198, para. 31 (1956). 
58 See, Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 720, at 197, para. 22 (1956); Massoud- 
Ansari (Iran), A/C. 3/SR-722, at 206, para. 9 (1956). 
59 See, Azkoul (Lebanon), A/C. 3/SR. 721, at 201, para. 21 (1956). 
60 See, Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR-723, at 214, para. 46 (1956). 
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fully supported by the travaux preparatoires of article 4 which 
reiterate that interpretation. 61 
C) ARTICLE 8(l)(b): THE RIGHT TO FEDERATE 
It was proposed in the Commission that trade unions should 
be permitted to federate in "local, regional and international 
spheres". 62 However, concern was expressed over the possibility 
of international federations of trade unions interfering in the 
internal politics of individual States. 63 As a result, no right to 
federate was included in the Commission's final draft. Instead the 
right to join trade unions was extended to "local, national and 
international trade unions". 64 
In the Third Committee, there was a certain amount of 
opposition to the inclusion of a provision relating to the 
establishment of federations and confederations. In particular, it 
was felt that such a provision was out of place in the Covenant 
because it did not relate to the rights of individuals but rather to 
the rights of trade unions themselves. 65 In response it was argued 
that the mere fact that the provision related to a group right was 
not crucial. If the right to trade union organisation was to be 
considered realistic, trade unions must be guaranteed the right to 
act which included the right to federate. 66 
It is submitted that, as a matter of textual consistency, the 
Commission draft was preferable to that of the Third Committee. 
It is submitted that although collective rights are not necessarily 
incompatible with individual rights and indeed might be necessary 
to ensure the full protection of the individual in certain 
circumstance s, 67 in this case they are unnecessary. The right to 
federate internationally could easily have been posited as a 
principle deriving from the effective en oyment of the right to 
form and join trade unions. 
61 See, UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 6, at 25, para-50. 
62 Azmi Bey (Egypt), E/CN. 4/SR. 224, at 24 (1951). 
63 See, Ciasullo (Uruguay), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 7 (195 1). 
64 UN Doc. E/2256,14 ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4), at 21-22 (1952). 
(1956). 
65 See e. g., Hamilton (Australia), A/C. 3/SR. 723, at 213, para-30 
666 See e. g., Kowalikowa (Poland), A/C. 3/SR. 720, at 196, para. 13 (1956); Bratanov (Bulgaria), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 205, para. 6 (1956). 
67 See e. g., Brownlie I., "The Rights of Peoples in Modem International 
Law", in Crawford J. (ed), The Rights of Peoles 1, at 3 (1988). 
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D) ARTICLE 8(l)(c): THE RIGHT OF TRADE UNIONS TO 
FUNCTION FREELY 
As stated above, the right of trade unions to function freely 
was considered to be a necessary corollary of the right to form 
and join trade unions. Although apparently encompassing both the 
right to call a strike and the right to federate, this provision was 
adopted in its own right in the Third Committee. 68 Additional 
elements that the right to function freely might include, are the 
right of trade unions to operate freely and call conferences and 
meetings without interference by employers or the State, and the 
right to collective bargaining. 69 Nevertheless, the precise scope 
and meaning of this provision was left undefined. 
In the Third Committee the original proposal provided that 
the right of trade unions to function freely should be restricted 
only "for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others". 70 
This phrase was considered too vague, unnecessary7l and laid the 
way open for States to avoid their obligations. 72 Nevertheless it 
was later proposed that the provision should be supplemented by a 
reference to public order and the security of the State. 73 Although 
it was argued that such concepts would deprive the article of full 
effect, 74they were felt necessary particularly in light of the fact 
that the trade-union functions to which the provision referred 
were nowhere defined. 75 
Given the fact that a limitation clause was considered 
necessary, the right to function freely should be properly 
interpreted in a wide sense. That the exact functions were left 
undefined may be because mention had already been made of the 
right of trade unions to establish and enforce rules as to their own 
68 UN Doc. A/3525, supra, note 6, at 11, para. 740) (1956). 
69 See, Sender (ICFIU), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 10 (1951); Pickford (ELO), 
E/CN-4/SR. 299, at 5 (1952). 
70 Revised Amendment of Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay: 
UN Doc. A/C. 3/]L. 552/Rev. 1. 
71 See, Serrano (Philippines), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 207, para. 15 (1956). 
72 See, Bratanov (Bulgaria), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 206, para. 6 (1956). 
73 See, Azkoul (Lebanon), A/C. 3/SR. 721, at 201, para. 22 (1956). Cf. 
Amendment of Netherlands and the United Kingdom: UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 555. 
(1956). 
74 See e. g., Townsend Ezcurra (Peru), A/C. 3/SR. 721, at 202, para. 28 
75 UN Doc. A/3525, supra, note 6, at 10, para. 70. 
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organisation, 76 and that their external functions were those 
necessary for the protection and promotion of their members' 
interests. 77 In addition, provisions were on the table relating to the 
right to strike and the right to federate. It became apparent 
nevertheless, during the debate on the right to strike, that the right 
to function freely includes at least a right to collective bargaining. 
E) ARTICLE 8(D(d)-. THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
There was considerable debate both in the Commission and 
in the Third Committee over whether it was appropriate to include 
a provision on the right to strike. 78 A number of arguments were 
put forward against the inclusion of a right to strike: i) the right to 
strike was often not subject to State regulation and thus should be 
left to the State concerned; 79 ii) the right to strike was subject to a 
number of restrictions and therefore could not be considered to be 
a truly universal right; 80 iii) the right to strike was merely a 
means to implement trade union rights and not a proper right in 
itself; 81 iv) the right to strike was a collective right and thus was 
out of place in a Covenant dealing with individual rights; 82 v) the 
right to strike was not a primary right but only a right of "last 
resort"83 to be exercised following other attempts at conciliation 
and only when other rights were endangered; 84 vi) as there was no 
corresponding provision in the UDHR, there was no justification 
for including the right to strike in the Covenant. 85 
76 See above, text accompanying notes 40-43. 
77 See above, text accompanying notes 44-52. 
78 See generally, Ben-Israel R., International Labour Standards: The 
Case of Freedom to Strike 72-83 (1988). 
79 See e. g., Azmi Bey (Egypt), E/CNA/SR. 224, at 24 (1951); Juvigny (France), E/CNA/SR. 300, at 4 (1952). 
80 See, Mehta (India), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 25 (1951). 
81 See, Rossel (Sweden), E/CN. 4/SR. 300, at 9 (1952); Azmi Bey (Egypt), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 21 (1951). 
82 See, Hamilton (Australia), A/C. 3/SR. 723, at 213, para. 32 (1956). 
83 Beaufort (Netherlands), A/C. 3/SR. 721, at 202, para. 25 (1956). 
84 See, Rajan (India), E/CN. 4/SR. 299, at 11 (1952). 
85 See, Juvigny (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 300, at 4, (1952). Ben-Israel 
notes that the absence of a right to strike in ILO Conventions was also an 
important factor in its exclusion in the early drafts of article 8. Ben-Israel, supra, 
note 78, at 73. 
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Such arguments effectively prevented the inclusion of a 
right to strike in the early Commission drafts. However in the 
Third Committee the position was reversed, whereby the majority 
endorsed the inclusion of a reference to the right to strike. In 
particular, it was considered that the right to strike was essential 
for the protection of the economic and social interests of 
workers86 to the extent that it was meaningless to try to guarantee 
trade union rights without a right to strike. 87 Further, the right to 
strike was mentioned in the legislation of many countries, 88 and 
had become a social reality that had to be recognised. 89 
Interestingly enough, for one State at least, the right to strike was 
associated with the right not to be forced to work. 90 This has to be 
tempered by the knowledge that the crucial question in relation to 
strikes is not the ability to stop work but rather the contractual 
liabilities or other penalties incurred upon striking. 
Although a number of States agreed to the inclusion of a 
right to strike, they argued that, given the effect of strikes on the 
economy, 91 reference should be made to the fact that it was a "last 
resort" following conciliation. 92 It was commented however that it 
might be necessary in certain cases for a strike to be called without 
86 See e. g., Morosov (USSR), E/CN. 4/SR. 298, at 8 (1952). 
87 See e. g., Bracco (Uruguay), E/CN. 4/SR. 299, at 3 (1952); Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR. 719, at 191, para. 25 (1956); Townsend Ezcurra (Peru), 
ibid, at 193, para. 40 (1956). 
88 See, Townsend Ezcurra (Peru), A/C. 3/SR. 721, at 202, para. 29 (1956). 
89 See, Chaudhuri (Pakistan), A/C. 3/SR. 723, at 212, para. 15 (1956). 
90 See, Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 6 (1951). 
91 Concern was expressed particularly for the position of developing 
countries in which it was considered necessary that new industries be protected from irresponsible trade-union action, Massoud-Ansari (Iran), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 
206, para. 11 (1956). Nevertheless it was responded that one reason for 
introducing the right to strike was "to protect the workers in under-developed 
countries against the reactionary tendencies of the dictatorships to which they so 
frequently succumbed precisely because of the backwardness and instability of 
the economies of such countries. Another reason was that the under-developed 
countries were the first to suffer in an economic crisis, and the workers in those 
countries were usually the hardest hit... " Ayala Mercado (Bolivia), 
A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 207, para. 19 (1956). 
92 See e. g., Roosevelt (USA), E/CNA/SR. 225, at 12 (1951); 
Eggennann (EFCIU), ibid, at 18 (1956); Azmi Bey (Egypt), jbid, at 22 (195 1); 
Cheng Paonan (China), F, /CN. 4/SR. 299, at 15 (1952); Diaz Casanueva (Chile), 
A/C. 3/SR. 721, at 203, para. 36 (1956); Ayala Mercado (Bolivia), 
A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 207, para. 19 (1956). 
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resorting to conciliation procedures. 93 Additionally it was noted 
that conciliation was a complex process in which it was not always 
clear when negotiations had broken down- often they continue as 
long as the strike lasted. 94 
In the same light some States argued that it was wrong to 
mention the right to strike without the other methods of dispute 
settlement. 95 or other activities of trade unions, 96such as the right 
to picket. 97 However such remarks had little effect upon the final 
wording adopted. 
At most stages of the debate, there was dispute over the 
extent to which the right to strike should be subject to limitations. 
In the Commission it was argued that strikes should be limited 
where the vital interests of the State were at stake. 98 It was 
responded that this would leave the door open to abuse as the State 
alone could judge its own security considerations99 and that any 
such limitation would encourage governments to attack trade union 
rights. 100 Indeed Yugoslavia argued that, given the financial 
constraints on strikes, the possibility of unjustified strike action 
was extremely unlikely. 101 However, although not explicitly 
stated, it would seem that the restrictions found in article 8(1)(c) 
would similarly apply to the right to strike- it being clear that 
striking is one of the functions of trade unions. 
The limitation finally adopted in article 8(l)(d) was 
proposed as a compromise, and gave much away to those who 
opposed the inclusion of the provision. 102 Although the limitation 
made the provision generally acceptable concern was expressed 
that to make the right subject to the laws of the particular country 
93 See, Sender (ICFIU), E/CN. 4/SR. 299, at 8 (1952). 
94 See, Wbitlam (Australia), E/CN. 4/SR. 300, at 8 (1952); Hoare (UK), 
ibid, at 11 (1952). 
95 See e. g., Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 720, at 198, para. 26 (1956); Vlahov (Yugoslavia), ibid, para. 30 (1956). 
96 See, Aman (Sweden), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 205, para. 3 (1956). 
97 See, Serrano (Philippines), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 207, para. 15 (1956). 
98 See, Azmi Bey (Egypt), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 22 (1951). An 
amendment was proposed to that effect, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/595. 
99 See, Fischer (WFTLJ), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 26 (195 1); Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), E/CN. 4/SR. 226, at 5 (195 1). 
100 See, Morosov (USSR), E/CN. 4/SR. 299, at 13-14 (1952). 
101 See, Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), F, /CN. 4/SR. 298,, at 10 (1952). 
102 UN Doc. A/3525, supra, note 6, at 10, para. 68. 
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could make it virtually inoperable-103 T'his was not enough to 
dissuade the vast majority of States from voting in favour of the 
proposal. 104 
F) ARTICLE 8(2): MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, 
POLICE AND THE ADMMSTRATION OF THE STATE 
A provision allowing the imposition of restrictions on the 
trade-union rights of workers in the public services was proposed 
in the Commission. 105 These were later encapsulated in the joint 
amendment proposed by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
which legitimised the imposition of restrictions on members of the 
police, armed forces and the administration of the State. 106 
A number of States argued that, although restrictions on the 
armed forces and the police were legitimate, that was not the case 
with respect to the administration of the State. 1071LO practice did 
not allow restrictions upon the trade union rights of all public 
officials- only those in the army and police and then only to an 
extent determined by law-108 
Moreover, to allow limitations upon the right to strike in the 
public service was open to abuse as the concept of a public service 
was a flexible one. 109 In this sense it would be unduly prejudicial 
in the cases of States with large nationalised sectors. 110 It might 
103 See e. g., Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 209, para. 33 (1956); 
Hamilton (Australia), A/C. 3/SR. 723, at 214, para. 32 (1956); Stabel (Norway), 
A/C. 3/SR. 725, at 221, para. 4 (1956). 
104 UN Doc. A/3525, supra, note 6, at 11, para. 74(m). 
105 See, CiasuRo (Uruguay), E/CN. 4/SR. 225, at 7 (195 1); Rajan (India), E/CN. 4/SR. 299, at 11 (1952). 
106 UN Docs. A/C. 3/L. 550 and A/C. 3/L. 555. 
107 See e. g., Dupont Widlemin (Guatemala), FICN. 4/SR. 225, at 8 (1951); Sender (ICFIU), E/CN. 4/SR. 299, at 8 (1952); Shoham-Sharon (Israel), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 208, para. 31 (1956). 
108 See e. g., Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 299, at 11 (1952); Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR. 719, at 191, para. 28 (1956); Morozov (USSR), ibid, at 
192,, para. 31 (1956). 
109 See, Juvigny (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 300, at 4 (1952); Bratanov (Bulgaria), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 206, para. 7 (1956). 
110 See, Eustathiades (Greece), A/C. 3/SR. 721, at 200, para-6 (1956); 
Thierry (France), A/C. 3/SR. 72 1, at 200, para. 11 (1956). 
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also be a retrograde step for those States where the right to strike 
was denied only to workers in essential services. 111 
The United Kingdom responded that the provisions of the 
ELO Convention referring to the armed forces and police were 
merely declaratory, 112 and in any case the provision did not 
stipulate that there should be such restrictions but only foresaw 
their possibility. 113 It would seem that States' acceptance of this 
provision was conditioned to an extent by their assumption that the 
ELO would play a significant part in the supervision of the 
Covenant. It could be inferred from the discussion that restrictions 
imposed would be considered legitimate only in so far as they 
comply with the ELO standards in the area. That this seems to have 
been the intention of the drafters is made clear by the inclusion of 
sub-paragraph 3 which makes reference to the ILO Freedom of 
Association Convention. 
G) ARTICLE 8(3): THE ILO CONVENTION OF 1948.11-4 
Considerable misgivings were expressed as to the inclusion 
of a reference to ILO Convention No. 87 as proposed by the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 115 States argued that such a 
reference was unclear in its meaning and unnecessary. 116 Not only 
was it of legally negligible value in that the obligations in the IOLO 
Convention could not be derogated from on the basis of the 
Covenant, 117 but also it implied that the obligations in other 
conventions were not similarly protected. 118 Moreover, no such 
cross-reference had been made in articles 6 and 7.119 There were 
few coherent arguments put forward in favour of the paragraph 
outside a statement that the paragraph would avoid any future 
111 See, Juvigny (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 300, at 4 (1952). 
112 See, Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 720, at 197, para. 24 (1956). 
113 See, Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 209, para. 33 (1956). 
114 ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), 9 Jul. 1948,68 U. N. T. S. 17. 
115 A/C. 3/L. 550 and L. 555. See, Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 719, at 191, 
para. 23 (1956). 
1166 See e. g., Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR. 719, at 192, para. 29 (1956). 
117 See, Eustathiades (Greece), A/C. 3/SR. 721, at 200, para-6 (1956); 
Mufti (Syria), A/C. 3/SR. 726, at 225-6, para. 10 (1956). 
118 See, Serrano (Philippines), A/C. 3/SR. 722, at 207, para. 18 (1956); 
Shoham-Sharon (Israel), A/C. 3/SR. 722., at 208, para. 29 (1956). 
119 See, Kowalikowa (Poland), A/C. 3/SR. 720, at 196, para. 14 (1956). 
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conflicts between the Convention and the Covenant. However, the 
paragraph was adopted by a small majority in the Third 
Committee, perhaps as a matter of maintaining support for the 
article as a whole-120 
III) THE APPROACH OF THE COMMITT 
The Committee has not as yet produced a general comment, 
or undertaken a general discussion on article 8. The only 
indication as to its approach to article 8 is to be found from its 
reporting guidelines and the comments and questions of individual 
members. It is a provision, however, in respect of which 
Committee members have been critical of the performance of a 
number of States, reflecting a greater confidence in the precise 
level of protection offered by the Covenant. 
A) ARTICLE 8: THE OBLIGATION TO ENSURE 
As was noted during the drafting of the Covenant, the right 
to join and form trade unions forms an integral part of the general 
right to freedom of association found in article 22 ICCPR. 121 
According to article 2(l) ICCPR States are required to flensure" 
the rights in the Covenant, which contrasts with article 2(1) 
ICESCR which provides for the progressive realisation of the 
rights. It would seem somewhat contradictory, given the oft stated 
"interdependence" of human rights, if a right were to be 
implemented immediately under one Covenant and progressively 
under the other. Tbus article 8, as was specifically intended during 
the drafting, 122 uses the term "ensure" to make clear that it is to 
be implemented in an immediate manner. 
Some commentators have argued that article 2(l) ICESCR 
applies only to those rights that are specifically "recognised" in the 
terms of the article. 123 Although there is no indication in the 
120 The paragraph was adopted by 19 votes to 14 with 35 abstentions. 
UN Doc. A/3525, supra, note 6, at 11, para. 74(p). 
121 See above, text accompanying note 7. The FIRC, however, has been 
reluctant o read into article 22 other rights that are associated with the right to 
form and join trade unions such as the right to strike. See, J. B. et al. V. Canada, 2 Selected Decisions H. R. C. 34 (1986). 
122 See above, text accompanying notes 23-25. 
123 Alston P. and Quinn G., "The Nature and Scope of States Parties' 
Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights", 9 Hum. Rts. Q., 156, at 185 (1987). 
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&afting that this was intended to be the case, 124 such an 
interpretation has some textual coherence. Nevertheless, even if 
this interpretation is not acceptable, it is clear that as the 
realisation of the rights in article 8 is not wholly contingent upon 
the availability of financial resources, the enjoyment of the rights 
should ensured within a reasonable time. 
The Committee has made clear that it considers that article 8 
"would seem to be capable of immediate application by judicial 
and other organs in many national legal systems". 125 That the 
en oyment of the rights within article 8 is primarily a matter for i 
legal regulation is reflected in the questions in the Committee's 
reporting guidelines which are directed primarily at legal and 
administrative conditions and restrictions that govern the exercise 
of trade union rights. 126 This approach seems justified to the 
extent that a number of States that have come before the 
Committee have noted that the right to join trade unions is to be 
found in their respective constitutions. 127 However, as was noted 
in the Committee's General Comment, constitutional enactment 
does not necessarily mean that such a right will be enforced. 128 
Although the travaux preparatoires indicate that States 
should undertake to promote trade unionism in a progressive 
manner, 129 the Committee has not specifically recognised this 
obligation. Questions have been asked as to the number and 
structure of trade unions 130 and to the proportion of the 
workforce that is unionised, 131 but they would seem to be 
concerned more with evaluating the effective enjoyment of trade 
union rights than with establishing an obligation to promote trade 
124 See above, Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 189-196. 
125 General Comment No. 3 (1990), ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), Annex HI, 
at 84, para. 5, UN Doc. E/1991/23 (1991). 
126 Reporting Guidelines, ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), Annex IV, at 94, UN 
Doc. E/1991/23 (1991). 
127 See e. g., Rhenan Segura (Costa Rica), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 6, 
para. 22; Weitzel (Luxembourg),, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 33, at 5, para. 15. See also, 
Panama, E/1984/6/Add. 19, at 17; Afghanistan, E/1990/5/Add. 8, at 7, para. 22; 
Syria, E/1990/6"`/Add. 1, at 8, para. 28; Rwanda, E/1984/7/Add. 29, at 15. 
128 General Comment No. 3, supra, note 125, at 84, para. 6. 
129 See above, text accompanying note 26. 
130 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 126, at 95. 
131 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 12, para. 63; ý&atchkov, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 21, at 10, para. 43; Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 4, 
para. 10; Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 5, para-30. 
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unionism itself. Nevertheless, given the important role of trade 
unions in securing just and adequate conditions of work, it might 
be considered desirable for States to assist workers in unorganised 
sectors, particularly through educational measures, to form 
effective trade unions. 
B) ARTICLE 8(l)(a): THE RIGHT TO FORM AND JOIN THE 
TRADE UNION OF HIS CH 
1) The Right of "Evervone" 
Article 8 provides that "everyone" has the right to form and join trade unions. Unlike article 7(a), its scope ratio personae is 
not limited to "workers". Despite the unresolved nature of the 
controversy apparent in the travaux preparatoires, 132 the fact that 
the French text refers to "syndicats" and the Spanish to 
"sindicatos", both of which have a broader meaning than the 
English term "trade unions", suggests that employers' 
organisations should also fall within the terms of article 8.133 
Although the Committee has not made clear its view on this 
question, it is not of utmost importance as most problems in the 
area relate to employee's trade unions. 134 
Notwithstanding the general application of article 8, certain 
restrictions appear to be legitimised by the Covenant. 
Article 8(2), in particular, provides that the article "shall not 
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of 
these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of 
the administration of the State". Whereas article 9 of ILO 
Convention No. 87 allows for restrictions to be placed upon the 
trade union rights of members of the armed forces and the police, 
132 See above, text accompanying notes 28-37. 
133 This interpretation would bring the Covenant in line with ILO 
Convention No. 87 which provides that both workers and employers shall have 
the right to establish and join trade unions "without distinction whatsoever 
. Valticos N., Intemational Labour Law, at 82 (1979); The Committee of Experts 
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations' General Survey on 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, 69th Sess., (1983), ELO 
11: 69/3 (4B), paras 100-102 (1983). 
134 Jenks W., T'he International Protection of Trade Union Freedom, at 
173 (1957). He notes earlier that the decision to include employers' 
Organisations was due to a recognition that the collective regulation of conditions 
of employment required strong and free workers' and employers' organisations. 
Ibid, at 24-5. 
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unlike article 8 ICESCR, no such restrictions are allowed as 
regards members of the administration of the State. 135 
As article 8(3) confirms, those States parties that are also 
party to the 11LO Convention No. 87 would still be bound by the 
provisions of that Convention. Indeed, article 8(3) requires that 
for States parties of the ILO Convention, the terms of article 8(1) 
and (2) should be read subject to the provisions of that 
Convention. Accordingly, a State that imposed wholesale 
restrictions on the ability of public servants to join or form trade 
unions, would be in violation not only of the ILO Covention but 
also of the Covenant. 136 Similarly as article 5(2) makes clear, 
limitations cannot be invoked merely on the pretext that the 
Covenant offers less protection than that already provided in 
domestic law-137 
However, those States not party to the ILO Convention 
might be entitled to rely upon article 8(2) as justification for 
restrictions upon the trade union activity of public servants in 
general, which would represent a significant loophole as far as 
international standards are concerned. As commentators have 
noted, the major problems with respect to the concept of freedom 
of association have occurred in the realm of public servants-138 
The only occasion on which members of the Committee 
actually confronted this issue was in a discussion as to the extent to 
135 Supra, note 114. Cf. General Survey, supra, note 133, para. 87. The 
ILO Freedom of Association Comrrdttee has been particularly critical of the UK 
as regards restrictions imposed upon the right of civil servants employed at GCHQ to join organisations of their own choosing. See generally, Ewing K., 
Britain and the ILO, 11- 14,31-37 (1989). The European Commission of Human 
Rights, however, did not consider the restrictions to be in breach of article 11 
E. C. H. R.. See, C. C. S. U. v. United Kingdom', (1987), 20 DREComHR 228, (1988) 10 EHRR 269. Cf. Fredman S. and Morris G., "Union Membership at 
G. C. H. Q. 11,17 Ind. L. J., 105 (1988). 
136 Whereas the terms of article 8(3) will modify the existing obligations 
under the terms of article 8, it is open to question whether this means that the 
wider terms of the ILO Convention should be given effect under the Covenant. 
This interpretation was expressly negatived by the HRC as regards the identical 
provisions of article 22(3) in J. B. et al. v. Canada, supra, note 121. 
137 Article 5(2) reads: 
"No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights 
recognised or existing in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations 
or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not 
recognise such rights or that it recognises them to a lesser extent. " 
138 Pankert A.,, "Freedom of Association", in Blainpain R. (ed), 
r%M, naT*n 
, 
1987); 
. pazative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 173 at 178 
(3rd Ed 
Jenks-, supra, note 117, at 178. 
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which civil servants in the Dominican Republic enjoyed freedom 
of association. 139 It was pointed out by the ILO representative that 
certain legislation within the Dominican Republic that allowed the 
authorities to dissolve public-employee associations seemed to be 
in conflict with the right of association. 140'Me Committee did not 
address this point directly, but concentrated instead upon the right 
to strike of public employees. In that context, it appears that the 
Committee is not willing to accept general restrictions upon the 
right to strike of public employees, but will investigate the 
necessity of such restrictions. It is assumed that as article 8(2) 
applies to all sections of article 8(l), the Committee will also 
scrutinise limitations imposed upon the right of public servants to 
form and join trade unions. 141 If the Committee does take the 
view that broad restrictions on the rights of public employees to 
exercise their rights to form and join trade unions are of doubtful 
legitimacy, it will have to explain its position at a textual level. 
This will involve making some important decisions as to the 
meaning and relative scope of the various limitation clauses that 
might be seen to operate in relation to article 8(l)(a). It win also 
mean defining what categories of employees are considered to fall 
within the scope of the term "members of the administration of the 
State". For example, it might be open to define that term in a 
narrow manner to include only those working in emergency 
services or otherwise involved in the security of the State. This 
would not allow general restrictions being placed upon the rights 
of civil servants or public employees. 
It is considered that there is good reason to deny the 
possibility of limiting the right of members of the administration 
of the State to forrn and join trade unions. As is evident from the 
travaux preparatoires, the intention of article 8(2) was not to 
provide for such restrictions but to merely make them possible in 
certain circumstances. 142 In particular, the purpose appears to 
have been to bring article 8(1) into line with article 22 ICCPR-143 
Article 22 ICCPR, in outlining the right to form and join trade 
unions, makes no allowance for the imposition of restrictions upon 
139 ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), at 58, para-226, UN Doc-E/1991/23 (1991). 
140 Dao (ILO), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44, at 8, para. 38. 
141 It might also be noted that as far as ILO standards are concerned, 
more restrictions will be tolerated as regards the right to strike than the right to form and join trade unions. 
142See above, text accompanying note 113. 
143 See above, text accompanying note 54. 
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the rights of members of the administration of the State. It is 
considered that, in light of article 22 ICCPR and ILO 
standards, 144 the real intention of the drafters was to allow 
restrictions vis a vis the armed forces and the police in relation to 
the whole of article 8(l), but allow for restrictions as regards 
members of the administration of the State only in the case of the 
right to strike-145 
Although the terms of article 8 are generally obscure, it is 
arguable that use of the term "lawful" restrictions in article 8(2) 
was intended to refer to the criteria laid down in article 8(1)(a) to 
govern the imposition of restrictions on the right to form and join 
trade unions. Accordingly, any restrictions imposed upon the right 
to form and join trade unions should be "prescribed by law" and 
"necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public order or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others". 146 If this were the case, it would be difficult 
to justify a general restriction upon the right of public servants to join or form trade unions irrespective of the type of work that 
they undertake. 
Another area that has attracted the attention of the 
Committee is the extent to which non-nationals are allowed fun 
participation in trade unions. Members of the Committee have 
taken the position that restrictions placed upon the right of 
foreigners to take part in trade union activities might be 
incompatible with the Covenant. 147 In both the cases of Costa Rica 
and Panama, certain members expressed the view that the 
restrictions imposed constituted a violation of the Covenant. The 
fact that in neither case did the Committee as a whole adopt this 
position, is perhaps a reflection of the fact that trade union 
participation itself was not prohibited, but merely the holding of 
144 Those contained in ELO Convention No. 87, supra, note 114. 
145 For the situation with respect to the right to strike, see below, text 
accompanying notes 226-274. 
146 For a discussion of limitations generally, see below, text 
accompanying notes 179-189. 
147 See, Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 11, para. 52; Texier, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 12, para. 56. As far as the IILO is concerned, Article 
6(l)(a)(ii) of the IILO Nfigration for Employment Convention (Revised) of 1949 (No. 97), 120 U. N. T. S. 7 1, provides for equal treatment regarding membership 
of trade unions for foreign workers. This has been supplemented by article 10 of 
the ILO Nfigrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention of 1975 (No. 143), 1120 U. N. T. S. 323. Cf. Article 19, European Social Charter (1961); 
UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Mgrant Workers and 
Members of their Families (1990). 
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executive positions within trade unions-148 It is likely that, were a 
State to entirely restrict the rights of non-nationals to join or form 
trade unions, the Committee would take a stronger line. 
2) Subject to the Rules of the Organisation Concerned 
Article 8(l)(a) provides for the right to join the trade union 
of one's choice "subject only to the rules of the organisation 
concerned". As the travaux preparatoires make clear, this 
provision was included to protect the right of trade unions to 
establish internal rules and maintain control over their own 
membership. 149 The ELO has noted that the free determination of 
the structure and membership of trade unions is an essential 
element of the right to form and join trade unions. 150 The need to 
protect unions from State interference already has some 
recognition in article 8(l)(c) in which their right to function 
freely is recognised. Article 8(l)(a), however, appears to centre 
upon the dynamic between the interests of the individual and those 
of the organisation. 
The only occasion on which this issue has come to be 
discussed was in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea. Members of the Committee raised questions over a 
statement o the effect that the right to join trade unions was 
subject to a provision which stipulated that the right was 
acknowledged "once they recognize the programme and rules of 
the Korean trade unions and strive to implement them". 151 One 
member went so far as to say that this seemed to be an "extremely 
restrictive provision". 152 Unfortunately the Committee members 
did not take the opportunity to establish what principles they 
considered were involved. 
Although it is not appropriate for the State to lay down 
conditions for membership of a trade union, it is reasonable to 
expect the right to join trade unions to be conditional upon the 
internal membership rules of the organisation concerned. If 
otherwise, it might provide the State with an excuse for undue 
interference in trade union organisation. However, it might well 
be appropriate for the State to intervene on behalf of the 
148 See below, text accompanying note 201. 
149 See above, text accompanying notes 40-43. 
150 General Survey, supra, note 133, para-121. 
151 E/1984/6/Add. 7. para. 66. 
152 Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 22, at 3, para. 6. 
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individual to ensure that trade unions do not discrimmiate 
unlawfully in their membership rules. 153 
3) The Trade Union "Of his Choicelf 
The right to form and join the trade union "of his choice" 
would seem to provide for a right not to be compelled to join a 
particular trade union. Whilst simple in principle, the matter is 
clouded in cases where there is only one trade union, or where a 
union security agreement is in operation. Each of these matters 
will be dealt with in turn. 
a) Trade Union Diversily. 
Whilst the Committee rather neutrally requests information 
as to the it number and structure of trade unions established", 154 
members of the Committee have taken a stronger line in arguing 
that "plurality of trade unions formed part of the notion of 
freedom of trade union rights". 155 Accordingly in cases where 
only a single trade union156 or a single federation157 exist in the 
whole country, Committee members have considered the States 
concerned to be in violation of the Covenant. 
The position adopted by the individual members of the 
Committee above is controversial. Although there is clearly a need 
to protect union-activity from State interference, 158 it might wen 
be to the advantage of workers, particularly in small developing 
countries, to avoid trade union multiplicity. This would certainly 
be the case as far as collective bargaining was concerned. Thus the 
formation of a single trade union or federation, might in itself be a 
matter of choice as far as the workers are concerned. It could not 
possibly be the case that the State is required to establish new trade 
unions itself to cater for individual choice. 
It is submitted that in cases where a single trade union exists, 
the Committee should direct its attention to whether it emerged as 
153 For the degree to which States are under an obligation to eliminate 
discrimination between private individuals and groups see above, Chapter 4, text 
accompanying notes 232-245. 
154 Reporting Guidelines, supra, note 126, at 95. 
155 Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 5, para-22. 
156 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 12, at 4, para-18. 
157 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 4, at 6, para. 32. 
158 It has been noted that provisions providing for single trade unions 
generally aim at the control of the trade union movement by the public 
authorities. Pankert, supra, note 138, at 179-180. 
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a result of the freely chosen will of the workers concerned, 159 and 
the extent to which the right to form new trade unions exists. T'he 
State here has an obligation to refrain from action that would 
institutionalise the single trade union in law. 160 The essential 
question then, is not whether or not trade union diversity exists, 
but whether that diversity remains a possibility. 161 
b) Union Security Agreements 
It is clear that when an worker takes up employment in an 
undertaking where a union security clause (whether pre- or post- 
entry162) is in operation, he or she is effectively obliged to join 
the union concerned-163 In such a situation, the restriction upon 
freedom of choice is often justified as a necessary means for 
securing union bargaining power. 164 Although article 20(2) of the 
UDHR provides that "[n]o one may be compelled to belong to an 
association", other international instruments display more caution 
in this respect. Article 2 of IOLO Convention No. 87 leaves it open 
to the States concerned as to whether union security agreements 
are considered to be legitimate. Similarly, proposals to insert 
provisions guaranteeing the negative freedom of association in 
159 This point has occasionally been made by members of the 
Committee, see e. g., Mrachkov, E/C. 12/199 l/SR. 7, at 11, para. 47. 
160 An interesting point, taken up by only one member, was the general 
federation of agricultural workers in Syria that "had been established under 
Decree No. 127/1964" and that two other organisations had been merged by 
decree (No. 21/1974), Khoury (Syria), E/C. 12/1991/SR. 7, at 5, para. 16. 
Cf. General Survey, supra, note 133, para. 137. This does raise serious 
questions about the legitimacy of the closed shop however, see below, text 
accompanying notes 174-179. 
161 Jenks, supra, note 134, at 180; Valticos, supra, note 133, at 82. 
162 A post-entry closed shop agreement is sometimes referred to as an 
ff open shop agreement", see, Pankert, supra, note 138, at 182. There are, in 
addition to the two forms of closed shop agreements, agency shop agreements 
under which workers, while not being required to become union members, are 
obliged to pay dues to the union concerned. 
163 In post-entry closed shop agreements there is of course the theoretical 
possibility of the worker terminating his or her employment before entry into the 
Union. 
164 Pankert identifies four main objectives of trade union security 
agreements: i) to enable unions to control access to jobs; ii) to strengthen the 
Position of the unions in a hostile environment; iii) to force outsiders to share the 
financial burden of the operation of the trade union; and iv) to strengthen trade 
unions as an indispensable partner for the effective operation of the industrial 
relations system. 
Pankert, supra, note 138, at 182. 
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the ICCPRI65 and the ECHR166 were rejected. Certainly there was 
no real discussion of the matter during the drafting of the ICESCR. 
As far as the Covenant is concerned, there are two issues. 
First is whether the right to join trade unions of one's choice 
includes a right not to join a particular trade union. Secondly, 
whether dismissal resulting from failure to join the union 
concerned could amount to a violation of the right to work in 
article 6.167 In both cases there is clearly a tension between the 
rights of the individual and the right of trade unions to function 
freely and effectively. 
To some extent, the terms of the Covenant point to the 
legitimacy of closed shop agreements. Unlike the ECHR and the 
ICCPR the right to join trade unions is not placed in the context of 
"freedom of association" and thus arguably does not bear the same 
connotations of negativity. 168 Moreover, in specifically outlining 
the rights of trade unions the Covenant appears to demand that the 
relative interests of trade unions should not be dismissed out of 
hand. Indeed, just as much as the right of trade unions to function 
freely may be subject to limitations "for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others", 169 that is also the case as regards the 
individual right to join trade unions. 170 It is quite possible to 
interpret the "rights of others" in article 80)(a) as including the 
rights of trade unions. Far from outlawing closed shop agreements, 
the text of the Covenant suggests that the position is to be 
determined on a case by case basis and justified by reference to the 
appropriate limitation clauses found in article 8. 
In a recent case, however, the Committee has indicated that it 
will consider closed shop agreements to be a violation of the 
individual's right to join and form trade unions of his or her 
165 Ibid, at 181-2. 
166 See, Shea C., "The Case of Young, James and Webster: British 
Labour Law and the European Convention on Human Rights", 15 Cornell I. L. J., 
489, at 506 (1982). 
167 For the extent to which article 6 protects the individual worker from 
arbiamy dismissal, see above, Chapter 5, text accompanying notes 210-226. 
168 For a discussion of the implications of "rights" and "freedoms" in the 
context of the closed shop see, von Prondzyns1d F., "Freedom of Association 
and the Closed Shop: The European Perspective", 41 
_C. 
L. J., 256, at 263-4 
(1982). 
169 Axticle 80)(c). 
170 Ardcle 8(l)(a). 
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choice. In its comments upon the additional information supplied 
by Zaire, the Committee included the following statement: 
"The Committee would like to draw the attention of 
the Government of the Republic of Zaire to the fact 
that the provisions of Zairian law concerning 
automatic membership of permanent staff of the State 
public services in the National Union of Zairian 
Workers (Ordinance No. 73-223 of 25 July 1973) 
seems to be inconsistent with the obligations under 
article 8 of the Covenant, which guarantees the 
freedom of the individual to join the trade union of 
his choice". 171 
It would appear that the Committee is prepared to take a stance 
similar to that of the Committee of Independent Experts to the 
European Social Charter in prohibiting both the pre-and post- 
entry closed shop on the basis that the right to join a trade union 
implicitly includes a right not to join a trade union. 172As 
suggested above, this was not necessarily the only conclusion that 
the Committee could have drawn from the text of article 8, and 
was perhaps unduly strict on the point. It is considered that it 
would have been better to leave such matters to be determined by 
the State in con unction with the unions concerned. i 
171 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), at 78, para. 328, UN Doc. E/1992/23, (1992). 
172 The Committee of Independent Experts has taken the following 
position: 
"Considering that freedom to join trade unions, guaranteed by 
Article 5 of the Charter, necessarily implies the absence of any 
sort of obligation to become or remain a member of a trade union, 
the Committee held that the absence of adequate protection of 
such freedom in national law (either through lack of appropriate 
statutes of through case-law validating practices conflicting with 
freedom to organise) cannot be considered as consistent with 
Article 5 of the Charter. " Conclusions XI-I, at 78 (1989). 
The European Court of Human Rights has similarly found, on the 
particular facts of the case, that the dismissal of employees for failing to join a 
trade union under a closed shop agreement that was imposed during their 
employment, to be a violation of the ECHR,, see, Young, James and Webster Cm, supra, note 5. Cf. Shea., supra, note 173; von Prondzynski, supra, note 
175; Forde M., "The European Convention on Human Rights and Labour Law", 
31 A. J. C. L.,, 301 (1983); Van Hoof G., ThegZ and Practice on the EuMean 
Qn-vention on Human Rights, 428-440 (2nd. Ed. 1990). 
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4) Conditions 
The Committee, in its reporting guidelines, requests States to 
supply information upon the substantive and formal conditions 
which must be fulfilled in order to form and join trade unions. 173 
It seems to have in mind provisions that require a minimum level 
of membership for an organisation to gain the status of a trade 
union, or restrictions on membership to those working in specific 
trades. 174 The Committee has not as yet expressed any opinion 
over what conditions it feels are acceptable., but it is implicit in its 
approach that the need to impose certain conditions on the 
establishment of trade unions should not be such as to impair the 
effective exercise of that right. Certainly members of the 
Committee have been particularly wary of State involvement in the 
creation of trade unions. 175 It is considered nevertheless that the 
Committee faces an uneasy task in determining the borderline 
between legitimate regulation and unlawful restriction. 176 
It is submitted that reference be made to ILO standards here. 
As far as the ILO is concerned, although formalities over the 
formation of trade unions may be prescribed by law, they must not 
be equivalent to previous authorization nor constitute an obstacle 
amounting to a prohibition. 177 More specifically, where 
registration is necessary to gain legal personality, the conditions 
should not be such as to restrict the right to freely establish such 
organisations 
- 
178 
5) Restrict ons 
The Committee, quite appropriately, directs most of its 
attention to the imposition of restrictions upon the right to form 
and join trade unions. Thus in its reporting guidelines it asks for 
information as to any legal restrictions that are placed upon this 
173 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 126, at 94. 
174 For the ILO position on these matters see, Pankert, supra, note 138, 
at 179. 
175 See above, text accompanying note 154-157. 
176 See, von Prondzynsld F., Freedom of Association and Industrial 
Reladons: A Comparative Stigdy, 25 (1987). 
177 General Survey, supra, note 133, para. 105. Valticos,, supra, note 
133, at 82. 
178 Article 7, Freedom of Association Convention. See generally, General 
Survey, supra, note 133, paras 106-117. 
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right and their application over time. 179 Individual members have 
often pursued such questions themselves. 180 
However, the text of the Covenant is by no means clear as to 
the relevant provisions that govern the imposition of restrictions 
upon the right to form and join trade unions. Article 8(l)(a) 
contains its own outline of the general criteria that govern the 
imposition of lawful restrictions upon the right to form and join 
trade unions. Article 8(l), however, is subject to the terms of 
article 8(2) which provides that the article as a whole should not 
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions upon members of the 
police, armed forces, or members of the administration of the 
State. Further, the legality of restrictions imposed upon rights 
within article 8 would also appear to be governed by the general 
terms of article 4 which outlines the characteristics of permissible 
limitations upon all the rights in the Covenant. As mentioned 
above, the position is particularly confusing as regards the 
legitimacy of restrictions upon the right to form and join trade 
unions of members of the administration of the State. 
The Committee has not, as yet, undertaken to clarify either 
the meaning or the relative scope of the limitation clauses. It is 
considered that in order to give article 8 some meaningful content 
the Committee will have to begin by untangling the knot of 
limitation clauses that serve to obscure the level of protection 
offered by the rights. As an initial point it is clear that article 4 
was only intended to apply with respect to those articles that were 
not already subject to limitations. 181 Indeed, the limitations in 
article 8(2) were created on the basis that article 4 would not apply 
to article 8.182 It is considered that the legality of a restriction 
should initially be determined by the specific provisions article 
8(l)(a). 
According to article 8(l)(a), restrictions should be 
it prescribed by law"183 and be "necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public order or for the 
179 Reporting Guidelines, supra, note 126, at 94. 
180 See e. g., Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 22, at 2, para. 3; 
Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 6, para. 26; Simma, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 9, 
para. 44. 
181 See, UN Doc-A/2929, supra, note 6, at 25, para. 50. 
182 See above, text accompanying notes 57-61. 
183 The French text in contrast uses the term "provided by law" (pr6vues 
par la loi). 
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protection of the rights and freedoms of others". 184 Such terms 
are identical to those found in article 22 ICCPR and have been the 
subject of considerable jurisprudence in the European Court of 
Human Rights. 185 The European Court has stipulated inter alia 
that the law concerned must be both accessible and enable the 
individual to foresee the legal consequences of his or her 
actions. 186 17hat the action taken must be "necessary" has been 
interpreted as meaning that it should be more than merely 
"reasonable" or "desirable", but should conform to a "pressing 
social need". 187 In addition, the Court has invoked a principle of 
proportionality in determining whether or not the action taken was justified by the aimed pursued. 188 If the Committee were to follow 
the European Court's interpretation of these terms, it would 
immediately have a good framework for evaluating the legitimacy 
of limitations. 
It is considered that the Committee should be slightly 
circumspect about the application of article 8(2) to the right to 
form and join trade unions in article 8(l)(a). As suggested above, 
the scope of limitations that it seems to legitimise is far greater 
184 The French text makes clear that the term "necessary" is to apply 
separately to each of the four justifications: 
"L'exercice de ce droit ne peut faire lobjet que des seules restrictions prevues 
par la loi et qui constituent des mesures necessaires, dans une societ6 
d6mcratique, dans lint6r8t de la s6curit6 nationale ou de lordre public, ou pour 
prot6ger les droits et les, libertes d'autrui. " 
185 See generally, Jacobs F., "The 'Limitation Clauses' of the European 
Convention on Human Rights", in de Mestral et al (eds), The Limitation 
Human Rights in Co=arative Constitutional Law, 21, at 30-34 (1986). See 
also, Kiss A., "Permissible Limitations on Rights", in Henkin L. (ed), The 
Intemafional Bill of Rights, 290 (198 1); Lockwood B., Finn J. and Jubinsky 
G., "Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on Limitation Provisions", 7 
Hum. Rts. Q,, 35 (1985). 
186 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court H. R., Series A, 
Vol. 30, para. 49, Judgement of 26 Apr. 1979, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245. 
187 Handyside Case, Eur. Court H. R., Series A, Vol. 24, para. 48, 
Judgement of 7 Dec. 1976, (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737. It is clear, however, that the 
European Court will allow States a "margin of appreciation" in determining 
whether or not a limitation is "necessary". For the operation of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine see, MacDonald R., "The Margin of Appreciation in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights", in International Law 
Codification: Essays in Honour of Robert Aggo, 187 (1987); 
ODonnell T., "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights", 4 Hum. Rts. 
-Q-., 
474 
(1982). 
188 Sunday Times Case., supra, note 186, paras. 62,67. 
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than that provided by either the ILO or the ICCPR. 189 As a 
general provision it would appear to require that all the terms of 
article 8(1) are read in such a way to allow for restrictions to be 
placed upon the rights of members of the armed forces, police and 
the administration of the State. Nevertheless, it does state that any 
such restrictions should be "lawful". It would not deprive article 
8(2) of all meaning if the term "lawful" were read to mean "in 
accordance with the specific requirements laid down for the 
imposition of restrictions within the terms of article 8(l)". Such an 
interpretation would allow the Committee a certain degree of 
control over the imposition of restrictions under the terms of 
article 8(2). 
Q ARTICLE 8(1)02): THE RIGHT TO FEDERATE 
The right of trade unions to establish national federations or 
confederations and for the latter to join international trade-union 
organisations is clearly related to the right of trade unions to 
function freely as established in article 8(l)(c). At the same time, 
many of the provisions that relate to the establishment of trade 
unions within a given country (governed by article 8(l)(a)), will 
also apply to national federations. 
According to the reporting guidelines, the Committee 
expects States to provide information on how the right to federate 
and affiliate internationally is secured and any restrictions that are 
placed upon such a right. This reflects the established practice of 
the individual members. 190 Although no specific comment has 
been made, it would seem appropriate for the Committee to 
provide that the same rights and guarantees apply to federations as 
to trade unions themselves. 191 
Ibus far it could only be said that the right to federate 
should not be subject to undue State control. In one case members 
of the Committee were critical of the need for approval from the 
Minister for Social Affairs and Labour for trade unions in Jordan 
to join an international organisation. 192 Such requirements have 
189 See above, text accompanying note 138. 
190 Questions have included: Did trade unions have the right to form 
confederations in Jordan? Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 3, para-5. Were trade 
unions freely allowed to affiliate internationally in Korea? Sparsis, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 21, at 9, para. 40. 
191 Cf. Article 6 and 7 ELO Convention No. 87, supra, note 114. 
192 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 10, para. 45; Alvarez Vita, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6., at 11, para. 50. 
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also been criticised by the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association. 193 
It is interesting to note that the United Kingdom, upon 
signature, reserved the right "not to apply subparagraph (b) of 
paragraph 1 in Hong Kong, in so far as it may involve the right of 
trade unions not engaged in the same trade or industry to establish 
federations or confederations". 194 On ratification the government 
went further in reserving the right not to apply article 8(1)(b) at 
all in Hong Kong. 195 
D) ARTICLE 80)(c): THE RIGHT OF TRADE UNIONS TO 
FUNCTION FREELY 
The free functioning of trade unions could be said to include 
inter alia the right to federate and affiliate internationally and to a 
lesser degree, the right to strike (or perhaps to organise strikes), 
both of which stand as separate rights within the Covenant. The 
additional protection provided by the right to function freely 
would then seem to be the protection of the internal organisation 
of trade unions, the right to organise and take action short of 
strikes, the right to bargain collectively, and the protection of 
trade unions from dissolution or suspension. 
1) The Internal Organisation of Trade Unions. 
If trade unions are to be given the right to function freely 
they must have the ability to draw up their constitutions and rules, 
to elect their own representatives and organise their administration 
and policies. Neither the Committee as a whole, nor its individual 
members have made significant indications as to the extent to 
which the State may control the internal affairs of trade unions. 196 
The freedom of trade unions to establish their own rules of 
membership and election would seem to be confirmed by article 
8(1)(a) which refers to "the rules of the organisation 
concemed". 197 What is of concern here is the extent to which the 
193 Pankert, supra, note 138,, at 185. 
194 UN Doc. E/C. 12/1988/1, at 17 (1987). 
195 Ibid., at 18. 
196 The only indication that members of the Conimittee Will concern 
themselves with this area was the remark that the existence of a Trade Union Office to "monitor trade union organisations" seemed to constitute an interference 
in the activities of trade unions incompatible with article 8(i)(c) of the Covenant. 
Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 13, para. 63. 
197 Cf. Article 3(l) ILO Convention No. 87, supra, note 114. 
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State may control the content and operation of those rules. It is 
axiomatic, as the ILO notes., that State control should not be such 
as to impede the normal running of the organisation. 198 A number 
of States have rules disqualifying certain kinds of person from 
election as union officers such as those engaged in occupations 
other than that which they wish to represent, foreign nationals and 
those convicted of crimes which suggest that they are 
untrustworthy. 199 The ILO Committee of Experts has noted that 
in such cases there is a real risk of arbitrary and improper 
interference in trade union affairs by the State. 200 
In both cases of Costa Rica and Panama, it emerged that non- 
nationals were barred from holding executive positions in trade 
unions. 201 On neither occasion was there a great deal of discussion 
in the Committee of the matter, but each time a passage was 
included in the Committee's concluding comments that stated: 
"I'he view was expressed that the restrictions placed 
on the participation of foreigners in trade unions were 
not in conformity with article 8 of the Covenant". 202 
In utilising the phrase "the view was expressed" the Committee 
makes it clear that this was the view of only one or two members. 
However, the fact that the matter found its way into the concluding 
observations shows the strength of feeling of the members 
concerned. It is considered that the Committee should tread with 
caution in this field. As is evident, a number of States have rules 
concerning the eligibility of non-nationals to executive posts in 
trade unions. Consideration needs to be given to whether the 
limitations imposed have a legitimate purpose within the terms of 
the Covenant. If not they may be considered an excessive 
interference in the activities of the trade unions concerned. 
The Conunittee has not yet attempted to outline those 
activities of trade unions that are protected by their right to 
function freely or the degree to which those activities may be 
subject to legal regulation. Certainly in so far as the free 
functioning of trade unions implies the right of trade unions 
198 Pankert, supra, note 138, at 186. 
199 Ibid, at 186-7. 
200 General Survey, supra, note 133, at 178-9. 
201 Costa Rica: Dao, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 8, para. 36. Panama: 
Rattray, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 9, para. 43. 
202 Costa Rica: ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), at 50, para. 194, UN Doc. 
E/1991/23, (199 1); Panama: ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), at 33, para. 138, UN 
Doc. E/1992/23 (1992). 
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organise their own administration, it would seem to involve 
freedom from excessive control of their finances and the 
protection of trade union premises and correspondence. 
Additionally, as the ELO has noted, 203 trade unions should also 
have the right to organize their activities and formulate 
programmes. Clearly, however., not every activity undertaken by 
trade unions will be so protected. 
During the drafting of the Covenant considerable concern 
was expressed as to the possible political activities of trade unions. 
On the basis that trade unions should not undermine the existing 
democratic process, the phrase "for the promotion and protection 
of his economic and social interests" was included in article 
8(l)(a). 204 It would seem unduly restrictive if trade unions were 
prohibited from all activities of a political nature. As has been 
noted, general economic and social policy questions that form a 
large part of the political diet of most countries do have an effect 
on the workers' interests. 205 Indeed in Western Europe, it is 
commonplace for a close association to exist between unions and 
political parties. 206 Accordingly, a general prohibition of political 
activities by trade unions would not be justifiable either in theory 
or practice. It might be argued that restrictions on the political 
activities of unions should only extend as far as ensuring that the 
means employed had sufficient relation to the objective of 
promoting the workers' interests, and should not be such as to 
compromise the continuance of the trade union movement. 
Although it might be possible to find some justification for a 
whole range of trade union activities, it is clear that actions that 
only have a remote relation to the immediate objectives of a trade 
union would not be protected. It would be difficult to justify, for 
example, trade union action being taken to protest against a 
government's commitment to nuclear weapons or its maintenance 
of diplomatic relations with certain other States. 
203 General Survey, supra, note 133, at 180-226. 
204 See above, text accompanying notes 44-52. 
205 General survey, supra, note 133, at 195. 
206 Bean R., Comparative Industrial Relations, at 22 (1985). It has been 
noted by the ILO Committee of Experts that States should not attempt to interfere 
with the normal functions of trade unions merely because of their freely 
established relationship with a political party. See, Report of the Director- General, Human Rights: A Common Responsibili1y,, ILC, 75th Sess-, at 17 
(1988). 
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2) Collective Bargaining 
Whereas an analysis of the variety of forms and functions of 
the collective agreement is outside the scope of this present 
study, 207 it is sufficient to note that they may serve the functions 
inter alia of preventing industrial conflict, increasing worker 
participation in decision-making and fon-ning the basis for 
standard conditions of employment. 
That article 8(1)(c) was intended to protect the right of 
trade unions to bargain collectively was apparent in the drafting of 
the Covenant. 208 Members of the Committee have also identified 
collective bargaining as being implicit in the concept of freedom 
of association. 209 The Committee specifically mentions the 
question of collective bargaining in its reporting guidelines and 
requests States to indicate the measures being taken to "promote 
free collective bargaining". 210 In implying that States have an 
obligation to promote collective bargaining, the Committee 
probably had in mind ELO Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)211 which is referred to in 
the guidelines. Article 4 of that convention provides that measures 
should be taken to promote the full development and utilization of 
collective bargaining "with a view to the regulation of terms and 
conditions of employment by means of collective agreements ". 212 
This has been supplemented by Recommendation (No. 91) of 1951 
which leaves it to the States Parties themselves to establish 
"machinery appropriate to the conditions existing in each 
country". 213 
207 See generally, Schmidt F. and Neal A., "Collective Agreements and 
Collective Bargaining" in Hepple B. A. (ed), Labour Law, Chap. 12, Vol. XV, 
(1984); Cordova E., "Collective Bargaining" in Blainpain R. (ed), Co=arative 
Law and Industrial Relations 307 (3rd Ed, 1987); Kahn-Freund 0. (ed), Labour 
Relations and the Law: A Comparative Study, 21-124 (1965); Bean, supra, note 
205, at 70-99; Prondzynski, supra, note 183, at 39-58. 
2w See above, text accompanying note 69. 
209 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/198 8/SR. 3, at 6, para. 18. 
210 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 126, at 94. 
211 ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (NO-98), 1 Jul. 1949,96 U. N. T. S. 257. 
212 See also, article 6(2), European Social Charter (1961). 
213 ILO Collective Agreements Recommendation (No. 91), 195 1, in ELO, 
Intemational Labour Conventions and Recommendations 1919-1981, at 205 (1982). 
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In utilising the term "Promote" the Committee makes clear 
that it does not expect States to guarantee to every trade union the 
right to bargain collectively. It is common practice in a number of States to allow employers to limit the number of trade unions with 
whom they conclude collective agreements. Often only the "most 
representative" union within a particular bargaining unit, has the 
right to consultation and negotiation in the collective bargaining 
process. 214 Certainly it would appear that the Committee requires, 
at least, that trade unions generally have the "freedom" to bargain 
collectively. 215 The principal question is, however, the degree to 
which the Committee will consider as justifiable, restrictions upon 
the right of particular trade unions to participate in the bargaining 
process. 
Obligations incidental to the promotion of collective 
bargaining appear to be the encouragement of trade unionism; the 
establishment of mechanisms for dispute settlement; State restraint 
from interference in the process and result of collective bargaining (except in so far as it might be a party to the agreement); and 
encouragement of the extension of such agreements to other 
workers. Members of the Committee have emphasised in 
particular the importance of worker participation in the 
establishment of standards relating to conditions of work. 216 In 
particular questions have been asked as to the extent of worker 
participation in management, 217 in the creation of legislation218 
and the conclusion of collective agreements. 219 In addition, 
members have looked to the State to restrain itself from 
interference in the conclusion of collective agreements, 220 but to 
214 See, Pankert, supra, note 138, at 180. In the context of the ECHR 
see, National Union of Belgium Police Case, Eur. Court H. R., Series A, Vol. 19, 
Judgement of 27 Oct. 1975, (1980) 1 EHRR 578; Swedish Engine Drivers Case 
Eur. Court H. R.. Series A, Vol. 20, Judgement of 6 Feb. 1976, (1980) 1 EHRR 
617. See generally, Forde, supra, note 179. 
215 This is currently the position under the ECHR, see, Van Hoof, 
supra, note 172, at 436. 
216 See above, Chapter 6, text accompanying note 122. 
217 See e. g., Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 13, at 4, para. 14. 
218 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 7, para. 32. 
219 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 7, para-32. 
220 See e. g., Sparsis,, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 10, para. 42; Sparsis, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 6, para. 18. 
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establish minimum standards through legislation in the absence of 
strong workers' organisations. 221 
It is notable however that 11LO Convention No. 98 does not 
apply to the armed forces, police, or public servants engaged in 
the administration of the State. This is specifically the wording 
adopted in article 8(2) of the Covenant. The ILO Committee of 
Experts has drawn a distinction between officials engaged in 
achninistration of the State who might be excluded from the 
protection of that convention and persons employed in public 
enterprises who should enjoy the right to free collective 
bargaining. 222 At the present stage it would seem that the 
Committee, by referring to Convention No. 98, has taken up a 
position analogous to that of the ILO in this respect. 'Ibis is 
equally apparent from its reference in the reporting guidelines to 
the ILO Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention (no. 151)223 
which provides for the establishment and operation of public 
employees' organisations with procedures for the determination of 
conditions of work and settlement of disputes. 224 That special 
conditions are considered to exist in relation to civil servants has 
been recognised by individual members of the Committee. 225 
3) Protection from Dissolution or Suspension. 
The third and final element of the right to function freely is 
the protection of trade unions from dissolution and suspension. 
Although the Committee has not expressed any opinion on this 
matter, it is clearly implicit in the terms of article 8 that trade 
unions should not be arbitrarily prevented from functioning 
freely. In cases where unions have been suspended or dissolved, 
the State concerned will have to justify it on the basis of national 
security, public order or the protection of the rights of others. In 
addition, it will have to be shown that the action taken was strictly 
necessary. As dissolution is the most extreme form of measure to 
be taken in this context, it is submitted that attention should be paid 
to whether it was strictly proportionate to the intended aim. 
221 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 10, para-42. 
222 Dao (ILO), E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 9-10, para-60. 
223 ILO Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention (No. 151), 27 
Jun. 1978, UKTS 33 (1981). Reporting guidelines, supra, note 126, at 94. 
224 Cf. Valticos, supra, note 133, at 90-1. 
225 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 10, at 13, para. 81; Sparsis, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 34, at 7, para. 51. 
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E) ARTICLE 8(1). ýd): THE RIGHT TO S 
In expressly including a provision of the right to strike the Covenant stands out in relation to other international instruments (with the exception of the European Social Charter226). The ]]LO 
in particular, has been forced to infer a right to strike from article 
3 of ILO Convention No. 87 under which trade unions have the 
right to formulate their programmes and organise their 
activities. 227 However, the fact that a right to strike may be 
inferrable from the prohibition of forced labour in article 6(l), the 
right to form and join trade unions "for the promotion and 
protection of his economic and social interests" in 8(l)(a), 228 and 
from the right of trade unions to function freely in article 8(l)(c) 
would suggest that even for those States that have made 
reservations with respect to article 8(l)(d), 229 a general 
prohibition of the right to strike would infringe the provisions of 
the Covenant. This would seem to be the position of certain 
members of the Committee who have stressed that the right to 
strike was central to the ability of unions to conduct collective 
bargaining. 230 Indeed one member asserted that the possibility of 
conducting meaningful collective bargaining without the right to 
strike was "an exercise in futility". 231 
Despite the fact that the right to strike is generally exercised 
as a form of collective action taken by trade unions, it is framed as 
an individual right in the Covenant. This is significant in so far as 
it indicates that protection in the case of strikes should not merely 
be afforded to the Union concerned but also to the individual who 
226Article 6(4) European Social Charter provides for both a right to strike 
and a right to lock-out: 
"the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of 
interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of 
collective agreements previously entered into. " 
227 Cf. Ben-Israel, supra, note 78, at 93. 
228 The HRC faced this question in the case of J. B. et al. 
- 
v. Canada, 
supra, note 121. The majority decided (erroneously in the author's opinion), that 
as the ICESCR specifically included the right to strike in article 8(l)(d), it could 
not be considered to be an implicit element in the right to form and join trade 
unions. 
M In addition to the reservations dealt with below, the following States 
have made reservations or declarations with respect to article 8(l)(d): France, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway. UN 
Doc. ST/LEG/SER. E/10, at 124 and 126 (1992). 
230 See e. g., Konate, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 11, at 6, para. 37. 
231 Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 4, at 6, para. 32. 
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should, in particular, be protected from dismissal on this 
ground. 232 The terms of Article 8(l)(d) are also significant in so 
far as no mention is made of the purposes for which strike action 
might be taken. 233 Whereas under article 8(l)(a) the right to form 
and join trade unions is specifically restricted to the "promotion 
and protection of his economic and social interests", no such 
condition is to be found in article 8(l)(d). Although this might 
imply that all strikes are to be protected, irrespective of their 
purpose, such a position would be difficult to sustain in light of 
current State practice. 234 For example, even in States where the 
constitution explicitly or indirectly guarantees the right to strike, 
political strikes are generally considered unlawful. 235 
The Committee has yet to establish an understanding of what 
form of action is protected by article 8(l)(d). In addition to the 
traditional form of strike (characterised by the complete stoppage 
of work) and its variants (such as the wildcat and sympathy 
strikes), there are several other forms of industrial action that 
might also be included in the definition such as the partial stoppage 
of work, the go-slow, the work to rule, the sit-down strike and the 
repeated walk-out. 236 It is submitted that a wide definition be 
adopted but a certain flexibility given to States as to the 
restrictions imposed on the various forms. The fundamental 
consideration should be whether or not the action taken is in 
pursuit of the economic and social interests of the workers 
concerned. 
The Committee has looked to the establishment of the right 
to strike as a legal or constitutional right in the States 
concerned. 237 However, recognition is paid to the fact that some 
232 For the importance of the individual aspect of the right to strike in the 
UK see, Ewing K., "The Right to Strike", 5 Ind. R. L., 143, at 158 (1986). 
233 Cf. Article 6(4) of the European Social Charter (1961) which restricts 
the fight to take collective action to cases of "conflicts of interests" 
. 
234 Schermers uses this particularly as a reason for concluding that the 
right to strike is not properly a human right at all. Schermers H., "Is there a 
Fundamental Human Right to Strike? ", 9 Yrbk. Eur. L., 225 (1989). 
235 Birk R., "IndustrW Conflict: The Law of Strikes and Lock-outstf, in 
Blainpain R. (ed), Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 401, at 415 (3rd Ed. 1987). For the-ILO position see, Ben-Israel, supra, note 78, at 93-98. 
236 See, Ben-Israel, supra, note 78, at 93. 
237 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 126, at 95. 
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countries may secure the right through different legal 
approaches. 238 This reflects the approach of the ILO Committee 
of Experts who consider that the right to strike may be recognised 
either implicitly or explicitly in legislation. 239 Nevertheless, 
certain members of the Committee have been unhappy about 
situations where there is stated to be no right to strike but merely a freedom to strike. 240 
The matter arose in the context of the Jamaican report 
where the situation was explained: 
"The Supreme Court had come to the decision, based on 
some English common law decisions, that there was in fact 
no right to strike as such.... Since it was an infringement of 
common law for a person to be compelled to work, slavery 
having been abolished, there must therefore be a freedom 
not to work. But if the consequences of exercising that 
freedom was that one withdrew services for which provision 
had been made in the contract, a case could arise where 
there was a breach of the contract of employment. From 
that it was inferred that there was a freedom to strike, but 
not the right to strike. "241 
238 The reporting guidelines make reference to other legal or factual 
approaches used to guarantee the right to strike, ibid. 
239 Dao (ILO), E/C. 12/1988/SR. 4, at 8, para. 43. 
240 Birk explains these concepts: 
"Freedom of strike means that the strike is legally permitted but 
no special privileges are granted. In this case the strike does not 
need special rules. Ile legal limits of the freedom to strike are 
hence a consequence of the general legal order. The strike is 
tolerated but not privileged... Ile right to strike differs from the 
freedom to strike when the legal order evaluates the pursuit of 
collective interests more highly than the opposed individual 
obligations of the employment contract. The strike is therefore 
privileged. If the right to strike is guaranteed the legal order of a 
state must hence take precautions to ensure the exercise of this 
right and not to impede it". 
Birk, supra, note 235, at 406-7. 
241 Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 15, at 5, para. 22. It is interesting to note here that 
the legal situation in Jamaica had to be explained by one of the members of the Committee given the insufficient nature of the oral and written reports. Cf. Nembhard (Jamaica), F, /C. 12/1990/SR. 12, at 4, para. 29. 
As regards the position of strikes under the UK common law, see, Morris G. 
and Archer T., Trade Unions. Emjplgyers and the Law 174-277; Ewing K., The Right 
1Q3Z&, 4-22 (1991). He concludes: 
"The legal position of the British worker engaged in a labour dispute is 
quite remarkable. A strike, for whatever reason, is a breach of contract; 
any form of industrial action short of a strike can lead to the total loss of 
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Members of the Committee were critical of this situation. It was 
suggested that "mere freedom to strike was not sufficient"242 and that the 
right to strike should be integral to the contract of employment. 243 
Accordingly, it was felt that Jamaica should consider amending its 
legislation to bring it into line with the article 8(1)(d) of the 
Covenant. 244 
It is considered that the Committee members were taking an 
excessively strict line on this question. Whereas certain States have a 
consitutionally protected right to strike, 245 others ensure the right 
through statutory immunity from civil liability. What should be of 
concern to the Committee is not whether the law expressly provides for a 
freedom or a right to strike, but whether employees are able in practice, 
without legal penalty, to participate in strike action. 246 This means that 
in countries such as the UK, statutory immunity from liability should be 
sufficiently extensive to ensure the operation of the right to strike, and 
should be bolstered by the protection of the individual worker from 
dismissal. 247 
Nevertheless, members of the Committee have persisted in treating 
cases where strikes may in principle involve a breach of contract, with a 
pay; those engaged in industrial action may be dismissed with impunity (regardless of the reasons for the industrial action); there is no right to 
unemployment benefit; and strikers and their families are penalised by 
social welfare legislation, even when the dispute is the singular fault of 
the employer. " 
Ibid, at 141. 
242 Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 11, at 2, para-6. 
243 See, Konate, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 15, at 6, para. 25. 
244 See, Konate, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 11, at 5,, para. 36. 
245 States that have declared the possession of a constitutional right to strike 
include: Costa Rica, E/1 990/5/Add. 3, at 18, para. 29; Panama, E/1984/6/Add. 19, at 17; 
Afghanistan, E/1990/5/Add. 8, at 7, Para. 24. 
246 Cf. Rattray, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 18, at 8., para. 42. 
247 The current legal position of the right to strike in the UK has come under 
much criticism from the ILO and the Committee of Independent Experts of the European Social Charter. 
Two main points have concerned the ILO Committee of Experts. First the lack of 
adequate protection of the individual from dismissal during a strike. Secondly, the limited scope of immunity from civil liability. See, ILO Observation of the Committee of 
Experts on Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 (1989), cited in, Ewing, supra, note 136, at 31- 
37. Ile Committee of Independent Experts have been concerned about the fact that an 
employer may dismiss all employees who take part in a strike. See, Conclusions XI-I, at 90(1989). 
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certain degree of caution. 248 They seem to consider that the enactment of legislation to ensure the right to strike is a priority. 249 Whether or not it is always appropriate to seek legislation in this area, it is clearly 
important that existing legislation does not impede the ability of 
employees to strike. 2.50 Hence a general prohibition of strikes of a direct 
or indirect nature (for example through compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration procedures), would be inconsistent with the right to strike as found in the Covenant. 251 
Beyond the question of how the right to strike is formulated in 
domestic law, the Committee has concerned itself with any restrictions 
that are placed upon the exercise of the right and special provisions that 
relate to certain categories of workers. 252 Article 8(l)(d) provides that 
the right to strike should be ensured "provided it is exercised in 
conformity with the laws of the particular country", suggesting that 
States have considerable discretion in placing legal restrictions upon the 
enjoyment of the right to strike. This can be contrasted with the right to 
strike in IILO practice, which cannot be limited by legal provisions if 
they are not in conformity with the criteria laid down by the Freedom of 
Association Committee of the Governing Body. 253 However, as has been 
noted above, for those States that are party to ILO Convention (No. 87), 
the terms of article 8(l)(d) have to be read in conformity with the 
provisions of the ELO Convention. Additionally, if higher standards were 
already in place, States could not lower them on the grounds of the 
Covenant as stipulated in article 5(2). This has been dubbed the "most- 
favourable-to-individual" clause. 254 
Nevertheless, it would probably be more appropriate to interpret 
the phrase "in conformity with the laws of the particular country" as 
legitimising the imposition of certain procedural requirements, rather 
than substantive limitations which are governed by article 8(2). 
Procedural requirements on the right to strike identified by the 
Committee on Freedom of Association have included the obligation to 
248 See e. g. Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 9, para-44; Texier, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 3, at 5, para. 15; Simma, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 4, at 7, para. 36. 
249 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 17, at 17, para. 90; Konate, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 11, at 3, para. 12. 
250 Cf. Dao (ELO), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 11, para. 59. 
251 For the ELO position see, Ben-Israel, supra, note 78, at 99-101. 
252 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 126, at 95. 
253 Ben-Israel, supra, note 78, at 87. 
254 Buergenthal T., "To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible 
Derogations", in Henkin L. (ed), The Intemational Bill of Rights, 72 at 89 (1981). 
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observe a certain quorum, to take the decision by secret ballot and to 
provide the employer with prior notice. Additionally certain temporary 
restrictions have been noted such as strike restrictions during conciliation 
and arbitration procedures, during the duration of a collective agreement 
and during a cooling-off period. 255 
As noted above, the Committee has concerned itself with the 
operation of such restrictions. 256 Although it has not as yet established 
any stated policy, it would seem that the Committee will. respect the 
irnposition of procedural requirements as far as they are reasonable and 
do not stand as an excessive restriction upon the enjoyment of the right 
to strike. Members of the Committee have also examined such 
restrictions as they operate in practice to ensure that they are not abused 
at the expense of the workers. 257 In the case of the Dominican Republic, 
a law which provided that in order to strike 60% of the workers 
concerned needed to have voted in favour, was thought to be contrary to 
the practice of the ELO's Committee on Freedom of Association and 
article 8(1)(d) itself. 258 Similarly, a Jordanian provision requiring 
workers to notify their employer of any planned strike between 14 and 
28 days in advance was considered "unduly harsh"259 and posed a 
"serious obstacle"260 to the exercise of that right in that it could have "a 
dissuasive effect on workers wishing to strike". 261 Strangely enough, a 
provision in Rwanda that required all strikes in the private sector to be 
authorised by an Executive Bureau of Trade Unions was sub ect to little 
conunent by the Committee. 262 It was perhaps a reflection of the initial 
tentativeness of the Committee that it did not question the power of such 
a body to prohibit strikes. 
In addition to procedural restrictions the Committee has made note 
of restrictions on the right to strike of certain public servants and those 
255 Ben-Israel, supra, note 78, at 118-121. 
256 See above, text accompanying notes 179-189. 
257 See e. g., Daoudi, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 4, para. 15. 
258 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44, at 14, para. 73. 
259 Article 103 Labour Act. Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 11, para. 5 1; 
Simma, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 12, para. 59. 
260 Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 7, at 4, para. 12. He commented that "Most 
domestic legislation provided for some period of prior notification, but the time-span 
was usually extremely short". 
261 Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 6, at 13, para. 68. It is worth noting that a 
provision that provided for an eight-day delay after notification was not considered to be 
excessive by the Committee on Freedom of Association. See, Ben-Israel, supra, note 
78, at 120. 
262 But see, Marchan Romero, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 10, at 7, para-34. 
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working in essential services. 263 It would seem that such restrictions are legitimised under article 8(2) where a general reference is made to 
members of the administration of the State. It is submitted that any such 
restrictions should also conform to the general criteria laid out in article 
4, namely be determined by law, compatible with the nature of the right 
and be "solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society". Reliance upon article 4 here is justified on the basis 
that article 8(l)(d) itself does not contain a specific limitation clause 
itself. 264 The Committee, although it has recognised the lawfulness of 
restrictions in general, has not defined which categories of workers are 
to fall under each heading, nor on what basis restrictions may be 
imposed. In this regard individual members have merely made enquiries 
into which categories of workers are covered by the restrictions that are 
employed. 265 
Given the practice of the ILO in this area, 266 it would seem 
appropriate if the Committee were to begin to define the categories of 
workers whose right to strike may be restricted. Clearly, if the article 
was to be read restrictively, members of the State administration should 
apply to civil servants alone. Those employed in State enterprises could 
not legitimately be deprived of the right to strike. This would certainly 
be the understanding of a number of States. For example, Japan declared 
upon ratification that 'members of the police' referred to in article 8(2) 
should be interpreted to include the fire service personnel of Japan. 267 In 
doing so, it clearly felt that the fire service personnel did not fall into the 
category of members of the administration of the state. It is considered 
that States would nevertheless be able to rely upon the general limitations 
clause in article 4 to impose restrictions upon the right to strike of those 
working in essential services. 
The question of restrictions upon the right to strike arose notably 
263 This has been the subject of a reservation by Trinidad and Tobago, which 
states with respect to article 8(1)(d) and 8(2) that it "reserves the right to impose lawful 
and/or reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the aforementioned rights by personnel 
engaged in essential services under the Industrial Relations Act or under any Statute 
replacing same which has been passed in accordance with the provisions of the Trinidad 
and Tobago Constitution". UN Doc. E/C. 12/1988/1, at 16 (1987). 
264 It is argued above that article 4 does not in general apply to article 8, see 
above, text accompanying note 181. 
265 See e. g., Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1989/SR-10, at 7, para. 33; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 18, at 2, para. 2; Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44, at 12, para. 56; Texier, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 5, at 6, para. 26. 
266 See, Ben-Israel, supra, note 78, at 106-114. 
267 UN Doc. E/C. 12/1988/1, at 13 (1987). 
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in the case of Panama. Following the comments of the ELO 
representative, 268 questions were asked as to the nature and scope of 
restrictions imposed upon the right to strike in Panama. 269 It was 
explained that certain restrictions were placed upon the exercise of the 
trade union rights of members of the civil service in Panama following a 
demonstration which coincided with an attempted coup d'gtat. Following 
the refusal of a request for them to rescind their decision to strike, the 
govenunent had adopted Act No. 25 authorising the dismissal of members 
of the civil service who jeopardised national security by taking part in 
strikes or demonstrations. There was, however, provision for 
administrative appeal which had been utilised by some public servants 
following their dismissal, a number of whom were subsequently 
reinstated. 270 
No real discussion of the matter was undertaken by the Committee, 
which seemed to accept the legitimacy of the Panamanian position as 
explained. Certainly, no mention was made of the matter in the 
Committee's concluding comments. The case is interesting in so far as it 
appears to be a situation that would normally be governed by a 
derogation clause. However, unlike the ICCPR, 271 the Covenant does not 
contain a derogation clause. Higgins explains this on the basis that 
derogation clauses are only necessary where there are strong 
implementation provisions. 272 It is clear, however, that article 8 is to be 
implemented in an immediate manner, and therefore does not contain the 
flexibility found in other articles. 
The problem, however, is that although article 8(2) does allow 
restrictions to be made on the right to strike of members of the 
administration of the State, article 5(2) appears to provide that the 
provisions of the Covenant cannot be used as a justification for 
restricting the rights of individuals as currently enjoyed under national 
or international law. 273 If this is the case, then restrictions are valid only 
268 Swepston (ILO), E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 6, para-23. 
269 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 10, para. 48. 
270 Ucros (Panama), E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 13-14, para. 64. 
271 Article 4 ICCPR provides that in time of public emergency which threatens 
the life of the nation, States Parties may take measures derogating from their obligations 
under the Covenant. On the operation of this provision see, Hartman J., "Working 
Paper for the Committee of Experts on Article 4"1 7 Hum. Rts. Q. 89 (1985); Meron T., 
Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations, 86-100 (1986); McGoldrick D., 
_The Human Rights Committee, 301-327 (1991). 
272 Higgins R., "Derogations under Human Rights Treaties", 48 B. Y. I. L., 281, 
at 286 (1976-77). See also, Kiss, supra, note, at 29 1. 
273 See, Buergenthal, supra, note 254, at 89. 
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in so far as they are imposed before ratification, which would mean that 
Panama is acting in direct violation of the Covenant. 
Although it is clear that States are less likely to resort to 
derogations in the case of economic, social and cultural rightS, 274 if 
limitations cannot be placed upon the enjoyment of rights after 
ratification, States might be severely hampered from dealing with 
national emergencies in an effective manner. Iliere is a case then for 
interpreting article 5(2) in a more restricted manner- perhaps subject to 
article 4 which provides for limitations for the purpose of promoting the 
general welfare in a democratic society. 
Although this discussion presents no clear answers to the questions 
raised, it does suggest that the Committee has considerable work to do on 
defining the scope and application of the limitation clauses. The fact that 
little consideration was given to the Panamanian case is unfortunate not 
only because it deserved serious consideration by the Committee, but also 
because it provided the Committee with an opportunity to extrapolate 
certain principles for general application which was not taken. 
IV CONCLUSIO 
In a number of respects, the Committee's task in evaluating State 
reports with respect to article 8 is considerably easier than for other 
articles. First, article 8 is confined to a relatively small area of State 
activity and is comparatively specific. Secondly, it is in general not 
subject to progressive implementation and therefore offers the 
Committee greater ease of assessment and evaluation of State 
performance. T11irdly, as with articles 6,7 and 9, it is a subject area 
covered by the work of the ILO which has a plethora of standards that 
may readily be utilised by the Committee in developing the norms within 
the Covenant. Finally, the Committee has the opportunity of drawing 
upon the experience of other human rights supervisory bodies (such as 
the Committee of Independent Experts of the European Social Charter, 
the European Court of Human Rights and the HRQ in so far as they deal 
with the right to form and join trade unions or the right to freedom of 
association in general. In light of these considerations, the Committee's 
treatment of article 8 is a good indicator of how well the Committee has 
developed its role as a human rights supervisory body. 
The Committee has got to the stage of establishing the broad 
nature of the obligations in article 8 and has taken a position on several 
important questions. In particular, one might note its opinion that a 
closed shop agreement operated in Zaire, was in violation of article 8 
which guarantees the freedom of the individual to join the trade union of 
274 See, Green L., "Derogations of Human Rights in Emergency Situations", 16 
-Can. Y. T. L. 92, at 103 (1978). 
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his or her choice. That this is but one of a number of cases in which 
Committee members have spoken out against States parties shows a 
willingness to enforce the standards within the Covenant and indicates 
that the Committee is receiving a certain amount of pertinent 
information. 'Me Committee has been assisted in this regard by the 
representatives of the ELO, who have pointed out areas that have been of 
concern to ILO supervisory bodies. The statements of the ELO 
representatives have often appeared to "trigger" the interest of the 
Committee. 
Whether or not the Committee will rely directly upon ILO 
standards it is clear that there is need for greater awareness and 
understanding of those standards and the general practice of States. As 
appeared from the Committee members' approach to Costa Rica and 
Panama, little attention was paid to the delicate manner in which the IILO 
generally approached the right of non-nationals to hold executive 
positions in trade unions. Similarly, their approach to the question of 
trade union diversity reflected a lack of sophistication that was out of 
place in the context of a complicated and sensitive issue. That the 
Committee should be aware of the need for greater delicacy is 
exemplified by Forde Is comments on the European Court of Human 
Rights: 
"The principal question... is the appropriateness of judges, many of whom possess relatively little 
industrial relations expertise, laying down common 
standards for collective bargaining systems of great 
complexity that often differ fundamentally from each 
other. Especially at the international level, there is a 
grave danger of amateurs, no matter how eminent 
they may be as jurists, tinkering with arrangements 
they do not fully understand, and tending to impose 
standards that may work in their countries upon the 
entirely different labour market systems of other 
States. "275 
Although premised by the perceived anti-union stance of the 
European Court, Forde's comments serve as a warning to the 
Committee. 
To some extent the ability of the Committee to develop an 
understanding of article 8 is restricted by the lack of sufficient 
information and the general nature of the reporting procedure, but 
many of the faults of the system could be overcome by careful and 
considered questions both in the reporting guidelines and within 
the Committee itself. That article 8 is relatively detailed suggests 
275 Forde, supra, note 179, at 332. 
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that particular attention should be paid to the specific wording of 
the provisions. In particular, an effort should be made to define 
the relative scope and meaning of the various limitation clauses. 
For example, consideration should be given to the term "members 
of the administration of the State" in article 8(2), and to the extent 
to which that provision as a whole overrides the specific terms of 
article 8(l)(a). As the terms of the constructive dialogue give little 
opportimity for discussion of the specific wording of article 8, it is 
clear that the Committee will need to adopt a General Comment on 
the question before any real headway is made. 
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PTER 8: 
STANDARD OF LIVING 
Article 11 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take 
appropriate steps to ensure the realisation of this right, recognising to 
this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based 
on free consent. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognising the 
fundamental right of everyone to be fi-ee from hunger, shall take, 
individually and through international co-operation, the measures, 
including specific programmes, which are needed: (a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution 
offood by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by 
disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by 
developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve 
the most e cient development and utilization of natural resources. (b) Taking into account the problems of both food- importing and 
food exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world 
food supplies in relation to need. It 
1) INTRODUCTION 
Article 11 is one of the most broad-ranging and general of the 
articles in the Covenant, encompassing a host of concerns that are 
usually addressed in the context of State "development". There is no 
doubt that the right to an adequate standard of living, including food, 
housing and clothing is of paramount importance not least because at 
minimum levels it represents a question of survival. It is also true to say 
that the right to an adequate standard of living has been violated "more 
comprehensively and systematically than probably any other right". 1 
That the realisation of the right is overlaid by issues of economic 
development, agrarian reform, principles of nutrition, international 
trade and aid (to name but a few), poses a challenge to the Committee 
that may serve as an acid-test of its effectiveness as the principal 
supervisory body to the Covenant. 
1 Alston P., "International Law and the Human Right to Food" in Alston P. and 
Tomasevski K(eds), The Right to Food, 9-68, at 9 (1984). He speaks specifically 
about the right to food, but his comment would also seem to apply more generally to 
the right to an adequate standard of living. 
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Thus far the Committee has not shied away from addressing 
questions related to article 11. At its third and fourth sessions it 
conducted general discussions on rights contained within article 11, and 
at its sixth session adopted a General Comment on the right to housing. 
It would not be wrong to suggest that article 11 is the area in which the 
Committee's practice is most developed. Indeed, the growing confidence 
of the Committee in the area is highlighted by the fact that it was on the 
question of the right to housing that the Committee first found a State to 
be in violation of the Covenant. 
H) THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 
A) INTRODUCTION 
Some of the earliest proposals relating to article 11 concerned the 
right to housing. 2 However, there is no doubt that article 25 UDHR 
probably played the most crucial role in determining its final content. 
At its seventh session in 1951, the Commission on Human Rights 
considered the rights in article 11 at its 203rd, 204th, 218th, 222nd and 
223rd meetings. 3 In the following year, it resumed consideration of the 
rights at its 294th and 295th meetings. 4 The result of the Commission Is 
deliberations on the question was two articles, the first recognising "the 
right of everyone to adequate food, clothing, and housing", and the 
second recognising "the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living and the continuous improvement of living conditions". 5 
Ihe IIiird Committee then took over consideration of the article 
11 at its 739th to 743rd meetings. 6 At its 741 st meeting, the 
representatives of Ecuador and Mexico proposed the establishment of a 
Working Party on articles 11 and 12 for the purpose of drafting a 
compromise text in light of the amendments that had been proposed to 
that date. Ille Working Party met on a single occasion and produced a 
2 See e. g., Koussoff (Byelorussian SSR), A/C. 3/SR. 299, at 186, para. 18 (1950). 
3 UN Docs. E/CN. 4/SR. 203-4,218,222-3,13 UN ESCOR, CNA, (203-4, 
218,222-3 mtgs. ), (1951). 
4 UN Docs. E/CN. 4/SR. 294-5,14 UN ESCOR, CNA, (294-5 mtgs. ), (1952). 
See generally, UN Doc. A/2929, at 109-111, paras 29-32 (1955), 10 UN GAOR, 
Annexes, (Ag. Item 28), Pt. II, (1955). 
UN Doc. E/2573, Annex IA, 18 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 7), (1954). 
6 UN Docs. A/C. 3/SR. 739-743,11 UN GAOR, C. 3, (739-743 mtgs. ), at 293- 
311 (1957). See generally, UN Doc-A/3525, at 17-19, paras 120-144,11 UN GOAR, 
Annexes, (Ag. Item 31), (1957). 
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mutually satisfactory formula with little dispute. Its report7 was 
subsequently considered by the Committee and adopted in its entirety 
with two minor additions. The Third Committee's final draft of article 
11 in 1955 contained merely the first of the four paragraphs. 8 Eight 
years later in 1963, the Third Committee came to discuss the matter 
again. A number of proposals were received and the final three 
paragraphs were adopted as article 11(2). 9 
B) ARTICLE 11 (1) 
1) Two Se arate Articles 
In its first detailed discussion of the proposals, the Commission 
was split between those States that considered that the right to housing 
should be dealt with separately from the right to an adequate standard 
of living, and those who thought they should be dealt with together. 
Although there was no doubt that the right to housing fell within the 
concept of the right to an adequate standard of living the question was 
one of formulation. At one extreme, it was felt that the priority was to 
draft a provision on the right to an adequate standard of living. To 
single out housing as a separate provision would give it undue 
prominence, 10 especially in light of the fact that other elements such as 
health, clothing, food and transport were also relevant. 11 At the other 
extreme, it was argued that it would be difficult and indeed 
unnecessary, to include a provision outlining the general concept of an 
adequate standard of living. 12 A better policy would be to enunciate the 
elements of that standard in separate, specific and obligatory 
provisions. 13 
Although there was some support for the idea of a composite 
article outlining the right to an adequate standard of living "including 
7UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 586,11 UN GAOR, C. 3, (1957). 
8 UN Doc. A/3525., supra, note 6, at 19, para-144. 
9 UN Docs. A/C. 3/SR. 1232,1264,1267-9,18 UN GAOR, C. 3, (1232,1264, 
1267-9 mtgs. ), (1963). See generally, UN Doc. A/5655, at 20-23, paras 86-108,18 
UN GAOR, Annexes, (Ag. Item 48), (1963). 
10 See e. g., Bowie (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 18 (1951); Whitlam (Australia), 
E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 20 (195 1); Mehta (India), ibid. 
11 See, Yu (China), E/CNA/SR. 222, at 17 (195 1). 
12 See e. g., Valenzuela (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 19 (195 1). 
13 See, morosov (USSR), E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 18 (1951). 
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adequate housing", 14 it was considered more convenient to adopt a 
separate provision on the right to housing without prejudice to its later 
position in the Covenant. Indeed certain States voted in favour of the 
text on the express condition that the Commission would not be bound 
by the decision to make it a separate provision. 15 
At the Commission's eighth session, the subject was reopened with 
a new proposal from the UK to delete the separate provision on the 
right to housing. 16 The UK argued that the concept was already implicit 
in other articles that related to conditions of work, standards of living 
and standards of health, and was therefore unnecessary and 
dupliCitoUS. 17 It was also noted that the UDHR mentioned the right to 
housing as part of the right to an adequate standard of living. 18 On the 
other hand certain states argued that given the importance of the right 
to housing, the reference in article 12 (the right to an adequate standard 
of living) was not sufficient, 19 particularly as it might limit the right 
merely to the fulfilment of immediate needs. 20 Moreover, the question 
of whether or not housing formed part of an adequate standard of living 
depended upon demographic pressures and the availability of resources. 
Given this uncertainty, it was submitted that the right to housing should 
be stated in a separate article. 21 Although the UK was forced to 
withdraw its amendment over a question of procedure, it is apparent 
that the majority opposed the deletion of the article in any case. 
In the Third Committee, it was decided almost immediately, upon 
the suggestion of the Swedish delegate, that articles 11 and 12 as drafted 
by the Commission should be discussed together. 22 During the 
discussion it was commented that the rights to food, housing and 
clothing could be seen as "illustrations" of the right to an adequate 
standard of living23 or as "component elements". 24 Although China 
14 See e. g., Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 16 (1951); Cassin (France), 
ibid. 
15 See e. g., Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 23 (195 1). 
16 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/L. 83,14 UN ESCOR, CNA, (1952). 
17 See e. g., Hoare (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 5 (1952). 
18 See, Whitlam (Australia), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 6 (1952). 
19 See e. g., Morosov (USSR), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 6 (1952); Mehta (India), 
E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 8 (1952). 
20 See, Azkoul (Lebanon), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 11 (1952). 
21 See, Juvigny (France), E/CNA/SR-294, at 9 (1952). 
22 A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 293, paras 1-8 (1957). 
23 Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 293, para. 11 (1957). 
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objected that the right to an adequate standard of living was broader 
than these three rights and should stand alone, 25 the majority quickly 
decided to combine the two articles. 26 As the Indonesian representative 
noted, an adequate standard of living could not be achieved without 
adequate food, clothing and housing. 27 
2) The Ri_ to Hou 
The Commission had two draft articles before it: one from the 
USSR referring to a right to living accommodation, 28 and the other 
from the USA providing for a right to adequate housing. The USSR 
amendment was criticised for placing too much emphasis on the role of 
the State. 29 It was argued that other bodies should also assist in 
providing adequate housing and that "in many cases, indeed, such a 
measure would require international co-operation". 30 In the event, the 
USSR proposal was narrowly rejected. 31 However, following the 
rejection of an Egyptian amendment which referred to "living 
accomodation worthy of man", the USA proposal was adopted by a 
large margin. 32 
The draft article, finalised by the Commission in 1951 provided 
that "Each State Party to this Covenant recognises the right of everyone 
to adequate housing". It was unfortunate, and perhaps indicative of the 
drafting process as a whole, 33 that in concentrating on whether or not it 
was appropriate to draft such an article, the Commission failed to enter 
into a discussion as to the precise meaning of a right to "adequate 
housing". 
At the Commission's eighth session, the USSR proposed an 
amendment to the effect that States parties would undertake to adopt all 
24 Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 740, at 299, para. 26 (1957). 
25 See, Tsao (China), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 295, para. 32 (1957). 
266 A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 295, para. 38 (1957). 
27 See, Sutanto (Indonesia), A/C. 3/SR. 740, at 298, para-23 (1957). 
28 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/AC. 14/2"/Add. 3, Sect. VL at 4,13 UN ESCOR, CNA, (195 1). The proposal read: 
"The State shall take the necessary legislative measures, to ensure to everyone 
living accommodation worthy of man". 
29 See e. g., Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 21 (1951). 
30 Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 19 (195 1). 
31 Six votes to five, with seven abstentions. E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 22 (195 1). 
32 12 votes to none with six abstentions. E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 23 (1951). 
33 See above, Chapter 1, text accompanying notes 267-273. 
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necessary measures, particularly by legislation, to ensure to everyone a 
dwelling consistent with human dignity. 34 In defence of the provision it 
was argued that the State should be obliged not merely to recognise the 
right to housing, but should take "all necessary measures". This did not just imply the building of houses, but also measures such as subsidies, 
tax exemptions, loans, and the provision of the requisite materials on 
favourable terms. 35 In addition Chile argued that the general 
obligations in article 1 were not sufficient in the reah-n of housing. 
Housing was a field in which "the State as well as the community had a 
special responsibility to solve a problem affecting physical and moral 
welfare". 36 
On the other hand, this amendment was criticised for duplicating 
the obligations in article 1 (current article 2(l)). By doing so, the 
amendment would destroy the balance of the Covenant and imply that 
the right to housing was more important than other rights in the 
Covenant. 37 It was argued that the term "dwelling consistent with 
human dignity" was narrower than the term "adequate housing", 38 and 
if placed alone would provide an insufficient guarantee. 39 Moreover, 
some States considered that the amendment placed too great an emphasis 
on legislation which would be unacceptable to countries where private 
enterprise was involved. 40 
Although the amendment was finally rejected, this was done 
primarily on the basis that it duplicated article 2(l). That this was the 
case suggests that the measures outlined by the various members in the 
discussion, would nevertheless be applicable in relation to the 
implementation of the right to housing as it exists now. 
3) Food and Clothing 
Until the Commission's eighth session, no reference to clothing or 
food had been agreed upon. At that session however, an amendment was 
proposed by China which argued for the inclusion of the words "food, 
34 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/L. 48,14 UN ESCOR, CNA, (1952). 
35 See, Boratynski (Poland), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 7-8 (1952). 
36 Santa Cruz (Chile), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 8 (1952). 
37 See e. g., Juvigny (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 9 (1952); Azkoul (Lebanon), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 11 (1952). 
38 Azkoul (Lebanon), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 12 (1952). 
39 See, Bowie (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 10 (1952). 
40 See e. g., Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 7 (1952); Juvigny (France), 
E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 9 (1952). 
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clothing and... " before "housing". 41 The Chinese representative 
explained that although housing might be more important for 
industrialised countries, the need for food and clothing came first in 
countries with a rural economy, especially "underdeveloped 
countries". 42 There was considerable support for the inclusion of these 
other elements43 to the extent that the amendment was finally adopted. 
In the Third Committee, a proposal was made to include the term 
"adequate" before "food, clothing and housing". 44 A number of States 
had considered that the idea of it adequate" food, housing and clothing 
were implicit in an "adequate standard of liVing", 45 and therefore the 
repetition of the word was unnecessary. 46 However the amendment was 
favoured to the extent that it would clarify the text, 47 and would 
introduce the idea that those components of the standard of living 
should be maintained at a certain level. 48 
4) An Adequate Standard of Living 
An Australian proposal which provided for "the right to an 
adequate standard of living", had considerable support in the 
Commission49 and was preferred to a US proposal which merely 
recognised the right to "improved standards of living". 50 The purpose 
of the Australian provision was to provide a text that was "concise and 
inclusive" and which could be seen to be a "kernel" to be expanded in 
later international agreements. 51 
There were, however, a number of critics of the article as 
proposed. As noted above, not all States were convinced as to the 
necessity of including a provision relating to the right to an adequate 
standard of living. In particular it was felt that the proposed right was 
it a very vague concept defying all attempts at definition" especially 
41 UN Doc-E/CNAAL. 57,14 UN ESCOR, CNA, (1952). 
42 Cheng Paonan (China), E/CN. 4/SR-294, at 5 (1952). 
43 See e. g., Hoare (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 294, at 10 (1952). 
44 Oral amendment of the UK. UN Doc. A/3525, supra, note 5, at 18, 
para. 136. 
45 See e. g., Brillantes (Philippines), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 309, para. 4 (1957). 
46 See e. g., Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR-742, at 305, para-22 (1957). 
47 See, Mahmud (Ceylon), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 306, para. 35 (1957). 
48 See e. g., Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 303, para. 10 (1957). 
49 See e. g., Bowie (UK), E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 18 (195 1). 
50 Roosevelt (USA), E/CN. 4/SR. 222,, at 16 (1951). 
51 See, Whitlam (Australia), E/CN. 4/SR. 223, at 4 (1951). 
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given the different standards of living around the world. 52 Moreover, 
in some circumstances the standard of living had to be allowed to fall in 
order to carry out long-term economic development. 'Ibe adoption of 
the proposal, it was thought, might prejudice further eceonomic and 
social development. 53 
China argued that the formula should refer to "housing, health, 
clothing, food and means of transport". 54 It was initially pointed out 
that the question of health was to be dealt with at a later stage, 55 and 
that transport could not be seen to be "a first essential in an adequate 
standard of living". 56 Indeed India argued that whereas an adequate 
standard of living could be said to cover matters such as the right to 
health and education, only the essentials should be mentioned, namely 
food, clothing and housing. 57 Nevertheless, a Chinese amendment to 
this effect was rejected at the Commission's seventh session in 1951.58 It 
was considered that there was a "general understanding of all that was 
implied by adequate standards of living"59 and that the Commission 
should not attempt to define it as it would lead to "interminable and 
fruitless discussion". 60 
At the Commission's seventh session, a certain number of States 
noted that the concept of an adequate standard of living related to 
virtually all of the economic, social and cultural rights under discussion. 
In addition to the rights to food, housing and clothing, particular 
mention was made of the rights to work, 61 fair wages, 62 health, 63 and 
52 Valenzuela (Chile), E/CNA/SR. 222, at 19 (1951). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Yu (China), E/CNA/SR. 222, at 17 (1951). 
55 See, Chairman, E/CNA/SR. 222, at 18 (1951). 
56 Whitlarn (Australia), E/CNA/SR. 223, at 4 (195 1). 
57 See, Mehta (India), E/CNA/SR. 223, at 6 (1951). 
58 Seven votes to three with five abstentions. E/CNA/SR. 223, at 8 (1951). 
59 Bowie (UK), E/CNA/SR. 222, at 18 (1951). 
60 Bowie (UK), E/CNA/SR. 223, at 7 (1951). 
61 See, Cassin (France), IE/CN. 4/SR. 223, at 7 (1951). 
62 See, Valenzuela (Chile), E/CNA/SR. 223, at 5 (1951). 
63 See, Yu (China), E/CNA/SR. 222, at 17 (195 1). Later in the Third 
Committee, it was noted that article 11 had some relation to article 12, especially in as 
far as an adequate standard of living related to a person #s "physical, mental and social 
well-being" mentioned in the latter article. Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 294, para. 14 (1957). 
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education. 64 Given the broad scope of the concept of an adequate 
standard of living, several States suggested that it should perhaps be 
placed as a general article or "understanding" before the other rights. 65 
The matter was not discussed further, it being decided that the order of 
the articles would be dealt with at a later stage. 66 Unfortunately no such 
rationalising process in fact took place. 
Although it became apparent in the Third Committee that the 
rights to food, clothing and housing were to be considered at least as a 
partial definition of the right to an "adequate standard of living", the 
latter term was again subject to a certain amount of criticism. It was 
noted that the concept of an adequate standard of living varied 
considerably between countries and over time, 67 and accordingly, "the 
range of meaning covered by the term, which was very vague at the 
national level, was even harder to determine at the international 
level. "68 
The majority of the Third Committee, however, considered that 
"an adequate standard of living" was a "generally understood and 
accepted concept". 69 Not only had a Committee of Experts already 
defined some components of an adequate standard of living, 70 it was 
also a notion understood by the inhabitants of every country. 71 
Additionally, the inclusion of the phrase was considered necessary to 
"irnpress upon States that the raising of the standard of living should be 
one of their constant preoccupations ", 72 and to bring article 11 into line 
with article 25 UDHR. 73 
A proposal was made to replace the word "adequate" with the 
word "decent" in order to clarify the meaning of the right, 74 and make 
64See, Mehta (India), E/CN. 4/SR. 223, at 6 (1951). 
65 See, Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 222, at 23 (1951); Valenzuela (Chile), 
E/CN. 4/SR. 223, at 5 (195 1). A similar proposal was that the provisions should begin 
with an affmination that human beings had the fundamental right to food and life, 
Cassin (France), E/CN. 4/SR. 223, at 7 (1951). 
6565 See, Chairman, E/CN. 4/SR. 223, at 5 (1951). 
67 See, Hamilton (Australia), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 310, para. 16 (1957). 
68 Baroody (Saudi Arabia), A/C. 3/SR. 739,, at 293, para. 4 (1957). 
69 Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 303, para. 9 (1957). 
70 Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 294, para. 20 (1957). 
71 See, Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 294, para. 21 (1957). 
72 Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 294, para. 21 (1957). 
73 See, Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 303, para. 9 (1957). 
74 Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 294, para. 12 (1957). 
313 
it conforrn with article 7 which spoke of a "decent living". 75 The term 
"decent" was also considered to be more appropriate in that it connoted 
a higher standard of living than a merely adequate one, which could be 
interpreted as covering only the bare necessities of life. 76 The majority 
however did not think that replacing the term adequate with decent 
would make the matter any clearer. 77 The term "adequate" related to 
the physical, moral and mental development of the individual and linked 
the article with article 12 in relation to health standards. Moreover the 
term "adequate standard of living" had "clear and well-understood 
irnplications" and was to be found in article 25 UDHR. 78 
Given the broad definition of the concept of a standard of living, 
it is considered that there was questionable value in it being placed as a 
separate right in itself. The Commission (and the Ibird Committee) 
would have done better either to adopt the proposal of the USSR and 
leave it out entirely whilst enacting its component parts as rights in the 
Covenant, 79 or to adopt a form of the French proposal and include it as 
a general principle (perhaps in the preamble). 80 Either way it might 
have avoided the somewhat anomalous position of it being a right with 
little independent substance. 
5) For Himself and His 
A joint amendment proposed by El Salvador, the Dominican 
Republic and Ecuador8l aimed at harmonizing the text of article 11 
with article 25 UDHR by including a reference to the "well being of the 
individual and his famidy". 82 A number of States considered this 
proposal unnecessary as the idea of the family was already taken care of 
by the use of the word "everyone". 83 Moreover certain States felt that 
75 See, Brillantes (Philippines), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 295, para. 24 (1957). For the 
drafting of the term "decent living" in article 7, see above, Chapter 6, text 
accompanying notes. 
76 See, Brillantes (Philippines), A/C. 3/SR. 740, at 299, para. 28 (1957). 
77 See e. g., Baroody (Saudi Arabia), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 295, para-36 (1957). 
78 See e. g., Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR. 740, at 299, para. 29 (1957). 
79 See above, text accompanying note 13. 
80 See above, text accompanying note 65. 
81 UN Doc. A/C. 34L. 5 83,12 UN GAOR, C. 3, (1957). 
82 See, Lima (El Salvador), A/C. 3/SR. 740, at 299, para. 31 (1957). 
83 See e. g., Tsao, (China), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 303, para. 4 (1957). 
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the proposal would raise questions about the scope of the provision84 
especially as regards individuals without families. 85 
The majority of the Ibird Committee, however, voted for the 
inclusion of the phrase. It appears that States felt that the provision 
would be made clearer by a reference to the family, 86 and that it would 
have the advantage of stressing the fact that wages and salaries should be 
such as to afford a decent standard of living not only to the workers 
themselves, but also to their familieS. 87 A suggestion that the phrase 
should be followed by the words "if any" to stress that it did not exclude 
those without familieS88 was not taken up. The assumption seems to 
have been that they would nevertheless be included under the term 
"everyone" 
- 
6) The Continuous Improvement of Living Conditions 
At the Conunission's seventh session, Yugoslavia proposed that 
the Australian text on an adequate standard of living, should be 
amended to include the phrase "and the continuous improvement of 
living conditions" in order to give the provision a "dynamic 
character". 89 In response Australia argued that such a dynamic element 
should be expressed in a general clause and not a substantive article. 90 
Greece noted that in any case the term "adequate" itself implied the idea 
of evolution. 91 Nevertheless the Yugoslavian amendment was adopted, 
albeit by a narrow margin. 92 
Like the text submitted by the Commission, the majority of 
amendments before the Third Committee referred to the "continuous 
improvement of living conditions". 93 There was little discussion of the 
phrase, it being considered entirely consistent with the principle of the 
84 See, Delhaye (Belgium), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 3 10, para-9 (1957). 
85 See e. g., Brillantes (Philippines), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 303, para. 7 (1957). 
(1957). 
86 See, Bernadino (Dominican Republic), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 303, para. 5 
87 See, Castaneda (Mexico), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 304, para. 27 (1957). 
88 See, Eustathiades (Greece), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 304, para. 19 (1957). 
89 Jevremovic (Yugoslavia), E/CN. 4/SR. 223, at 5 (1951). 
90 See, Whitlam (Australia), E/CN. 4/SR. 223, at 6 (1951). 
91 See, Eustathiades (Greece), E/CN. 4/SR. 223, at 8 (1951). 
92 Six votes to five against, with seven abstentions. E/CN. 4/SR. 223, at 8 (1951). 
93 See e. g., UN Docs. A/C. 3/L. 580, L. 581, L. 582, L. 583, L. 584,12 UN 
GAOR, C. 3, (1957). 
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progressive realization of economic and social rights, 94 and appropriate 
given the fundamental nature of the right concerned. 95 
However, certain States did raise particular objections with 
respect to this phrase that were left unanswered by the majority. One 
member considered that States were often powerless to ensure a 
continuous improvement of living conditions, as "it was primarily the 
responsibility of the individual himself to exert an effort towards that 
end". 96 Another member commented that "the primary aim should be 
to improve the living conditions of the most under-privileged; persons 
outside that category could hardly claim, at the current stage, to have a 
'right' to 'continuous improvement"'. 97 
The difficulties of this term, as the criticism implies, were 
generally overlooked. Certainly, the inclusion of the phrase "the 
continuous improvement of living conditions" does confin-n that the 
standards are dynamic and State-specific rather than universal, but that 
much might have been inferred from the concept of an "adequate 
standard of living". It does raise questions as to the individual nature of 
the right, however, if it is conceded that only the poor have a right to 
the continuous improvement of living conditions' 
. 
7) Appropriate Steps to Ensure the Realisation of the Right 
The general intention of States in the drafting process was that the 
rights in article 11 should be implemented in a progressive manner in 
accordance with the provisions of article 2(1). This is evidenced not 
only by specific statements to that effeCt, 98 but also by the fact that a 
considerable proportion of the discussion centred. upon the compatibility 
of the draft article with specific elements of article 2(l). However, it 
was noted by more than one State99 that the wording of the second 
sentence of paragraph 1, which speaks of the obligation "to ensure" the 
realization of the right, suggests that the implementation of article 11 
should be immediate. 100 However, on closer examination, it would 
94 See, Baroody (Saudi Arabia), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 293, para. 4 (1957). 
95 See, Radic (Yugoslavia), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 3 10, para. 10 (1957). 
966 Massoud-Ansari (Iran), A/C. 3/SR. 741, at 301, para. 1 (1957). 
97 Delhaye (Belgium), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 309, para. 8 (1957). 
98 See e. g., Hamilton (Australia), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 310, para. 16 (1957). 
99 See e. g., Afhan (Iraq), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 311, para. 32 (1957); Juvigny (France), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 304, para. 14 (1957). 
100 An "obligation of an immediate nature" is intended to mean one which 
provides for immediate implementation as opposed to progressive implementation. In a 
strict sense the obligation (as opposed to the implementation) in the latter case is also 
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appear that at most States considered that the immediate obligation 
referred to the "steps" to be taken as opposed to the full realisation of 
the rights. 101 and that there was an explicit intention on the part of a 
number of States that article 11 be bound by the provisions of article 
2(1) as regards progressive realisation of the rightS. 102 It was 
particularly evident for example that States considered the realisation of 
the rights to be dependent upon resources. 103 
The inclusion of the word "ensure" in the second sentence of 
article 11(l) reflects the rather superficial nature of the drafting 
process-104 The argument centred on the more general question of 
whether or not specific implementation clauses should be included in the 
substantive articles, 105 rather than concentrating on the specific 
wording of those clauses. 
In accordance with the progressive nature of the obligation, a 
number of States argued that "it was not intended that States should be 
directed to do anything specific", 106 rather, States would be under a 
duty to develop general conditions through which the rights in question 
might be secured to individuals. 107 However, an Afghan amendment 
which provided for the "opportunity to gain" the rights, 108 was 
criticised for concentrating on the "object" of the right rather than the 
immediate. 
101 For example Iraq rather controversially commented: 
"Article 2 provided that States were to take steps progressively, whereas the steps 
referred to in article 11 were to be taken immediately. " Afhan (Iraq), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 
311, para. 32 (1957). It is currently considered however that article 2(l) does require 
steps to be taken immediately. See above, Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 46-54. 
102 See e. g., Castaneda. (Mexico), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 305, para. 26 (1957); 
Hamilton (Australia), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 310, para. 16 (1957). It might be noted 
however that even if bound by the terms of article 2(l), there is room to argue for the 
immediate implementation of a right which involves minimal resource commitments. 
See above, Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 196-7. 
103 See e. g., Diaz Casanueva (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 294, para. 21 (1957); 
Tsuruoka (Japan), A/C. 3/SR. 740, at 299, para. 25 (1957). 
104See above, Chapter 1. 
105 See e. g., Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 740, at 299, para. 27 (1957); Tsao (China), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 303, para. 3 (1957). For those who resisted particular 
implementation clauses, the battle had really already been lost following the adoption of 
article 6(2), see above, Chapter 5, text accompanying notes 53-63. 
106See, Quan (Guatemala), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 293, para. 9 (1957). 
107 See, Tsuruoka (Japan), A/C. 3/SR. 740, at 299, para. 25 (1957); Pazhwak 
(Afghanistan), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 295, para. 27 (1957). 
108 UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 578,12 UN GAOR, C. 3, (1957). 
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right itself, 109 and was subsequently withdrawn. In rejecting an 
approach that centered upon the State playing a "facilitative" role (although it was not evident that States should not have that role at all), 
it would seem that the intention was for States to have a more positive 
"providing" role in the realisation of the rights to food, housing and 
clothing. One particular example was cited by a member of the Third 
Conunittee in which she argued that where private undertakings did 
not have sufficient capital to build houses for low-income groups, it was 
for the State to sponsor such housing. 110 
8) International Co-operation 
Perhaps the element of most controversy in the adoption of article 
11 was the second sentence of article 11 (1) drafted by the Working 
Party, which provided that "States Parties will take appropriate steps to 
ensure the realization of this right, recognising to this effect the 
essential importance of international co-operation based on free 
consent". 111 
Those who opposed this provision maintained that it was 
unnecessary, as reference to international co-operation was better dealt 
with in article 2(1)112 and in Part IV of the Covenant. 113 The repetition 
of such an obligation might in turn detract from the general 
obligationl 14 and imply that article 11 was more important than other 
rights. 115 Moreover, international co-operation was only one of several 
factors which governments would have to consider when they came to 
apply article 11,116 and it might discourage States from taking 
independent action to implement the article. 117 
On the other hand it was argued that the reference to international 
co-operation "in no way" conflicted with the general provisions on the 
109 See, Tsao (China), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 295, para. 33 (1957). 
110 See, Afhan (Iraq), A/C. 3/SR. 739, at 295, para. 30 (1957). 
111 Supra, note 7. 
112 See e. g., Hoare (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 304, para-1 1 (1957); Shoham- Sharon (Israel), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 304, para. 16 (1957). 
113 See e. g., Tsao (China), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 303, para. 3 (1957). 
114 See, Hamilton (Australia), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 3 10, para. 16 (1957); Paulus 
(India), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 306, para. 41 (1957). 
115 See e. g., Brillantes (Philippines), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 309, para. 5 (1957). 
116 See, Castaneda (Mexico), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 304, para. 26 (1957). 
117 See, Brillantes (Philippines), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 303, para. 8 (1957). 
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subject, 118 and in any case, as article 2 had not been adopted, it was not 
possible to guarantee that a reference to international co-operation 
would exist in that article. 119 Additionally, reference to international co- 
operation was "essential" 120 given the fundamental importance of the 
rights in article 11121 and the need to impose precise obligations upon 
states. 122 Indeed the Greek representative commented that article 11 
was "so basic and far-reaching that all the other rights might be 
regarded as specific aspects of it or as applying to certain categories of 
persons; there was therefore every justification for stressing 
intemational co-operation in that particular article". 123 Following the 
adoption, by a small margin, 124 of an amendment to the effect that 
international co-operation should be "based on free consent". 125 the 
second part of the second sentence was adopted by a considerable 
Majority. 126 
Although there is no reason to consider that the reference to 
international co-operation in article 11 should necessarily conflict with 
that in article 2(l), if it were to do so, as a matter of interpretation the 
terms of the specific clause would prevail over those of the general. It 
appears that a number of members of the Third Committee considered 
that the rights in article 11 were "more fundamental" than other rights 
to be found in the Covenant, 127 however it is not clear whether it was 
intended that those rights should be afforded any form of priority, 
whether in terms of public expenditure or otherwise. 
118See, Brena (Uruguay), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 305, para. 22 (1957). 
119 See, Tsuruoka (Japan), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 306, para. 39 (1957); Tsuruoka 
(Japan), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 310, para. 14 (1957). 
120 Montero (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 305, para. 24 (1957). 
121 See e. g., Ahmed (Pakistan), A/C. 3/SR-742, at 305, para. 32 (1957); 
Tsuruoka (Japan), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 306, para. 39 (1957). 
122 See, Radic (Yugoslavia), A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 3 10, para. 10 (1957). 
123 Eustathiades (Greece), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 304, para. 18 (1957). 
124 20 votes to 19 with 21 abstentions. See, A/C. 3/SR. 743, at 311, para. 23 (1957). 
125 See, Mufti (Syria), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 306, para. 33 (1957). 
126 31 votes to 14 with 17 abstentions. See, UN Doc. 3525, supra, note 6, at 
19, para. 143. 
127 For example, the Japanese representative commented: 
"... article 11 had a place distinct from other articles, for it was 
concerned with life and death; for example, education and hygiene were 
not as essential to survival, as food, clothing and housing were". 
Tsuruoka (Japan), A/C. 3/SR. 742, at 306, para. 39 (1957). 
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B) ARTICLE 11(2) 
In 1963 the Director-General of the FAO submitted an informal 
proposal to the 'Ibird Committee for the inclusion of a draft article 
relating to the right to be free from hunger which would be included 
after the combined articles 11 and 12.128 Ihe proposal read as follows: 
" 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the 
right of everyone to be free from hunger. They undertake, 
individually and through international co-operation, to 
develop programmes aimed at achieving freedom from 
hunger within the shortest possible time. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise that, 
with a view to achieving the full realisation of this right, 
national and international action should be geared to the 
realisation of this right by paying attention to: (a) Policies to ensure that world food supplies are shared on 
a rational and equitable basis; (b) Economic, technical and other measures to increase the 
production of food; (c) The adaptation of existing institutions, including systems 
of land tenure and land use, to the requirements of 
economic and social progress; and (d) The promotion and full utilisation of scientific and 
technical knowledge and a massive education of the 
population in order to improve methods of production, 
conservation and distribution of food. "129 
Ms suggestion came to be reflected in the proposal of Saudi Arabia to 
add an article on the right to freedom from hunger, 130 and in the 
combined proposal of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Uganda to add a 
paragraph on the same subject in the combined articles 11 and 12 of the 
draft Covenant. 131 It was decided to set up a working group to produce 
a non-controversial text that could command unanimity. The Working 
Group produced a joint proposal on the right of everyone to be free 
from hunger. 132 The various proposals and amendments were 
128 Sen (FAO), A/C-3/SR. 1232, at 93-4, paras 4-10 (1963). See generally, 
Alston, supra, note 1, at 30-31. 
129 UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR-1232, at 94, para-10 (1963). 
130 UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 1172,18 UN GAOR, C. 3, (1963). 
131 UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 1175,18 UN GAOR, C. 3, (1963). 
132 UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 1177,18 UN GAOR, C. 3, (1963). 
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considered by the Third Committee at its 1264th, 1267th, 1268th and 
1269th meetings. 133 
1) The Right to Freedom From Hunger. 
The Director-General of the FAO made his proposal on the basis 
that although the right to freedom from hunger was mentioned, it was 
not clearly defined. The provision, he argued, should include a detailed 
enumeration of the measures to be taken to ensure the enjoyment of the 
right. 134 A large number of States considered it appropriate that such a 
provision be incorporated into the Covenant as being of "paramount 
importance". 135 As the Australian representative stated: "No human 
right was worth anything to a starving man". 136 Nevertheless, it was 
recognised that the question of hunger was more appopriately dealt with 
by the Second Committee and that provisions on the subject were not 
entirely appropriate to a legal instrument such as the draft Covenant. 137 
Indeed the Philippines commented that "it was hard to predict what 
practical effect a provision of that kind would have, but it was bound at 
least to draw national attention to the problem and offer some hope of 
relief to the hungry of the world". 138 
Opponents of the proposals argued that the draft Covenants 
should be restricted to outlining the fundamental human rights and the 
basic principles that underlay them. Although freedom from hunger 
was an important principle, the Covenant should not contain any 
specific measures of implementation. 139 Not only would measures to 
ensure freedom from hunger differ from country to country, questions 
such as increasing world food supplies and ensuring their equitable 
distribution, or reforming systems of land tenure, were properly 
subjects to be dealt with by the Second Committee and by specialised 
133 UN Docs. A/C. 3/SR. 1264-5,1267 
-9,18 GAOR, C. 3, (1264-5, and 1267- 
9 mtgs. ), (1963). See generally, UN Doc. A/C. 3/5655, supra, note 9, at 20-23, paras 
86-108. 
134 Sen (FAO), A/C. 3/SR. 1232, at 94, para. 10 (1963). 
135 See e. g., Yapou (Israel), A/C. 3/SR. 1264, at 27 1, para-7 (1963). 
136 Gilchrist (Australia), A/C. 3/SR. 1267, at 287, para. 8 (1963). 
137 See e. g. Gilchrist (Australia), A/C. 3/SR. 1267, at 287, para. 8 (1963). 
138 Quiambao (Philippines), A/C. 3/SR. 1267, at 287, para. 6 (1963). 
139 See, AtauUah (Pakistan), A/C. 3/SR. 1264, at 27 1, para. 4 (1963); 
A/C. 3/SR. 1269, at 300, para. 9 (1963). 
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agencies. 140 The provisions as adopted were unfortunately "vague and 
general considerations" which were capable of different 
interpretationsl4l and which reflected considerations that would be 
included more appropriately in a separate declaration on the question 
rather than in the Covenant. 142Furthermore it was thought wrong for 
the Third Committee to single out just one of the rights in the second 
paragraph of article 11 (2). 143 
Much as the arguments against the provisions suggest that there 
was a considerable division within the Third Committee, the fact that no 
one voted against the provision in the final analysis indicates that this 
was not the case. In fact the final text seems to reflect a cautious 
approach which, whilst outlining certain principles, did not prejudice 
the development of more specific policies by international agencies or 
the State concerned. As the Australian representative commented: 
"While it would have been unwise of the Third 
Committee to act as a body of economic experts or 
put forward detailed proposals on the economic means 
of achieving the realisation of the right in question, it 
was quite fitting that it should indicate the general 
areas in which Governments must take action". 144 
The crucial characteristic of article 11(2) appears to have been that 
although certain objectives and methods of implementation were 
outlined, they were considered sufficiently general as not to bind a 
State to any particular course of action. 
2)'llie Fundamental Right of Everyone 
The word "fundamental" is first to be found in the joint 
proposal drafted by the Working Group. There, States Parties 
recognised the "fundamental importance of the right of everyone 
to be free from hunger". It was later pointed out that there was a 
difference between recognising a right and recognising the 
importance of a right- the latter being a far weaker obligation. It 
was accordingly suggested that the words "fundamental 
140 See, Ataullah (Pakistan), A/C. 3/SR. 1264, at 27 1, para. 4 (1963); Beaufort 
(Netherlands), A/C. 3/SR. 1266, at 285, para. 60 (1963); Alatas (Indonesia), 
A/C. 3/SR. 1268, at 293, para. 4 (1963). 
141 See, Monod (France), A/C. 3/SR. 1269, at 300, para. 7 (1963). 
142 See, Beaufort (Netherlands), A/C. 3/SR. 1266, at 285, para. 62 (1963); 
Herndl (Austria), A/C. 3/SR. 1268, at 294, para. 9 (1963). 
143See, Beaufort (Netherlands), A/C. 3/SR. 1266, at 285, para. 61 (1963). 
144Gilchrist (Australia), A/C. 3/SR. 1267, at 287, para-8 (1963). 
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importance" be deleted from the proposal. 145 Ile sponsors of the 
proposal suggested in reply that the paragraph should be amended 
so as to refer to "the fundamental right of everyone to be free 
from hunger". 146 This became the final revised text which was 
adopted by the Tbird Committee. 
Much as the right to be free from hunger is the only right in 
either Covenant that is explicitly referred to as "fundamental", the 
travaux preparatoires give no indication that it be given any pre- 
eminence among the range of human rights. In absence of 
explanation, it is to be assumed that the drafters did not intend to 
invest in the word "fundamental" any particular legal significance. 
As such, it represents another example of the uneveness of the 
drafting process which was left uncorrected by the failure of the 
Third Committee to undertake a "rationalising study" of the two 
Covenants. 147 
3) Measures and Specific Programmes 
One member of the Committee was concerned that the 
measures envisaged within article 11(2) should not be pursued at 
the expense of other development policies. Accordingly it 
suggested the inclusion of the words "within the context of national 
programmes of economic and social development" after the word 
"measures", or at least that the provision should be interpreted in 
that manner. 148 The silence of the other members of the 
Committee on this matter might imply their general agreement 
with such an interpretation. Accordingly it could be said that the 
measures undertaken in pursuance of the provisions of article 
11(2) should not be such as to compromise other development 
objectives, 149 but should be taken up as an integral part of the 
development process. 
A number of proposals were made for the inclusion of the 
word "necessary" before the word "measures". 150 In particular, it 
was thought that this might reflect the optional nature of the 
145 See, Kabbani (Syria), A/C. 3/AR. 1268, at 293, para. 1 (1963). 
1466 See, Eluchans (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 1268, at 294, para. 12 (1963). 
147 See above, Chapter 1, text accompanying note 27 1. 
148 See, Alatas (Indonesia), A/C. 3/SR. 1268, at 293, para. 5 (1963). 
i1 
149 It should be noted that this does not in any way legitimise the is priontisation. of development objectives over the requirement to ensure people 
freedom from hunger. 
150 See e. g., Capotorti (Italy), A/C. 3/SR. 1268, at 294, para. 18 (1963). 
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measures outlined in the final paragraphs. 151 However, Chile 
forcefully argued that such an amendment would weaken the text 
by implying that the need for measures was merely hypothetical 
rather than absolute. 152 The position of the majority appears to 
have been that the text should be read to imply that all States, 
irrespective of their situation, are under an obligation to take 
appropriate measures and specific programmes within the areas 
stipulated. 71he form of those measures and programmes however 
would be determined by the social and economic circumstances 
that pertained to the situation in the country concerned. 
4) Paragraph (a) 
Ile debate in the Third Committee rarely touched upon the 
main elements of paragraph (a) apart from the question of 
agrarian reform. It was generally accepted that food production, 
conservation and distribution were objectives of fundamental 
importance with a view to ensuring freedom from hunger. 
Specific comments merely stressed the importance of agricultural 
self-reliance 153 and of adequate modem systems of marketing of 
agricultural produce-154 
As regards agricultural reform, the original five-power 
amendment used the phrase "adapting or refon-ning existing 
systems of land tenure and land use and systems for the 
exploitation of natural resources". 155 This was then rationalised by 
the Working Party to its current form. Following a request for an 
explanation of the phrase, Chile explained that in paragraph (a) the 
sponsors "wished to point out suitable measures to be taken by 
States Parties in order to implement the right to be free from 
hunger". 156 The representative continued: 
151 A Greek oral amendment initially suggested the replacement of the 
words "which are needed" with "if and where needed", Mantzoulinos (Greece), 
A/C. 3/SR. 1268, at 294, para. 10 (1963). It was later withdrawn in favour of the 
inclusion of the word "necessary". Mantzoulinos (Greece), A/C. 3/SR- 1268, at 
294, para. 22 (1963). 
152 See, Eluchans (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 1268, at 294, para. 13 (1963). 
(1963). 
153 See e. g., Herrera (Costa Rica), A/C. 3/SR. 1269, at 299, para-3 
1 5A See e. g., Zalamea (Colombia), A/C-3/SR. 1267 , at 288, para. 11 (1963). 
155 Supra, note 131. 
156 Eluchans (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 1267, at 287, para. 3 (1963). 
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"Among those measures was the development or 
reform of agrarian systems, with a view to improving 
the use of agricultural resources. States Parties were 
given an alternative: they could either develop or 
reform agrarian systems, depending on their needs. 
Moreover, 'agrarian systems' implied both improved 
techniques of land exploitation and legal questions, 
such as those of ownership". 157 
If a just agrarian system existed then the State was not obliged to 
undertake land reform- in such cases only the improvement of 
farming methods would be required. 158 
This interpretation was supported by a large number of 
States whose main concern seemed to be that they should not be 
bound to undertake land reform. Two unsuccessful proposals were 
made to introduce the phrase "if necessary" before the reference to 
land reform. 159 Their rejection did not so much reflect the idea 
that land reform was essential in all cases, rather that the existing 
text already sufficiently provided for alternative approaches. The 
amendments would merely have complicated the provision. 160 
As regards land reform, States stressed that each country 
should find the approach best suited to its conditions, 161 and that it 
should be carried out "wherever necessary, desirable and 
acceptable to the majority of those to be affected". 162 It appears to 
be suggested that priority should be placed upon democratic 
participation in land-reform programmes, with particular 
emphasis being placed upon those most directly affected. 
Given the choice over whether agricultural reform is 
necessary, it is submitted that the measures outlined in paragraph (a) are of such a general and innocuous nature that they offer little 
of substance to the article as a whole. As one State noted,, 
paragraph (a) was unnecessary given that those measures were 
"perfectly well known to even the most backward CoUntry", 163 a 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid, para. 4. 
159 See, Aujay de la Dure (France), A/C. 3/SR. 1267, at 288, para. 18 
(1963); Mantzoulinos (Greece), A/C. 3/SR-1268, at 294, para-10 (1963). 
160 See, Eluchans (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 1268, at 294, para. 13 (1963). 
(1963). 
161 See e. g., Mendez (Guatemala), A/C. 3/SR. 1267, at 288, para. 12 
162 Attlee (UK), A/C. 3/SR. 1267, at 287, para. 5 (1963). 
163 U Myat Tun (Bunna), A/C. 3/SR. 1267, at 288, para. 14 (1963). 
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matter that seems to have been reflected in the cursory nature of 
the discussion on paragraph (a). 
5) Paragraph Q2) 
Both of the original proposals for article 11(2) referred to 
the sharing of the world food supplies on a rational and equitable 
basis-164 In order to clarify the notion of sharing resources, it was 
proposed that reference be made to "the interests of both food 
producers and consumers". 165 This concern was taken up in the joint proposal which stressed that States take into account the 
problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries. 
Chile argued that the term "problem" was preferable to that of 
"interests" because "the distribution of food supplies should be 
based not solely on the interests of the countries involved or on 
purely economic grounds, but also on social and humanitarian 
considerations which were implicit in the word 'problems"'. 166 
Moreover, it was pointed out that freedom from hunger should not 
be interpreted as freedom to dispose of agricultural surpluses to 
the detriment of the economies of the less developed countries. 167 
HI) THE APPROACH OF THE COMMITTEE 
A) AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVINGM 
As was made clear in the travaux preparatoires, the concept 
of an adequate standard of living was intended to have a broad and 
general meaning. Although the rights to food, clothing and 
housing expressly form a partial definition of the right, mention 
was also made to the rights to health, education, and transport. 
States, however, showed great reluctance to define the right in any 
greater detail relying inter alia upon the argument that the right to 
an adequate standard of living was a tenn whose meaning was 
generally understood. 169 
It is clear, however, that the Committee, in assessing the 
degree of compliance with the right to an adequate standard of 
1 rA Supra, notes 130,13 1. 
165 See, U Myat Tun (Burma), A/C. 3/SR. 1264, at 27 1, para. 6 (1963). 
166 See, Eluchans (Chile), A/C. 3/SR. 1268, at 294, para. 16 (1963). 
167 See, U Myat Tun (Burma), A/C. 3/SR. 1267, at 288, para. 15 (1963). 
168 Cf. Article 25(l) UDHR. See, Eide A., "Article 25", in Eide A. et al 
(eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rip-hts: A Co entary 395 (1992). 
169 See above, text accompanying notes 69-71. 
326 
living, cannot rely merely upon an intuitive understanding of the 
notion. Some attempt has to be made to define it in more detail if 
only for the purpose of measurement. Whether or not the 
Committee manages to give the provision substantial meaning wifl 
be the most significant test of its capabilities, not least because, as 
Sen notes, the notion of a standard of living is "full of contrasts, 
conflicts and even contraditions". 170 
An important consideration for the Committee is the degree 
to which the right to an adequate standard of living actually 
contributes to the protection offered by the Covenant. If, as the 
travaux preparatoires indicate, the right is primarily an 
agglomeration of other economic, social and cultural rights, then it 
arguably will have little utility as an independent human right. If 
on the other hand, it is read to include concerns that are not 
already addressed by other rights, it might usefully extend the 
scope of the Covenant. 
Thus far, the Conunittee has not assigned to the right to an 
adequate standard of living a meaning that substantially extends the 
protection offered by other rights. In discussing article 11, little 
mention is ever made of an adequate standard of living per se, 
rather, the Committee has concentrated on the rights to adequate 
housing and food. Moreover, when dealing specifically with the 
right to an adequate standard of living, Committee members have 
generally concentrated upon questions relating to social 
security, 171 unemploymentl72 and income levels. 173 In doing so, 
it seems to duplicate much of its work in respect to articles 6 to 9 
of the Covenant. Part of the problem seems to have been the 
former reporting system in which States would report on article 
11 independently from articles 6 to 9. However, whilst the 
introduction of global reports has reduced the problem of 
duplication, it has meant that article 11, and in particular the right 
170 Sen A., The Standard of Living, at 1 (1985). 
171 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 5, at 6, para. 24, and 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 6,, at 5, para. 32; Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 18, at 4, 
para. 17. 
172 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/19 8 8/SR. 12, at 10, para. 49, and 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 13, para. 81; Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR-13, at 14, 
Para-85; Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 12, at 13, para. 71; Fofana, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 7, at 3, para. 8. 
173 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 9, at 7, para. 28, and 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 18, at 3, paras 6 and 8; Simma, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 5, at 7, 
para. 30; Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 10, para. 55. 
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to an adequate standard of living, has been given considerably less 
consideration. 
Even where questions have been asked specifically on the 
question of an adequate standard of living, they have been general 
and unfocused. The main practice of the Committeee has been to 
call upon States to establish benchmarks to define an adequate 
standard of living174 (such as a "poverty-line"175), pinpoint and 
direct action in favour of the disadvantaged, 176 ensure non- 
discrimination 177 and greater equality, 178 and establish legal 
remedies where appropriate. 179 
In the Committee's reporting guidelines, however, it is 
possible to identify a number of questions which appear to relate 
particularly to the right to an adequate standard of living. 
Information is requested as to the current standard of living of the 
population both in the aggregate and as to different groups within 
the population. In addition, States are required to indicate the per 
capita GNP of the poorest 40% of the population and their 
Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI). 180 
It is notable that the Committee does not stipulate itself how 
the standard of living of the population upon which States are to 
report is to be measured, but rather leaves it to the State concerned 
to adopt its own criteria for evaluation. Moreover, the indicators 
referred to by the Committee do not give a great deal of insight 
into the content of the right. First, the PQLI is a composite 
indicator intended to "measure the performance of the world's 
174 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 16, at 12, para. 56; Sparsis, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 5, at 6, para. 24; Rattray, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 19, at 7, para. 41; 
Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44, at 12, para. 58. 
175 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 16, at 7, para. 29; Alston, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2, at 10, para. 64; Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 7, at 3, para. 7. 
176 See, Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 12, para. 58; Alston, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 13, para. 7 1; Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 5, at 
11, para. 65; Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 16, at 14, para. 66. 
177 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 5, at 9, para. 5 1; Jimenez Butragueno, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44, at 13, para. 61. 
178 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 10, para. 50; Sparsis, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 12, para. 63; Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 6, para. 25. 
179 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 9, at 10, para. 49; Sparsis, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 20., at 5, para. 18. 
180 Reporting guidelines, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), Annex IV, at 11, 
UN Doc. E/1991/23 (1991). For the PQLI see., Morris M-, Measuring the 
CO-nditions of the-World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index, (1979). 
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poorest countries in meeting the most basic needs of people". 181 It V` 
uses as measurements., infant mortality, life expectancy and 
literacy. Quite apart from the technical limitations of the PQLI, 182 
from the point of view of the Committee it has serious 
shortcomings. It was designed to be a macro-economic indicator 
measuring the physical welfare of the total population, not 
individual welfare or social and psychological welfare. Moreover 
the components, which roughly concentrate upon the degree of 
enjoyment of the rights to health and education, were chosen 
primarily for their utility as indicators rather than the degree to 
which they encompassed the range of concerns that fall within the 
notion of "quality of life". 183 
Secondly, the UNICEF indicator (the per capita GNP of the 
poorest 40 per cent of the population) is considered to be a broad 
measure of poverty-184 The use of this indicator, together with its 
request that States establish a "poverty line", 185 suggests that the 
Committee defines the deprivation of an adequate standard of 
living in terms of poverty. 186 However, identifying the 
relationship between two concepts does little to rectify the present 
problem. Poverty is as resistant to precise definition as is an 
adequate standard of JiVing. 187 
The indicators to which the Committee refers will provide it 
with an insight into the general welfare of the population as a 
whole. At a State level, the PQLI, like the Human Development 
Index of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 188 
will rank countries according to their aggregate level of "social 
development". Their utility is primarily in providing a 
181 Morfis, ibid, at 34. 
182 For a discussion on the relative value of the PQLI as a human rights 
indicator see, TUrk D., The New International Economic Order and The 
-rTT----- n: -U*- T3--lvý^#4. 
-Izr%-inI nnri 
('ilinirs] 
Rights, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1990/19, at 27, para. 83 (1990). 
183 Morfis, supra, note 180, at 34-35, and 94. 
184 See, Tfirk, supra, note 182, at 28. 
185 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 99. 
186 The World Bank clearly defines poverty as "the inability to attain a 
minimal standard of living". IBRD (World Bank), World Develoment R=rt 
1990, at 26 (1990). 
187 For a discussion of the notions of absolute and relative poverty, see, 
United Nations Development Programme, Human Develgpment Roort 1990. 
106-108 (1990). 
188 Ibid, at 9-16. 
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comparative picture of social development between countries with 
a view to managing economic growth "in the interest of the 
people". 189 Such indicators do not provide information as to 
specific human rights nor are they orientated to the position of the 
individual. If viewed in this light, the right to an adequate standard 
of living becomes merely a right of the State (or the people) to 
social development. 190 
The Committee appears to be content to leave the precise 
definition of an adequate standard of living to the State concerned. 
However, it is considered that whilst it is entirely appropriate for 
the State to establish their own quantitative benchmarks to 
determine what is considered to be "adequate" in light of the 
current level of economic and social development of the State 
concerned, 191 the Committee itself should specify the qualitative 
matters that comprise the notion of a "standard of living". 
Following the Committee's discussion on statistical indicators, 192 it 
may be assumed that the Committee will at some stage in the 
future, specify particular rights-oriented indicators for use by 
States that will, to some degree, outline what the Committee 
perceives to be the content of the right. 
As suggested above, there is a need for the Committee to 
explain the utility of the right to an adequate standard of living 
from the point of view of how it extends the protection offered by 
189 Ibid, at 10. 
190 As McChesney commented: 
"The comprehensive right to an 'adequate standard of living' 
under ICESCR Article 11 invokes the essence of development, 
and 
... 
would appear to justify almost any action in the name of 
economic progress. " 
McChesney A., "Promoting the General Welfare in a Democratic Society: 
Balancing Human Rights and Development", 27 Neth. I. L. R., 283, at 289 (1980). 
191 It is worth noting that the World Bank utilises country-specific 
poverty lines. It reasons: 
"'Ibe perception of poverty has evolved historically and varies 
tremendously from culture to culture. Criteria for distinguishing 
poor from non-poor tend to reflect specific national priorities and 
normative concepts of welfare and rights. In general, as countries 
become wealthier, their perception of the acceptable minimum 
level of consumption- the poverty line- changes. " 
IBRD, supra, note 186, at 27. 
192 See, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No-3), at 81-86, paras 332-351, UN 
Doc. E/1992/23, (1992). Cf. EIC. 12/199 1/SR. 20-2 1. 
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the Covenant. 193 One possibility with much to recommend it, is 
for the Committee to interpret the concept as encompassing, as a 
minimum, the "basic needs" of the individual. 194 The 1976 World 
Employment Conference of the ILO defined basic needs in the 
following manner: 
"First, they include certain minimum requirements of 
a family for private consumption: adequate food, 
shelter and clothing, as well as certain household 
equipment and furniture. Second, they include 
essential services provided by and for the community 
at large, such as safe drinking water, sanitation, public 
transport and health, educational and cultural 
facilities. " 195 
Some of these concerns (such as food, clothing and housing) are 
already specifically enumerated by the Covenant itself. The 
category of basic needs, however, also includes matters that do not 
fall easily within the compass of the enumerated human rights, 
such as "safe drinking water of and "public transport", 196 and 
"sanitation". 197 It would be entirely appropriate for the 
Committee to concentrate upon these matters under the heading of 
an adequate standard of living in so far as they are not dealt with 
193 See above, text accompanying notes 170-17 1. 
194 On the developmental aspect of "basic needs" see, International 
Labour Office, E=Ioyment. Growth and Basic Needs: A One World Problem, 
(1976); Ghai D., and Alfthan T., 
- 
"On the Principles of Quantifying and 
Satisfying Basic Needs", in Ghai D. et al (eds), The Basic-Needs Approach-to 
Develoment: Some Issues Regarding Concepts and Methodology, 19 (1978); 
Hopkins M. and Van Der Hoeven R., Basic Needs in DevelZ ent Planning, (1983). For the legal and human rights aspects of basic needs see, Alston P., 
"Human Rights and Basic Needs: A Critical Assessment" 12 H R. 1,19 (1979); 
Green R., "Basic Human Rights/Needs: Some Problems of Categorical 
Translation and Unification", 26 I. C. J. Rev., 53 (198 1); Trubeck D., 
"Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Third World: Human Rights Law 
and Human Needs Programs", in Meron T. (ed), Human Rights in International 
law, 205 (1984); Muchlinski P., "'Basic Needs'Theory and Development 
Law... in Snyder F. and Slinn P., International Law of Development: 
-Comparative Perspectives, 
237 (1987); Stewart F., "Basic Needs Strategies, 
Human Rights, and The Right to Development", 11 Hu Rts. O., 347 (1989). 
195 International Labour Office, Target Setting for Basic Needs, at 2 
(1982). 
196 It is relevant to note that "transport" was one of the rights suggested 
in the drafting but was considered not important enough to be given specific 
recognition. See above, text accompanying notes 54-56. 
197 See, Alston, supra, note 195, at 36. 
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elsewhere. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Committee 
does adopt such a methodology. 
B) THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD 
1) Introduction 
Article 11 (1) provides for a general right to an "adequate 
standard of living" which is defined specifically as "including 
adequate food". As such, the right to food emanates from and 
contributes to the realisation of the more general right to an 
adequate standard of living. The conditions for the realisation of 
the right to an adequate standard of living would thus appear to be 
directly applicable to the right to food. 
Conversely, action taken to achieve the realisation of the 
right to food should be viewed from the perspective of how it 
contributes to the realisation of an adequate standard of living. 
This would seem to require an approach in which action in favour 
of providing adequate food, over and above the fulfilment of basic 
needs, would have to be balanced with competing priorities such as 
housing. In cases where resource allocation is not driven by the 
falfilment of basic needs, a State would be required to assess the 
most effective utilisation of resources to achieve the general 
realisation of an adequate standard of living. This might mean for 
example, that preference be given to housing rather than food. 
2) Freedom from Hunge, 
The general notion of the right to food would seem to have 
more explicit recognition in article 11(2) which provides for a 
right "to be free from hunger". It is not clear in what way this 
provision relates to the right to adequate food or indeed the right 
to an adequate standard of living. The Committee, by the 
construction of its general guidelines, appears to consider that the 
elements of article 11(2) relate to the achievement of the right to 
food. 198 Indeed it makes no clear distinction between the right to 
food and the right to freedom from hunger (the latter notion not 
even being mentioned). 
However, there would seem to be tacit approval by members 
of the Committee of a distinction between the meaning of the two 
norms. 199 Far from being synonymous with the right to food, the 
right to freedom from hunger is considered to be merely a "sub- 
198 See, Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 12-13. 
199 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 7, para. 26. 
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norm". Whereas freedom from hunger implies freedom from 
starvation, or the fulfilment of basic needs necessary for survival, 
the right to food goes further in requiring a level and type of food 
that is consonant with human dignity. 200 
One reason for maintaining a distinction between freedom 
from hunger and the right to food is that the former is specifically 
referred to as "fundamental". No other right in either of the two 
Covenants is referred to in this manner, nor does the ICESCR 
make apparent any specific legal consequence that may derive 
from it being termed "fundamental". It has been suggested in the 
Committee that this term implied that the State, assisted if 
necessary by the international community, had an obligation (of an 
immediate as opposed to progressive nature) to avoid starvation, 
and that it was so closely linked to article 6 ICCPR that it should 
be respected under all circumstances. 201 
However, there are a number of arguments against giving 
the provision priority. First, the travaux preparatoires do not 
demonstrate an intention to give the provision any form of 
priority. 202 Secondly,, much as famines are often presented as 
essentially man-made phenomena, it is as yet unrealistic to 
consider the obligation to prevent starvation as one requiring 
immediate implementation. Finally, it is legally incorrect to 
assume a provision is non-derogable merely because it resembles a 
non-derogable right in another treaty. Indeed that matter is of 
little importance given the lack of a derogation clause in the 
ICESCR. 
Tbus, on a strictly legal level, although the right to freedom 
from hunger is said to be "fundamental" there is little justification 
for interpreting it as having any form of priority over other 
rights. This does not mean, however, that the right is not 
important. Certainly, as commentators have pointed out. ) at one level at least, the right to food is a "basic right" upon which the 
enjoyment of other rights depend. As Shue noted: 
"Any form of malnutrition, or fever due to exposure, 
that causes severe and irreversible brain damage, for 
example, can effectively prevent the exercise of any 
right requiring clear thought and may, like brain 
injuries caused by assault, profoundly disturb 
personality. And, obviously, any fatal deficiencies end 
200 See, Alston, supra, note 1, at 32-34. 
201 See, Dobbert (FAO), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 6, para. 18. 
202 See above, text accompanying notes 145-147. 
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all possibility of the enjoyment of rights as firmly as 
an arbitrary execution. "203 
it is clear that the fundamental nature of the right to freedom from 
hunger relates to its association with survival. In this sense it might 
be distinguished from a right to "adequate food" that extends 
beyond basic needs. The term "fundamental" then, would appear to 
require that action taken towards the realisation of the right to 
adequate food (in its widest sense), should be directed primarily 
towards the enjoyment of minimum levels of subsistence. In other 
words, action should be prioritised in favour of the realisation of 
the "minimum core-content" of the right to food. 204 
3) The Meaning of "Adequate Food" 
As has been implied above, 205 the right to adequate food 
would seem to extend beyond that which is required for survival. 
Indeed article 11 speaks of "adequate" food. Some commentators 
have suggested that adequacy should be measured not merely by 
what is necessary for survival, but by a person's health or by their 
ability to pursue a normal, active existence. 206 It is clear, 
however, that whatever criterion against which adequacy is to be 
measured will itself have to be defined. For example, the notion of 
"health" as a reference criterion "is limited by our inability to 
define a state of health which an adequate nutrient intake should 
sustain". 207 
In addition to the quantitative sufficiency of the food supply, 
it has also been considered that adequate food has a qualitative 
element, 208 namely that food should be culturally acceptable and 
203 Shue H., Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US- Foreign 
Policy, 24-25 (1980). See also, Konate, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 21, at 2, paras. 6-7. It 
was noted in the Committee that in 1982 the Human Rights Committee had 
expressed the link between the right to life and malnutrition in its general 
comment on article 6. Eide, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 21, at 5. See, HRC General Comment 6(16), UN Doc. A/37/40, at 93 (1982). 
204 See above, Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 236-253. 
205 See above, text accompanying note 200. 
2M Alston, supra, note 1, at 22,33. These are also the common cntena 
for defining malnutrition. 
207 Pacey A. and Payne P., Agricultural Develgpment and Nutrition, at 
230985). 
2W It should be noted that this "qualitative" and "quantitative" distinction 
is not entirely watertight. The concept of adequate food for the maintainance of 
health not only requires a minimum calorific intake but also a certain balance of 
nutrients. 
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healthy (or in other words, safe). 209 An effort has thus been made 
to endow the concept of adequate food with a broad definition that 
extends beyond merely an analysis of calorific intake. 
Accordingly, the mere presence or absence of malnutrition would 
not in itself be the sole determinant of whether a State was 
complying with its obligations. 
In its guidelines, the Committee has not attempted to define 
what it considers to be adequate food. It requests States merely to 
provide information as to the extent to which the right to adequate 
food has been realised. 210 It could be assumed then that it expects 
States to form their own national benchmarks of what amounts to 
"adequate food". 211 The Committee does however refer to 
"malnutrition" which would seem to suggest that it understands the 
concept of adequate food to mean more than mere freedom from 
starvation. 212 Committee members themselves have frequently 
looked to measures of calorie intake as a means of assessing the 
adequacy of the food supply. 213 In doing so they have often 
requested disaggregated statistics according to vulnerable groups 
and individuals. 214 In particular, concern has often been expressed 
about declines in the average calorie intake over a period of 
tirne, 215 and occasionally in cases where the calorie intake seems 
excessively high. 216 
Despite considerable agreement during the Committee's 
General Discussion217 that "the right to recieve food was not 
209 Alston, supra, note 1, at 33; Eide, E/C. 12/19P/SR. 21, at 6, para-18; 
Centre For Human Rights, Right to Adequate Food as a Human Kigh-t, 27 (1989). 
210 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 12. 
211 See e. g. Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 17, at 16, para. 86. 
212 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 12. 
213 See e. g., Neneman, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 6, at 4, para. 22. 
214 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 11, para-59. See also, 
Eide, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 11, para. 46. 
215 See e. g., Nenernan, E/C. 12/1988/SR-17, at 4, para. 25; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 6, at 10, para. 47; Nenernan, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 11, 
para. 55. 
216 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 18, at 2, para. 3. 
217 See generally, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4), at 68-72, paras 310-326, 
UN Doc. E/1989/22, (1989). 
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simply a question of calories but adequate nutrition", 218 
Committee members seem to have concentrated rather heavily on 
calorific intake as a measure of adequate food. Such an approach 
may be subject to considerable criticism. First, it has been pointed 
out that estimates of calorific intake suffer from personal, inter- 
personal, and inter-temporal variations as measures of food 
adequacy. 219 Secondly, calorific intake may give an indication of 
"undernourishment" (defined as an inadequate intake of calories), 
but is insufficient as a measure of "malnourishment" which is 
defined more widely as a lack of essential nutrients (including 
vitamins for example), 220 and wholly fails to accomodate a wider 
sense of food "adequacy" that might be seen as relating to 
individual capabilitieS. 221 
That Committee members have only rarely requested 
information as to the nutritional status of the population, 222 or as 
to food quality and safety, 223 may be criticised as being unduly 
cautious. However, the Committee does face considerable 
problems in assessing the level of enjoyment of the right to food 
even in so far as it relates merely to malnutrition. Whereas a 
consumption survey would be the ideal method, it poses 
prohibitive logistical and financial obstacleS. 224 Physical indicators 
of health are thought to offer "much promise" as measurements of 
malnutrition, 225 but even here there are difficulties in establishing 
that a restricted food intake is entirely responsible for the apparent 
health problems. It is clear that whatever form of measurement is 
218 Ibid, at 7 1, para. 320. Cf. Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 7, 
para. 26. 
219 Dr6ze J. and Sen A., Hunger and Public Action, 37-41 (1989). 
220 Huddleston B., "Approaches to Quantifying the World Food 
Problem", in Clay E. and Shaw J. (eds), Poverty, Develgpment and Food, 1 at 
11(1987). 
221 See above, text accompanying note 206. 
222 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 9, at 7, para. 30; Neneman, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 8, para. 34. 
223 See e. g., Taya, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 8, at 6, para. 26; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 16, at 18, para. 95; Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 13, 
para. 69. 
224 Huddleston, supra, note 220, at 10. 
225Ibid, at 11. 
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adopted, it is likely to display only a "probabilistic picture" of 
nutritional deprivation. 226 
4) The Realisation of the Right to. Food 
Article 11 (1) makes reference to the obligation of States to 
"take appropriate steps to ensure the realisation" inter alia of the 
right to food, whilst recognising "the essential importance of 
international co-operation based on free consent". This seems to 
parallel the obligation in article 2(l) with the exception of the use 
of the word "ensure". As was apparent in the drafting of the 
Covenant, there was no clear intention to oblige States to achieve 
the realisation of the rights in article 11 immediately. 227 
Unsurprisingly the Committee has taken a similar viewpoint. In its 
guidelines the Committee specifically asks for information as to 
the extent to which the right to adequate food has been realised in 
that country- the implication being that it is acceptable for full 
realisation not to have been achieved for the time being. 228 
rMe modalities of implementation were debated in the 
Committee's General Discussion on the right to food. The report 
of the discussion states: 
"Some members of the Committee considered that 
every country should take immediate steps to ensure 
the realisation of the right to food; that ultimate 
realisation at the fullest acceptable level may in the 
circumstances of some countries be achieved 
progressively but the national and international 
obligations arising under the Covenant meant that 
with co-ordinated efforts a meaningful start could be 
made immediately in all States, whilst it was generally 
agreed that the primary responsibility for ensuring 
the right to food rested with the individual. 11229 
Although only being the opinion of "some members", the form of 
obligation underlined here largely conforms to the Committee's 
general approach with respect to article 20). 230 One interesting 
point, however, is the statement that the "primary responsibility" 
for ensuring the right to food lay with the individual. Although 
226 See, Dreze and Sen, supra, note 219, at 41. 
227 See above, text accompanying notes 98-110. 
228 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 99. 
229 Ibid, at 7 1, para. 32 1. 
230 See above, Chapter 2. 
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individuals are certainly responsible for buying or growing food 
for themselves and their families under normal conditions, to say 
that they have "primary responsibility" in times of famine is to 
understate the State obligations with respect to food. 
It is considered that the Committee members intended to 
stress the importance of individual access to food rather than the 
provision of food by the State. As the General Discussion shows, 
"[ilt was generally agreed that the right to food was much more 
extensive than the right to stand in line for food". 231 The role of 
the State then, is one of ensuring that the external conditions are 
such that individuals have the ability to feed themselves. 232 In 
particular it might be said that the principal State obligation "is 
not, at least initially, to give food to others. Instead, it is a duty not 
to restrict unduly the right of others to obtain an adequate 
diet. "233 
People's access to food quite clearly depends upon a number 
of factors relating to their own social and economic situation (such 
as their income), and upon "external" factors such as the 
availability of necessary food-stuffs and their prices. One well- 
known approach has been to assess a person's command over food 
through an analysis of his or her "entitlements". 234 Members of 
the Committee have rightly recognised the importance here of 
income, 235 especially as might be secured through the rights to 
work and to social security. 236 However, it is apparent that in the 
great majority of countries, the absence of full and adequately 
remunerated employment and of a comprehensive social security 
system requires that independent action be taken to secure access to 
food. The rights to work, to a minimum income and social 
231 General Discussion, supra, note 217, at 7 1, para. 320. 
232 See, Tomasevski K., "Human Rights: The Right to Food", 70 Iowa 
L. R., 1321, at 1325 (1985). As Christensen comments: 
to the emphasis lies, not on 'feeding' or 'maintaining' people, 
*i 
on creating a social and economic environment which fosters ýu
development and hence need not depend upon charity. " 
Christensen C., The Right to Food: How to Guarantee, at 33 (1978). 
233 Brockett C., "The Right to Food and United States PolicY in 
.,, 
366, at 367 (1984). Guatemala", 6 Hum. Rts. Q 
2u Sen A., Poverty and Famines: An nts and 
Deprivation, (1981). 
235 See e. g., Neneman, E/C. 12/1989/SR-20, at 9, para. 36. 
236 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 7, para. 26. 
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security are thus not sufficient in themselves to satisfy the right to food. 237 
In so far as the individual's access to food is dependent upon 
his or her control over resources. ) there is clearly a need for decisions, strategies and policies affecting resources to be taken 
with the active participation of those affected. As has been noted in 
the Committee, the realisation of the right to food is thus also 
dependent upon participatory rights such as the right to 
organise, 238 and the right to self-detennination. 239 
In the context of malnutrition however, commentators have 
gone considerably further in linking the right to food with a whole 
range of other rights. 240 In particular, it has been commented that 
"a person's capability to avoid undernourishment may depend not 
merely on his or her intake of food, but also on the person's access 
to health care, medical facilities, elementary education, drinking 
water, and sanitary facilities ". 241 The fulfilment of other basic 
needs would also seem to be necessary in order to realise the right 
to food not only because of the physiological interrelationships 
between them (for example between health and nutrition242) but 
because they are mutually interdependent for their realisation. 243 
This has led one commentator to the conclusion that "a 
237 See, Alston, supra, note 1, at 17; Kassahun Y., "The Food 
Questions Within the Prism of International law of Development", 38 Oklahoma 
L. R., 863, at 882 (1985). 
238 TbiS would seem to be the case particularly in respect to agricultural 
workers. 
239 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR-20, at 7, para. 26. 
240 Alston, supra, note 1, at 10. See also, Tomasevski, supra, note 232, 
at 1324-5. 
241 Dreize and Sen, supra, note 219, at 13. 
242 Christensen cites a number of examples of the interdependence 
between food and health: physical and mental health depend upon adequate 
nutrition (especially in the case of children); malnourished adults have a greater 
susceptibility to disease; illness diminishes the physiological benefits of 
"adequate" food supplies, may increase the body's nutrient requirements and 
may deplete the body's nutrient supply. Christensen, supra, note 232, at 31-32. 
243 Lustig comments for example that households would not necessarily 
use the extra income (that was intended for food) to eliminate malnutrition, but 
would use it to fulfil other subsistence needs. Lustig N., "Direct and Indirect 
Measures to Ensure Access to Food Supplies", in World Food Security: Selected 
-Themes and Issues, 38 at 46 
(1985). 
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compartmentalised approach to the right to food is both 
empirically unworkable and theoretically unacceptable". 244 
However, the recognition of connections between the right 
to food and other rights may lead in two directions. On the one 
hand it might be concluded that it is impractical to assess the right 
to food without consideration of the level of reahsation of other 
rights. On the other hand it might be argued that the right to food 
may be realised merely by ensuring the other rights and need not 
be referred to itself 
The Committee has not been consistent in its approach in 
this regard. Although the guidelines require the same information 
to be provided by every State, the Committee has generally only 
concentrated on the question of the right to food in relation to 
poorer developing countries. With regard to the more wealthy 
States, the Committee seems to concentrate on the questions of 
employment, income and social security, reflecting the assumption 
that if these rights are fully provided for, the individual would 
have no problem with access to food. Thus, no questions were 
asked as to the right to food in the consideration of the report of 
Luxembourg245, and even in the case of Costa Rica, few direct 
questions were asked. 246 
The margin of appreciation given to such States seems to 
reflect the assertions of a number of Western States which 
maintain that the central problem relating to food in those 
countries is over-consumption rather than under-consumption. 247 
In those States efforts are concentrated on encouraging people to 
eat more healthily, through inter alia the provision of public 
244 Alston, supra, note 1, at 19. Christensen gives three supporting 
arguments: 
"First, there are physiological interrelationships which limit the 
effectiveness of efforts that fulfill only one physical need while 
bypassing others. Second, a right to food may be more 
sustainable if it is part of a 'package' of subsistence rights which 
provides minimal guarantees of economic security. Tbird, 
common duties are associated with the provision of all 
subsistence rights. Violations of one right are likely to generate 
difficulties with regard to others as well. " Christensen, supra, note 232, at 3 1. 
245 See, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 33-36. 
246 See, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 38,40,41 and 43. 
247 See e. g., Steel (UK), E/C. 12/1989/SR-16, at 9, para. 43; Walkate (Netherlands), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 14, at 9, para. 36. It has been maintained, 
however, that inadequate food remains a problem in Canada, see, Robertson R., 
"The Right to Food: Canada's Broken Covenant", 6 Can. H. R. Y., 185, at 191- 
194 (1989-90). 
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information as to healthy diets. 248 Unfortunately, outside the 
requirement that States disseminate knowledge of the principles of 
nutrition, the Committee has not developed an understanding of 
the manner in which the right to food is applicable to wealthy 
States with well-developed social security systems. 
In its general approach to the realisation of rights in the 
Covenant, the Committee looks in particular at the legal regulation 
of the rights, the degree to which monitoring and targetted policy- 
making has been undertaken. 249 These matters will be considered 
individually in the context of the right to food. 
a) Legal Regulation 
Although it is not immediately clear how a legal system may 
affect an individual's access to food, it is apparent that a number of 
States do recognise a right to food in their constitutions. 250 In 
addition, those States that have adopted or incorporated the 
Covenant into their domestic law, will also have an expression of 
the right in their legal systems. 251 These moves find support with 
a number of commentators who consider that the most effective or 
direct route to secure the right to food is through constitutional 
enactment or specific legislation. 252 
This approach has not been evident in the work of the 
Committee. There, the role of law in the realisation of that right 
has been given a relatively low profile. In contrast to the right to 
housing, the guidelines do not ask for detailed information as to 
legal provisions that may affect a person's access to food, 253 and 
only occasionally has the matter been raised at all. 254 A lack of 
concern with the role of law in the realisation of the right to food 
is also reflected in the State reports. For example, it was noted in 
248 See e. g., Opdahl (Norway), E/C. 12/1988/SR. 15, at 6, para. 22; 
Willers (FRG), E/C. 12/1987/SR. 20, at 10, para. 41. 
249 See above, Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 74-90. 
250 See e. g., Ecuador, UN Doc. E/1 986/3/Add. 14, at 11, para. 55 (1986); 
Netherlands, UN Doc. E/1986/4"/Add. 24, at 1, para. 2 (1986). Ganji cites in 
addition: Pakistan, Turkey, Uruguay and Yemen. Ganji M., "The Realisation of 
F-Conomic, Social and Cultural Rights: Problems and Perspectives", UN 
Docs. E/CN. 4/1108/Rev. 1, and E/CNA/113 1/Rev. 1, at 16 (1975). 
251 See above, Chapter 3. 
215.252 
See e. g., Alston, supra, note 1, at 16; Robertson, supra, note 247, at 
253 See, Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 12. 
254 E/C. 12/WG/1991/CRP. 2, at 3, para. 22. 
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the United Kingdom report to the Committee that "there are no 
laws, regulations or agreements, nor court decisions bearing on 
the right of everyone to adequate food in the United Kingdom". 255 
It is considered that the Committee is wrong to overlook 
the relationship between law and the realisation of the right to 
food. Even in absence of a specific legal recognition of a right to 
food, it is clear that the legal framework will condition the access 
of individuals and groups to the resources necessary to feed 
themselves. 256 As has been noted in the context of famines: 
"The legal system that precedes and survives through 
the famine may not, in itself, be a particularly cruel 
one. The standardly accepted rights of ownership and 
exchange are not... authoritarian extravaganzas... [t]hey are, rather, parts of the standard legal rules of 
ownership and exchange that govern people's lives in 
much of the world. But when they are not 
supplemented by other rights (eg. social security, 
unemployment insurance, public health provisions), 
these standard rights may operate in a way that offers 
no chance of survival. "257 
According to the general requirements for the implementation of 
the Covenant, States are obliged to ensure that no laws or 
regulations exist which operated to deprive people of their rights 
in the Covenant. 258 This would be clear in cases where, for 
example, a State discriminated against certain groups as regards 
access to State- subsidised food. Greater attention, however, needs 
to be paid to cases where the existing system of exchange and 
ownership serves to impede the access of individuals to adequate 
food. 259 
b) Monitoring Malnutrition 
As outlined in its general comment, the Committee has 
placed considerable emphasis on the importance of monitoring the 
255 UN Doc. E/1980/6/Add. 16, at 2 (1980). 
256 See, Alston, supra, note 1, at 16. 
257 Dreze and Sen, supra, note 219, at 23. 
258 See above, Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 13 1. 
259 For an analysis of the influence of land law on the right to food, see, 
Plant R., "The Right to Food and Agrarian Systems: Law and Practice in Latin 
America", in Alston P. and TomasevsId K. (eds), The Right to 
-FQQd, 
187 
(1984). 
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extent of realisation of the rights. 260 'MUS in its reporting 
guidelines it requests States to provide information as to the 
general realisation of the right to food with reference to sources 
"including nutritional surveys and other monitoring 
arrangements". 261 In addition it asks for information as to the 
extent of hunger and malnutrition in the country concerned, with 
specific reference to the situation of vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups, and for the establishment of time-related goals and 
nutritional bench-marks for measuring achievements in 
guaranteeing access to food by vulnerable groups and sectors or 
within worse-off regions. 262 
Individual members of the Committee have consistently 
asked for information as to the incidence of hunger and 
malnutrition263 and their possible causes. 264 Despite the general 
tendency to ignore the food situation in developed countries, 265 
individual members have occasionally insisted upon the need for 
monitoring such countries to ensure that there was no significant 
amount of malnutrition, and have criticised States where they have 
failed to do so. 266 
As noted above, nowhere does the Committee define what it 
means by either "adequate food" or "malnutrition", nor does it 
request specific indicators. 267 It is assumed that in the process of 
monitoring and evaluation, States will have to define these matters 
for themselves. Currently, the statistical information provided to 
the Committee by States is partial and generalised indicating no 
regular pattern of monitoring. In its discussion on the use of 
indicators, there would appear to be an intention on the part of the 
Committee to establish a list of indicators that should be utilised in 
260 General Comment No. 1, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4), Annex III, at 
88, para. 3, UN Doc. E/1989/22, (1989). Cf also, Centre for Human Rights, 
supra, note 209, at 51, paras 257-261. 
261 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 12. 
262 Ibid. 
263 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 8, para. 46; Alston, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 5, para. 19; Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2, at 9, para. 55; 
Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2, at 10, para. 64. 
264 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 8, para. 46. 
265 See above, text accompanying notes 245-248. 
266 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 8, at 6, para. 23, and 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 17, at 7, para. 32. 
267 See above, text accompanying notes 205-226. 
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monitoring. 268 It is submitted that this would considerably 
increase the Committee's control and supervision of State 
compliance with their obligations. 
c) Vulnerable Groups 
The guidelines require States to provide information on the 
extent of hunger and malnutrition in that country with particular 
reference to the vulnerable or disadvantaged groups in society. It 
stipulates that information should at least cover the position of 
landless peasants, marginalised peasants, rural workers, rural 
unemployed, urban unemployed, urban poor, migrant workers, 
indigenous populations, children, elderly people and other 
"especially affected groups". It should also address whether there 
is any significant difference in the situation of men and women in 
the above groups, and requires information as to changes over the 
past five years for each group. 269 This general concern for 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups has been reflected in the 
questions of the pre-sessional working group. 270 In addition, 
members of the Committee have looked to the disparities in the 
relative position of those in rural and urban districts. 271 
In so far as the effectiveness of the guidelines has not truly 
been tested, it is as yet too early to say whether States will be able 
or willing to provide the amount of disaggregated data required by 
the Committee. Thus far States have rarely volunteered 
information as to the position of particular disadvantaged groups. 
The statistical information provided generally relates to the 
aggregate position of the population as a whole. It is important to 
note, however, that the emphasis on vulnerable groups is of 
primary importance for the adoption of targetted and considered 
policies. It will not necessarily be the case that all of the specified 
groups will have insufficient access to food. What is important, 
however, is that the State identify those groups in society that are 
vulnerable in this respect. 
268 See below, Chapter 9. 
269 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 12. 
270 E/C. 12/WG/1 99 1/CRP. 1, at 4, Para-24(a); 
E/C. 12/WG/1991/CRP. 4, at 6, para. 37. 
271 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 22, at 6, para. 21; 
E/C. 12/WG/1991/CRP. 4, at 6, para. 36. 
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5) SDecific State Obligations 
Although article 11 as a whole was intended to be governed 
by the general obligation clauses in article 2(1) under which States 
parties are obliged to take steps to achieve progressively the full 
realisation of the rights, 272 it was decided nevertheless to include 
certain specific obligations in article 11(2) relating to the right to 
food. Those obligations were not intended to detract from the 
general State obligations found in article 2(l), but merely 
provided a more detailed outline of the measures to be taken and 
the objectives to be achieved in the context of the right to food. 
However, as a result of the uneven, over-hasty and badly co- 
ordinated drafting process, article 11(2) appears to be a "relatively 
confused and by no means all-embracing mixture of means and 
ends. "273 Three objectives seem to be specifically outlined, namely 
to improve methods of production, conservation and distribution 
of food; to achieve the most efficient development and utilisation 
of natural resources; 274 and to ensure an equitable distribution of 
world food supplies in relation to need. 275 Whereas the first two 
objectives are national ones, the third relates to the international 
plane. 276 
States are under an obligation to take the necessary measures 
and programmes, both individually and through international co- 
operation, to achieve these objectives. Specifically however, with 
respect to the two national objectives (in article 11 (2)(a)), States 
should make full use of technical and scientific knowledge, 
disseminate knowledge of the principles of nutrition and develop 
or reform their agrarian systems. Given the general obligation to 
take the necessary measures to acheive the stated objectives, there 
is no reason to consider that the measures specifically enumerated 
are exhaustive. 277 
It is unclear whether the specified measures are intended to 
relate to the right to food as a whole, or merely to the right to be 
272 See above, text accompanying notes 101-103. 
273 Alston, supra, note 1, at 34. 
274 Article 11(2)(a). 
275 Article 11 (2)(b). 
276 Kassahun, however, reads sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) together. He 
argues that the objectives in sub-paragraph (a) are to be read in light of the limits 
imposed by the problems of food-importing and food-exporting States, and in h 
comes to the conclusion that "the formulation of article 11 appears to Mainta te 
status quo in terms of food production". Kassahun, supra, note 237, at 888. 
2'n See, Alston., supra, note 1, at 34. 
345 
free from hunger. However, on the basis that the right to be free 
from hunger acts as a "sub-norm" of the right to food as a whole, 
progress made in achieving the subsidiary ends in article 11(2) 
must always be judged against the objective of realising everyone's 
right to adequate food and ultimately their right to an adequate 
standard of living. 278 It would not be sufficient, for example, to 
argue that agrarian reform was not necessary merely because no- 
one was dying of hunger. 
a) The Subsidiary Objectives 
In dealing with the questions of production, conservation 
and distribution, the Committee seems to confine itself to assessing 
the degree of realisation of the right to food and ensuring that a 
policy has been adopted to alleviate the position of the poor and 
disadvantaged. 279 It has not entered into an analysis of the relative 
merits of the programmes undertaken, nor has undertaken to make 
recommendations as to specific courses of action even on a State 
by State basis. 
i) Production 
In order for everyone to have adequate supplies of food, it 
is clear that food production should be increased to keep pace with 
population growth. 280 Although article 11(2) speaks of an 
improvement in "methods" of production, rather than an increase 
in production itself, it would seem obvious that the provision was 
intended to be directed towards the latter concern. The 
Committee's guidelines do nothing to resolve this question and 
make rather a bland reference to the objective in asking what 
278 Ibid. 
279 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 12; Fofana, 
E/C. 12/1991/SR. 7, at 13, para. 54. 
280 In areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the population growth and 
increasing urbanisation have placed considerable strain on food resources to the 
extent that an increase in food production is vital. See e. g., Christensen C. and 
Hanrahan C., "African Food Crisis: Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term 
Responses", 70 Iowa L. R. 1293, at 1294-5 (1985); Kumar G., "Ethiopian 
Famines 1973-1985: A Case Study" WIDER Worldnig P=aer N 
. 
26, (1987); 
Green R., "Sub-Saharan Africa: Poverty of Development, Development of 
Poverty", in Clay E. and Shaw J. (eds), Poverty. Development and-Emd, 78, at 
87-88 (1987). However, for the view that access to food is one of distribution 
not production see, George S., How the Other Half Dies, 53-68 (1986). 
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measures had been taken to improve methods of food 
production. 281 
There are clearly a great number of ways in which food 
production may be increased and improved, such as through 
improving access to agricultural inputs (high yield crops, C; P__ 
fertilisers, pesticides and machinery), increasing the area of arable 
land, providing farmers and fishermen with incentives for 
production, undertaking soil conservation and improvement, and 
increasing agricultural research and the transfer of technology, 282 
to name but a few. 283 Clearly, the measures taken will depend 
upon the agricultural and economic situation in the country 
concerned. 
Members of the Committee have rarely entered into a 
discussion of the policies pursued in this direction, and have 
generally looked only to the existence of such policies. 284 
Occasionally comments have been made as to type of policy 
undertaken. One member, for example, argued that large-scale 
State food subsidies often led to insufficiently profitable output and 
hence to lower food production, and that it was therefore essential 
to provide sufficient incentives to make food production profitable 
and hence to ensure that there was enough food on the market. 285 
However in no way can there be presumed that the Committee has 
formulated any coherent policy in this regard. 
In terms of food production it has often been considered that 
States should have as their ob ective food self-sufficiency. It is 
clear that a number of States have set food self-sufficiency as a 
target for achieving the realisation of the right to food, and to a 
large extent, members of the Committee have endorsed such an 
objective. 286 7111e, Committee has not gone so far as to analyse 
whether "self-sufficiency" in terms of producing all the food for 
281 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 12. 
282 See, Boerma A., A Right to Food, 87-97 (1976). 
283 See, Huddleston, supra, note 220, at 18; Christensen, supra, note 
232, at 6-17. 
284 See e. g., Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 5, at 4, para. 15; 
Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 5, at 9, para-50; E/C. 12/WG/1991/CRP. 2, at 3, 
para. 23. 
285 See, Neneman, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 9, para. 35. 
286 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/198 8/SR. 17, at 8, para. 46; Muterahejuru, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 6, at 12, para. 60; Dobbert (FAO), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 21, at 10, 
para. 41. 
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domestic consumption is indeed a realistic or desirable 
proposition. 
Members of the Committee have occasionally noted that 
given their dependence on international trade, poorer agricultural 
countries were often unable to ensure self- sufficiency, 287 and that 
it would at any rate involve a certain amount of agricultural 
protectioniSM. 288 However it is not at all clear that food self- 
sufficiency would necessarily guarantee food security in the first 
place given the vulnerability of such an economy to domestic 
surpluses and deficits. 289 Moreover, a great number of States that 
are not self-sufficient do not suffer from serious food shortages. 
This has led some commentators to argue that food "self-reliance" (which involves the import of a cerain amount of food to be paid 
for by exports) through diversification, is a more stable and 
effective method of securing sustained access to food for all. 290 
Nevertheless, whereas the availability of sufficient food 
resources is clearly important, it is by no means clear that alone it 
is enough to guarantee access to food. As one member rightly 
pointed out "it was not unusual for individuals to go hungry even 
though food production was high. "291 The essential question is the 
extent to which an individual has an adequate "command" over 
food, which has to be assessed through an analysis of both the 
supply and consumption of food. 292 
ii) Conservation 
The term "conservation" in the context of article 11(2)(a) is 
specifically confined to the preservation of food-stuffs before they 
reach the market place. The term seems to have been included to 
remedy the problem of loss and deterioration of food that has been 
particularly apparent in developing countries. 293 Although being 
given a passing comment in the Committee's guidelines, the issue 
287 See, Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 2 1, at 2, para. 4. 
288jbid, para. 1. 
289 Mangahas M., "Relative Emphasis on Food Self-Sufficiency and 
Trade-Oriented Self-Reliance", World Food Security: Selected Themes and 
Issues, 1 at 16 (1985). 
290 Ibid, at 13; Dreize and Sen, supra, note 219, at 165-176. 
291 Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 9, para. 35. See also, Dreze and Sen, 
supra, note 219, at 27-8. 
292 Centre For Human Rights, supra, note 209, at 27. 
293 See, DobbeM "The Right to Food", Academie de Droit Intemational, 
Cg-IIQQue, 184 at 200 (1978). 
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of conservation of food-stuffs has not been the subject of any 
specific comment by the Committee or individual members. Given 
the role that conservation could have in increasing food self- 
reliance (by decreasing the need for food imports), in improving 
nutritional standards (by preventing nutritional deterioration), and 
in contributing to the effective use of human and physical 
resources, it would surely be worth more detailed consideration. 
iii) Distribution 
"Distribution" in article 11(2)(a) would seem to relate to 
distribution within the territorial limits of each country in contrast 
with article 11(2)(b) which refers primarily to international 
distribution. The area of State action covered by the term 
distribution would seem to include marketing arrangements (such 
as the transport infrastructure294), price controls, rationing, food 
subsidieS295 and direct food or cash relief. Clearly the objective of 
"improving" the distribution of food should be read in light of 
ensuring access to food for everyone, and its effectiveness may be 
measured by consumption levels. 
As with the question of production, the Committee has not 
endeavoured to discuss or analyse specific distributional methods, 
and clearly lacks the necessary knowledge, and technical expertise 
to do so. It has rather enquired as to how measures taken to 
improve distribution have "contributed towards, or have impeded 
the realization of the right to adequate food"296 particularly as 
regards vulnerable groups in society. 297 
b) Development and Utilisation of Natural Resources. 
Although the efficient development and utilisation of natural 
resources appears to relate solely to agrarian development, 
commentators have generally considered that, despite the absence 
of a comma, it should be read to relate to the whole of article 
294 Kumar G., Ethiol? ian Famines 1973-1985: A Case Study, 57 (1987). 
295 The World Bank notes that a number of forms of food subsidy are 
used by developing countries including: general food price subsidies, " 
mtions, food stamps, food distribution policies and food supplementation 
schemes. IBRD, supra, note 186, at 92-96. 
296 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 174, at 12. 
297 E/C. 12/WG/1991/CRP. 2, at 3, para. 23. 
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11(2)(a). 298 The Committee appears to have adopted this 
interpretation in asking what effect the measures of 
implementation have had on the protection and conservation of 
food producing resources. 299 
In addition however, the Committee has laid an emphasis on 
the phrase that perhaps was not envisaged at the time of drafting. 
The drafters, in making reference to the development and 
utilisation of natural resources, were arguably concerned merely 
that resources should be utilised to their maximum extent without 
unnecessary wastage. The Committee however, in line with more 
recent environmental awareness, has stressed "ecological 
sustainability" and the "protection and conservation of food 
producing resources". 300 At a very general level, the Committee 
seems to be concerned that the utilisation of natural resources 
should be consistent with their future, long-term, su stainability. 301 
In its questions to States however, the Committee has not 
pursued such environmental issues. It would, however, be open for 
the Committee to enquire into action being taken to ensure such 
concerns enter into the planning debate, particularly as regards the 
regeneration of living resources, the productivity of soils (including action to combat desertification), the effective use of 
water resources, and the control of silviculture. 302 
298 Dobbert considers that this is the necessary implication of a 
teleological interpretation given that the development and utilisation of natural 
resources is a concomitant of methods of production, distribution and 
conservation of food. Dobbert, supra, note 293, at 193. See also, Alston, supra, 
note 1, at 35. 
299 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 12. 
300 Cf. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, Stockhohn 1972,11 I. L. M. 1416 (1972). Principle 13 which 
states: 
"In order to achieve a more rational management of resources and thus to 
improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated and co-ordinated 
approach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is 
compatible with the need to protect and improve the environment for the benefit 
of their population' 
. 
301 For the notion of "sustainable development" see, Environmental 
ELO-tection and Sustainable Develgpment (1986). 
302 The clearance of forest land for agricultural purposes perhaps 
illustrates most poignantly the competing concerns of food production and 
environmental protection. In many such cases it would seem that the short-term 
benefits of increased food-production are outweighed by the far more drastic 
environmental problems that ensue. 
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6)SDecified Measures 
a) Science and Technology 
Scant mention is made within the Committee of the requirement 
that "full use" be made of "technical and scientific knowledge". It has 
been given a passing reference in the guidelines, and has only rarely 
been mentioned by members of the Committee. 303Whilst the provision 
would appear to require, at minimum, the institution of national 
education and training programmes and research to engender the 
effective utilisation of existing expertise, it has been noted that the 
provision could also be seen to have an international dimension. 304 
Specifically, it might be interpreted as obliging States to co-operate 
internationally in the dissemination of such knowledge whether through 
the auspices of the FAO or through the transfer of knowledge to 
developing countries. 305 
b) Princip es of Nutrition 
The requirement in article 11(2)(a) that States "disseminate 
knowledge of the principles of nutrition" has been expressly taken up by 
the Committee in its guidelines. 306 In addition, the Commitee requests 
infonnation as to whether "any significant groups or sectors within 
society seem to lack such knowledge". 307 This would seem to be 
principally an educational objective aimed at enabling people to feed 
themselves in a healthy manner. Members of the Committee have taken 
up such educational questions particularly in regard to developed 
countries, where problems often relate to over-consumption. 
A related field, not directly covered by the express terms of the 
Covenant, is the establishment and enforcement of food standards. 308 It 
is clear that there is a considerable potential State role in ensuring food 
safety. Legislative standards could be enacted to ensure that food 
production and marketing are undertaken in a safe and healthy manner, 
and that the food available is free from adverse alien substances. 309 
303 See e. g., Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 6, para. 34. 
304 There are however objections to importing into a provision that deals 
primarily with national obligations, obligations that operate on the international level. 
305 Dobbert, supra, note 293, at 196-7. 
306 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 13. 
307 Ibid. 
308 See, Dobbert, supra, note 293, at 198-200. 
309 See, Center for Human Rights, supra, note 209, at 27, para. 133. On the 
international plane cf. FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Conunission. 
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Moreover, a system of inspection and control could be established at the 
national level to enforce such standards. 
Although the Covenant makes no reference to food quality, or 
measures to control it, it would be natural to infer from the concept of 
"adequate food" a qualitative element. Similarly, it is clear that the 
measures envisaged in article 11(2) are not exhaustive and therefore 
could not be said to exclude an obligation to take action as regards food 
quality. Unfortunately, although a number of members have made 
reference to food quality issues, the Committee as a whole has not taken 
up this question in any coherent manner. 
c) Agrarian Reform 
According to the travaux preparatoires, it was not intended that 
every State should undertake a programme of agrarian reform, but only 
in cases where the existing land-tenure system required it. 310 For those 
States that did not need to undertake agrarian reform, it seems to have 
been considered that they should nevertheless "develop" their agrarian 
systems. This distinction is not immediately apparent in the Committee's 
guidelines. No mention is made of the development of agrarian systems- 
merely reform. It might be inferred that all countries are required to 
reform their agrarian systems to ensure the right to food. This would, 
of course, be an unreasonable proposition. What the Committee has to 
establish is an idea of the type of agrarian system that is adequate from 
the point of view of realising the right to food. 
Some Committee members do seem to have been concerned with 
attempting to evaluate whether or not agrarian reform is necessary. 
Principally they have directed their attention towards the existing 
system of land tenure and the number of peasant farmers without their 
own land. 311 Although it has been asserted that any developing country 
which had not carried out agrarian reform would be considered 
automatically to have violated the Covenant. )312 there have been no 
occasions in which members have expressly stated that land reform is 
necessary. 
The purpose of agrarian reform in the context of the right to 
food is not always clear. The travaux preparatoires make clear that it 
310 See above, text accompanying note 158. 
311 See e. g., Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 9, at 6, para. 19; Fofana, 
E/C. 12/1991/SR. 7, at 13, para. 54. 
312 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22, at 13, para. 8 1. 
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was deemed necessary to improve the utilisation of agricultural 
resources. 313 More indirectly, however, existing inequalities in land 
distribution can contribute to social marginalisation, poverty, 
unemployment, homelessness and may increase rural-urban migration. 
Given that malnutrition (and even starvation) have significant links with 
poverty, all of these factors would have significant effects on the 
enjoyment of the right to food. 
The Committee, in its guidelines, requests information as to the 
measures of agrarian reform that have been taken to ensure that "the 
agrarian system is efficiently utilised in order to promote food security 
at household level without negatively affecting human dignity both in 
rural and urban settings taking into account articles 6 and 8 of the 
Covenant". 314 In addition, it wishes to know what measures have been 
taken to legislate, enforce and to monitor in this regard. 315 The 
Committee quite rightly appears to consider that agrarian reform is 
only relevant in so far as it is related to the enjoyment of the right to 
food- it is not sufficient on its own. As one Committee member 
commented: "agrarian reform might be sweeping yet result in severe 
deprivation of food for a significant part of the population". 316 In 
referring to human dignity (and particularly articles 6 and 8 of the 
Covenant), the Committee would seem to stress the necessity of 
ensuring access to food in a manner that does not conflict with the 
satisfaction of other rights or needs. As one study argues: 
"Food procurement should be possible for all without 
conflicting with the satisfaction of other material and 
non-material basic human needs. Otherwise food 
procurement may not be viable over time for the 
household concerned, whose members will chose their 
final strategies based on a range of priorities 11.317 
Whilst the reference to article 6 would seem to stress the need to 
ensure employment prospects in rural areas during reform, article 
8 probably relates to the desirability of popular participation in 
rural development activities in general. As has been commented 
elsewhere: 
313 See above, text accompanying note 157. For the utility of agrarian reform 
see, EBRD, supra, note 187, at 64-66; Brockett, supra, note 233, at 369; McChesney, 
supra, note 190, at 315. 
314 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 13. 
315 Ibid. On the importance of law in this area see, Plant, supra, note 259, at 
187. 
316 Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 8, para. 43. 
317 Center for Human Rights, supra, note 209, at 27, para. 134. 
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"Rural development strategies can realise their full 
potential only through the motivation, active 
involvement and organisation at the grass-roots level 
of rural people, with special emphasis on the least 
advantaged, in conceptualising and designing policies 
and programmes and in creating administrative, social 
and economic institutions, including cooperative and 
other voluntary forms of organisation for 
implementing and evaluating them". 318 
Questions of individual members have occasionally centered upon 
the level of participation in measures designed to promote the 
right to adequate food, 319 but none have done so in relation to 
agricultural reform per se. 
7) Article 11 (2) (b 
Little comment has been made by the Committee on the 
purport of article 11(2)(b). The guidelines ask States to "describe 
and evaluate" the measures taken to ensure an equitable 
distribution of world food supplies in relation to need. 320 It is 
unlikely that the Committee will receive much useful information 
so long as the text is not explained, and the breadth of State 
obligations outlined. As was noted in the General Discussion, 
paragraph 2(b) appeared to refer not only to programmes financed 
by voluntary funds, but also to "intemational commodity 
arrangements under the auspices of the Committee on Commodity 
Problems, consultations within the Sub-Committee on Surplus 
Disposal and even GATT or UNCTAD negotiations on 
agricultural commodities ". 321 
The assumption of the Committee, and certain 
commentators, has been that sub-paragraph (a) deals with national 
obligations and sub-paragraph (b) with the relevant intemational 
measures that have to be taken in order to achieve the fulfilment of 
the right to be free from hunger (and more generally the right to 
food). 322 Although reference is made to intemational problems 
318 Programme of Action, World Conference on Agrarian Reform and 
Rural Development, Rome l2th-20th July 1979. See also, Alston, supra, note 
at 20. 
319 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 7, at 2, para-2; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 16, at 18, para. 95. 
320 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 101. 
321 Dobbert (FAO), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 6, para-21. 
322 See e. g., Alston, supra, note 1, at 34. 
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and "world" food supplies, there is no reason why the obligation to 
ensure an equitable distribution of food in relation to need should 
not equally have a domestic element. As an objective, it applies 
equally well on the domestic level as on the international level. 
Indeed. ) a reference to international co-operation is to be found in 
the first paragraph of article 11 (2) and should be read as applying 
to both sub-paragraphs. 
Such an approach benefits from the fact that "need" does not 
have to be interpreted in terms of "State-need" but more 
appropriately in terms of "individual-need". This would conform 
more closely to the individual nature of human rights in general 
and avoid placing the "State" in a duplicitous position as the agent 
for realisation and the co-beneficiary of human rights provisions. 
What it does mean is that States would have both domestic and 
international obligations (or internal and external obligations) to 
ensure that the malnourished and starving world-wide have 
sufficient food. 323 
This question was raised in the Committee's general 
discussion. One member suggested that the duty to provide for 
international cooperation might lead to a point at which it could be 
asserted that the world's surplus food resources were the common 
heritage of mankind for meeting the needs of the hungry and 
impoverished. 324 That member, whilst admitting the proposal was 
"excessive", considered that it was the "only way in which an 
international legal obligation could be imposed upon States under 
the Covenant". 325 On a more realistic level, Mr Eide (the Special 
Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission) asserted that "it was 
increasingly possible to claim that States had external obligations at 
least to the extent of allowing other peoples in other countries to 
survive". 326 
323 It is worthy of note here that the Covenant does not have any 
territorial restrictions on the obligations of States. It could be argued that, in 
principle, every State is responsible for the position of every individual with 
respect o the right to food. This would in effect be a step towards seeing food 
resources as the common heritage of mankind. However, the implication of 
article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is that in absence of a 
specific provision otherwise "a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its 
entire territory", and only that territory. Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that 
States would admit such an obligation, not least in so far as it might affect their 
own sovereignty. 
324 See, Rattray, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 11, para. 48. 
3251bid. 
326 Eide, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 20, at 10, para. 41. 
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Article 11(2)(b) refers specifically to the problems of food- 
importing and food-exporting countries. It has been asserted that 
such a reference was included to reflect the fear of 
grain-exporting States that the FAO Freedom From Hunger 
Campaign might interfere with the operation of the international 
grain markets, and as such is anachronistic today. 327 Nevertheless, 
the Conunittee makes reference to the phrase in its reporting 
guidelines without attempting to explain its meaning. Despite the 
unsatisfactory nature of the wording, probably the best 
interpretation today, given the fact that food-importing and food- 
exporting countries exist in both the developed and developing 
world, is to read the provision in light of the need to ensure an 
"equitable distribution of world food supplies". This would mean 
focussing particularly upon the position of developing countries of 
either category. 328 Although every State could claim to have some 
form of trade problems, the problems that are relevant here are 
those that directly relate to the ability of the State to ensure every 
individual access to adequate food. 
The reference to exports and imports clearly relates to the 
terms of international trade. The Committee, however, reads the 
term "distribution" more widely. In the Committee's guidelines, 
reference is made to "an equitable distribution, in terms of both 
production and trade, of world food supplies". 329 Two main issues 
appear to be of concern to the Committee. First is that the location 
of greatest production of food resources (the developed world), 
does not coincide with the location of greatest need (the developing 
world). There is clearly a need for greater food production in 
developing countries and a transfer of human and material 
resources out of the agricultural sector in the developed world. 330 
Secondly, the protectionist farm trade policies of the developed 
world, accompanied by an increasing number of tariff and non- 
tariff barriers, have served to reduce the export earnings of 
developing countries, have endangered developing counties' food 
security through destabilising food prices and have obstructed 
327 Alston, supra, note 1, at 43. 
328 See, Dobbert, supra, note 293, at 194. This would avoid the Criticism 
of Kassahun that the article does not address the question of "agribusiness" 
which "allows global food production for global markets that causes the hungry 
country to be a food-exporting state". Kassahun, supra, note 247, at 888. 
329 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 101. 
330 Boerma, supra, note 282, at 75-86. 
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agricultural development in developing countries. 331 Although 
such problems are commonly accepted, it is not entirely agreed 
that developing countries would reap significant benefits from 
agricultural trade liberalisation. 332 
It is notable, however, that the Committee members, in 
speaking of the question of international co-operation, rarely refer 
to trade issues. In the General Discussion mention was made of the 
inequitable terms of trade between primary producers of 
agricultural products and producers of manufactured products 
particularly in terms of prices. "It was therefore an important part 
of the solution of the problem of the right to food that there 
should be an adjustment in the terms of trade as called for by the 
new international economic and social order". 333 The Committee 
has not taken it upon itself to suggest the forms of adjustment that 
should be undertaken. 
At the international level, although a great number of 
measures have been taken to stabilise food prices, volume of trade 
and to create buffer stocks where necessary, it is not apparent that 
in the short or medium term, a distribution of food supplies 
according to need would be provided by trade alone. This concern 
was expressly raised in the drafting of article 11. There, in 
rejecting the use of the word "interests" in place of "problems" in 
the drafting of article 11 (2)(b), the States concerned wished to 
331 See e. g., Carlson J., "Hunger, Agricultural Trade Liberalisation, and 
Soft International Law: Addressing the Legal Dimensions of a Political 
Problem", 70 Iowa L. R. 1187,1209-1220 (1985); IBRD, supra, note 186, at 
121-123. 
332 Carlson argues that "liberalising the agricultural trade policies of 
developed nations is widely recognised as a critical international goal particularly 
important in the battle against hunger and underdevelopment. " Ibid, at 1209. 
Similarly the World Bank claims that developing countries will reap "substantial 
gains" from trade liberalisation, 1[BRD, supra, note 186, at 123. However, 
sceptics have argued otherwise. Christensen concludes that "attempts to remove 
these limitations within the present 'rules of the game' are likely to achieve only 
marginal results. Liberalising agricultural trade, for example, would be largely 
ineffective. It would not significantly alter the underlying distribution of wealth 
which such a structure demands. " Christensen, supra, note 280, at 31. 
333 General Discussion, supra, note 217, at 72, para. 325. On the New 
International Economic Order and human rights generally, see, Ferrero R., "The 
International Economic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights", UN Doc. 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1983/24/Rev. 1, (1983); Baxi U., "The New International 
Economic Order, Basic Needs and Rights: Notes Towards Development of the 
Right to Development", 23 Ind. M. L., 225 (1983). Van Hoof F., "Problems and 
spects with Respect to the Right to Food", in van Dijk P. et al (eds), 
Restructuring the International Economic-Order: The Role of Law and LaMýYers, 
107 (1987). - 
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stress social and humanitarian considerations as opposed to merely 
economic ones. 334 'Ibis would mean that an international strategy 
to achieve more equitable distribution should not be a narrow CV 
trade-orientated one, but should seek to ensure that access to food 
is a reality for all members of the population concerned. 335 It is 
an implication that the provision of food aid would be highly 
desirable in certain circumstances. 
8) International Co-operation and Assistance 
Article 11 refers to international co-operation specifically 
on two occasions and implicitly on a third. First, article 11 (1) 
provides that States parties shall take measures to realize the right 
to an adequate standard of living (and therefore the right to food) 
"recognising to this effect the essential importance of international 
co-operation based on free consent". In merely providing that 
States "recognise" the importance of international co-operation, 
the provision does not seem to set out a binding legal obligation. It 
should perhaps be seen as drawing attention to the correlative 
obligation found in article 2(l) of the Covenant. 
The phrase "based on free consent tog it might be assumed, 
was inserted as a safety clause against any assumption that food- 
surplus States have an automatic responsibility to make transfers to 
food-deficient States. It might also be read as requiring that food 
aid should only be provided with the consent of the recipient 
State. 336 Either way, given its hortatory nature., it cannot be 
interpreted as making co-operation entirely optional, nor can it 
defeat the general obligation in article 2(l). 
Article 11 (2), however, specifically provides that States 
should take "individually and through international co-operation" 
the measures necessary to achieve the objectives in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). In so far as it merely repeats the general clause in 
article 2(l), this provision cannot be seen to add anything 
substantive to the existing State obligations. Indeed by the fact that 
it refers only to the two sub-paragraphs rather than the right to 
food itself, suggests that its scope is considerably less wide. In it 
addition, article 11(2) does not refer to "international assistance 
but merely "co-operation". No attempt has been made to 
distinguish these two concepts as far as the Covenant is concerned, 
either in the travaux preparatoires or in subsequent practice. It 
334 See above, text accompanying note 166. 
335 Alston, supra, note 1, at 43. 
336 Ibid, at 40. 
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would seem from an ordinary reading of the terms that co- 
operation is the broader concept including not merely a positive 
duty to assist, but also a negative duty not to obstruct the 
realisation of the rights. 
Finally, a duty to co-operate internationally may be inferred 
from article 11(2)(b) which refers to the duty to ensure an 
equitable distribution of world food supplies. However, as noted 
above, there is no need to interpret this provision in such a 
restrictive manner- especially as certain domestic obligations may 
be inferred therefrom. If the domestic and international 
obligations are seen as complementary, there is no necessity to 
determine whether or not a state "qualifies" for international 
assistance. 337 7hus the failure of a State to undertake the necessary 
distributional measures to ensure everyone has access to adequate 
food, although potentially signifying a violation of the Covenant, 
would not necessarily disqualify it from receiving aid. This is 
apparent not only because effective distribution may be an 
expensive and time-consuming goal, but also because the need 
relates to the individual not the State. 
As noted above, the concept of international co-operation 
does not exclusively relate to the obligation to assist. In addition, it 
might be argued that States have a duty to desist from action that 
may impede the realisation of the right to food in other countries. 
More specifically, this could involve restraining itself from 
"dumping" food surpluses on developing countries where it may 
have the effect of undermining domestic food-productionj and also 
perhaps the control of transnational agribusiness corporations. 338 
Only scant reference has been made by the Committee to either of 
these obligations. 339 
With respect to the question of international assistance, there 
are clearly a large number of areas and fora in which this may 
take place, a number of which have been referred to elsewhere. 
The most obvious concern would seem to be the provision of 
international aid. Recently there has been a move away from the 
provision of large, long-term aid programmes, which have been 
3371bid, at 36. 
338 See, George, supra, note 280, at 158-191; Kassahun, supra, note 
237, at 864-868. 
339 With respect to Trans-National Corporations see, Wimer Zambrano, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 21, at 8, para. 32. As regards "dumping" of unsafe food see, 
Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 13, para. 69. 
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thought to increase dependence upon assistance, 340 impair 
domestic production and reinforce existing inequalities within the 
recipient States. 341 However, there are still a number of 
arguments in favour of the provision of food aid. One 
commentator has noted that food aid can: i) provide States with the 
ability to maintain nutritional and consumption status of the 
population. ii) relieve the impact of fluctuations in food supplies 
and build the necessary administrative capacity, and iii) allow for 
broad-based employment orientated development strategies to 
increase food-production. 342 In addition, there are clearly ways to 
prevent food aid diminishing the demand for local produce. 343 
Members of the Committee have however been wary of 
advocating the provision of food aid. 'Ibey have stressed in 
particular the need for international co-operation to focus on 
assisting the production, 344 conservation and distribution345 of 
food at the domestic level. It has been considered that the 
Committee should enquire into the extent to which States have 
contributed through international cooperation towards the 
realization of the right to adequate food. 346 However, the 
Committee's guidelines merely require information as to measures 
taken to ensure an equitable distribution of food supplies, 347 and 
the Committee members' questions have been general and 
infrequent. 348 
As has been noted that although there may be a duty to co- 
operate internationally, it is likely that "States will insist on a right 
340 Alston, supra, note 1, at 41; George, supra, note 280, at 192; Eide, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 10, para. 44. 
341 Alston, supra, note 1, at 11 and 4 1. 
342 Mellor J., "Effective Food Aid for Effective Food Security", in 
World Food Securijy: Selected Themes and-lupps, 18 at 30, (1985); and, "Food 
Aid for Food Security and Economic Development", in Clay E. and Shaw 
J. (eds) Poverty. Development and Food, 173 (1987). 
343 Dobbert (FAO), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 21, at 10, para-39. 
344See e. g., Neneman, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 9, para. 38; Eide, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 10, para-44. 
345 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 12, para. 52. 
346 See, Dobbert (FAO), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 7, para. 22; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20, at 8, para. 28. 
347 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 13. 
348See e. g., Alvarez Vita., E/C. 12/1987/SR-19, at 13, para. 69; 
Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 12,, at 12, para. 64; E/C. 12/WG/1991/CRP. 2, at 
3, para. 24; 
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to retain absolute discretion in determining the level of their 
contribution to world welfare requirements ". 349 However, it is 
considered that the Committee might benefit from distinguishing 
between claims for the provision of food aid in the case of chronic 
malnutrition and claims that relate to a situation of famine. In the 
latter case, there is a more imperative moral obligation on the part 
of developed States to provide immediate assistance to the victims. 
Such a moral obligation could be assimilated to the "minimum 
core" of an obligation to provide international assistance. 350 
THE RIGHT TO HOUSING 
1) Introduction 
The Committee has dedicated more attention to the right to 
housing than any other right. 351 At the end of its sixth session in 
1991, the Committee had undertaken a general discussion and 
formulated a general comment to the right and had based its first 
express finding of a violation of the Covenant upon that subject. Its 
prominent concern with the subject of the right to housing has 
been driven primarily by the active participation of housing- 
oriented non-governmental organisations in the Committee's work. 
However, unlike the right to food, the right to housing does seem 
to allow for greater legal control and therefore be more 
susceptible to monitoring and quasi-judicial supervision. 352 
The right to adequate housing, although to be found in other 
international instruments, finds its broadest and most clear 
recognition in the Covenant. 353 Like the right to food, the right to 
adequate housing should be seen to be a component part of the 
right to an adequate standard of living. The Committee has noted 
349 Bard R., "The Right to Food", 70 Iowa L. R., 1279, at 1289 (1985). 
350 Cf. Shelton D., "The Duty to Assist Famine Victims", 70 Iowa L. R., 
1309 (1985). 
351 Note, however,, earlier criticism that the Committee's perspective on 
the right to housing was at best partial. Leckie S., "The UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Right to Adequate Housing: 
Towards an Appropriate Approach", 11 Hum. Rts-O., 522, at 534-5 (1989). 
352 See below, chapter 9, text accompanying no s- 
353 See also at the universal level, Article 25(l) UDHR, article 5(e)(iii) of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), 
article 14(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (1975), article 27(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (1989), and article 21 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951). 
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that the right to housing "is integrally linked to other human rights 
and to the fundamental principles upon which the Covenant is 
premised". 354 In particular. 355 it has stressed the importance of 
the rights to freedom of expression, 356 freedom of association. 357 
freedom to take part in public decision-making, 358 freedom to 
choose one's residence, 359 and freedom from arbitrary and 
unlawful interference with one's privacy, family, home or 
correspondence. 360 In addition, it might be argued that the rights 
to work, 361 to minimum remuneration, 362 and to social 
security, 363 all have an influence upon the degree to which the 
right to housing is enjoyed. 364 
2) Progressive Realization 
Although everyone has a right to housing, the mere fact of 
homelessness is not sufficient to find a State to be in violation of its 
obligations. The Committee has recognised that "the steps required 
to be taken by States parties in order to promote realisation of the 
right to adequate housing will often be time-consuming, complex 
and costly". 365 This would particularly seem to be the case where 
States are themselves responsible for providing housing for all. 
However, as will be seen below, the Committee does not expect 
States to take such a central role in the provision of housing. 
354 General Conunent No. 4 (1991), UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), Annex 
III, at 115, para. 7, UN Doc. E/1992/23, (1992). 
355 Ibid, at 117, para. 9. 
356 Article 19(2) ICCPR. 
357 Article 22(l) ICCPR. 
358 Article 25 ICCPR. 
359 Article 12(l) ICCPR. 
3660 Article 17(l) ICCPR. 
361 Article 6, ICESCR. 
362 Article 7, ICESCR. 
363 Article 9, ICESCR. 
364 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 23, at 8, para. 30; Dao (ILO), 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22, at 7, para. 36. 
365 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 117, para. 10. As one 
Committee member noted, the inability of States to ensure the right to housing 
was firstly due to the lack of resources of the States and secondly due to the 
internal structure of the States concerned. Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 23, at 
9, para. 35. 
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Accordingly States have to show that the measures being taken are 
sufficient "to realize the right of every individual in the shortest 
possible time in accordance with the maximum of available 
resources". 366 
In its General Comment No. 4, the Committee has reiterated 
its general rationale as regards the implementation of the 
Covenant. It stresses that to the extent that States are required to 
restrain themselves from action that obstructs access to housing, or 
are required to "facilitate self-help", they should implement such 
obligations in an immediate manner. 367 States are thus under an 
obligation for example, to refrain from action that either 
arbitrarily deprives people of their own housing or prevents them 
from finding or building their home themselves. The Committee 
also comments that where these immediate obligations are beyond 
the powers of the State concerned, it should request international 
assistance. 368 
Perhaps as a reflection of the right to a "continuous 
improvement of living standards", or of the notion of progressive 
achievement, the Committee has noted that "a general decline in 
living and housing conditions, directly attibutable to policy and 
legislative decisions by States parties, and in the absence of 
accompanying compensatory measures, would be inconsistent with 
the obligations found in the Covenant". 369 It is interesting to note 
that a general decline in living and housing conditions alone does 
not involve State responsibility; only where it is "directly 
attributable" to State policies and where no "compensatory 
measures" are taken. For example, if a State were to find itself in 
an economic recession which had a negative effect on the housing 
market, it would not automatically be considered to be in violation 
of article 11. 
366 Ibid. 
367 In the Committee's general discussion, one expert argued that States 
should undertake the following immediately: a) acknowledge that the right to 
housing was a human right; b) adopt legislation to prohibit all forms of 
discrimination; 0 ensure that individuals and organisations were able to 
participate effectively in housing planning; d) annul or amend laws which 
prevented or hampered the implementation of the right to housing; e) grant all 
citizens equal rights in housing matters; f) change housing policies to take into 
account he needs of the most underprivileged groups. Leckie (International 
Habitat Coalition), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22, at 9, para. 55. 
368 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 117, para. 10. 
369 Ibid, at 117, para. 11. 
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However, the question of attribution is particularly 
interesting in so far as it is conditioned by the degree to which the 
State undertakes to provide housing through public as opposed to 
private channels. If a State which provided large amounts of public 
housing was forced to cut spending in an economic recession 
thereby instituting a decline in housing conditions, it would be 
forced to take compensatory measures to alleviate the adverse 
effects. If, on the other hand, housing was generally controlled by 
the private sector which experienced a recession, the State would 
no longer be considered directly responsible370 and therefore 
would not have to provide compensatory measures. The difference 
between the two situations suggests that the test is slightly harsh 
for those States that take direct responsibility for the wellbeing of 
the population. 
It is clear that States should take steps to the "maximum of 
available resources" in accordance with article 2(1). Accordingly 
the Committee requests information as to financial measures taken 
by the State "including details of the budget of the Ministry of 
Housing". 371 Although an aggregate figure of expenditure is in 
itself unhelpful, 372 where public expenditure on housing has 
declined appreciably, Committee members have been quick to 
criticise the State concerned. 373 Whilst the Committee clearly 
expects government expenditure to be at a reasonable level, it does 
not attempt to stipulate how that money should be spent. 
3) Monitoring and Policy Formulation 
In accordance with its approach to all rights in the 
Covenant, the Committee has outlined certain procedural 
obligations as part of States' duty to take appropriate steps. In 
particular the Committee considers that States have an obligation 
to undertake appropriate monitoring and policy formulation 
immediately. As regards monitoring, States are required to take 
"whatever steps are necessary, either alone or on the basis of 
370 Ilere is the possibility that the government concerned may be 
considered to be responsible for the economic recession. However, except in the 
most obvious cases this would be virtually impossible to establish. 
371 Reporting Guidelines, supra, note 180, at 15. 
372 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 17, at 7, para. 3 1. 
373 For example, one member questioned whether Zaire was in 
compliance with its obligations under the Covenant in cutting expenditure on 
housing from 2% to 0.6% between 1972 and 1985. See, Alston, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 17, at 7, para. 44. 
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international co-operation, to ascertain the full extent of 
homelessness and inadequate housing within its jurisdiction". 374 
In its guidelines, the Committee has attempted to outline this 
obligation in more detail. Detailed information is requested as to 
the housing situation of those groups in society that are vulnerable 
and disadvantaged. As a minor technical detail here, it is unclear 
whether the Committee wants information as to the housing 
position of all "vulnerable and disadvantaged groups" defined in a 
broad sense by their social and economic status, or rather to 
pinpoint those groups that are vulnerable and disadvantaged as 
regards housing specifically. Although the definition of 
"vulnerable or disadvantaged group" would vary from country to 
country, in relation to article 2(2) the Committee has outlined 
certain groups that are characteristically discriminated against. It 
might be appropriate for the Committee to request, as a minimum, 
information as to the housing situation of such groups. 
In addition, the guidelines require information particularly 
as to the number of homeless individuals and families; the number 
of individuals and families inadequately housed; the number of 
persons living in "illegal" settlements; the number of persons 
evicted in the last five years (and those currently lacking 
protection against arbitrary eviction); the number of persons 
whose housing expenses are classified as unaffordable; the number 
of persons on waiting lists for accomodation; and the number of 
persons in different types of housing tenure. 375 Such 
considerations have been reflected in the questions of individual 
members of the Committee which have been directed primarily at 
ascertaining the extent of homelessness, 376 (or the size of the 
housing shortage377) the amount of sub-standard housing378 and 
the percentage of people living in rented accomodation. 379 
374 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 118, para. 13. 
375 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 13-14. 
376 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 6, at 12, para. 62; Konate, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 10, at 2, para. 3; Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 7, para. 41; 
Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 17, at 7, para. 3 1; Rattray, E/C. 12/199 1/SR-3, at 12, 
para. 62; Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 16, at 9, para. 39. 
377 See e. g., Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 8, at 5, para. 16; Alston, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 18, at 2, para. 3. 
378 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 16, at 9, para. 39; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 16, at 17, para. 94; Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 34, at 6, para. 43. 
379 See e. g., Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 9, at 9, para. 44. 
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As a corollary to the monitoring strategy, States are 
expected to develop a policy directed at the relief of the situation 
of the most disadvantaged. According to the Committee's General 
Comment, this will "invariably require the adoption of a national 
housing strategy which, as stated in the Global Shelter Strategy, 
'defines the objectives for the development of shelter conditions, 
identifies the resources available to meet these goals and the most 
cost-effective way of using them and sets out responsibilities and 
time-frame for the implementation of the necessary measures"'. 380 
Moreover it appears that in drawing up this strategy, States should 
consult those affected including the homeless and the inadequately 
housed. 381 
Although the Committee presents these procedural 
conditions as "obligations" there is little indication that they are 
enforced in any way by the Committee. On no occasion has the 
Committee found a State to be in violation of the Covenant for 
failing to monitor effectively or to draw up a coherent policy with 
relevant participation. In the case of Panama, however, the 
Committee did criticise the government for not having an accurate 
estimate of the number of persons affected by the bombing of El 
Chorillo during the US intervention. 382 
However much monitoring and policy formulation are 
posited as obligations upon States Parties, the recent nature of the 
reporting guidelines and the resource limitations on effective 
monitoring will mean that it will be some time before they are 
effectively put into effect everywhere. 
4) "EveEyone" 
According to the Covenant "everyone" has a right to 
housing. The right to an adequate standard of living, however, 
merely refers to "himself and his family". It is possible that this 
might be interpreted as excluding female-headed households and 
those without families. The Committee, in accordance with the 
travaux preparatoires,, 383 has explicitly refuted such an 
interpretation in stating that the phrase "himself and his family" 
it cannot be read today as implying any limitations upon the 
applicability of the right to individuals or to female-headed 
380 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 118, para-12. 
381 Ibid. 
382 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), at 32, para. 135, UN Doc. E/1992/23, 
(1992). 
383 See above, text accompanying notes 81-88. 
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households or other such groups". 384 Indeed it considers that the 
phrase merely "reflects assumptions as to gender roles and 
economic activity patterns commonly accepted in 1966 when the 
Covenant was adopted". 385 Thus when considering the report of 
Mexico, members of the Committee criticised a Constitutional 
provision that posited the right to housing as a right of "families 
and not of the individual. 386 
5) Adeguate Housing 
A right to housing would seem to require that every 
member of the population has access to some form of 
accommodation. At a general level this could be determined by an 
analysis of the quantity of housing in relation to the population 
size. On a more individually-oriented level, it would require an 
assessment of whether the distribution of housing is sufficient to 
enable every individual ready access to accomodation. Other 
factors that might affect such access are the affordability of the 
accomodation, its location, and any related discriminatory 
practices. In addition, a right to housing would also seem to 
require that persons should not be arbitrarily deprived of their 
housing. 
In view of the fact that the right to housing is a sub-norm of 
the right to an adequate standard of living, the concept of 
"adequacy" would seem to import into the right a qualitative 
element that might otherwise have been absent. 387 The Committee 
has commented in this regard that "the right to housing should not 
be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense which equates it 
with, for example, the shelter provided by merely having a roof 
over one's head. Rather it should be seen as the right to 
somewhere to live in security, peace and dignity". 388 Although the 
precise nature of adequate housing may be determined to an extent 
by climatic, sociological and other factors, the Committee has 
found there to be certain elements that should be taken into 
account at all time such as security of tenure, availability of 
384 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 115, para. 6. 
3851bid. 
386 However, it was asserted that although the Constitution recognised 
the fight to housing as a farrAly right, in practice it was an individual right. 
Gonzales Martinez (Mexico), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 6, at 7, para. 37. 
387 See, Leckie (International Habitat Coalition), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22, at 
8, para. 5 1. 
388 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 115, para-7. 
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services, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location and 
cultural adequacy. 389 
Despite outlining these qualitative elements in its General 
Comment, the Committee had not demonstrated a real commitment 
to the definition in either its prior practice in reviewing State 
reports, or its reporting guidelines. ýffie main concern of 
Committee members had been as to those aspects that affect access 
to housing- namely issues relating to the provision of housing, its 
affordability and to security of tenure. The General Comment thus 
represents not so much an outline of current practice, but rather a 
bold new interpretative statement. 
a) Access to Housing 
i) The Provision of Housing 
In looking at the number of homeless in each country, the 
Committee seems to place the primary obligation for ensuring the 
provision of housing upon the State. However, this does not mean 
that the State has to act as the sole provider of housing itself. In 
accordance with the provisions of article 2(l), States have a certain 
amount of discretion as to the means of realising the right to 
housing. The precise solution adopted will depend upon the 
economic, social, cultural, and political situation of the country 
concerned. In a sense, the main concern of the Committee, is with 
the results of that policy. 
Although a number of governments have undertaken to 
provide all housing themselves, it is clear that the Committee does 
not expect this to be the case in all States. Accordingly, in its 
General Comment, the Committee comments that: 
"Measures designed to satisfy a State party's 
obligations in respect of the right to adequate housing 
may reflect whatever mix of public and private sector 
measures considered appropriate. While in some 
States public financing of housing might most usefully 
be spent on direct construction of new housing, in 
most cases, experience has shown the inability of 
Governments to fully satisfy housing deficits with 
publicly built housing". 390 
In cases where the State does have a central role in the provision 
of housing, members of the Committee have been concerned about 
389 Whilst the Committee inferred all of these elements from the notion of 
"adequacy", it was not necessary to do so. 
390 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 118, para. 14. 
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the conditions for the allocation of such housing391 and the extent 
of choice over the location. 392 In addition, questions have been 
asked as to whether there was a variety of types of housing 
available, 393 and whether legal remedies were available in disputes 
over allocation. 394 
In taking a balanced view of the question of provision of 
housing, the Committee requests information as to measures taken 
by the State to build housing units itself, and to increase "other 
construction" of affordable rental housing. In particular, it places 
an emphasis on "enabling strategies" whereby local community- 
based organisations and the "informal sector" are encouraged to 
build houses themselves. 395 Given the emphasis on such "enabling 
strategies" it would seem that it is not sufficient for the 
government concerned merely to build houses itself, it must also 
take positive steps to encourage private housing construction. This 
would appear to be the approach of individual Committee 
members, 396 who have also stressed the fact that private 
individuals or groups should be able to construct houses 
themselves397 without undue conditions being placed upon 
them, 398 and should be given financial or other assistance to do 
so. 399 Private house construction not only promotes the 
construction of appropriate housing, but also can be seen as an 
391 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 21, at 10, para. 44, and 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 4, para. 12; Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 16, at 9, para. 39, 
and Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 9, at 9, para. 42. 
392 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 8, para-3 1, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 21, at 13, para. 63, and E/C. 12/1987/SR. 16, at 9, para. 39; 
Taya, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 9, at 11, para. 52. An NGO representative argued that 
individuals should have ultimate choice over the kind of house and the location in 
which they will live. LecIde (International Habitat Coalition),, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22, at 10, para. 60. 
393 See, Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 9, at 9, para. 42. 
394 See, Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 9, at 9, para. 42. 
395 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 15. 
396 See e. g., Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1988/SR-5, at 6, para. 26, and 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 11, para. 58. 
397 See, Watchkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 4, para. 12; Muterahejuru, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 19, at 11, para. 54. 
398 See, Marchan Romero, E/C. 12/1988/SR-5,, at 7, para. 32. 
399 See, Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 10, at 2, para. 3. 
369 
economic activity which contributes to the growth and 
development of the country concemed. 400 
On the other hand, it would not be legitimate for States to 
absolve themselves entirely from responsibility for the provision 
of housing. Chile, for example, was criticised by members of the 
Committee following a sharp reduction in government low-cost- 
housing construction projects. In particular concern was expressed 
over the fact that Chile appeared to leave the housing problem 
entirely in the hands of the private sector. 401 One member 
commented that by encouraging private ownership of property the 
Government of Chile was ignoring the position of the poor. 402 
In the provision of housing, the State is clearly obliged to 
take into account the qualitative aspects of housing detailed below. 
it is also obliged to enforce similar requirements on the 
construction and provision of housing by private individuals and 
companies. Accordingly, the Committee expects to receive 
information as to legislation concerning building codes, 
regulations and standards. 403 
ii) Discrimination and Disadvantaged GroUDS 
Article 11, when read in conjunction with article 2(2), 
prohibits discrimination as regards all elements of the right to 
housing. Most crucially, the State is obliged to ensure equality of 
access to housing whether public or private. 404 In its concentration 
on disadvantaged groups, the Committee appears to assume that a 
certain amount of defacto discrimination (albeit indirect) as 
regards housing, exists in all countries. 405 
Although article 2(2) is indicative of the groups likely to be 
discriminated against, it is clearly not exhaustive. Thus in its 
General Comment, the Committee specifically mentions the 
elderly, children, the physically disabled, the terminally ill, 
individuals who are HIV-positive, persons with persistent medical 
problems and the mentally ill, as categories of people that should 
be afforded "some degree of priority consideration in the housing 
400 See, Lugvigsen (UNCHR), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22, at 6, para. 33; 
Barsh (Four Directions Council), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 23, at 3, para. 11 
- 
401 See e. g., Marchan Romero, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 10-11, para. 52. 
402 See, Neneman, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 12, at 11, para. 56. 
403 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 14. 
404 See above, Chapter 3. 
405 See above, Chapter 4, text accompanying notes 25-41. 
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sphere". 406 Whilst not maintaining that all these groups are 
discriminated against in all cases or that they represent the only 
disadvantaged groups, the Committee appears to consider that 
States should at least be aware of the relative position of such 
groups. 
In addition to refraining from discrimination itself, States 
are expected to enforce non-discrimination provisions with regard 
to private individuals. In its guidelines, the Committee expects 
information as to "legislation prohibiting any and all forms of 
discrimination in the housing sector, including groups not 
traditionally protected". 407 In referring to the "groups not 
traditionally protected", the Committee implies that States should 
reconsider their discrimination laws with a view to widening their 
scope. As a minimum, however, States should consider explicitly 
prohibiting discrimination against those groups identified by the 
Committee in its General Comment. 
States are obliged to take positive action to allieviate the 
position of disadvantaged groups whether or not they are the 
objects of discrimination. 408 In particular, the Committee has 
stressed that such groups should be given "priority consideration" 
and that housing law and policy should take fully into account the 
special housing needs of those groups. 409 
Individual Committee members have specifically looked to 
the housing situation of non-nationalS410and women, 411 and have 
requested information regarding cases of such discrimination that 
have been taken to court. 412More frequently however, concern is 
expressed as to the position of those on low incomes413including 
406 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 116, para. 8(e). 
407 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 14. 
408 It has to be questioned whether people such as low-wage-earners 
could be said to be discriminated against merely because they do not have the 
same access to housing as other, more wealthy members of society. 
409 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 116, para. 8(e). 
410 See e. g., Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1988/SR-17, at 2, para. 8; Badawi El 
Sheikh, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 8, at 2, para. 4. 
411 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/19 89/S R. 15, at 7, para. 4 1. 
412 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2, at 10, para. 63. 
413See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 12, para. 62; Sparsis, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 16, at 17, para. 91; Fofana, E/C. 12/1989/SR-16, at 16, 
para. 84; Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 11, at 5,, para. 24. 
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the unemployed, 414in respect to whom States are expected to 
undertake some form of targetted action. 
iii) Afford 
The cost of housing clearly has a significant impact upon 
each individual's access to adequate housing, their ability to 
continue living in their current residence and their standard of 
living in general. Indeed as the Committee noted: 
"Personal or household financial costs associated with 
housing should be at such a level that the attainment 
and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened 
or compromised". 415 
Whereas it is not necessary for States to fix all rents at a specified 
rate, it is clearly a priority to ensure that enough low-cost housing 
exists in order to cater for the needs of the whole population and 
in particular the poor and disadvantaged. The Committee appears 
to expect States to establish a "limit of affordability" based upon 
ability to pay or as a ratio of income, and to assess the number of 
persons whose housing expenses are higher than that limit. 416 For 
those unable to obtain affordable housing, the State is required to 
establish housing subsidies. It is also expected to establish "forms 
and levels of housing finance which adequately reflect housing 
needs". 417 Although it would be beyond the means of many States 
to undertake such programmes of State support immediately, it is 
important for the ultimate fulfilment of the right that such a long- 
term ob ective is spelt out. 
Equally importantly, the Committee expects States to 
exercise some control over rent levels in the private sector. 
Tenants should be protected from rent levels or rent increases "by 
appropriate means". 418 Individual members of the Committee 
have similarly regularly requested information as to the means of 
rent control, 419 and have likewise refrained from stipulating any 
414 See e. g., Fofana, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 7, at 12, para-53. 
415 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 116, para. 8(c). 
416 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 13. 
417 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 116, para. 8(c). 
41SIbid. 
419 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 6, at 6, para. 46; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 3, para. 8; Fofana, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 18, at 3, para. 9; 
Rattray, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 12, para. 62. 
372 
specific means by which it should be achieved. 420 In one case, 
Committee members took a poor view of what seemed to be the 
abolition of rent control by the State. 421 It would seem that even 
where such a measure was designed to increase the amount of 
rented accommodation available, members were still concerned 
about the effect the legislation would have on those living on low 
incomes. 
b) Security of Tenure and Evictions 
Much as there is variety in forms of tenure such as owner- 
occupation, rented accomodation, co-operative housing and other 
informal settlements, there is variety in the degree of security 
offered to the occupier. The Committee requires that 
"notwithstanding the type of tenure, all persons should possess a 
degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal protection 
against forced eviction, harassment and other threats". 422Given 
that the Committee speaks of "a degree of security of tenure", it 
leaves open the extent of protection required. It is certainly 
appropriate that tenants be entitled to legal protection from 
harassment and threats, but the question of protection against 
eviction is not so clear. 
An absolute protection against forced eviction would not be 
sustainable in any legal system. By the nature of a lease, there must 
exist the possibility of reversion to the owner (for example at the 
effluxion of time or for non-payment of rent), and in certain 
circumstances this may have to be carried out through forcible 
eviction. The object of law in such a situation is not to prevent 
eviction from occuring at all, but rather to ensure that it occurs 
only in strictly defined circumstances and follows appropriate 
procedures to minimise the possibility of abuse. A careful balance 
has to be struck between the right of the tenant to a place to live 
and the right of the lawful owner to maintain control over the 
premises. 
The Committee however has taken a rather strong stance on 
forced eviction. In its General Comment, it provides that forced 
evictions "are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of 
the Covenant and could only be justified in the most exceptional 
420 One member rather ambiguously asked why regulation of rent 
increases been entrusted to the judiciary. It was unclear however whether it was 
felt that this was inappropriate. See, Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 2, at 11, 
para. 67. 
421 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 16, at 18, para. 94. 
422 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 115, para-8(a). 
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circumstances, an in accordance with the relevant principles of 
international law". 423 It might be argued that the Covenant itself 
does not provide for a balance of individual interests. Article 4 
provides that the rights may be subject only to such limitations as 
are "determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible 
with the nature of those rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society". In that a 
right to ownership of property does not exist in either of the 
Covenants, such a concern is relevant only in so far as it coincides 
with the "general welfare in a democratic society". 
Certain members of the Committee have taken cognisance of 
the competing interests of the right to housing and the right of 
ownership, 424 and have looked to the reform of the law of 
property. 425 Such an approach would appear to be particularly 
appropriate in those countries where the unequal ownership of 
land presents a significant problem for the realisation of the right 
to housing, 426 especially as far as "illegal settlements" are 
concerned. Although property rights certainly conflict with the 
right to housing in certain circumstances, it is somewhat 
unrealistic for the Committee to argue that the right to housing 
should be given precedence in all circumstances. Depending upon 
the circumstances, it is more appropriate for the Committee to 
look to State action in the form of rent-control, compulsory land 
purchase, and expropriation, than undermining the concept of 
property per se. 
Most of the questions of the Committee members have been 
directed at ensuring that a system for the protection of tenants does 
exist and is operated in practice. 427 In particular,, attention has 
been focused upon legal forms of protection428 and means of 
423 Jbid, at 119, para. 18. A question may be raised as to what the It Committee meant in referring to "the relevant principles of international law . 
424 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22, at 13, para. 83. 
425 See, Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 23, at 9, para. 37. 
426 See, Leckie (International Habitat Coalition), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22, at 
10, para. 67. 
427 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 10, at 7, para. 27; Fofana, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 18, at 3, para. 9; Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 40, at 10, para. 46; 
Nenernan, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 9, para-41. 
Ll- 
- 
428See e. g.,, Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 38, at 3, para. 15; Foiana, 
E/C. 12/1988/SR. 6, at 7, para. 51. 
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dispute settlement. 429 Certain members have looked to the 
existence of protective measures specifically in cases of 
termination of leases, 430 eviction for the purposes of repairs, 431 
and eviction for non-payment of rent. 432 
The question of eviction arose in perhaps the most important 
case in the Committee's work thus far. After considering the 
report of the Dominican Republic, the Committee found the 
Dominican Republic to be in violation of its obligations under 
article 11 of the Covenant. According to Non-Governmental 
Organisation sources, the Dominican Republic authorities had 
adopted plans for remodelling a number of cities, including 
Santiago and San Domingo, which had led to the eviction of nearly 
15,000 families from their homes. These facts themselves were not 
disputed by the Dominican Republic. In its concluding comments, 
the Committee made the following statement: 
"The information that had reached members of the 
Committee concerning the massive expulsion of 
nearly 15,000 families in the course of the last five 
years, the deplorable conditions in which the families 
had had to live, and the conditions in which the 
expulsions had taken place were deemed sufficiently 
serious for it to be considered that the guarantee in 
article 11 of the Covenant had not been respected. "433 
It is clear from the statement that the violation of the right to 
housing was not established solely by the fact of eviction. The 
Committee, in addition refers to two factors. First is that 
following the evictions, many of the families had been forced to 
live in "deplorable conditions ". 434 The Summary Records show 
that although alternative accommodation was available, it was 
it very CoStly". 435 Secondly, the Committee was concerned with the 
"conditions in which the expulsions had taken place". Reference 
has to be made to the Summary Records to establish in what way 
the circumstances were objectionable. It appears that although 
429 See e. g., Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 13, at 14, para. 83. 
430 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 6, at 6, para. 46. 
431 See, Fofana, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 5, para. 23. 
432 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 14, at 16, para. 72. 
433 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), at 64, para-249, UN 
Doc. E/C. 12/1990/8, (199 1). 
434 Cf. Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44, at 10, para. 48. 
435 Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44,, at 11, para. 53. 
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there was an established eviction procedure involving a 
conciliation meeting in the presence of a lawyer, with a right to 
appeal to a tribunal and from there to the State Attorney, it had 
not been followed. 436 Nor had the evicted tenants been given any 
legal assistance. 437 It is likely that factors contributiong to the 
Committee's finding were the scale of the evictions, the fact that it 
was the public authorities undertaking the evictions, and that the 
overt purpose was to hide the people affected from public view 
rather than come to their assistance. 
It is unclear whether each of the two specified factors 
constitued individual and separate violations of the Covenant, or 
only in so far as they were taken together. Perhaps the most 
crucial factor for this case was that the evictions had taken place in 
violation of domestic law. To the extent that the Covenant requires 
the establishment of a system for the protection of tenants, failure 
to comply with existing domestic mechanisms should be considered 
a prima facie violation of the Covenant. 
It might be questioned whether these evictions would have 
amounted to a violation, had they taken place with due legal 
process. Given that the State is under an obligation to realise the 
right to housing for everyone, it is possible to argue that public 
authorities should, in any event, be required to show a legitimate 
purpose in undertaking the evictions. The fact that those evicted 
had not been provided with alternative accomodation or other 
assistance, suggests that the Dominican Republic did not have the 
interests of the population at heart in this case, and thus were not 
fulfilling their obligations under the Covenant. This would seem to 
be the position of one member who commented: 
"The Dominican Republic had put itself in an entirely 
different position than other countries which, for 
their part, were unable to ensure observance of the 
right to housing because they did not have the means. 
The Dominican Republic was deliberately flouting the 
provisions of the Covenant". 438 
In so far as evictions represent a step away from the full 
realisation of the right to housing, public authorities should show 
an overriding justification for their action. 439 
436 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44, at 11, para. 53. 
437 See, Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44, at 10, para. 48. 
438 Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 44, at 10, para. 48. 
439 It is to be noted that none of these considerations necessarily apply to 
the case of evictions by private land-owners. 
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More recently, the Committee has addressed the question of forced evictions in the context of the Panamanian report. Questions were asked on the basis of information from Non- 
Governmental OrganisationS440 as to the destruction of half of El Chorillo441 and the forced expulsion of people from their homes 
in Tucmen, San Miguelito and Panama Viejo, 442 following the US 
invasion of Panama. 443 Although the destruction of El Chorillo 
seems to have been accepted by the Committee as an inevitable 
aspect of the invasion, the forced expulsion of families from the 
other "Barrios" was not. Among other criticisms the Committee 
expressed the following opinion: 
"the justification for the actions carried out by 
Panamanian and United States forces in Tocumen, San- 
Miguelito and Panama Viego in early 1990, which 
affected over 5,000 persons, was unacceptable under 
the terms of the Covenant as a ground for forcibly 
removing people from their homes. During the 
actions concerned, a large number of houses were 
demolished, in spite of the affected persons having 
lived in the area for more than two years. 
Additionally these evictions had not been accompanied 
by legal eviction orders. The Committee was of the 
view that evictions carried out in this way not only 
infringed upon the right to adequate housing but also 
on the inhabitants' rights to privacy and security of 
the home". 444 
From the Summary Records it is not clear what justification was 
offered by the Panamanian representative for the action of the 
combined forces. Reference is only made to El Chorillo. However, 
the comment suggests that, in certain circumstances (with 
sufficient justification), evictions may be legitimate under the 
Covenant. The main objection of the Committee appears to have 
440 See, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/199 1/NGO/34, which was widely available in 
the Committee's meeting. 
441 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 7, para. 31. 
442 See, Simma, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 3, at 7, para. 32; Wimer Zambrano, 
E/C. 12/1991/SR. 3, at 8, para. 38; Rattray, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 8, at 2, para. 6. 
443 For details of the invasion and analyses of the legal position see, Quigley J., "The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama", 15 Yale jd1_. L., 276 (1990); Henkin L., "The Invasion of Panama Under International 
Law: A Dangerous Precedent", 29 Colum. J. Trans. L.,, 293 (1991). 
444 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), at 32, para. 135(c), UN Doc. E/1992/23, 
(1992). 
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been to the manner in which the evictions took place. Like the case 
of the Dominican Republic, the Committee expressed particular 
concern over the illegitimacy of the evictions in domestic law, and 
the inadequacy of alternative accommodation arrangements. 445 
Finally, at its sixth session in 1991, the Committee 
undertook to make an ad hoc request for information from the 
Dominican Republic as to proposed new eviction plans. In doing 
so, the Committee noted that information received from a Non- 
Governmental Organisation, would, if accurate, "give rise to 
serious concern on the part of the Committee", and accordingly 
requested the State "to suspend any actions which are not clearly in 
conformity with the provisions of the Covenant". 446 In this case 
however, the evictions had been authorised by Presidential Decree 
and seemed to have some legal basis. The concern of the 
Committee was rather focused upon the fact that the 12,000 
families of La Cienaga and Los Guandules would be housed in 
different places according to their "education, living habits and 
social level", and that the area from which they were evicted 
would be used for recreational purposes only. 447 
Given that in each of these three cases the Conunittee has 
been given considerable infon-nation from NGO sources, and (on 
two occasions at least) has had the opportunity to discuss the 
matters with the States concerned, it is unfortunate that it drafted 
such general concluding comments. The Committee might have 
taken the opportunity to establish certain principles that operate, 
for example, as regards the eviction of tenants by public 
authorities or private individuals. What needs to be considered, in 
such cases, is the desirability of establishing precise rules so a State 
may assess in advance whether its proposed action would be in 
conflict with the obligations under the Covenant, especially in so 
far as the Committee is intending to adopt a "quasi-judicial" 
approach to supervision. 448 
445 In its concluding observation the Committee noted that it "had 
received information which pointed to many complaints by the residents that had 
received alternative accommodation and which concerned the distance which 
now had to be travelled to and from places of employment on relatively 
expensive public transportation and the overall poor quality of the housing in the 
resettlement sites. Moreover, two years after the invasion, a large number of 
persons had yet to be rehoused. " Ibid, at 32, para. 135(b). 
446 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3),, at 79, para. 330, UN Doc-E/1992/23, 
(1992). 
447 See, Simma, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 19, at 4, para. 15. 
448 See below, Chapter 9, text accompanying notes 187-195. 
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The current position of the Committee, however, could be described as follows. The legality of an eviction will be determined initially by reference to domestic law. The relevant 
procedures and safeguards established to protect tenants' rights 
must be complied with. However, even in cases where the relevant 
procedures are carried out, eviction may still be illegitimate under 
the Covenant if no sufficient justification is given for the action. 
The Committee has not given a precise indication of what form of justification will be acceptable. As a minimum the eviction should 
be undertaken in good faith, and should conform to the general 
objectives of the Covenant and in particular to the progressive 
realisation of the right to adequate housing. In determining 
whether the State is acting in good faith, consideration win be 
made to the alternative accomodation arrangements made for those 
deprived of their homes. 
c) Qualitative Aspects of Adequate Housing 
As mentioned above, the Committee has addressed itself 
primarily to questions concerning access to housing and security of 
tenure. Less attention has been focussed upon the notion of 
"adequacy" in so far as it relates to the quality of housing. 
Individual members of the Committee have frequently looked to 
the qualitative aspects of the right to adequate housing449 in the 
creation of national benchmarks, 450 and in ascertaining the 
number of persons housed in inadequate dwellings. 451 However, 
they have been less willing to establish what are the common 
elements of adequate housing. The approach seems to have been 
rather that the notion of adequacy differs from country to 
country. 452 
As a whole, however, the Committee has been more positive 
in its approach. In its guidelines, it requests information as to the 
it number of individuals and families currently inadequately housed 
and without ready access to basic amenities such as water, heating (if necessary), waste disposal, sanitation facilities, electricity., 
postal services, etc. " (in so far as those amenities are relevant in 
449 See, Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 8, para. 31. 
450 See, Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/19 89/SR. 12, at 12, para. 64, and 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 17, at 16, para. 86; Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 16, at 17, 
para. 94; Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 34, at 6, para. 43. 
451 See, Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 16, at 9, para. 39; Texier, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 38, at 6, para. 37. 
452 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1987/SR-9, at 10, para. 49. 
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A- 
- die country concerned). In addition information is requested as to 
the number of persons living in "over-crowded, damp, structurally 
unsafe housing or other conditions Which affect health". 453 The 
Committee has further defined its notion of "adequacy" in its 
General Comment No. 4. In addition to the aspects already referred 
to above, it specifies that States should take into account the 
availability of services, and the habitability, location and cultural 
adequacy of the housing. 454 
i) Availabilily of Services 
According to the Committee "an adequate house must 
contain certain facilities essential for health, security, comfort and 
nutrition. All beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing should 
have sustainable access to potable piped drinking water, sanitation 
and washing facilities, food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage 
and emergency services". 455 It would seem clear that several other 
services could also be included in this list such as postal services, 
fuel or energy for cooking, eating and lighting (for example 
electricity). The fact that these were not included in the General 
Comment (although to be found in the Reporting Guidelines) is not 
to be interpreted as if the Committee does not consider them to be 
important. Rather, the matters outlined are merely illustrative- the 
concept of adequate housing is in the final analysis to be 
determined at the domestic level. 456 
It would seem very clear that the realisation of the 
objectives outlined is a long-term aim. In many countries, the State 
does not have sufficient resources to provide much more than 
potable drinking water. 457 In such cases it would be appropriate 
for States to draw up intermediate objectives such as ensuring the 
provision of potable drinking water everywhere before the 
introduction of piped water. The type of prioritisation undertaken 
will have to depend upon the circumstances prevailing within the 
State concerned (for example in colder countries the provision of 
electricity for heat and light might be a priority), taking into 
account the fundamental necessity of providing for the basic needs 
of all members of the population at the earliest possible time. 
453 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 13. 
454 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 116-117, para. 8. 
455Ibid, at 116, para. 8(b). 
456Ibid. 
457 See, Muterahejuru, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 23, at 9, para. 36. 
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ii) HabitabLlily 
The Committee states that housing must be habitable "in 
terms of protecting the inhabitants from cold, damp or other 
threats to health, structural hazards, and disease vectors". 458 To a 
certain extent the requirement of habitability co-incides with the 
provision of services (such as electricity for heating), but it also 
relates to the physical structure of the building. In so far as 
inadequate and deficient housing often contributes to higher 
mortality and morbidity rates, this is a priority. 
The State should take a number of forms of action in respect 
to habitability outside the provision of services. For example, it 
should ensure that all public housing conforms to adequate 
standards as regards habitability. This would mean that all new 
housing construction projects should automatically take such 
considerations into account, and that renewal operations should be 
undertaken to improve old unsatisfactory housing. 
It is apparent that there is a role for legislation in enforcing 
such standards on the construction of private housing. Although 
this is certainly appropriate where construction firms are 
operating in the private sector for profit, it is not necessarily so 
where housing is built by local communities, or by the individuals 
for themselves. In such cases, excessively stringent conditions may 
serve to dissuade people from building their own homes and 
therefore contribute to a continued shortage of housing generally. 
iii) Location 
According to the Committee's General Comment, housing 
it must be in a location which allows access to employment options, 
health care services, schools and other social facilities.... Similarly, 
housing should not be built on polluted sites nor in immediate 
proximity to pollution sources that threaten the right to health of 
the inhabitants ". 459 Location of housing thus is of importance not 
only in so far as it has an effect on the ability of people to carry on 
normal lives, but also to the extent that it might prejudice the 
health of the inhabitants. 
A major consideration for the Committee seems to be that 
governments should not build large, low-cost housing settlements 
far from centres of population merely because land is cheap. In 
any case in the long run, this would be a false economy given State 
458 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 116, para. 8(d). 
4591bid, at 116-7, para. 8(f). 
381 
obligations to provide accessible health care, education and full 
employment. 
'I'he Committee took up the question of location in its 
criticism of Panama. In its concluding observation the Committee 
noted inter alia that it "had received information which pointed to 
many complaints by the residents that had received alternative 
accomodation and which concerned the distance which now had to 
be travelled to and from places of employment on relatively 
expensive public transportation and the overall poor quality of the 
housing in the resettlement sites". 460 As noted above, this was one 
of the considerations taken into account in finding Panama to be in 
violation of its obligations under the Covenant. 
iv) Cultural Adequacy 
In its General Comment the Committee states that "the way 
housing is constructed, the building materials used and the policies 
supporting these must appropriately reflect the culture in which 
they are undertaken". 461 The rationale for this is not immediately 
apparent from the General Comment itself, and it may seem on 
face value to be a matter of lesser importance. However, 
traditional housing in each country often reflects the form and 
nature of social interactions. Failure to take such concerns into 
account in the provision of housing may contribute to the 
alienation and disruption of community life and thence unden-nine 
the traditional forms of community support. 
6) The Role of Law and Legislation 
Unlike the right to food, the right to housing may be found 
in the Constitution of a number of States. 462 Although not often 
subject to judicial remedies, such constitutional entrenchment 
suggests quite rightly that housing as an issue does warrant a 
certain amount of legislative intervention. The Committee, in its 
guidelines, forsees the existence of a panoply of legislation relating 
to land use and distribution, security of tenure, housing finance, 
building codes and regulations, discrimination in housing, 
460 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), at 32, para. 135(b), UN Doc. E/1992/23,, (1992). 
461 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 117, para. 8(g). 
462 See e. g., Mexico,, UN Doc. E/1986/3/Add. 13, at 14, para-57; 
Ecuador, UN Doc. E/1986/3/Add. 14, at 11, para-55; Netherlands, UN Doc. 
E/1986/4"/Add. 24, at 1, para. 2. 
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prevention from eviction, property speculation and environmental health and planning. 463 
Although clearly desirable, the Committee does not 
specifically expect the right to housing to be provided for by the Constitution, 464 or that any specific legislative measure should be 
enacted. 465 Its approach has rather been directed to the provision 
of domestic remedies in case of violation of the right. 466 In its General Comment, the Committee has outlined a number of areas in which domestic legal remedies might be provided: 
"(a) legal appeals aimed at preventing planned 
evictions or demolitions through the issuance of court- 
ordered injunctions; (b) legal procedures seeking 
compensation following an illegal eviction; (c) 
complaints against illegal actions carried out or 
supported by landlords (whether public or private) in 
relation to rent levels, dwelling maintainance, and 
racial or other forms of discrimination; (d) 
allegations of any form of discrimination in the 
allocation and availability of access to housing; and (e) 
complaints against landlords concerning unhealthy or 
inadequate housing conditions. In some legal systems 
it might also be appropriate to explore the possibility 
of facilitating class action suits in situations involving 
significantly increased levels of homelessness ".467 
Although the Committee appears not to require the institution of 
such legal remedies, in a number of cases, such as discriminatory 
action by landlords, failure to provide remedies (whether legal or 
otherwise) would seem to be a major obstacle to the full realisation 
of the right. 
463 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 14. 
464 Contra see, Von der Weid (Antenna Intemationale), 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 23, at 5, para. 18. 
465 However, as one commentator noted, failure to repeal legislation 
which was clearly incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant, or the non- 
application of legislation could amount to a violation. Leckie (International 
Habitat Coalition), E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22, at 10, para. 63. 
466 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 119, para. 16; see also, 
Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 9, at 5, para. 22; Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 12, at 8, 
para. 3 1. 
4671bid, at 119, para. 17. 
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7) International Co-operation 
In addition to the general obligation in article 2(l) to take 
measures both domestically and through international co-operation 
to realise the rights in the Covenant, article 11 (1) specifically 
provides that States should "recognise the essential importance of 
international co-operation based on free consent". As is apparent 
from the travaux preparatoires, there is no reason to suppose that 
this provision either adds to, or detracts from, the more general 
obligation. 468 Indeed, in using the term "recognise" there is room 
to argue that the obligation in article 11 (1) is hortatory rather than 
one conferring binding legal obligations. 
Whereas the Committee has not in practice placed much 
emphasis on the role of international co-operation in its questions, 
it seems that it will do so in future. 'Ibe guidelines require the 
provision of information as to the role of international assistance 
in the full realisation of the rights in article 11, and that measures 
be taken to ensure that such assistance is used "to fulfil the needs of 
the most disadvantaged". 469 In addition, the General Comment 
provides that International Financial Institutions should ensure that 
structural adjustment measures should not compromise the 
enjoyment of the right to housing. 470 
D) THE RIGHT TO CLOTHING 
The right to clothing, although specifically included in the 
Covenant, has had little attention either from the Committee or 
independent commentators. As far as the Committee is concerned, 
no reference to clothing is to be found in the reporting guidelines, 
and only the occasional question has been asked of States by 
individual members. The impression given is that clothing is not a 
matter in which the State may exercise a great deal of control, nor 
one that the Committee feels is of great importance. 
IV) CONCLUSION 
In comparison to other articles, the Committee has spent a 
considerable amount of its time addressing issues within article 11. 
Two of its general discussions have been on the subject of rights 
within article 11, and the third on the related issue of statistical 
indicators. In addition, it has adopted its first right-oriented 
General Comment on the right to housing. The prominence given 
468 See above, text accompanying notes 98-103. 
46B9 Reporting guidelines, supra, note 180, at 15. 
470 General Comment No. 4, supra, note 354, at 119, para. 19. 
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to article 11 is a reflection of a number of considerations. First, 
article 11 contains rights that are closely associated with the "basic 
needs" of the individual. The enjoyment of a minimum level of the 
rights to food, housing and clothing, is a necessary condition for 
survival, and therefore warrants detailed consideration. Secondly, 
article 11 includes rights that are peculiar to the Covenant. Unlike 
articles 6-9, there is no other body equivalent to the ILO that has 
dealt with matters such as food and housing on an individual level 
or has established detailed legal standards that might be applied by 
the Committee. Article 11 thus presents itself as an area in which 
the Committee has considerable work to do and in which its work is innovative and particularly valuable. 
Finally, a related point is that the article 11 is often viewed 
as being the epitome of economic, social and cultural rights. The 
rights are phrased in very general terms, they are accompanied by 
broad policy objectives and are clearly dependent for their 
realisation upon the economic resources of the State concemed. 
The extent to which the Committee deals effectively with article 11 
will either sustain or destroy the criticisms of legal obligations in 
respect of economic, social and cultural rights in general. Article 
11, to a large degree, is an acid-test of the Committee's 
effectiveness and of the fundamental utility of the Covenant. 
T'he Committee has made headway in a number of areas. Its 
most significant achievement must be the General Comment on the 
right to housing. In its General Comment No. 4, the Committee has 
clearly outlined the parameters 'Of the right to adequate housing 
and has usefully described the qualitative considerations that must 
be taken into account in the realisation of the right. The General 
Comment is also a success in so far as it was produced with 
considerable collaboration by NGO representatives, not only in the 
previous general discussion but also in the drafting of the 
Comment itself. It is considered that this was an essential element 
in ensuring that the General Comment adequately reflected the 
interests and concerns of the disadvantaged worldwide. 
The input of NGOs has also been significant in the cases of 
the Dominican Republic and Panama which the Committee found 
to be in violation of the Covenant. In each case, the Committee was 
only able to come to that opinion on the basis of the vast amount of 
material supplied by the NGO concerned. The significance of the 
decisions is not merely in the fact that it is the first time in which 
the Committee as a whole has found a State to be in violation of 
the Covenant, or that it signals a development in the role of the 
Committee itself, but that it clearly shows the justiciable nature 
(from an international point of view) of the rights in article 11. 
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Outside the specific question of the right to housing the 
Committee has made less headway. In particular, it has failed to 
give substantial meaning to the right to clothing and has yet to 
adopt an appropriate methodology with respect to the right to an 
adequate standard of living. It has been suggested that the 
Committee should attempt to identify those elements of the right to 
an adequate standard of living that are not already covered by 
other articles in the Covenant. As regards the right to food, the Committee has undertaken a useful general discussion which has 
generated awareness of a variety of issues which have occasionally 
arisen in its consideration of State reports. There is clearly a need, 
however, for more detailed consideration of the issues, with an 
emphasis upon the precise obligations to which States are bound. 
Three main areas might be identified in which further work 
is necessary. First, the Committee will have to establish a means by 
which those persons without adequate food may be identified. This 
will require the establishment of qualitative criteria which define 
adequacy and the stipulation of means by which they may be 
measured. The Committee has begun to address the latter question 
at its sixth session, where there was a discussion of the use of 
statistical indicators. Secondly, although the method by which the 
rights are progressively realised is primarily within the discretion 
of the State, it would be useful for the Committee to identify the 
extent to which the State can be considered directly responsible for 
lack of adequate food. Thirdly,, more consideration should be 
given to the question of international co-operation. For example, 
whereas developed States will not generally accept an obligation to 
provide a specific form of assistance to specific States, an 
exception could be made in the case of famines or other "natural" 
disasters. 
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9 
SUPERVISION 
I) INTRODUCTION 
As has been pointed out, the concept of a human rights treaty is 
something of an anomaly. I In accordance with the horizontal nature of international law, 2 the large majority of treaties contain reciprocal 
obligations mi which compliance by one State party is a condition for 
another State party to be bound by the terms of the treaty in their 
relations inter se. 3 Human rights treaties, however, are not premised 
upon the mutuality of State obligations, rather, they are intended to 
create a legal order in which States make binding unilateral 
commitments to protect the basic rights of all individuals within their jurisdiction. As was noted by the European Court of Human Rights, the 
European Convention (as a human rights treaty): 
... 
comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements 
between contracting States. It creates, over above a 
network of mutual bilateral undertakings, objective 
obligations which... benefit from a'collective 
enforcement"'. 4 
Although it is possible to identify reciprocal State interests in 
ensuring the enjoyment of human rights, 5 not least in so far as 
they contribute to international peace and security, the fact that 
human rights treaties essentially entail unilateral commitments, 
means that other States parties cannot be relied upon to ensure 
1 Sieghart P., 'llie Lawful Rights of Mankind 92-3 (1986). 
2 HenIdn L., "The International Bill of Rights: The Universal Declaration and 
the Covenants", in Bernhardt R. and Jolowicz J. (eds), International Enforcement o 
Human Ritahts, 1, at 8 (1985). 
3 Brierly J., The Law of Nations, 62 (6th ed. 1963); Morgenthau H., Politics 
Among Nations, 290 (5th ed. 1973). 
4 Ireland v. United Kingdom., Eur. Court H. R., Series A, Vol. 25, 
Judgement of 18 January 1978. 
5 State A may become concerned with the treatment of individuals in 
State B in a number of situations inter alia: 
i) where the systematic mistreatment of citizens in State B threatens to destabilise 
the region as a whole. 
ii) where there are close economic, social, political, or cultural links between the 
States (for existence the presence of large minority groups) such that there is 
internal pressure within State A to react in cases of mistreatment of individuals in 
State B. 
iii) where the exploitation of workers in State B may be seen to undermine the 
economic competitiveness of State A. 
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compliance. 6 The institution of international supervisory 
mechanisms through the creation of human rights committees has 
become the accepted form of effecting compliance with human 
rights treaty obligations. 
At a superficial level the main function of such supervisory 
bodies is to ensure compliance with the relevant treaty obligations. 
What this entails and how it is to be achieved, however, requires 
more consideration. 7 Three basic functions of the supervisory 
process in relation to human rights may be identified. First, the 
clarification of the standards that are to be applied. Secondly, 
establishing the degree to which States parties are actually acting in 
conformity with their obligations. Thirdly, taking either remedial 
or preventive action to ensure compliance. 8 T1-ie degree to which 
emphasis is given to each of these functions and the method by 
which they are exercised, varies according to the type of system of 
supervision. 
6 The fact that inter-state complaints systems have rarely been utilised is 
testament to the lack of commitment on the part of States to concern themselves 
with the human rights situation in other States. Henkin explains: 
"While in legal principle every state party is a promisee and entitled to 
request compliance by any other state party, ordinarily no other state has 
any interest in doing so and is especially reluctant to demand compliance 
or threaten sanctions for violation at the expense of its friendly relations 
and diplomatic capital. " 
Henkin, supra, note 2, at 8. Cf. Bilder R., "Rethinking International Human Rights: 
Some Basic Questions", 2 Hum. Rts. J. 557, at 569-574 (1969). Leary recognises: 
"Reciprocity has traditionally been the most important enforcement 
mechanism in international law. It fails to function, however, when 
States do not perceive their own immediate interests as threatened by 
another State's non-compliance with international law. " 
Leary V., International Labour Conventions and National Law, 17 (1982). 
7 Cf. Alston P., "Appraising the United Nations Human Rights 
Regime", in Alston P. (ed), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical 
A42praisal, at 1 (1992). 
8 Cf. The analysis of supervisiory functions in terms of the "review 
function", the "correction function" and the "creative function", van Dijk P. and 
Rood J., "Function and Effectiveness of Supervision in an Economically 
Interdependent World", in van Dijk P. et al (eds), Restructurin a the International 
Economic Order. The Role of Law and Lawyers 135, at 144 (1987). Each 
function is defmied in the following manner. - 
" 1) The review function: the process of judging whether behaviour 
conforms to a rule. 
"2) The correction function: the function designed to ensure compliance 
with international legal obligations through outside pressure or persuasion. 
"3) The creative function: the function which consists of the clarification 
and elaboration of existing rules in order to make them sufficiently specific to be 
applied in a concrete case. " 
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Two main forms of supervisory (or implementation) 
systems exist on the international plane: the reporting system and 
the petition system. Each of these systems is thought to have its 
own theoretical and practical basis. Reporting systems., the most 
common9 and least politically sensitive method of supervision, 10 
require States to submit periodic reports on the domestic situation 
with regard to the rights within the treaty concerned. Generally, 
the reports are considered by a supervisory body entitled to 
review the reports and make general recommendations. 
Reporting systems are dependent, to a large extent, upon the 
good faith of the States concerned. 11 They are reliant upon the 
provision of accurate and relevant information by States parties 
and the supervisory body is mandated purely with the function of 
assisting and advising the States parties. Reporting systems are 
therefore considered as mechanisms for fact finding12 and more 
9 Currently there are seven universal human rights instruments that 
impose reporting obligations: the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973), the UN 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (1984) the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. In addition, the ILO, 
UNESCO and the VYrH0 all have periodic reporting provisions on matters that 
relate to human rights. 
10 Buergenthal T., "Implementing the UN Racial Convention", 12 
Tex. I. L. J., 187, at 189 (1977). Dormenval comments however that human 
rights are almost certain to be badly dealt with by UN supervisory bodies, 
"because the question of the relationship between a government and its nationals 
is, par excellence, political. " Dormenval A., "UN Committee Against Torture: 
Practice and Perspectives", 8 N. Q. H. R*, 26, at 27 (1990). 
11 Schoenberg H., "The Implementation of Human Rights by the United 
Nations", 7 Isr. Y. H. R. 22, at 37 (1977). 
12 Lippman M., "Human Rights Revisited: The Protection of Human 
Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", 10 
Cal. West. I. L. J. 450, at 486-7 (1980); Vasak comments more specifically that 
reporting systems fall halfway between the functions of information and 
investigation. Vasak K9 "The Distinguishing Criteria of Institutions", in Vasak 
K. and Alston P. (eds), The Intemational Dirn F Human Ri ghts 215, at 
218(1982). 
389 
specifically the "verification" 13 or the "promotion" of human 
rights in contrast to the protective functions of a petition system. 14 Such a comparison has led many commentators to criticise 
reporting systems as being "state centred", 15 "ineffective" 16 and 
"self-contradictory". 17 
Petition systems, on the other hand, are generally considered 
the most effective means for the protection of human rights. They 
involve the receipt of communications from individuals or States 
parties alleging violations of the treaty concemed. 18 The 
supervisory body takes on a "quasi-judicial" function19 in 
13 Tumanov V., "International Protection of Human Rights: Soviet 
Report", in Bernhardt R. and Jolowicz J. (eds), International Enforcement o 
Human &1&U, 21, at 23 (1985). 
14 For a definition of the two opposed functions see, Vasak, supra, note 12, at 216. 
15 Mower A., "The Implementation of the UN Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights", 10 Hum. Rts J., 27 1, at 285 (1977); Capotorti F., "The 
International Measures of Implementation Included in the Covenants on Human 
Rights", in Eide A. and Schou. A. (eds), International Protection of Human 
Rights, 131, at 147 (1968). 
16 Schoenberg, supra, note 11, at 37. 
17 Vasak considers that the lack of the court gives the process a 
conciliatory character which "suggests that, despite their sacred and inviolable 
nature, human rights can be 'negotiated"'. Vasak, supra, note 12, at 220. 
18 The main universal human rights treaties that possess petition systems 
are: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (under its Optional 
Protocol); The UN Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (art. 22); The International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (art. 14); the Apartheid 
Convention; and the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their 
Families (art. 77). As regards petition systems in general see, Cancado Trinidade 
A., "Co-existence and Co-ordination of Mechanisms of International Protection 
of Human Rights", 202 Hague Recueil, (1987); Tardu M., Human Rights: The 
Intemational Petition System, (1985). 
The inter-State complaints facility is not as effective, probably as a result 
of the unwillingness of States to sacrifice their good relations with other States 
for the sake of human rights. Leary, supra, note 6, at 17. See generally, Leckie 
S., "The Inter-State Complaint Procedure in International Human Rights Law: 
Hopeful Prospects or Wishful Thinking? ", 10 Hum. Rts 
_Q., 
249 (1988). 
19 There might be objections to use of the term "quasi-judicial" as it was 
never the intention for any of the UN human rights monitoring bodies to be 
considered "courts". It has been commented that the Human Rights Committee, 
when operating under its Optional Protocol, is "neither a court nor a body with a 
quasi-judicial mandate". However it is admitted that it does perform functions 
similar to those of the European Commission of Human Rights and "applies the 
provisions of the Covenant and Optional Protocol in a judicial spirit". de Zayas 
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interpreting the convention and making decisions or 
recommendations on the merits of each case. As regards the 
individual complaints system, which is generally optional for 
States parties, 20 the procedure may also be seen to provide the 
victim of a violation with an international "remedy" where a 
domestic remedy is unforthcoming. Although the supervisory 
body may not necessarily have the power to enforce its decision, 
this is generally not decisive as to its impact. 21 
It is often assumed, probably as a result of over-simplified 
analogies with domestic law, that the only really effective 
mechanism for supervision is the petition procedure. However, to 
really assess the utility of each mechanism they should be analysed 
in terms of the degree to which they fulfil the essential functions 
of a supervision. 
First, in terms of review or the assessment of compliance, 
whereas the petition procedure allows for in depth analysis of 
particular situations, it cannot compare with the breadth and scale 
of action that takes place under the various reporting mechanisms. 
It has been noted that even in those cases where petition systems 
are operative, the reporting system has formed the mainstay of 
supervision22 in providing an essential form of continuous 
monitoring. This is partially due to the limited number of States 
that have agreed to be bound by the petition systems (which are 
generally optional), but also because the specific procedures for 
the receipt and consideration of complaints (including extensive 
A., M61ler J., and Opsahl T., "Application of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights under the Optional Protocol by the Human Rights 
Committee", 28 Ger. Yrbk. I. L., 9, at 11 (1985). It is considered, however, that 
the CESCR has begun to exercise quasi-judicial functions in the context of the 
reporting system. See below, text accompanying notes. 
20 However the American Convention on Human Rights G 969), 1144 
U. N. T. S. 123, has a compulsory individual petition procedure (art. 44). 
21 For changes in the domestic situation related to the work of the Human 
Rights Committee, see, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 45 UN GAOR, 
Supp. (No. A/45/40), Vol. II, Annex XII, at 207-211 (1990); Cohn C., "The 
Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes Related to the Human Rights Committee 
and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", 13 Hum. Rts. Q., 295 (1991). 
22 See generally, Fischer D., "International Reporting Procedures", in 
Hannum H. (ed), Guide to International Human Rights Practice 165 (1984). 
Such a point has been noted by Robertson with regard to the 1CC! PR- Robertson 
A., "T'he Implementation System: International Measures", in Henldn L-(Ed), 
The International Bill of Rights, 332, at 341 (1981). See also, with respect to the 
ILO. Leary, supra, note 6, at 18. 
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admissibility criteria), 23 mean that they are not always readily 
accessible to the disadvantaged who might be the victims of 
violations-24 
Secondly, in terms of enforcement or correction, both 
systems ultimately depend for their effectiveness upon the force of 
national and international pressure. Petition procedures are 
generally accompanied by greater public interest and therefore 
could be said to be more effective in "the mobilisation of shame". 
However, it cannot be maintained that the principal objective is to 
condemn and alienate States. 25 Supervisory bodies may play a 
much more constructive role in assessing the situation and advising 
countries as to possible remedial action. 26 Indeed petition 
procedures themselves require a certain amount of co-operation 
from States parties that may disintegrate if it was thought that the 
burdens of participation outweighed the benefits. 
Additionally, it is often easy to overlook the importance of 
the promotional or preventive aspects of implementation. This has 
been most clearly pointed out by the Committee in its General 
Comment No. 1 of 1989.27 The reporting process has a number of 
objectives at its heart, namely that the State should monitor and 
23 For the operation of the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR in particular, 
see, McGoldrick D., The Human Rights Committee, 120-246 (1991); Ghandi 
P., "The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Petition", 57 
B-N. I. L., 201 (1986); Prounis 0., "The Human Rights Committee: Toward 
Resolving the Paradox of Human Rights Law", 17 Col. H. R. L. R., 103, (1985/6); Brar P., "The Practice and Procedures of the Human Rights 
Committee Under the Optional Protocol of the International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights", 25 Ind. J. I. L., 506 (1985); de Zayas A. et al, supra, note 
20. 
24 Alston cites in particular: i) ignorance of the existence of an applicable 
international procedure; ii) a lack of time and/or resources; iii) the physical 
impossibility of lodging a complaint; iv) the difficulty of demonstrating sufficient 
individual, as opposed to general community, standing to justify lodging a 
complaint; and v) the assumption that the international body in question is 
unlikely to stand in favour of the victim in a given situation. Alston P., 
"Discussion Note", UN Doc. E/C. 12/1991/WP. 2, at 8, para. 26 (1991). 
25 As Mower commented: 
"T'he cardinal objective is to gain, for individuals and groups, the most 
complete enjoyment of rights which can possibly be obtained, not to find 
and punish 'criminal' governments. 
Mower, supra, note 15, at 285. 
26 See, Gaer F., "First Fruits: Reporting by States under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights", 10 N. Q. H. R., 29, at 31 (1992). 
27 General Comment No. 1, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4), Annex I][[, at 87- 
89, UN Doc. E/1989/22, (1989). 
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undergo a thourough review and evaluation of the actual situation 
prevailing within the country as concerns the rights within the Covenant. In doing so it should stimulate public scrutiny of 
government policy in the areas concerned and pinpoint difficulties 
and shortcomings in the existing arrangements. Higgins remarks, in this regard, that the reporting process can be a very "salutary 
exercise" for States in which failure to comply with substantive 
obligations is often "inadvertent". 28 Such considerations support 
the idea that reporting systems should form the basis of any 
supervisory mechanism, to be supplemented by petition systems 
where possible and appropriate. The "promotion" of human rights 
could be said to be "the first, and the necessary, stage leading to 
protection. "29 
Finally, in terms of standard setting or normative 
development, it is clear that petition systems are particularly 
effective mechanisms for the creation of standards for application 
in specific cases. In comparison, the process of considering State 
reports does not give rise to similar opportunities for the 
specification of the norms in the treaty concerned. There has been 
a tendency, however, among supervisory bodies to adopt a distinct 
interpretative role in the guise of "general comments". Although 
still lacking in the specificity offered by a petition system the use 
of General Comments does give the supervisory body an 
opportunity to develop an understanding of the norms within the 
treaty concerned. 
H) BACKGROUND TO THE COMMITTEPS 
ESTABLISHMENT 
A) THE DRAFTING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION SYSTEM 
. During the drafting of the Covenant, there was considerable 
disagreement as to the nature of the implementation procedure that 
should accompany the substantive articles. At one stage or another, 
three forms of supervision were mooted: the possibility of 
supervision through a petition procedure; supervision by the 
28 Higgins R., "Some Thoughts on the Implementation of Human 
Rights", Bull. H. R. 60, at 63 (1989). 
29 Ibid. See also Vasak who comments: 
"If an international body for the promotion of human rights is successful, 
it cannot help but assume the task of protection. " 
Vasak, supra, note 12, at 218. 
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Specialised Agencies; and supervision by an expert committee 
specificaRy set up for that purpose. 30 
1) A Petition Procedure 
Despite the division of the draft Covenant into two separate 
texts over the question of implementation, 31 the discussion over 
whether the Human Rights Committee procedure should apply to 
economic, social and cultural rights continued. Two proposals 
were submitted at the Commission's tenth session for the 
application of such a procedure to selective economic, social and 
cultural rights in certain circumstances. 32 Doubts were expressed 
about the capability of the Committee to exercise its quasi-judicial functions with regard to rights that were of a programmatic 
nature. 33 The suggestions were also opposed by the Specialised 
Agencies who considered that they were technically better 
qualified to implement economic, social and cultural rights, and 
such a procedure would only lead to duplication of work. 34 
On the other hand it was argued that certain rights could be 
subjected to the Human Rights Committee procedure "and, in time, 
most of the rights might become enforceable. "35 Accordingly it 
was argued that States should have the option to accept the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Conunittee of the ICCPR with 
30 See above, Chapter 1, text accompanying notes 201-227. See also, 
Alston P., "Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New 
U. N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 9 Hum. Rls. Q., 332, 
at 335-340 (1987) (henceforth "Abyss"); and "The Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights", in Alston P. (ed), The United Nations and Human 
Rights: A Critical Appraisal, 473, at 475-479 (1992). 
31 See above, Chapter 1, text accompanying notes 126-143. 
32 For the French proposal see, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/L. 338,18 ESCOR, 
Supp. (No. 7), UN Doc. E/2573, para. 216 (1954). It was suggested that the 
States Parties might be given the opportunity of accepting the Human Rights Committee's complaints procedure for specific economic, social or cultural rights 
as they so desired. Such a procedure would be subject to reciprocal agreement by 
the States concerned. 
33 Not only was it considered that there was a lack of criteria to evaluate 
state compliance, it was argued that: 
"Complaints relating to that covenant could only refer to 
insufficient programmes in the attainment of certain goals and it 
would be impossible for the committee to determine what the rate 
of progress in any particular case should be. " 
UN Doc. A/2929,10 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 28), PUI, at 124, 
para. 41 (1955). 
34 Ibid at 124, para. 40. 
35 Ibid, at 124, para. 42. 
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respect to certain rights. In case of competing procedures the 
Committee would defer to the authority of the Specialised Agency 
concerned. 36 However, as with a proposal to authorise ECOSOC 
to receive individual petitions, 37 in the face of significant 
opposition the suggestions were withdrawn before being taken to 
vote. 
2) The Sp cialised Agencies38 
As suggested above, the Specialised Agencies were 
somewhat jealous of their technical and formal jurisdictions. 
Accordingly, the ELO made a proposal for an implementation 
system in which the ILO itself would review the state reports. 39 
This was rejected in favour of a Secretariat draft proposing the 
submission of periodic state reports to the United Nations with 
reference of relevant extracts to the Specialised Agencies. 40 
Although the co-operation of the Specialised Agencies is clearly of 
considerable importance, in terms of their knowledge and 
technical expertise, to the implementation of the Covenant, it 
would have been inappropriate for one of them to take on the 
central supervisory role. 
First, as not all States Parties are members of the relevant 
Specialised Agencies, the UN would still have to develop its 
capabilities in those areas. Secondly, a divergence both in 
standards and implementation systems would emerge between 
members and non-members of the competent Specialised Agencies. 
The universality of the rights within the Covenant and the essential 
element of reciprocity in obligations would inevitably be 
36 Ibid, at 124, paras 42-45. 
37 The General Assembly requested the Commission on Human Rights 
in resolution 421 (V), Sect. F, to consider provisions "to be inserted in the draft 
Covenant or in separate protocols, for the receipt and examination of petitions 
from individuals and organizations with respect to alleged violations of the 
Covenant. " GA Resn. 421 (V), (Dec. 4 1950), 5 UN GAOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. 20), at 42 (1950). 
38 See generally, Alston P., "The UN Specialised Agencies and 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights", 18 Colum. J. Trans. L., 79 (1979); Samson K., "Human Rights Co- 
ordination within the UN System", in Alston P. (ed), The United Nations and 
Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal, 620, at 629-30 (1992). 
39 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/AC. 14/1 (195 1). 
40 The Secretariat plan for implementation was inspired by the technical 
assistance program and "the idea that it was better to help governments to fulfil 
their obligations than to penalise them for violations", Humphrey J., Human 
Kiahts and the United Nations- A 
-Great 
Adventure, at 143 (1984). 
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undermined. Thirdly, no single Specialised Agency could 
effectively take up supervisory duties with respect to the whole of 
the Covenant without extending their existing mandate. 
3) 12ert Committee 
Following earlier unsuccessful proposals to create a 
specialised Committee to supervise the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights, 41 two last-minute proposals 
were made in 1966. On the one hand, the US representative 
proposed the establishment of an expert committee of independent 
experts to oversee the implementation similar to the model created 
for the Convention on the Eliminaton of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. 42 Simultaneously, Italy proposed the creation of 
ad hoc Committees elected by ECOSOC. 43 Both proposals were 
based upon the premise that ECOSOC would not have the time or 
the expertise to examine the reports adequately44 and would not 
properly represent the States Parties. 45 However, the suggestions 
were withdrawn at the General Assembly Third Committee's 
1401st meeting when it became apparent that there was insufficient 
SUpport. 46 
In light of the discussion within the Third Committee it is 
clear that some form of compromise solution could have been 
achieved. The fact that no attempt was made at compromise was a 
reflection of the political situation at that time. In 1966, the 
Socialist States were still suspicious of any international means of 
implementation, the African States were disillusioned with "expert 
bodies" in light of the ICJs recent decision in the South West 
41 See, Alston (Abyss), supra, note 30, at 335-338. 
42 A/C. 3/L. 1360, para. L, in, UN Doc. A/6546,21 UN GAOR, C. 3, 
Annexes, (Ag. Item. 62) at 10, paras. 13- 14 (1966). It proposed that the reports 
should be considered by a "Conunittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" 
consisting of independent experts elected by States Parties. It is considered that 
the independence of the proposed Committee and the fact it would have drawn 
on expert individuals from States Parties rather than ECOSOC, were matters that 
recommended the proposal, see Alston, supra, note 38,, at 91-92. 
43 Ibid, at 11, paras 18 and 24. 
44 See e. g., MacDonald (Canada), UN DOC. A/C. 3/SR. 1399, at 128, 
para. 28 (1966). 
45 See e. g., Capotortii (Italy), UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 1397, at 120, para. 32 (1966). 
46 Un Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 14011, para-19; ibid, para. 21. 
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IN Africa Cases4-2 and the Western States had little political interest in 
economic, social and cultural rights. Essentially there was no 
"champion" to push for strong implementation procedures for the 
draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
However, the rejection of the proposals did not necessarily 
rule out the possibility of the subsequent creation of an expert 
committee. Schwelb comments: 
"It appears, however, that the fact that the Italian 
amendment was withdrawn would not prevent the 
Council, which is the master of its own procedure (Art. 72 of the Charter) and which is empowered to 
set up 'such other commissions as may be required for 
the performance of its functions' (Art. 68 of the 
Charter) from establishing a subsidiary body to study 
and report to it on the information transmitted by 
governments under the Covenant. "48 
Thus although there was insufficient political will to endorse the 
creation of an expert committee in 1966, "the door was not 
irretrievably closed". 49 
4) The Result 
The final intentions of the drafters as regards the provisions 
on implementation are quite obscure. States parties are required to 
submit reports "in stages", in accordance with a programme to be 
established by ECOSOC after consultation with the States parties 
and the specialised agencies concerned. 50 The reports should 
indicate the "measures... adopted" and the "progress made" in 
achieving observance of the rights within the covenant. 51 They 
may additionally indicate the factors and difficulties affecting the 
degree of fulfilment of the obligations. 52 Such reports are to be 
submitted to the Secretary 
-General, who is required to transmit 
47 (1966) I. C. J. Rep., at 6. 
48 Schwelb E., "Some Aspects of the Measures of Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rightsit, 
363, at 367 (1968). In particular see e. g, Mr Richardson (Jamaica), 
A/C. 3/SR. 1401, at 142, para. 26 (1966). 
49 Alston, supra, note 30, at 479. 
50 Article 17(l). 
51 Article 16(l). 
52 Article 17(2). 
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copies of the reports to ECOSOC "for consideration", 53 and copies 
of the relevant parts of the reports to the specialised agencies in so far as they relate to their responsibilities. 54 Where information has 
already been submitted to a specialised agency it is sufficient to 
refer thereto. 55 Arrangements may be made for the specialised 
agencies to report to ECOSOC on the progress made in achieving 
the observance of the rights within the Covenant including 
particulars of decisions and recommendations on such 
implementation adopted by their competent organs. 56 ECOSOC 
may also transmit the State reports to the Commission on Human 
Rights "for study and general recommendations or, as appropriate, 
for information". 57 Any such recommendation submitted by the 
Commission is open to comment by the specialised agencies and 
the States parties. 58 
Finally ECOSOC may submit "from time to time" to the 
General Assembly, reports and recommendations "of a general 
nature" together with a summary of the information received from 
the States parties and the specialised agencies. 59 It may also bring 
to the attention of other organs of the UN or specialised agencies 
concerned with furnishing technical assistance, any matters that 
may help those bodies decide what measures are likely to 
contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the 
Covenant. 60 
The system outlined in the Covenant is thus unclear as to the 
nature, purpose or degree of supervision to be given and as to the 
extent to which the bodies mentioned should involve themselves. 
First although ECOSOC is mandated with the "consideration" of 
the State reports, the Commission on Human Rights may similarly 
"study" the reports and make general recommendations. It is 
unclear on the face of it, as to which body has the primary 
responsibility for undertaking supervision. Given that the 
53 Article 16(2)(a). 
54 Article 16(2)(b). 
55 Article 17(3). 
56 Article 18. 
57 Article 19. 
58 Article 20. 
59 Article 2 1. 
60 Article 22. 
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Commission is a subsidiary body to ECOSOC it might be assumed 
that it would play the most significant role. 
Secondly, although many assumptions may be made about 
the nature of reporting systems generally, the Covenant itself only 
provides for the submission of reports and their consideration. 
The periodicity, form and specific content of those reports are left 
open, as is the nature of the consideration undertaken. The most 
significant limits however are first that States parties are only 
obliged to submit reports on the measures adopted and the 
progress made in achieving observance of the rights; any further 
participation in the consideration of the reports is purely 
voluntary. Moreover, ECOSOC is at most authorised to submit 
recommendations to the General Assembly; it is in no way 
empowered to make decisions binding on States parties. 
B) THE SESSIONAL WORKING GROUP 
As noted above, ECOSOC has considerable discretion in the 
conduct undertaken in the consideration of reports. 61 Accordingly, 
following the entry into force of the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights on January 3rd 1976, ECOSOC 
undertook to consider the best means to supervise the 
implementation of the Covenant. Although there appears to have 
been considerable support for the idea that the Commission take on 
a central role in the supervisory process., 62 the Council adopted an 
alternative strategy. 
In Resolution 1988(LX) of 1 lth May 1976 ECOSOC laid 
down the implementation procedures that were to accompany the 
Covenant. It created a three-stage, biennial reporting process with 
a cycle of six years. For the first stage States would be required to 
61 As Sohn commented: 
"The Covenant does not specifically foresee the establishment of a 
specialist Working Group charged with responsibility for scrutinising 
reports submitted by the States Parties and the specialised agencies. That 
responsibility is vested in the Council itself which, in turn, must exercise 
its own discretion as to the most appropriate arrangements for ensuring 
effective supervision. " 
Sohn L., "The Role of the United Nations Organs in Implementing the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", Background Paper, at 39-40 (1985). 
62 See, Alston, supra, note 30, at 483. He comments: 
Illie Commission's already overcrowded agenda, its reluctance to take 
economic, social and cultural rights very seriously, and the undoubted need for 
specialist expertise in monitoring such rights would all seem to confirm the 
wisdom of that approach now that a committee of independent experts has been 
given the principal responsibility. " 
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submit reports on the rights covered by articles six to nine. Two 
years later, States would be required to report on articles 10 to 12, 
and two years following that on articles 13 to 15. The reports 
were to be forwarded by the Secretary-General to ECOSOC which 
would be "assisted" in its consideration of the reports by a 
"Sessional Working Group" (the Working Group). The Specialised 
Agencies were also to receive the State reports as appropriate and 
could submit their own reports in response and have 
representatives take part in the proceedings of the Working Group. 63 
The initial plans for a Sessional Working Group were 
criticised for having insufficient provision for the consideration of 
the reports by persons of requisite expertise64 and for making no 
provision for enlisting the services of the Commission on Human 
Rights. 65 Notwithstanding such objections ECOSOC formally 
created the "Sessional Working Group" in Decision 1978/10 of 3rd 
May 1978.66 Much of the discussion that preceded the decision was 
concerned with the composition and membership of the Working 
Group whilst its actual role in the consideration of the reports was 
left unclear. 67 The rather haphazard way the Working Group 
began was somewhat indicative of how it continued. 68 Following a 
review of its operation, the Working Group was renamed the 
63 See ECOSOC Resn. 1988(LX), 11 May 1976, found in UN 
Doc. E/C. 12/1989/4, at 3 (1988). See generally, Ramcharan B., "Implementing 
the International Covenants on Human Rights" in Ramcharan B. (ed), Human 
Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration, 159, at 163-165 (1978). 
64 Massip (Canada), UN Doc. E/SR. 1999, at 7 1, para. 16,60 UN 
ESCOR, (Ag. Item 4), (1976). 
65 See e. g., Sucharipa (Austria), Ibid, at 72, para. 19. 
66 ECOSOC Decn. 1978/10, (May 3 1978), in UN Doc. E/C. 12/1989/4, 
at 6 (1988). 
67 See e. g. Ramcharan, supra, note 63, at 169. The French 
representative commented in the discussion: 
"T'he form and composition of the sessional working group would be 
determined by the nature of the tasks entrusted to it and could therefore 
be determined only after the methods of work and the procedure for 
considering reports had been established. " 
UN Doc. E/1978/SR. 9, para. 5. 
68 See generally, Sohn, supra, note 61,1-66; Commentary, 
"Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: ECOSOC Working Group", 271 Rey., 26 (1981); Alston (Abyss), 
supra, note 30, at 340-342; Westerveen G., "Towards a System for Supervising States' Compliance with the Right to Food it, in Alston P. and Tomasevski 
K(eds), The Right to Food 119 (1984). 
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"Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts" and its 
members were elected for three years from nominees put forward 
by states parties to the Covenant. The change did not seem to have 
any significant effect on the work that the group produced. The 
barrage of criticism that has been directed at the Working Group 
in both of its forms can be summarised as the following: 
a) The examination of reports was superficial. 69 In particular it 
was marked by poor quality of questioning70 and political 
disagreement. 71 
b) The Working Group failed to establish standards for the 
evaluation of reportS72 or an effective procedure. 73 
c) The Working Group reports were purely procedural, giving 
little indication of the substance of the reports or discussion. 74 
Neither did they indicate any conclusions or recommendations. 75 
d) There was continual dispute over the participation of the 
Specialised Agencies. 76 
e) The State representatives presenting the reports were often not 
sufficiently qualified to answer the questions of the Working 
Group, 77 (members often presenting the reports themselves). 
f) Disagreements within regional caucuses led to difficulty in 
filling its 15 membership position. 78 
69 Commentary, ibid, at 35. 
70 See e. g. Yakolev (USSR), who seems to respond to the questions of 
other members of the Working Group rather than pose questions himself, 
E/1985/WG. 1/SR. 9, at 6, para. 29-30. 
71 See e. g. Altercations between Texier (France) and Yakolev (USSR) 
over the Polish report, E/1 986/WG. 1/SR. 26, at 2-4; and between Yakolev (USSR) and Hoppe (Denmark) over the restrictions on Solidarnosc in Poland, 
E/1986/WG. 1/SR. 27, at 7-8. 
72 Westerveen, supra, note 68, at 125. 
73 Sohn, supra, note 61, at 45. 
74 Alston (Abyss), supra, note 30, at 342. See e. g. the comments of: 
Walkate (Netherlands), E/1981/SR. 15, para-90; Bell (Canada), E/1981/SR. 15, 
para. 98. 
75 Westerveen, supra, note 68, at 341; Fischer, supra, note 22, at 175. 
76 Commentary, supra, note 68, at 36 and 38. It was finally agreed that 
the representatives of the Specialised Agencies should be able to make general 
statements but not pose questions to State representatives. 
771bid, at 35. 
78 Sohn notes that two members were lacldng in 1984, one member in 
1983, and two members in 1982, Sohn, supra, note 61, at 42. 
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g) The attendance of the Working Group members was poor, 79 
and there was excessive use of alternates. 80 
h) 'I'he initial one year tenure of the members, and the later high 
turnover of members led to a lack of continuity and consistency. 81 
i) State reports were considered too quickly due to the lack of time 
available to the Group. 82 j) The Working Group was handicapped by the lack of pubECity. 83 
k) The Working Group was not even-handed in its consideration 
of State reports. 84 
1) Ibe Working Group's discussions often ignored the broader 
context in which the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights operates. 85 
m) The Working Group was insufficiently supported by the 
Secretariat. 86 
n) The lack of technical expertise on the part of States parties and 
the absence of sufficiently detailed reporting guidelines led to a 
poor level of compliance with the reporting obligations. 87 
The general dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the 
Working Group as a supervisory body, combined with the 
increasing interest being placed upon economic, social and cultural 
rights in the UN and a more conciliatory stance on the part of the 
Eastern European States, 88 all combined to put fresh impetus into 
the creation of a truly independent committee of experts. 
However, although the decision to create the Committee indicated 
the possibility of a fresh start, it was clear that the fonn of 
supervision would remain largely the same. 
79 One member noted that there was rarely more than ten members 
present at one time. Texier (France), E/1985/WG. 1/SR. 19, para. 17. 
80 Alston (Abyss), supra, note 30, at 341. 
81 Sohn, supra, note 61, at 43. 
82 Initially the Working Group only had a two-week session. After 1980 
this was extended to three weeks. See, Commentary, supra, note 68, at 37. 
83 Ibid, at 33. 
84 Certain States for example were given considerably harsher treatment. 
Indeed the Worldng Group actually refused to ask questions of the Chilean 
report in light of its general human rights abuses. Ibid, at 38. 
85 Alston (Abyss), supra, note 30, at 342. 
86 Sohn, supra, note 61, at 35. 
87 Ibid, at 39. 
88 See, Alston (Abyss), supra, note 30, at 345-349. 
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The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights did 
not so much replace the Working Group as inherit and develop the 
existing system. ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17 under which the Committee was formally established, states merely that the 
Working Group shall be "renamed" the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. 89 Similarly paragraph (h) of the same 
resolution states that the procedures and methods of work 
established previously for the Working Group continue to remain 
in force in so far as they are not superseded by that resolution. 90 
More importantly, there was no substantial reevaluation of the 
basic system of supervision such as to give effect to articles 19-21. 
The Committee merely inherited the existing procedures of the 
Working Group (such as the "constructive dialogue" approach to 
the consideration of reports), which it has attempted to undertake 
in a more effective manner. 
IH) THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC. SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS 
A) THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE 
Ilie Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
was created in ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17.91 Paragraph (b) of 
that decision reads: 
"(b) The Committee shall have 18 members who shall 
be experts with recognised competence in the field of 
human rights, serving in their personal capacity, due 
consideration being given to equitable geographical 
distribution and to the representation of different 
forms of social and legal systems, to this end, 15 seats 
will be equally distributed among the regional groups, 
while the additional three seats will be allocated in 
accordance with the increase in the total number of 
States parties per regional group; " 
1) Size of the Committee 
The decision to create a Committee with 18 members was 
not necessarily an automatic one, particularly in light of the fact 
that its predecessor, the Sessional Working Group, had 15 
89 ECOSOC Resn. 1985/17, para. (a), UN ESCOR, Supp. (Nol), at 15, 
UN Doc. E/1985/85, (1985). 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
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members. In contrast it might be noted that CAT has only 10 independent experts, the ILO Committee of Experts has 20, and CEDAW has 23. The increase in size of the Committee seems to have stemmed from a desire to emulate the Human Rights 
Committee and to satisfy the need for representation for the 
growing number of new States parties to the Covenant. 
Smaller Committees arguably benefit from being able to 
operate by consensus, 92 come to decisions quickly, and maximize 
the use of time and resources. However absences in a small Committee can disrupt both the ability to form quorum and the 
quality of decision-making. 93 With respect to the wide range of 
issues that confront the Committee, it is in theory essential for the 
Committee to be of a size large enough to include members from 
all the necessary areas of technical expertise whilst maintaining its 
ability to operate by consensus. 
The Committee has operated relatively smoothly at its 
present size. The ideological conflicts that beset its earlier sessions 
have not reoccurred and although there have been a number of 
minor disagreements between members, there has been no serious 
challenge to its ability to come to decisions by consensus. In light 
of the Committee members' increasing work-load over and above 
the consideration of State reports (such as attending meetings of 
the pre-sessional working group, monitoring activities of other 
human rights bodies, and the preparation of concluding 
observations and general comments), there might be an argument 
for increasing the size of the Committee to spread the burden. 
However, it is considered that the cost this would have on the 
ability of the Committee to function quickly and effectively and 
come to decisions by consensus would greatly outweigh any 
benefit. Moreover, it has to be noted that ideally, many of the tasks 
undertaken by the Committee should be the responsibility Of the 
Secretariat. 
2) ne Appointment of Members 
Under ECOSOC resolution 1985/17 paragraph (c) members 
of the Committee are elected by ECOSOC by secret ballot from a 
list of nominees submitted by States Parties. 94 The first elections 
took place in 1986 where 18 members were elected for a term 
beginning on 1st January 1987. Whereas the regular term of office 
92 'Ibis has been a problem for larger Committees such as CEDAW. 
93 Dormenval, supra, note 10, at 33. 
94 ECOSOC Resn. 1985/17, supra, note 89. 
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is four years, 95 the necessity of instituting a staggered membership 
meant that the President of the Council chose by lot the names of 
nine members whose term was to expire at the end of two years. 96 
Accordingly half the membership is renewed every second year. 97 At the elections in 1988 ECOSOC elected nine members whose 
term of office runs until December 1992, and in 1990 another nine 
members were elected whose tenure continues until December 
1994.98 Due to the resignation of two members (Mr Sviridov and 
Mr Daoudy) in 1988, ECOSOC elected two members to fill those 
vacancies for the remainder of their terms of office, expiring in 
December 1990. 'Me present and past state of membership may be 
found in the Appendices to this work. 99 
The fact that members of the Committee are elected for four- 
year terms allows the Committee an element of continuity. 100 It is 
apparent, particularly in light of the experience of the original 
Working Group, that changes in membership can be disruptive in 
terms of the Committee Is efficient functioning. 101 Long terms of 
membership promote stability through allowing the development 
of inter-personal relationships which can help to avoid unnecessary 
friction. More importantly, it assists consistency and promotes the 
development of expertise by the individual Committee members so 
essential to the effective analysis of State reports. 
The staggered membership of the Committee and the 
eligibility of existing members for re-election, has done much to 
ensure this vital continuity in the Committee's working 
methods. 102 Indeed, 14 members of the original Committee are 
still members as of 1992 and only three members have not been re- 
95 Ibid, para. (c)(i). 
96 Ibid, para. (c)(iii). 
97 Ibid., para. (c)(ii). 
98 See generally, Report of the Committee's Fifth Session, UN 
Doc. E/1991/23, at 2, paras 4-5, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), (199 1). 
99 Appendix III. 
100 Members of the HRC, CEDAW, CAT are all elected for four years. 
101 See above, text accompanying note 8 1. 
102 The IILO Committee of Experts is 20 members strong each of whom 
is elected for three years. "... their term of office is generally renewed since 
continuity makes it possible to acquire more thorough knowledge of matters dealt 
with by the Committee and also ensures the greater independence of its 
members. " Valticos N., "The International Labour Organisation", in Vasak K. 
and Alston R(eds), The Intemational DimenSions of Human Rights, 363, at 369 (1982). 
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elected. 103 However, the desirability of maintaining continuity has 
to be balanced against the current need for new specific expertise 
in the Committee as intimated below. 1041t is perhaps possible that 
such expertise could be brought to the Committee on a limited 
scale in appointments following "natural wastage" such as 
resignations or retirements. 
3) Representation and Distribution of Membership 
Paragraph (b) of ECOSOC resolution 1985/17 stipulates that 
in the election of the experts "due consideration" should be given 
to "equitable geographical distribution and to the representation of 
different forms of social and legal systems". Although the 
Committee members are undoubtedly appointed as independent 
experts,, 105 this provision appears to ensure that the interests of 
States are represented in a general manner through social and 
cultural affiliation. 
However, from the point of view of the Committee, it is 
entirely suitable that membership should span geographical areas, 
legal and social forms in that its expertise would be seriously 
diminished if one aspect went unrepresented. The formula devised 
for the Committee stipulates that 15 seats shall be distributed 
equally among the five regional groups (Africa, Asia, Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and Western Europe) and that the 
additional three seats be allocated according to the increase in the 
total number of States parties per regional group. It has been 
argued that this formula is unduly inflexible. 106 Its emphasis on 
ideological groupings not only means that valid and relevant 
criteria for membership are ignored (such as ensuring a spread of 
expertise across the relevant disciplines), it places an unwarranted 
significance on the representation of States parties. 
It must be admitted that the composition of the Committee 
does seem to fulfil, to a large extent, the three criteria of 
representation (geographical, legal and social distribution). As far 
as the regional distribution is concerned, it has three members 
from each of the regional groups with the extra members going to 
103 In comparison, the Human Rights Conunittee has experienced some 
problems of continuity, see, Nowak M., "UN Human Rights Committee: 
Comment", 11 H. R. L. J., 139 (1990). 
104 See below, text accompanying note 119. 
105 See below, text accompanying note 122. 
1 Oro Alston (Abyss), supra, note 30, at 349. 
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Africa, Asia and Latin America. 107 The weakest unit is perhaps 
that of Asia which only has three representatives, one of whom is from Cyprus. 108 
The variety of legal systems found on the international plane 
are generally well represented with a mixture of common-law and 
civil systems and a variety of constitutional forms with different 
philosophies. Similarly, there is a fairly wide representation of 
differing social structures, although stronger Asian representation 
would be beneficial. 
Nevertheless, from the point of view of expertise, it is 
important that the Committee is composed of experts spanning the 
areas of concern within the Covenant. It is certainly true that there 
is a need for people with local knowledge of the various 
geographical areas and of the different social and legal systems of 
States parties, but the demands of knowledge and expertise within 
the Committee are considerably wider. Given that the Committee 
is in the best position to deten-nine its needs as regards the 
expertise of its members, a more flexible arrangement would be 
appropriate in which the Committee could have greater control 
over membership. 
The existing arrangement, especially in so far as it refers to 
ensuring the representation of States parties, reflects the misplaced 
idea that the experts are still representatives of States. The fact that 
members are elected from nominees of the States parties, despite 
leaving open the faint possibility of experts being elected from 
nationals of non-States parties, 109 similarly re-emphasises the 
unwillingness of States parties to abandon the control previously 
held over membership of the Working Group-110 
107 For a list of the different groupings for the purposes of elections see, 
Hovet T. and Hovet E., A Chronology and Fact Book of the United Nations 
19-41-1985,310 (7th Ed, 1986). 
108 Cyprus of course is a member of the Council of Europe. On political 
groupings generally see, Petersen M., The General Assembly in World Politics, 
290-297 (1986); Bailey S., The General Assembly qf the United Nations. A 
Study of Procedure and Practice, 21-40 (1960). It is assumed that the Eastern 
European group will disappear at some stage which will alter all the terms of 
election. 
109 As Alston comments, "although there appears to be nothing to 
prevent the nomination of an individual who is not a national of a State party, 
there have been no precedents and the chances of election would probably be 
slight". Alston (Abyss), supra, note 30, at 349. 
110 Whereas the Western States considered that the Worldng Group 
should consist of members of ECOSOC, the East European States argued that 
membership of the Working Group should be Immted to States Parties to the 
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4) The Expert Nature of the Committee 
ECOSOC resolution 1985/17 requires that the Committee be 
composed of "experts with recognised competence in the field of 
human rights". The expertise of the membership is of importance 
not only in as far as it relates to the ability of the Committee to 
assess the State reports 111 but also in that it lends to the credibility 
of the Committee in the eyes of States parties. 112 The willingness 
of States parties to produce high quality reports is directly related 
to the quality of the supervision undertaken by the Committee. 113 
Although the Working Group was supposedly composed of 
competent members or experts, the quality of analysis shown in 
the consideration of State reports was manifestly poor. 114 The 
Committee, on the other hand, has demonstrated an ability to draw 
Covenant. See generally, Ramcharan, supra, note 63, at 165-167. UN Docs. 
E/1978/SR. 5,9 and 12, UN ESCOR, (Ag. Item 5), (1978). 
The final solution was presented as a compromise: the Working Group 
should consist of 15 members elected from those States that were parties to the 
Covenant and members of ECOSOC (of whom there were only 20), other 
members of the Council and States Parties were invited to participate in the 
proceedings of the Working Group as observers. ECOSOC Decn. E/1978/10, 
paras. (a) and (c), supra, note 66. 
At the creation of the Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts 
under ECOSOC Resolution 1982/33 paragraph (b), the requirement for 
membership of the Council was dropped; the 15 members would be elected from 
the States Parties to the Covenant alone. ECOSOC Resn. 1982/33, (May 6 
1983), in, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1989/4, at 11 (1988). 
111 As Mower said with respect to the HRC: 
"Since a body like this is an aggregate of individuals, the attitudes and 
competence of individual members become matters of not little 
significance for the Covenant's effectiveness. " 
Mower G., "Organizing to Implement the UN Civil/Political Rights Covenant: First 
Steps by the Committee", 3 Hum. Rts-Rev., 122, at 123 (1978). The point is equally 
relevant with respect to the CESCR. 
112 The Netherlands representative commented in ECOS OC: 
"The requirement that members of the Group should be experts in the 
matter to which the State reports related was of great importance. If 
reporting States hesitated to submit reports or did not submit reports at all 
because they believed that they would be discussed by a less than 
competent group of individuals, the monitoring function of the Council 
would be undermined. " 
Mr Walkate (Netherlands), E/198 1/SR. 15, para. 92 (198 1). 
113 See e. g. Dormenval, supra, note 10, at 32. 
114 See above, text accompanying note 77. One commentator has pointed 
out that with the exception of Norway and USSR, States were represented by 
members of the permanent missions whose "technical preparation was poor", 
with the result that the questions asked were generally superficial. Fischer, 
supra, note 22, at 175. 
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out and evaluate some of the fmer issues in the reports and has 
made a certain amount of progress in further defining the 
substance of the guarantee. 115 Individual members have 
occasionally fallen short in their legal analysis, 116 but there is 
demonstrably a core of expertise within the Committee that 
maintains a high standard of work. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the Committee does not 
possess expertise in all the subject areas encompassed within the Covenant. It was noted by one Committee member that "the 
Covenant's scope was so broad that the Committee could not hope 
to find among its members experts in housing, discrimination, 
nutrition and all the other sub ects involved in economic, social 
and cultural rights". 117 Although it clearly would not be possible 
for the Committee to have members with expertise in every 
conceivable area, the fact that the vast majority of current 
members have a predominantly legal background may be 
criticised. 118 As a legal entity, the Covenant certainly requires a 
supervisory body with legal expertise, but it is doubted, given the 
need for wider knowledge particularly as regards the rights to 
food, housing, clothing and health, that the current emphasis on 
legal expertise is appropriate. Indeed, in so far as the strictly 
"legal" functions of the Committee are limited, there is scope for 
the inclusion of more non-lawyers within its ranks without 
prejudicing its ability to function effectively. 
It might be concluded that, given the nature of the Covenant, 
the requirement that the experts be limited to those of recognised 
competence in human rights is not necessarily suitable. 119 The 
recent appointment of Mrs Bonoan-Dandan, however, whose 
expertise lies in the area of art and culture, would seem to suggest 
that the term "competence in human rights" will be interpreted 
broadly to cover the needs of the Committee as a supervisory 
body. To further extend this process, it is submitted that the 
115 The discussion undertaken on article 11 illustrates both of these 
points. See, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22-23. 
1166 For example, a curious argument was used by one member who 
argued that France was in violation of its obligations under the Covenant with 
respect o article 9 notwithstanding an explicit reservation on the question. 
Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/19 89/S R. 12, at 12, para. 6 1. 
117 Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22, at 3. ) para. 12. 
118 At least fourteen of the eighteen members have a specifically legal 
background. Only one member has clear expertise in other fields. See generally, 
UN Docs. E/1990/46 and E/1988/46. 
119 See generaRy the suggestion of Westerveen, supra, note 68, at 128. 
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Committee should undertake to advise ECOSOC of the nature of 
the experts it wishes to be appointed at the next election in 1992. Nevertheless, as pointed out, the Committee could not hope 
to have a membership of experts covering all the subjects involved 
in the Covenant. It is, and always will be, dependent upon the use 
of external advice and technical expertise in its consideration of 
reports. Ideally this would be the type of support provided to the Committee by the Secretariat-120 In absence of such a role being 
played by the Secretariat, the Committee will have to look towards 
greater participation by the specialised agencies, 121 and through 
the use of consultants on an ad hoc basis during the consideration 
of the reports. Such consultants, if used, would deal with issues of 
a specific nature that may arise in the occasional report. 
5) The Independence of the Committee 
ECOSOC resolution 1985/17 stipulates in paragraph (b) that 
the members should serve "in their personal capacity". 122 
Moreover, rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure provide that 
members of the Committee make a solemn declaration to 
undertake their duties "impartially and conscientiously". 123 It is 
clear from the experience of the Working Group that such 
independence is crucial to the effective functioning of the 
Committee. It might be argued that since the reporting system is 
primarily intended not for making judicial determinations of 
compliance, but rather for assisting States in the implementation of 
the rights within the Covenant, that an insistence on the 
independence and impartiality of the Committee members is 
largely misplaced. 124 However, even if the form of judicial 
impartiality that is essential to those bodies that operate a petition 
120 See below, text accompanying notes 456-468. 
121 See below, text accompanying notes 338-363. 
122 ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17, supra, note 89, para. (c). 
123 Rules of Procedure as approved by ECOSOC, in UN 
Doc. E/C. 12/1990/4. 
124 Capotord, spealdng solely from a textual analysis of the ICESCR, %--"F 
noted that although in theory an independent committee of experts was most 
suitable for human rights treaty supervision, "as the States reports on economic, 
social and cultural questions must also help to promote international cooperation, 
especially in the field of technical assistance, the Economic and Social Council is 
still the best qualified organ for this kind of 'implementation' of the Covenant. it 
Capotorti, supra, note 15, at 136. 
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system125 is not strictly necessary,, it is nevertheless debilitating 
for the Committee to be subjected to the political pressures that 
attend those organs composed of State representatives. 
As the terminology used in the ECOSOC resolution is the 
same as that in article 28(3) ICCPR, it is to be assumed that the 
Committee should operate in the same independent manner as the 
Human Rights Committee, whatever the differences in role. 
However, the fact that members should act in their personal 
capacities does not mean in itself that they are entirely free from 
State control. As noted above, State parties retain significant 
influence over the election of the members of the Committee both 
by the fact that they nominate the candidates and by the necessary 
political "trade-offs" that accompany the distribution of seats. 
Indeed the decision by the Eastern Bloc countries to withdraw 
their nominee for the Committee at its first session illustrates the 
political bargaining that enters into the election process. 126 In 
addition, an attempt was made, albeit unsuccessful, to enforce an 
"understanding" made during the election process that the 
rapporteur for the second session should be an expert from an 
Eastern European Country. 127 
Moreover it is clear that many members of the Committee 
have been, and continue to be, government officials and civil 
servants. 128 Robertson comments in relation to the Human Rights 
Committee, that such a situation: 
"contradicts the intent of the Covenant. - it not only 
makes it difficult for the members to devote the 
necessary time and attention., but also makes it less 
likely that they can perform their functions 
'impartially'. The task of the Committee is difficult 
and delicate and is not aided by subjecting any of its 
members to political pressures that are inevitable if 
125 For example, members of the ILO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations are required to work "in a 
spirit of complete independence and entire objectivity". Valticos, supra, note 
102, at 369. 
126 See, the comment of Sviridov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 2, at 3, para. 15. 
127 See, Sviridov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 25, at 2, para. 6. 
128 See e. g., Mr Rattray is the Secretary-General of Jamaica; Mr Alvarez 
Vita is a Minister in the Diplomatic Staff of Peru; Mr Fofana is the Advocat 
Gen6ral of Guinea; Mrs Ider is the head of the department of Legal Affairs of 
Mongolia; Mr Konate is a Councillor to the Permanent Mission of Senegal to the 
UN in Geneva; Mr Marchan Romero is an Ambassador for Ecuador; Mr 
Mratchkov is the Attorney-General of Bulgaria. Other members hold various 
government or civil service posts. See above, note 118. 
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Committee members are, or are seen as, representing 
governments. " 129 
Robertson goes on to argue that this should be established as a 
matter of principle130 and that the Committee members should be 
permanent salaried staff of the UN-131 Although it is certainly 
necessary that members be free from government control, it is doubtful that such a proposition is realistic, especially given the financial constraints under which the UN is currently operating. 
Indeed it is arguable that Committee members in fact benefit from 
the knowledge that derives from links with their State. 132 A more 
modest proposal would be to prohibit Committee members from 
being in the direct employment of their State. 133 However, even 
this would present problems for certain developing states which 
would clearly have difficulties in providing persons with the 
necessary technical expertise who are not upon the State payroll. 
In fact, members of the Committee have consistently 
stressed their independence before State representatives 134 and 
there is little evidence of members allowing political affiliations to 
compromise their role in examining State reports. There is an 
unofficial agreement, self-imposed on the whole, that an expert 
from the State whose report is being considered should not 
participate in the discussion. Interventions in such cases have 
occurred only when that expert considered that the Committee 
129 Robertson, supra, note 22, at 338; Galey comments that the fact that 
members of CEDAW often hole official posts gave rise to "serious questions as 
to the extent they can or do serve in their personal capacity independent of 
governments", Galey M., "International Enforcement of Women's Rights", 6 
Hum. Rts. Q-., 463, at 478 (1984). Such a consideration has also been noted in 
the Committee itself, see, Texier, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 23, at 7, para. 60. 
130 Robertson, supra, note 22, at 350. 
131 Ibid. at 339. 
132 McGoldrick, supra, note 23, at 43. 
133 This would exclude in particular the participation of ambassadors and 
other civil servants. However, it would raise certain problems of interpretation, 
for example, where a university professor was employed in a public institution 
financed directly by the State. 
134 For example, following the Chilean representative's reference to the 
"Australian representative", it was pointed out that members of the Committee 
were experts acting in an individual capacity and should be referred to by name 
or by any other neutral expression. See, Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 16, at 3, 
para. 6. 
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would benefit from his or her specialist knowledge. 135 More often 
than not, any conflict within the Committee has related to regional 
rather than State affiliations, reflecting not so much the 
interference of States parties, but rather the personal views of the 
members concerned. 
The one area of concern, however, has been the degree of 
absenteeism experienced by the Committee that may be directly 
related to the responsibilities of the members. At four of its past five sessions, one member of the Committee has been entirely 
absent, and at two of those sessions an additional two members 
attended only part of the session. 136 In addition to the casual 
absences from particular sessions this represents quite a significant 
problem. Although average attendence must be about twelve or 
thirteen members, on a number of occasions attendence falls well below this level. Indeed it was commented at the Committee's third 
session that much of the Committee's work would have been 
impossible if it had enforced the quorum rule of 12 members (Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure). 137 How far such absences are 
due to official State business is unclear, 138 but it is notable that 
those members who are clearly independent have good records of 
attendence. 139 It is clearly of importance to the Committee that it 
maintains the quality of its work which may well be prejudiced by 
the continuing shortage of members. 140 This is especially the case 
135 See e. g. the intervention of Rattray in the consideration of the 
Jamaican report, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 21, at 5, para. 21. 
136 The attendence over the first six sessions is as follows: 
1987 (First Session): All members attended; 
1988 (Second Session): Mr Sviridov was absent; NIr Daoudi, Mr Rattray 
attended only part of the session. 
1989 Jbird Session): Mr Kouznetsov, Mr Marchan Romero, ý& Rattray and Mr 
Mmchkov attended only part of the session. 
1990 (Fourth Session): Mr Mrachkov was absent. 
1990 (Fifth Session): Mr Badawi El Sheikh was absent; Mr Alvarez Vita and NIr 
Rattray attended only part of the session. 
1991 (Sixth Session): Mr Texier was absent; Mr Rattray attended only part of the 
session. 
137 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 23, at 6, para. 41. 
138 The absences of Mrachkov was cited however as being due to State 
business. 
139 One may cite in particular Mr Alston and ý& Simma. 
140 Dormenval considers that "[o]ne's agreement to serve as an expert 
entails the moral duty not to undermine the authority of the Committee one serves 
on. " Dormenval, supra, note 10, at 34. 
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if the Committee is forced to take decisions that are technically 
ultra vires for not fulfilling the quorum rule. 
B) THE STATUS OF THE COMMITTEE 
On a theoretical level, the sovereign equality of States dictates that the supervision of any treaty obligations should be 
undertaken exclusively by those States that are party to the 
agreement. On the other hand the effective supervision of human 
rights demands that the body mandated with its implementation 
should be independent of the States parties. The Covenant, by 
placing ECOSOC as the primary organ responsible for the 
implementation of the Covenant, appears to reflect the latter 
position. 141 However, such a decision seems to have been taken on 
the assumption that the supervisory role should merely be one of 
providing technical assistance and that the Council would be the 
most appropriate body for assuming such a function. 
Tlie debate over the control of the States parties reemerged 
in determining the membership of the Working Group. It was 
argued on the one hand that members of the Group could be 
elected from any member of ECOSOC whether or not they were 
Party to the Covenant, 142 on the other hand it was contended that 
members had to be elected from those members of ECOSOC who 
were also States Parties. 143 As noted above, the position is no 
clearer in respect to the Committee itself-144 
Although States parties are responsible for the nomination 
of members of the Committee, it is clear that the Committee as a 
whole is primarily a United Nations organ. T'he Committee was 
established as a subsidiary organ of ECOSOC and as such derives 
all its authority from, and is responsible to that body. The interests 
of the States parties are represented here only in so far as they are 
represented by ECOSOC. To this extent the Committee differs 
quite significantly from other human rights committees. 
The obvious benefit of such a position is that the Committee 
maintains a significant degree of autonomy from the States parties. 
As such, it is not subject to the financial problems faced by other 
141 Although a number of States in ECOSOC are parties to the Covenant, 
there are also a significant number which are not. 
142 Ramcharan, supra, note 63, at 157. 
143 Yugoslavia, E/S R. 1999, at 5,60 UN ES COR, (Ag. Item 4), (1976); 
USSR, ibid. ) at 6. 
144 See above, text accompanying note 109. 
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Committees that are sponsored by the States parties. 145 Rather, the Committee is financed exclusively by the United Nations. 146 
Additionally the Committee could be said to be more flexible in its 
operation in that changes merely need the authorisation of ECOSOC rather than the amendment of the text of the Covenant 
itself. The Conunittee, whilst operating within the broad 
perameters of the ECOSOC resolutions that created it, has 
undergone an unprecedented evolution particularly in its working 
methods. This can be attributed to a large extent to the absence of formal textual constraints experienced by other Committees. 
On the other hand, the mandate of the Committee is 
essentially an indirect one. It operates "to assist the Council" in the 
consideration of State reports, rather than being directly 
responsible itself. 147 There is potential here, for a conflict of 
competence to anse, similar to that experienced by the Committee 
of Independent Experts to the European Social Charter vis a vis 
the Governmental Committee. 148 In practice, however, the work 
of the Committee has drawn little interest from ECOSOC, and 
only in a few cases has the Committee sought the approval of 
ECOSOC for the adoption of its working methods-149 
The Committee is also somewhat more vulnerable than other 
committees to the extent that it is permanently subject to sea- 
145 For comment on the financial position of CERD see, Bernard- 
Maugiron N., "20 Years After: 38th Session of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination", 8 N. Q. H. R., 395 (1990). With respect to CAT see, 
Dormenval, supra, note 10, at 28. For arguments in favour of central funding for 
all human rights committees see, Note by the Secretary General, Effective 
Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights. Including 
Rennrtinpr Ohlicyntion-, iinder Tnternational Instruments on Human Rights, UN 
at 30-40,44 UN GAOR, (Ag. Item 109), (1989). 
146 Although the Conurdttee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
developed late in the day, it was somewhat fortunate that the earlier proposals for 
a Committee submitted by the USA and Italy did not come to fruition. Both of 
those proposals envisaged the States Parties taking primary responsibility for 
financing the Committee which would be set up independently of ECOSOC. UN 
Doc. A/6546, at 10- 13,21 UN GAOR, Annexes, (Ag. Item. 62), (1966). 
147 See, Alston, supra, note 30, at 488-489. 
148 The recent Amending Protocol has sought to address the overlap in 
roles between the two bodies, see, Harris D., "A Fresh Impetus for the 
European Social Charter", 41 I. C. L. Q., 659, at 662-664 (1992). 
149 These include: the adoption of the Committee's Rules of Procedure 
E/1989/22, at 74, paras 333-4 (1989); the ability of NGO's to submit 
information to the Committee, E/1987/28, at 49, paras. 312-3 (1987); and the 
creation of a "blacklist" of non-reporting States, E/1991/23, at 68, para. 264 (1991). 
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changes within ECOSOC upon which the Committee is entirely dependent for its existence. The fragility of the whole 
implementation system was in fact apparent when it was made 
clear during the drafting of the Covenant that it was legally 
impossible for the treaty to impose any obligations on the UN with 
regard to implementation-150 However this vulnerability does not 
seem to have manifest itself in any way as yet. During the recent 
financial crisis in the United Nations for example, the Committee 
was one of the few institutions that was left unaffected. 
WORKING METHODS OF THE COMMITTEE 
1) Rules of Procedure 
Draft provisional rules of procedure, prepared by the 
Secretary-General taking into account the relevant resolutions and 
decisions of ECOSOC and the practice and procedure of other 
human rights treaty bodies, and amended by members of the 
Committee were accepted on a provisional basis at the Committee's 
third session. 151 An amendment was made to the rules at the 
Committee's fourth session and they were finally approved by 
ECOSOC in decision 1990/251 prior to the Committee's fifth 
session. 152 
Although the Committee is nominally a subsidiary of 
ECOSOC and therefore subject to the rules of procedure of that 
body, by adopting its own set of rules of procedure it has asserted 
some form of independence that is entirely appropriate with its 
role in the supervision of the Covenant. However, in looking to 
ECOSOC to endorse the procedures, the Committee effectively 
tied its own hands as regards effecting future changes to the rules, 
and has left itself at the mercy of ECOSOC. As Alston concludes, 
it would be highly desirable for the Committee to regain control 
over its Rules of Procedure as soon as practicable-153 
150 UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 33, at 119, para. 16. This is the reason 
why the Covenant does not instruct ECOSOC but rather uses the term "may", as 
in articles 18 and 19. 
151 E/C. 12/1989/SR. 22, at 5, para. 24. 
152 ECOS OC Decn. 1990/25 1, (Oct. 10 1990), UN ESCOR, Resns, 
Supp. (No. ) (1990). 
153AIston, supra., note 30, at 489. 
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2) Frequency and duration of sessions. 
ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17 paragraph (d) provides that 
the Committee should meet annually for a period of up to three 
weeks. 154 That the phrase "up to" might be interpreted as 
precluding the possibility of longer sessions has been explicitly 
negatived by rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure which includes the 
phrase "or as may be decided by the Economic and Social Council... taking into account the number of reports to be 
examined by the Committee". 155 It is specifically open for the Committee, when it has a sufficient backlog of reports, to request 
either an extra session or longer sessions. 
There is no doubt that the Committee is in principle disadvantaged in comparison to the Human Rights Committee 
which meets for nine weeks per year (three, three-week sessions) 
and has an additional three weeks for working groups. Even 
including the one week meeting for its pre-sessional working 
group, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
meets for only a third of that time. 156 However, the Human Rights 
Committee has additional tasks to undertake with the Optional 
Protocol and the amount of time spent on considering equivalent 
reports is almost the same. 157 Generally, the Committee spends 
about eight days considering 12 reports (or four global reports), 
which gives it an average of one global report every two days-158 
1 5A Ile Sessional Working Group initially only had a two week session 
per annum. It was clear ab initio that this would be inadequate for the effective 
supervision of the reporting mechanism. See e. g. Mr Pastinen (Finland), UN 
Doc. E/1979/SR. 14, para. 61, ESCOR, (Ag. Item 4), (1979). 
155 Supra, note 123, at 1. 
156 However it is worth noting that CEDAW, under article 20 of the 
Discrimination against Women Convention, only has two weeks per annum. 
157 Contra, Note by the S ecretary-General, supra, note 
, 
at 4 1, para. 10 1. 
However the Secretary-General's report, in comparing the amount of time spent 
on the consideration of each report by different Committees did not take into 
consideration the fact that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural it Rights used to consider three state reports in place of a single "global report 
158 NUM13ER OF REPORTS CONSIDERED/SESSION: 
First session= 11 reports; 18/28 meetings. 0.6 reports/meeting. 
Second session=15 reports; 18/24 meetings. 0.8 reports/meeting. 
Third session= 14 reports; 15/25 meetings. 0.9 reports/meeting. 
Fourth session= 9 reports; 19/26 meetings. 0.4 reports/meeting. 
Fifth session= 13 reports; 18/23 meetings. 0.7 reports/meeting. 
Sixth session= 14 reports; 19/26 meetings. 0.7 reports/meeting. 
Appx Average 
= 
12 reports; 18/25 meetings. 0.7 reports/meeting. 
At a rate of 0.7 reports/meeting it will take 4.2 meetings to complete a global 
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In comparison to CERD or CEDAW this is an inordinate amount 
of time. 159 
Two competing concerns are apparent here: on the one hand 
the recent financial crisis within the UN has stressed the need for 
efficient and productive reporting systems; on the other hand it is 
necessary for the Committees concerned to maintain a high 
standard of evaluation that inevitably takes time. Thus, it has been 
noted that the unduly short examinations of reports undertaken by CERD for example, are "simply pointless". 160 The Committee has 
in fact taken a number of innovative procedural steps such as the imposition of time limits, in order to expedite the consideration of 
reports. 161 It is unlikely, given the breadth and sheer volume of 
information that is presented before the Committee, that it win be 
able to shorten the time required for each report in any significant 
manner. It has been correctly noted that the only way forward for 
the Committee in the long run, is for its sessions to be extended 
when a significant backlog of reports builds Up. 162 
So far, requests by the Committee for extra or longer 
sessions have met with limited success. At its first session, after a 
debate when it was considered quite widely that it would need two 
three-week sessions per annum, 163 it was proposed that its sessions 
should be extended to four weeks given the financial problems 
facing the UN. 164 ECOSOC, however, did not respond 
favourably. 
Tlie Committee has managed to gain authorisation to hold a 
pre-sessional working group meeting prior to its plenary sessions, 
which has relieved some of the work load. In addition, following 
report. 
Under the present time limits it should take 8.5 hours to consider a 
report: approximately 3 meetings (It is a saving of 30 minutes from the previous 
schedule, but in terms of meetings it would still be about the same). 
159 CERD for example, considered 26 reports in 14 working days. 
M. L. R. 
160 I-Eggins R., "The United Nations: Still a Force for Peace", 52 
.11, at 
19 (1989). 
161 See below, text accompanying note 282. 
162 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 7, at 7, para. 3 1. 
163 See e. g. Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 23, at 5, para. 21. 
164 Report of the Committee's First Session, UN Doc. E/1987/28, at 50, 
para. 314,, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 17), (1987). 
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the Committee's request at its second session, 165 ECOSOC allowed 
the Committee to hold an extraordinary session in 1990. The fact 
that this was merely a temporary expedient that did little to resolve 
the fundamental problem is evidenced by the Committee's repeated 
request for another extraordinary session in 1993. In the 
Committee's draft decision, it spoke of the "long standing backlog" 
of reports many of which had been pending for over two years, 166 
and that the "abnormal situation seriously undermines the 
effectiveness and threatens the credibility of the system for 
monitoring the implementation it of the Covenant. 167 
It is clear that if the Committee is granted an extra session, 
it will temporarily help with the backlog of reports. However, the 
fact that the States parties have, at present, a poor record on 
reporting suggests that in future when this situation improves, a 
three-week session per annum will be far from adequate even with 
the occasional extraordinary session. 
3) Timing of the Sessions 
Problems were encountered, particularly with the 
participation and attendance of members, State representatives, 
representatives of the Specialised Agencies168 and 
Non-Governmental Organisations169 by the co-incidence of the 
Committee's meeting with that of the Commission on Human 
Rights. 170 It was also noted that the fact that the Committee met at 
the same time as the Commission on Human Rights not only made 
participation difficult, but detracted from the publicity given to the 
Committee. 171 In addition the timing of the session coincided with 
that of the ILO Committee of Experts which hindered the 
attendance or the presentation of a report by the ILO. 172 
165 Report of the Committee's Second Session, UN Doc. E/1988/14, at 
59, para. 346 and 61 para. 356, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4), (1988). 
166 Draft Decision I, Report of the Committee's Sixth Session, UN 
Doc. F, /1992/23, at 1, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), (1992). 
1671bid. 
168 See, Mr Raffray (UNESCO), E/C. 12/1987/SR. 3, at 6, para. 30. 
169 This became apparent at the meeting with NGOs at the Committee's 
third session. Chairman, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 19, at 8, para. 47. 
170 Report of the Committee's Third Session, UN Doc. E/1989/22, at 77, 
para. 346, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4), (1989). 
171 See, Konate, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 22, at 7, para. 53. 
172 See, Samson (ILO), E/C. 12/1987/SR-3, at 4, para. 18. 
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Much as the rescheduling of the Committee's session to early December should have enabled it to avoid the problems of 
attendance, the experience of the fifth and sixth sessions suggest 
that this is not the case. Comparatively, the attendance of the Specialised Agencies, NGOs and members of the Committee has 
been no better at the Committee's later sessions than at its earlier 
ones. To some degree this is because a number of NGOs attending 
the Commission would previously have attended the Committee, 
albeit briefly. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the 
Committee's work at the earlier sessions was largely 
overshadowed by that of the Commission. It is unlikely that the 
Committee will find the "perfect" time to hold its sessions. 'Ibe 
Committee has rightly concentrated on the primary concern, that 
interested parties do not feel that they are prevented from 
attending the Committee by the timing of the session. 
4) Consensus Decision-M 
Rule 46 of the Committee Is Rules of Procedure states that: 
"Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a 
majority of the members present. However, the 
Committee shall endeavour to work of the basis of the 
principle of consenSUS. "173 
In principle, with its present quorum standing at 12,174 the 
Committee may make a decision with the concurring votes of 
seven members. It is clear from the phrase "of the members 
present" (as opposed to those voting), that abstentions are not 
sufficient to endorse a decision. 175 However, as with many other 
human rights committees the emphasis is on working through 
consensus. On the one hand, it might be argued that an attempt to 
work by consensus "is liable to water down the moral principles to 
a lowest common denominator" and restrict the power to make 
decisions at all. 176 However, the use of consensus is important in 
maintaining a cohesiveness and a sense of common purpose within 
the Committee that will be reflected in its work. Moreover, the use 
of voting in important decisions, not only deprives them of a 
173 Rule 46, Rules of Procedure, supra, note 123, at 10. 
174 Rule 32, ibid, at 7. 
175 This contrasts with the position under CERD, see, Das K., "United 
Nations Institutions and Procedures Founded on Conventions on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms", in Vasak K. and Alston P. (eds), The International 
Dimensions of Human Rights, 303, at 309 (1982). 
176 Robertson, supra, note 22, at 340. 
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certain amount of authority, but might encourage political 
disagreements within the Committee. 
In practice the Committee has not resorted to the vote as yet 
and has maintained a unified approach to all its problems. 177 It is 
of course important that the Committee retain the ability to take 
decisions by majority to ensure its power act in the face of a 
"veto" power (which is implicit in a consensus decision-making 
process), and to preserve the freedom of conscience and 
independence of action for each member. 178 
5) Publicity 
Publicity is of prime importance to the Committee both in 
assisting it in its work and in the realisation of the rights in 
general. From the Committee's point of view, publicity of its work 
would attract the attention of relevant NGOs and Specialised 
Agencies and stimulate their participation. In addition, it has a 
promotional effect in generating more international concern for 
economic, social and cultural rights, thus raising the status of the 
Committee from that of a poor relation to the HRC. 179 Raising the 
status of the Committee might in particular induce ECOSOC to 
allow the Committee and extra session per annum. and stuimulate 
interest in an Optional Protocol. 
From the point of view of the realisation of the rights 
generally, it is clear that one of the aims of the reporting process 
is to stimulate awareness and debate at a national level. Although it 
has recognised the importance of this aspect of publicity, the 
Committee is obviously unable to take much action itself to this 
end. It has merely requested that States should make their reports 
to the Committee available on the domestic level. 180 
In order to effectuate greater publicity of its work, the 
Committee has undertaken a number of initiatives. On its own part 
it holds its meetings in public. 181 and has held meetings with 
NGOs and the press. Additionally it has stressed that members of 
177 Ramcharan notes with regard to the Sessional Working Group that it 
was the clear understanding of delegates that the Working Group should not vote 
and that decisions should be taken by consensus. Ramcharan, supra, note 63, at 
169. 
178 See, Mower, supra, note 111, at 124. 
179 See e. g., Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 3, at 10, para. 63. 
180 See, Simma, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 22, at 8, para-56. 
181 Rule 28, Rules of Procedure, supra, note 123, at 5. 
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the Committee should attempt to give the Covenant greater 
publicity in their personal capacity, whether through attending 
conferences or publishing articles. 182 
The Committee has also pushed for greater efforts to be 
taken by the UN in this regard. In particular, the Committee has 
asked for both a bibliography of published materials on the Covenant183 and a brochure on the work of the Committee to be 
published. 184 It has also recommended that the text of its annual 
report and summary records, available in English, French and Spanish, 185 be distributed as widely as possible by the UN 
Information Office. Thus far, the Secretariat has not done as much 
as it could. In response to the Committee's request for a 
"brochure", the Secretariat produced a brief "fact sheet" outlining 
the Committee's work in a very general manner. The Committee 
criticised this rather mediocre effort, commenting in its annual 
report that: 
"in light of the continuing widespread lack of 
awareness of the Committee's functions, procedures 
and preoccupations and of the measures it had taken, 
there remained a pressing need for a detailed and 
informative analysis to be made widely available. "186 
It is considered that the production of such a report would require 
comparatively few resources and could be drafted with ease in 
light of the Committee's policy of describing its working methods 
within the annual report. Nevertheless, it would be appropriate for 
the Committee should make an effort to describe the exact type of 
report that it is looking for, which would obviously avoid 
unnecessary misunderstandings. 
In absence of effective Secretariat backing, the efforts of the 
Committee to increase the awareness and status of the Covenant 
and its work will be fairly limited. It is worth noting, however, 
that publicity will develop when the Committee shows itself to be 
an effective and useful supervisory body. In particular, it is 
arguable that the most effective method of generating publicity 
would be the institution of an Optional Protocol allowing the 
Committee to receive and consider individual complaints. 
182 E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 65, para. 372. 
183 Ibid, at 65, para. 372. 
184 Report of the Committee's Fourth Session, UN Doc. E/1990/23, at 
75, paras 301-2, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), (1990). 
18.5 Rule 27, Rules of Procedure,, supra, note 123, at 6. 
186 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 97, para-375. 
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D) THE ROLE OF THE COMM 
Primarily, the Committee is merely required to "assistif 
ECOSOC in the "consideration" of reports under the reporting 
system. Whilst being posited as an alternative to a petition system 
overseen by an expert committee, the precise nature of that 
"consideration" seems to have been an assumed by the drafters of 
the Covenant as being self-evident. No attempt has been made then 
or since to establish precisely the role of the supervisory body in 
considering reports under such a system. 
It is arguable that the decision of ECOSOC to create a Committee composed of independent experts signifies its intention 
that the body should assume some form of quasi-judicial role in 
the supervisory process. If the role of the supervisory organ was 
principally to aid States in the implementation of their obligations 
under the Covenant, particularly by stimulating international co- 
operation and assistance, it would be most effectively performed 
by ECOSOC as an inter-governmental body. 187 However, the 
delegation of its authority to a committee of independent experts 
can only suggest that some independent form of evaluation is 
intended in the supervision of State reports-188 
187 Capotorti, speaking solely from a textual analysis of the ICESCR, 
noted that although in theory an independent committee of experts was most 
suitable for human rights treaty supervision, "as the States reports on economic, 
social and cultural questions must also help to promote international cooperation, 
especially in the field of technical assistance, the Economic and Social Council is 
still the best qualified organ for this kind of "implementation" of the Covenant": 
Capotorti, supra, note 15, at 136. It has also been suggested that an independent 
Committee would only be necessary if complaints from individuals or States 
were contemplated, Mr Dombo (Ghana), UN Doc. A/C. 3/SR. 140 1, at 141, 
para. 15 (1966). 
188 Tlat independence is a crucial factor in the adoption of quasi-judicial 
functions is confirmed by the rather generalised statement of MacBride: 
"UN Committees or Sub-Committees are not the ideal bodies to 
be charged with implementation. They are subject to the 
prevailing political and ideological controversion: they do not 
have a judicial approach to the problems with which they are 
dealing. They regard themselves as the political spokesmen of 
their governments and often use Committees as a convenient 
arena in order to gain kudos for themselves or their 
governments... (They) are necessary and valuable for the purpose 
of discussing and preparing new Conventions and proposals but 
not for the purpose of serving as an implementation authority. 
They have not the necessary time or attributes for such a 
function. " 
MacBride S., "The Strengthening of International Machinery for the Protection 
of Human Rights ft. in Eide A. and Schou A. (eds), Intern onal Protection o 
Human 'g-Int 
. 
149, at 162 (1968). 
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However, the Committee has been rather cautious of taking 
up a "quasi-judicial" role. The Committee has emphasised that it 
sees itself as entering into a "constructive dialogue" in the 
reporting process whereby State representatives are asked to 
appear before the Committee to undertake a mutually-beneficial 
discussion regarding the degree to which the State concerned has fulfilled its obligations under the Covenant. Members of the Committee have stressed, almost unanimously in the past, that the Committee is not a "court"189 and therefore should not sit in judgement over States or condemn them for non-compliance with 
their obligations. 190 Rather, it is thought that the Committee 
should play a facilitative role in assisting States in their realisation 
of the rights, 191 especially through filtering requests for 
international co-operation192 and technical assistance193 and 
providing States with advice. In particular, it has been felt that the 
Committee should play the role of a "catalyst" in encouraging 
States to make it possible for national organisations to participate 
in the implementation of the rights. 194 
In fact the Committee has done little to characterise itself as 
a body capable or willing to facilitate or provide technical 
assistance and advice. Rather it has developed its role in ways that 
point more towards the assumption of quasi-judicial functions. In 
particular, it has undertaken to receive information from NGOs, 
asserted its authority as the central supervisory body to interpret 
the Covenant, and has adopted the procedure of making 
it concluding comments" or "observations" of a State-specific 
nature on each report considered. In more recent cases this has 
involved making comments as to whether or not the State 
concerned was acting in conformity with its obligations under the 
Covenant. 195 
189 See e. g., Mrachkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 4, at 7, para-26. 
190 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 4, at 3, para. 8; Rattray, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 4, at 11, para. 43; Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 2, at 7, 
para. 35. 
191 See e. g., Mrachkov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 4, at 7, para. 26. 
192 See e. g., Taya, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 20, at 4, para. 13. 
193 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 20, at 5, para. 20. 
194 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 4, at 3, para. 8. 
195 See below, text accompanying note 420. 
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E) THE REPORTING PROGRAMME 
1) The Obligation to Report 
Article 16(l) of the Covenant reads: 
"The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
submit in conformity with this part of the Covenant reports 
on the measures which they have adopted and the progress 
made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized 
herein. " 
ribe submission of reports by the States parties is clearly central to the 
integrity of the reporting system and that failure to report constitutes a 
violation of a State's obligations under the Covenant. However it has 
often been recognised that compliance with reporting obligations is 
generally poor. 196 
The current experience of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights is that 16 States have not submitted a single report in ten 
years and 137 reports are overdue from 55 States parties. 197 It is 
recognised that this is one of the worst records of all the human rights 
committees. 198 Members of the Committee have identified a number of 
reasons for such a record. First, it is evident that the production of 
reports requires a certain amount of internal organisation199 and 
expertise on the part of States which presents problems for developing 
countries. 200 Secondly, given the vast quantity and range of information 
required, in contrast to civil and political rights reporting, developing 
states may not dispose of sufficient personal and economic resources to 
provide the necessary data. 201 This is a particularly acute problem for 
those States that are party to a number of different human rights treaties 
196 Schoenberg noted with respect to the history of the periodic reporting 
system that it was one of "limited and shallow participation". Schoenberg, supra, note 
11, at 25. 
197 E/1992/23, Annex I, supra, note 166, at 103-112. 
198 Both CERD and CEDAW have also had particular problems in this regard. 
One difficulty in establishing the exact position of reporting under the Covenant has been 
the tendency of the Secretariat to "move the goal-posts". For example in the Committee's 
Annual Report of its Fifth Session there appear to be 211 overdue reports, see, 
E/1991/23, supra, note 98, Annex I, at 74-81, but in the report of its Sixth Session, this 
number had dropped to 137, see, E/1992/23, supra, note 166, Annex 1, at 103-112. 
199 See, Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 7, at 9, para. 52. 
200 See, Konate, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 22/Add. 1, at 3, para. 5; see also, Nowak, 
supra, note 103, at 142. 
201 See e. g. Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 18, at 8, para. 45. 
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in that they may well be overburdened by reporting requirements. 202 
Thirdly, the original set of guidelines were complicated, general and difficult to apply. 203 
It might also be argued that the low quality and inefficiency of the Committee's predecessors may well have alienated a number of States 
which have yet to be convinced of the value of the supervisory 
mechanism. Additionally, as was noted with respect to the HRC, some of 
the problems experienced may well be due to the relative newness of the 
procedures. 204 In that case the Committee is well advised to allow the 
system time to it settle if and concentrate on providing assistance to those 
States that experience problems in producing the necessary reports. 
The Committee, in response to the poor record of reporting, has 
approached the matter from two different angles. On the one hand, the 
Committee has consistently recommended that States that experience 
problems in drafting reports,. should seek the assistance of the Secretary- 
General and particularly the Centre for Human Rights. 205 In light of the 
poor response it has also suggested that the Under-Secretary-General for 
Human Rights should approach each State party that has not submitted 
such a report, and request that they indicate whether assistance is 
required. 206 
On the other hand, the Committee has also taken a more 
adversarial stance. It would be somewhat naYve of the Committee if it 
were to rely entirely on the good faith of the States parties. As one 
commentator noted, even Western States are often late in submitting 
their reports. 207 Indeed Belgium stands out as being a relatively wealthy 
Western State that has not submitted a single report since its ratification 
in 1983. Thus the Committee has requested that the Secretary-General 
send reminders to States from which reports are overdue, 208 and records 
the state of compliance with the reporting procedure in its annual report 
to ECOSOC. Since its fifth session, however, the Conunittee has drafted 
a decision each year, for adoption by ECOSOC, specifically naming 
202 Report of Meeting of ChailPersons of Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN 
Doc. A/39/484, (1984) and UN Doc. A/44/135, paras 46-100, (1989). 
203 See, Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 22/Add. 1, at 4, para. 9; see also, Sohn, 
supra, note 61, at 39. 
204 Robertson, supra, note 22, at 346. 
205 E/1990/23, supra, note 98, at 765, para. 304. 
206 Ibid, at 68, para. 265. Cf. Konate, E/C. 12/199 I/SR. 24, at 11, para. 82. 
207 See, Higgins, supra, note 160, at 18. 
208 E/C. 12/1987/SR. 23, at 4, para. 14. 
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those States that have failed to submit a single report for over a decade. 209 The endorsement of the decision by ECOSOC is notable not 
only because it shows a concern that the failure to report "threatened to 
undermine the foundations of the supervisory arrangements" 
. 
210 but also because it specifically names the States concerned. 211 
Although both Iceland and Uruguay quickly submitted their 
reports before the first draft decision was adopted by ECOSOC, 
members of the Committee have not considered this mechanism to have been entirely succesSfUl. 212 Therefore, at its sixth session, the Committee 
resolved to take further steps to address the problem of non-reporting. 
Following the example of CERD, 213 the Committee decided that as from its seventh session it would schedule for consideration the reports of 
those States whose initial reports are 10 or more years overdue (and 
subsequently in case of all reports that are five or more years overdue) 
whether or not the report has been received. 214 
There are problems with this approach. First, without the 
assistance of a State report, it is clearly going to be extremely difficult 
for the Committee to consider the position of States as regards the 
implementation of the rights. 215 Currently the Committee does not 
receive sufficient alternative information from NGOs or specialised 
agencies to make such a consideration viable. Secondly, if States perceive 
that the Committee will continue to undertake its supervisory role 
without State reports, they might take this as a signal that it is 
unnecessary to submit reports at all. Thirdly., if the Comr-nittee's mandate 
is read strictly, it is only entitled to assist ECOSOC in the consideration 
of State reports. This does not give the Committee the right to consider 
the situation of States in absence of a report any more than it can 
consider the situation of a State not party to the Covenant. Finally, given 
the problems that States face in the drafting of reports, the Committee 
might be considered to be unnecessarily confrontational in its stance. 
2m See, Draft Decision I, E/1991/23, supra, note 98, at 1, and Draft Decision III, 
E/1 992/23, supra, note 166, at 1- 
210 Ibid, Draft Decision H. 
211 It has to be noted that there is nothing in the terms of the Covenant itself that 
specifically allows the Council to make State-specific recommendations of this Idnd. The 
fact that many States parties to the Covenant are also members of ECOSOC, however, 
gives considerable force to such an interpretation of its powers. 
212 See e. g., Mratchkov, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 24, at 11, para. 86. 
213 Cf. Houshmand, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 24, at 10, para. 80. 
214 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 99, para-382(b). 
215 See, Simma, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 24,, at 12, para. 89. 
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It is considered that notwithstanding such difficulties, the Committee is correct in interpreting its powers in a teleological manner 
so as to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of the supervision system 
as a whole. It is quite apparent that there is a positive correlation between the effectiveness of the reporting system and the extent to which States parties take their reporting obligations seriously. Thus alternative 
measures such as considering three or four periodic reports together, 216 
or altering the cycle of submission according to the actual date of 
submission are effectively counter-productive. 217 The Committee has to 
take a strong stance on State reporting which, as is clear, is central to the 
system as a whole. It should be careful, however, to make clear that 
notwithstanding its consideration of the situations, the States parties 
remain in violation of their reporting obligations. 
2) Periodicity of Reports 
Article 17(l) reads: 
"The States Parties to the present Covenant shall furnish 
their reports in stages, in accordance with a programme to 
be established by the Economic and Social Council within 
one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant 
after consultation with the States Parties and the specialised 
agencies concerned. " 
During the drafting of the Covenant a proposal was made that the 
periodicity of reports should be set in the text itself. 218 It was fortuitous 
that the amendment, which provided for the submission of reports every 
two years, was not adopted, as it is unlikely that such a schedule would 
have been realistic either for the States concerned or the supervisory 
body. Such was the position of CERD which, despite the textual 
requirement of bi-annual reports, has adopted a four-yearly cycle. It is 
clear that the solution adopted for the Covenant was appreciated for its 
flexibility and the amount of discretion given to ECOSOC. 219 
Following the requirements of article 17(l) the Secretary General 
carried out consultations with the States parties and the Specialized 
Agencies and prepared a note on the implementation of the Covenant. 
After consultations with the Specialised Agencies and the States Parties, 
the Secretary General arrived at the proposal that the States Parties 
would report in the following stages: first year, articles 6-7; second year, 
216 Bernard-Maugiron, supra, note 145, at 396. 
217 Ifiggins, supra, note 160, at 19. 
218 Proposed Amendment of Italy, UN Doc. A/C. 3/L. 1358, para-3. 
219 UN Doc. A/6546, at 14, para. 44,21 UN GAOR, C. 3, Annexes, (Ag. Item 
62), (1966). 
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article 11; third year,, articles 13-15; fourth year, article 12; fifth year, 
articles 9-10; and sixth year, article 8.220 No specific recommendations. 
however, were made as to article 1 or the provisions in pan III (articles 2- 
5). 221 
The initial three-part reporting system was justified on the basis of 
the interest of the specialised agencies in the area. However, the agencies 
were never able to perform the role which was initially envisaged for 
them and there was a growing appreciation of the interrelationships 
between rights such that it was no longer suitable for the rights to be 
separated into discrete categories. 
The change to a new five-yearly periodicity for the submission of 
reports had a number of objectives at its heart: 
1) To reduce the burden imposed on States parties with respect to 
reporting. 
2) To facilitate the task of both the reporting State and the 
Committee by working on the basis of a global unified report. 222 
3) To be more consistent with reporting obligations under other 
international human rights instruments. 223 
4) To make the nature and periodicity of the reporting process 
more readily understood by all concerned. 224 
5) To enhance the effectiveness of the overall monitoring 
system. 225 
It was also noted that a single report would be consistent with the 
indivisibility of the various rights contained in the Covenant (although 
the single report should nevertheless be organised into chapters 
reflecting different clusters of rights). 226 Accordingly, in its resolution 
1988/4., ECOSOC approved the recommendation of the Committee that 
States parties be requested to submit a single report within two years of 
220 UN Doc. E/5764, at 5 para. 24,60 UN ESCOR, Annexes, (Ag. Item 4), (1976). 
221 Ibid, at 10, paras 25-6. No such provision for reporting for articles 2-5 was 
proposed as it was considered that such provisions apply to the exercise of all the rights 
in part M and therefore could be taken into account in those reports. 
222 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 21, at 3, para. 10. 
223 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 21, at 5, para. 21. 
224 See e. g., Konate, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 21, at 4, para. 14. 
225 E/1990/23,, supra, note 184, at 94, paral. 
226 E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 58, para. 339; See e. g. Alston, 
E/C. 12/198 8/SR. 2 1, at 3, para. 7, where it was argued that the right to an adequate 
standard of living could be linked with the right to social security or with the right to 
work. 
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the entry into force of the Covenant and thereafter at five-yearly intervals. 227 
The possibility of the reporting period being seven years was discussed at the Committee's second session228 particularly as it was felt 
that the situation would not change sufficiently over the five-year 
interval, 229 but it was considered that the latter was preferable to bring 
the Committee into line with other supervisory committees. 230 The five- 
yearly reporting cycle will certainly entail an increase in the work load 
of the Committee, which considering its existing situation may not be 
advisable. 231 However the benefits of having a system that involves more 
consistent monitoring on the part of the Committee should outweigh any 
such problems. 
It was considered that a single report still conformed with article 
17(l) of the Covenant despite the reference to "stages". Members 
considered that the term "stages" referred to the periodicity rather than 
the articles themselves, a matter that seems to have been accepted by 
States parties. 232 Indeed the Committee invited ECOSOC to seek legal 
advice on the issue. The fact that it has not done so attests to its general 
acceptability. 233 
3) The Content of Reports 
As indicated above, it is clear from the travaux preparatoires that 
the term "programme" was to signify a programme for the timing, form 
and substance of the reports submitted to ECOSOC. 234 Indeed, in the 
Third Committee, this view prevailed over the idea that the States parties 
themselves should determine the content of the reports. The latter 
proposal was rejected, quite rightly, on the basis that wide divergencies 
in the form and contents of the reports would arise and that the reports 
would soon "degenerate into vehicles of propaganda". 235 
227 ECOSOC Resn. 1988/4, (May 24 1988), in, E/C. 12/1989/4, at 30 (1988). 
228 See the proposal of Taya, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 21, at 5, para. 20. 
229 See, Taya, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 21, at 3, para. 9. 
230 E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 58, para. 340. 
231 See, Taya, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 21, at 3, para. 9. 
232 See e. g., Konate, E/C. 12/198 8/SR. 2 1, at 4, para. 14. 
233 E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 59, para. 341. 
234 UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 33, at 118, para. 12. 
235 UN Doc. A/6546, supra, note, at 14, para. 45. In particular see, Mr 
Richardson (Jamaica), UN Doc. A/C. 3/S R. 140 1, at 143, para. 46 (1966). 
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States are required to repom, under article 16 on the "measures 
which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the 
observance of the rights recognised". 236 As in article 2(l) there is an 
implicit question-mark over how, and to what extent, the reporting 
obligation extends to those rights that are not "recognised" in the 
Covenant. Although this question was raised by the Secretary-General in 
1956,237 no explanation was given in the drafting process that followed. 
The practice of the Committee, reinforced by the acquiesence of the 
States Parties, indicates that it is understood that reports are required on 
all the rights in the Covenant on the same basis. 
It is also possible to argue here that in so far as those rights not 
"recognised" are capable of inunediate implementation there will be less 
emphasis on the "progress made" (although as the ICCPR illustrates, this 
is not entirely out of place with the immediate realisation of rights). It 
would then suggest that the current interpretation of the provision 
requires that States report on the "measures they have adopted" with 
regard to all of the rights; in addition, they will have to show the 
"progress made" with regard to those rights expressly recognised in the 
Covenant. 
However, there is no indication that the Committee has taken such 
a stance, indeed it has leaned towards interpreting its powers in 
accordance with the object or purpose of the implementation system as a 
whole, in which debate on the minutiae in the wording of Part IV is 
generally absent. Thus the reporting guidelines (and the debate in the 
Committee during their drafting) show no signs that the Committee 
wishes to confine the information contained in the reports to that 
indicating the "measures adopted" or the "progress made". Rather, the 
Committee has taken the view that all States Parties are obliged to submit 
all information necessary for the Committee to make an evaluation of the 
extent to which they comply with their obligations under the Covenant. 
Capotorti finds this to be an inevitable conclusion given the power to 
request submission of reports, which "includes the power to request 
supplementary information, and this is tantamount to determine the 
questions to which the States are asked to answer. 11238 
It is clear nevertheless that with respect to the second periodic 
reports the Committee, like the HRC, will lay greater emphasis on the 
"progress made" in the realisation of the rights. As such, it will attempt 
236 The ICCPR contains a substantially similar format in article 40 where States 
Parties "undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give 
effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those 
rights". 
237UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 33, at 117 para-5. 
238 Capotorti, supra, note 15, at 135. 
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to avoid the repetition of questions asked in the first stage of reporting 
and concentrate on the changes that have occurred in the intervening 
period. Nevertheless, the Committee has at the present stage, had no 
experience of considering a second periodic report in which it 
considered the first report itself. The many questions of continuity 
relating to what issues to raise, and how to follow up on issues 
considered previously, will have to be dealt with when the Committee 
comes to consider such periodic reports. 
Under article 17 States parties should indicate the "factors and difficulties" affecting the degree of fulfilment of the rights. 239 Alston 
has described the problem facing the Committee in persuading States to 
be open about the difficulties encountered in implementing the Covenant 
as the "principle dilemma". 240 In one case, a State objected to the 
requirement that States should indicate the difficulties experienced in the 
realisation of the rights. In particular it argued that the Covenant used 
the term "may" which indicated that reporting on the difficulties 
experienced was optional. 241 It was quickly responded that 
"it would make a mockery of the Covenant and distort 
its very spirit to suppose that it only obliged States to 
report on the positive aspects of developments; that 
would also mean disregarding the preparatory work 
and the international follow-up of the Covenant". 242 
'Mis conclusion appears to have been accepted by the State 
concerned. That it is important for States to report on the 
problems encountered is conditioned by the assumption that no 
State will consistently apply the Covenant without problems, 243 
and that the Committee has a role to play in facilitating technical 
assistance. 
In general the Committee has received reports that are brief, 
239 Nowak, in noting that the Torture Convention does not explicitly ask for 
information on the progress made or the factors and difficulties experienced in 
implementation, comments that 
"... it is implicit in any efficient reporting procedure that States parties shall submit all 
information relevant to the implementation of its international obligations, including both 
positive and negative developments. " NOwak, supra, note 103, at 498. 
240 Alston P.,, "hnplementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The 
Functions of the Reporting Obligations", Bull. H. R., 5 (1989). 
241 Walkate (Netherlands), E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 9, para. 56. 
242 Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 15, at 15, para. 87. 
243 Alston (Abyss), supra, note 30, at 360. 
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generalised and incomplete. 244 They have often impeded the 
process of considering pertinent issues by the fact that the 
representative has had to fill out the written report orally before 
the Committee. To some extent the unsatisfactory nature of the 
reports has been a result of the poor quality of the original 
reporting guidelines and the difficulties experienced by States 
parties in drafting the reports. More evidently, however, the 
reports show a lack of commitment or concern with economic, 
social and cultural rights generally. 
The Committee, for its part, has been extremely active in 
trying to improve the general methodology and content of the 
reporting process. In its first General Comment, the Committee 
stressed that reporting was not merely a "procedural matter 
designed solely to satisfy each State Party's formal obligation to 
report to the appropriate international monitoring body". 245 It 
thereafter outlined a number of different objectives that the 
reporting process was intended to promote. It is perhaps correct to 
say that even if the Committee only manages to induce States to 
report in a full and timely manner, that in itself will be a 
considerable achievement. Whether or not the Committee should 
set its sights so low, it is clear that poor reporting is a matter that 
will not be overcome in a short space of time. Accordingly, the 
Committee has also taken a number of steps towards improving the 
quality of State reports. 
In line with its right to control the content of State reports, 
the Committee has adopted a set of reporting guidelines to ensure 
that the principal issues are dealt with in a "methodical and 
informative manner". 246 These "general guidelines" were adopted 
at the Committee's fifth session to replace the existing guidelines 
drafted by the Secretary General following an ECOSOC resolution 
in 1976.247 
The old guidelines were considered too general248 and 
244 See e. g. Concluding observation on the report of Luxembourg, 
Neneman, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 36, at 8, para. 31. 
245 General Comment No. 1, supra, note 27, at 87, para. 1 
246E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 7, para. 22. 
247 ECOSOC Resn. 1988(LX), (11 May, 1976), in UN 
Doc. E/C. 12/1989/4, at 3 (1988). A compilation of these guidelines is to be 
found in E/1991/23, Annex IV, supra, note 98, at 88-110. 
248 E/1987/28, supra, note 164, at 49, para-308. 
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rendered out of date by the new reporting periodicity. 249 In 
addition to reflecting the developments in the substantive content 
of the rights, the Committee hoped to ease the reporting burden on States by simplifying the guidelines and providing a consolidated 
general section to be used in all human rights reporting 
SySteMS. 250 
During the drafting of the guidelines, two points of view 
presented themselves: on the one hand it was felt that the 
guidelines should be shorter rather than longer, taking into 
account States' ability to provide detailed reports in the light of 
their being at present overburdened by reporting obligationS251 
and the ability of the Committee to cope with the voluminous 
reports that might reSUlt. 252 On the other hand it was argued that 
detailed reporting guidelines would help, rather than impede States 
that have problems with the reporting requirements. Advocates of 
the latter position correctly pointed out that the reporting 
guidelines would enable States to have a clearer idea of what was 
required,, 253 would avoid the inclusion of information that was not 
necessary and would help the domestic authorities responsible for 
the drafting of the State report, to distribute the various parts of 
the report to the relevant authority. In addition it might have been 
argued that although the concerns of developing States have to be 
considered when drafting such guidelines, 254 the fact that many 
Western States are also party to the Covenant should not be 
forgotten. To "pitch" the guidelines at a very general level would 
249 E/1990/23, supra, note 184, at 73, para. 288. 
250 The meeting of Chairpersons recommended that an agreement should 
be made as to a consolidated introductory section for all human rights reports 
covering matters such as the size and organization of the country and its legal and judicial system. Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 1, at 10, para. 47. 
251 See e. g., Neneman, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 15, at 11, para. 56. One 
member noted that if the guidelines were made too complicated, States whose 
statistical services were not sufficiently developed might be deterred from 
reporting at all. Neneman, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 23, at 3, para. 11. 
252 See e. g., Neneman, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 23, at 11, para. 90; Mrachkov, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 3, a t 5, para. 14. 
253 See e. g., Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 47, at 6, para. 20. 
254 Note could be made, however, that the guidelines of the African 
Commission under the Affican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights are said 
to be "far more lengthy than those available for other international human rights 
instruments". Gaer, supra, note 26, at 3 1. 
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not encourage the presentation of sufficiently detailed reports by 
the more developed StateS. 255 
It was stressed, however, that if detailed guidelines were 
adopted, emphasis should be placed on the provision of technical 
assistance to those States that lack the requisite bureaucratic 
organisation. 256 In this respect it was noted that the "Country 
Profile" section in the guidelines could be prepared by the 
Secretariat if the State party so wished. 257 
In the end the guidelines as finally adopted at the 
Committee's fifth session, generally reflect the latter point of 
view. On the whole the guidelines represent a considerable 
improvement. They reflect a greater understanding, on the part of 
the Committee, of the central issues pertaining to each rights, and 
avoid the necessity of duplicating reports submitted to other 
human rights bodies and specialised agencies. Not only will they 
save a great deal of the Committee's precious time by avoiding the 
necessity of asking for basic factual information, they will enable 
it to pinpoint the crucial issues more effectively. 
Although lengthy, it is clear from statements made during 
the adoption of the guidelines, they are not definitive. Thus at the 
Committee's sixth session, following a study undertaken by a 
Committee member on the rights of the elderly, a list of additional 
questions was drafted for insertion into the reporting 
guidelines. 258 Although the questions were not adopted at that 
session, the Committee was clearly willing to revise the reporting 
guidelines at appropriate times. It will be essential for the 
Committee to use this ability to make appropriate changes to the 
content of the guidelines as it develops a greater understanding of 
the normative content of the rights. 
F) CONSIDERATION OF STATE REPORTS 
The technique adopted by the Conunittee in the 
consideration of State reports is one of conducting a "constructive 
and mutuaRy rewarding dialogue"259 with State representatives. 
255 Higgins comments that: 
"While wordiness is no guarantee of worth, a serious report must necessarily be of a 
certain length; as must a serious examination. " Higgins, supra, note 160, at 19. 
256 See e. g., Konate, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 47, at 8, para. 29. 
257 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 23, at 12, para. 93. 
258 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 132-134. 
259 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 10, para. 33. 
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Representatives of the reporting States "are entitled, and indeed 
are strongly encouraged, to be present at the meetings of the Committee when their reports are examined". 260 The Committee 
describes the procedure undertaken in its report: 
"31... The representative of the State party was invited to introduce the report by making brief 
introductory comments and responding to the list of issues drawn up by the pre-sessional working group. 
A period of time was then allocated to enable the 
representatives of the specialised agencies to provide 
the Committee with any observations relevant to the 
report under consideration. During the same period, 
members of the Committee were invited to put 
questions and observations to the representative of the 
State party. As a matter of practice, the members who 
had participated in the pre-sessional working group 
were expected to limit their additional questions and 
the Committee accorded priority to those members 
who were not present at the pre-sessional working 
group. A further period of time, usually not on the 
same day, was then allocated to enable the 
representative to respond, as precisely as possible, to 
the questions asked. It was generally understood that 
questions that could not adequately be dealt with in 
this manner could be the subject of additional 
information provided to the Committee in writing. 
"32. The final phase of the Committee's examination 
of the report consisted of a period during which 
members were invited to offer any concluding 
observations they wished to make on the basis of all 
the information available to them. Rather than taking 
place on the same day as the final set of replies by the 
representative of the State party, it was agreed that 
this final phase would be held at least one day later in 
order to provide adequate time for members to reflect 
on the information provided and to reach a balanced 
evaluation. To facilitate the process it was agreed that 
260 Ibid, at 9, para. 3 1. Rule 62 of the Rules of Procedure provide: 
"Representatives of the reportins States are entitiled to be present at the meetings 
of the commttee when their reports are examined. Such representatives hould be 
able to make statements on the reports submitted by their States and reply to 
questions which may be put to them by the members of the Committee. " SuPra, note 118, at 14. 
436 
the Chairman would request a particular member, ideally not from the same region as the reporting State, to take initial responsibility for drafting a text 
which would reflect the views of the Committee as a 
whole. The Committee would then discuss the draft 
with a view to adopting it by consensus. The final 
phase of the consideration of the report did not involve the representative of the State party although 
the latter was entitled to observe the work of the Committee in this regard. Once the concluding 
observations were adopted, they were forwarded to 
the State party concerned and included in the 
Committee's report. If it so wished, the State party 
might address any of the Committee's concluding 
observations in the context of any additional 
information that it provided to the Committee. "261 
1) Theoretical Undelpinnings of the Constructive Dialogue 
The constructive dialogue is primarily intended to allow the 
Committee to enter into a mutually beneficial dialogue regarding 
the degree to which the State concerned has fulfilled its obligations 
under the Covenant, without the necessity of formal declarations 
of compliance or non-compliance. 262 There are a number of 
benefits of such an approach. First, in so far as representatives 
provide answers to the issues of concern it allows the Committee 
to make a more precise analysis of the problems and intricacies of 
the situation. 263 Secondly, it gives the Committee an opportunity 
to offer informal suggestions and recommendations based on their 
wide experience in the field. 264 Tbirdly, it avoids the type of 
confrontation that may occur with governments following formal 
declarations of non-compliance. 265 
2) Effectiveness of the Approach 
As Nowak commented, "the efficiency of the procedure 
depends however primarily on the willingness of States 
representatives to get down to the problems and engage in a 
261 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 9, paras. 31-2. 
262 See e. g., Robertson, supra, note 22, at 344. 
263 Das, supra, note 175, at 258. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Fischer, supra, note 22, at 168. 
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constructive dialogue with the Committee". 266 Despite the 
problem of postponements, 267 the constructive dialogue approach 
has been a relatively successful experience for the Committee. It 
has not suffered for example the problems of the HRC with the 
refusal of certain States to participate in the process. 268 Indeed, in 
general the participation of States has been good and a number of 
the discussions detailed and informative. 
However the unwillingness of certain States to participate in 
good faith has presented the Committee with a number of 
problems. Despite the fact that the approach is supposedly one of 
mutual benefit, the Committee is often faced by representatives 
that are either inept, consummately evasive or disarmingly open. 
The Committee has consistently emphasised the desirability 
of States parties' reports to be presented by experts in the fields 
concerned. 269 Unfortunately, a certain number of States continue 
to dispatch representatives who do not posess sufficient experience 
or knowledge to be able to answer the questions of the Committee 
in a proficient manner. 270 'Me Committee has adopted the policy 
of naming the representatives of the States concerned in Annex V 
of its annual reports presumably with a view to indicating which 
States take the reporting process seriously. In addition, it was 
suggested at the Committee's sixth session, that the Committee 
should make clear that delegations composed solely of a single 
Ambassador would in most cases be inadequate. 271 
Although this remains a problem,, to a large extent States 
have provided more than one person in their delegations and have 
displayed a considerable amount of expertise. 272 It is considered 
that the Committee should look towards the presence of larger 
delegations with broad expertise. Inevitably, questions generally 
cover a large range of subjects that are not necessarily the 
266 Nowak, supra, note 103, at 201. 
267 See below, text accompanying notes 324-332. 
268 See, "Human Rights Committee: Commentary", 20 I. C. J. Rev., 25 
(1978). This has not, however, been an enduring problem for the HRC, see, 
McGoldrick, supra, note 23, at 82. 
269 See e. g., Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 10, at 9, para. 46; 
Cf. E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 62, para. 362. 
270 See e. g. concluding observation on the report of Mexico, Alston, 
E/C. 12/1990/S R. 11, at 7, para. 40. 
271 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 10, at 9, para. 48. 
272 See e. g. the list of State delegates which participated in the 
Committee's sixth session. E/1992/23, Annex V, at 139-141. 
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responsibility of any single person in the government 
administration. Tbus unlike bodies dealing with civil and political 
rights, the presence of the Minister of Justice, for example, would 
not be adequate. 273 A good indication of the abihty of the 
representatives to answer questions is the number of advisors 
present, and the range of expertise that they bear. 274 
It is apparent that the Committee, as indeed with many other human rights committees, is often faced by the evasive diplomat 
who circuitously avoids the questions. 275 It is clear that a certain 
amount of persistence is warranted in such situations and indeed is 
sometimes enough to elicit adequate responses. 276 In addition it is 
open for the Committee to respond that its questions have not been 
answered in an adequate manner and request additional 
information be supplied at a later date. 
The fact that the Committee has only a single three-week 
session per annum also places a certain pressure on the 
constructive dialogue in terms of time. 277 The tendency of State 
representatives to present their reports at great length278 and of 
members of the Committee to duplicate their questionS279 has 
stimulated the Committee to place time limits on the various 
sections of the Constructive dialogue. 280 In part this was the 
response to paragraph 7 of ECOSOC resolution 1987/5281 in 
273 Cf. Gaer, supra, note 26, at 38. 
274 A good example is that of Spain, which was represented for its report 
on articles 13 to 15 by a delegation of four, including the Deputy Director- 
General for Legal Affairs for the Ministry of Education and Science, Technical 
Advisors to the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education and Science, 
and a Counsellor to the Permanent Mission of Spain at the UN Office in Geneva. 
See, E/1992/23, Annex V, supra, note 166, at 140. 
275 See e. g., Representative of Colombia, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 13-14. 
276 See, Dormenval, supra, note 10, at 33. 
277 It has been noted that lack of time has also seriously affected the 
operation of CEDAW, see, Bumes A., "CEDAW's Tenth Session", 3 
N. Q. H. Rq 340 (1991). 
278 Cf., Higgins, supra, note 160, at 19. 
279 Cf., Dormenval, supra, note 10, at 32. 
280 The suggestion was first made at the Committee's fust session that, 
in order to expedite the Committee's procedure, it might adopt the practice of the 
specialised agencies and set time-limits on statements. Sparsis, 
E/C. 12/1987/SR. 23, at 5, para. 23. 
281 ECOSOC Resn. 1987/5, (May 26 1987), in, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1989/4, 
at 27 (1988). 
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which the Committee was requested, inter alia to explore ways of 
expediting consideration of reports. It was thus decided at the Committee's fourth session that, in line with the practice of the 
HRC, up to three meetings would be used to consider a report. 
Accordingly it allocated the following "indicative" times for each 
"global" report: 
1) Up to 30 minutes of general introductory comments by the 
representative of the State party; 
2) Up to two hours for the representative to respond to the list of 
written questions. 
3) Up to three hours for observations from representatives of the 
Specialised Agencies and questions from members of the 
Committee. 
4) Up to two hours for further replies by the State Party. 
5) Finally, up to one hour, on a subsequent day, for concluding 
observations by members of the Committee. 282 
It is clear from the Committee's practice that these time 
limits are primarily "indicative", relating more to the need to 
fulfil its schedule than to engender more accurate and concise 
responses from the State representative. At its fifth and sixth 
sessions for example, there is little evidence that these limits were 
strictly imposed. 
Although there is certainly a need for the Committee to 
maintain a degree of flexibility in the process to allow for real 
dialogue to take place, 283 State representatives still spend an 
excessive amount of time discussing irrelevant issues. It is 
submitted that a greater emphasis should be placed upon the use of 
time limits to enforce more concise responses. In that respect the 
Committee might consider take up the proposal made in its second 
session of imposing time limits on individual answers. 284 
Certain members of the Committee have also looked 
towards eliminating duplicitous questioning to expedite the 
consideration of reports. Although an immoderate amount of 
duplication in the questioning would not be propitious, not only do 
State representatives show consummate ability in assimilating 
various questions on a single issue in giving their response, but the 
repetition of certain questions gives an indication of the relative 
282 Cf. E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 10, para. 24. 
283 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 10, at 11, para. 54. 
284 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 2, at 2, para. 5. 
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importance of the matter raised. 285 The practice seems to be that 
members repeat questions that they consider to be of considerable importance. It would be unfortunate if this mechanism for 
assessing the degree of consensus within the Committee over a 
particular issue was lost. 
Several other possibilities for expediting the questioning 
process have been discussed, such as limiting the Committee to a 
single set of questions, 286 and limiting the oral questions to those 
members not members of the pre-sessional working group. 287 It is 
considered that in accordance with the idea of setting up a 
dialogue, the Committee should maintain its ability to ask further 
questions on issues that have not been adequately responded to. 
Despite the limits of time and the necessity of allowing all the 
members of the Committee to ask questions at some stage, it 
should not be necessary that the members of the Committee 
generally, or of the pre-sessional working group in particular, be 
restricted from asking further questions when required. 
One of the major problems with the questioning process is 
that the questions tend to be general and unfocussed. 288 Little 
attention is paid to the actual text of the Covenant and quite often 
questions are asked as to matters that appear to have only indirect 
relevance to the rights concerned. It has been noted that this is 
partially due to the fact that the Committee is still adjusting to the 
"global" report system. 289 Accordingly, it has been suggested that 
the Committee should deal with each right in turn followed by the 
285 The Committee commented in the report of its second session: 
"It was noted, however, that some duplication was both inevitable and desirable 
and that it would not be appropriate to seek to limit the type of issues which 
Committee members might wish to raise. " 
E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 59, para. 345. 
286 See, Jimenez Butragueno, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 11, para. 63. 
287 See, Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 8, at 11, para. 62. 
288 As Alston noted: 
"Regarding the process of questioning... the only way to elicit detailed and 
focused responses from the Governments concerned was to begin by asldng 
very specific questions. A general question inevitably gave rise to a standard 
response whereas a specific one, requesting facts and figures which were 
generally available to the Government, led to targetted and meaningful dialogue. 
Similarly, a precise question based on information in the Committee's 
possession would yeild an explicit confirmation or denial, as the case may be. In 
any case the question and the Government's recorded answer would constitute a 
tangible contribution to the international debate. "Alston, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 10, at 5, para. 25. 
289 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 10, at 5, para. 26. 
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government response. 290 It is considered that this might go some 
way towards focussing the attention of the Committee members 
upon specific issues, but the Principal initiative will have to be 
taken by the individual Committee members themselves. 
Committee members should attempt to relate each question to the 
specific rights in the Covenant and to demonstrate more clearly 
their understanding of the guarantee. 
One method of ensuring more specific and informed 
questions would be to introduce a form of division of labour 
within the Committee, under which members of the Committee 
would be assigned responsibility for questions in certain areas. 291 
This is a mechanism that has been instituted in other fora. 292 
Although this might discourage members from asking questions on 
issues outside their area of responsibility, 293 it would encourage 
individual members to become specialists in their designated areas 
and thus engender a greater specificity in questioning. An 
additional benefit would be to enable the Committee to identify 
those areas in which it requires further specialist input in future 
years. It is submitted that the Committee should reconsider the 
benefits of such an approach with a view to instituting it at some 
point in the future. 
3)The Pre-Sessional Working Group 
In response to a request by the Committee, 294 ECOSOC in 
resolution 1988/4 authorised the creation of a pre-sessional 
working groUp295 whose principal task (although it had no fixed 
mandate and could undertake a variety of taskS296) would be "to 
identify in advance the questions which might most usefully be 
discussed with the representatives of the reporting States. "297 By 
doing so, it was thought that it would improve the efficiency of the 
system and facilitate the task of States parties by providing advance 
2901bid. 
291 Cf. Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 2, at 3, para. 8. 
292 For example within the Committee of Independent Experts to the 
Eurpean Social Charter. 
293 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 22, at 4, para. 24. 
294 E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 60, para. 348; recommendation: at 62, 
para. 361. 
295 ECOSOC Resn. 1988/4, supra, note 247, at 31, para. 10. 
296 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 1, at 7, para. 36. 
297 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 7, para-24. 
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notice of the issues that might arise in the examination of 
reports. 298 The establishment of the pre-sessional working group 
was a logical step in the work of the Committee299 given the diverse range of issues covered, their complexity, and the need for 
precise and detailed information. It has also been noted that by 
removing the element of surprise, the chances of an altercation between the State concerned and the Committee has been 
reduced. 300 
Accordingly a pre-sessional working group composed of five members, appointed by the Chairman, with due regard for a balanced geographical distribution, met for five days prior to the Committee's third, fourth, fifth and sixth sessions. Following a 
request by the Committee at its fourth session, ECOSOC approved 
the holding of the working group's session at a time one to three 
months prior to the Committee's session, 301 despite the additional (if only marginal) cost. The change in schedule was aimed at 
allowing sufficient time for the list of questions to be translated 
into the appropriate language, the transmission of the list to the 
capital concerned and the preparation of adequate responses by the 
relevant State Party. It would also allow greater time for the 
translation and dissemination of the list of issues to Committee 
members. 302 Although the pre-sessional working group met some 
three months before the Committee's sixth session, 303 there was 
considerable agreement within the Committee that additional time 
had to be given to the States concerned. 304 It therefore requested 
that the arrangements be made for holding the meetings of the 
working group in May, June or July as from 1992.305 
Each member of the working group is assigned a particular 
report, or reports, taking into consideration the preferred areas of 
expertise. 306 He or she is then required to make a particularly 
298 E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 62, para. 361. 
299 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 8, para. 25. 
300 See, Rattray, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 4, at 11, para. 4. 
301 ECOSOC Decn. 1990/252, (May 25 1990). 
302 E/1989/22, supra, note 170, at 75, para. 338. 
303 It met from 16-20 September 199 1, see, E/1 992/23, supra, note 166, 
at 3, para. 11. 
304 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/199 US R. 10, at 9, para. 44. 
305 E/1 992/23, supra,, note 166, at 5, para. 17. 
306 Ibid, at 8, para. 26. 
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detailed study of the report and draw up, with the assistance of a file of information provided by the Secretariat, 307 a draft list of 
the issues which appear to be important for consideration by the 
working group as a whole. The final lists of issues are then sent to 
the States concerned and made available to members of the Committee. They are intended to highlight the issues that the 
working group thought to be important and in no way preclude 
members of the Committee from raising other issues during the 
consideration of the report in plenary. 308 
A list of such questions is transmitted to the permanent delegations of the relevant States together with a copy of the Committee's most recent report and a note which reads: 
"The Est is not intended to be exhaustive and it should 
not be interpreted as limiting or in any other way 
prejudging the type and range of questions which 
members of the Committee might wish to ask. 
However, the working group believes that the 
constructive dialogue which the Committee wishes to 
have with the representatives of the State party can be 
facilitated by making the list available in advance of 
the Committee's session. "309 
Certain operating problems have been identified with regard to the 
pre-sessional working group. It was noted by one member of the 
Committee at its fourth session that, following the experience with 
the Mexican report, there was a need to streamline the questions 
prepared by the pre-sessional Working Group. 310 Ihis was 
partially evident from the reaction of Luxembourg at the 
Committee's fourth session to the lengthy list of issues presented to 
it by the working group,, when it asked for a postponement in the 
consideration of its report. 311 It was noted,, howeven) that the 
length of the list of issues was partially a reflection of the poor 
quality of the report. 312 
Similarly, during the fifth session a certain amount of 
inconsistency was apparent in the work of the pre-sessional 
working group. Tle members of the group did not place emphasis 
307Ibid. 
30SSee, Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 1, at 7, para. 36. 
309 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 8, para. 28. 
31OSee, Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 7, at 5, para. 21. 
311See, Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 12, at 1, para. 2. 
312See, Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 12, at 1, para-4. 
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on the same problems and often the questions reflected the 
personal interests of the drafter. 313 It was noted however that this 
was somewhat inevitable, given that the questions were to an 
extent, a reflection of the adequacy of the report itself. As one 
member commented: 
"each list of issues related to a particular case; it was 
to some extent the reverse reflection of the report 
with which it dealt and of which it sought to fill the 
gaps concerning the nature and the amount of 
information given. "314 
It should be assumed, however, that some of the unnecessary 
inconsistencies will be ironed out in future with the operation of 
the revised reporting guidelines and the aid of the Secretariat 
Nowak considers that the consequences of the use of the pre- 
sessional working group by the HRC has been "to protract rather 
than streamline the procedure, and the hope for more controlled 
exchange of views and information between States representatives 
and members of the Committee has not materialised yet. " He goes 
on to assert that it is only the oral questions that really stimulate "a 
spontaneous and critical discussion". 315However, it must be 
stressed that for the CESCR the work of the pre-sessional working 
group is an important element in extending what would otherwise 
be a brief and unsatisfactory dialogue. The fact that the process is 
more protracted is really of concern only in so far as it is a drain 
on the financial resources of the UN which, in the case of the pre- 
sessional working group, is marginal. 
From the point of view of supervising State compliance with 
the obligations, a sustained dialogue will enable greater specificity 
and more accurate evaluation. In addition it would be inaccurate to 
maintain that the Committee does not, by use of the working 
group, exercise more control over the exchange of views. The pre- 
sessional working group in theory enables the Committee to direct 
the oral presentation primarily at those issues of concern to the 
Committee. 
It has to be said that the Committee's consideration of 
reports has not improved dramatically since the operation of the 
pre-sessional working group. The questions asked in plenary 
sessions appear to be equally generalg and it is still rare for the 
Committee to enter into a detailed debate about the issues that have 
313 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 33, at 2, para. 2. 
314 Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 33, at 2,, para-3. 
315 Nowak, supra, note 103, at 201. 
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arisen. The main function of the working group, as indicated 
above, 316 has been as a means of ensuring that the Committee is 
provided with all the information requested by the reporting 
guidelines. 
It is considered that the full potential of the pre-sessional 
working group will only be realised once States have undertaken 
to report in a full and accurate manner, and when the Committee 
has access to sufficient alternative sources of information such that 
problem areas may be identified at an early stage in the 
constructive dialogue process. Until that time the working group 
will function in its present limited manner. 
Outside the operation of the constructive dialogue, the 
Committee has also been able to use the pre-sessional working 
group to undertake a number of tasks that would otherwise 
consume the Committee's own precious working time. 317 In 
particular, the working group has been mandated with: 
i) the allocation of time limits for the consideration of State 
reports; 318 
ii) the transitional arrangements for the extension of the 
periodicity of reporting to five years. 319 
iii) making a preliminary study of the draft general guidelines. 320 
iv) considering the issue of how to deal with supplementary 
reports containing additional information and formulating 
comments and recommendations on them. 321 
v) examining draft general comments. 322 
vi) considering the structure of the general discussion. 323 
316 See above, text accompanying note 314. 
317 For the work of the pre-sessional working group at the Committee's 
sixth session, see, Texier, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 1, at 7-8, paras. 36-8. 
318 E/1989/22, supra, note 170, at 2, para-13. See, Alston, 
E/C. 12/1989/SR. 1, at 8, para. 38 
319 E/1989/22, ibid, at 2, para. 13; See also, Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 1, 
at 8, para-39. 
320 See, Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 1, at 6, Para-37 
321 UN Doc. E/1 990/23, supra, note 184, at 3, para. 11 
- 
Prior to the 
fourth session the pre-sessional worldng group considered the additional reports 
received from the Netherlands, France and Zaire. 
322E/1992/23, supra,, note 166, at 9, para. 30. 
323 
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4) Non-Appearance Before the Committee 
A recurring problem for the Committee has been the 
continual deferral by States Parties of the consideration of their 
reports after they have been scheduled in the Committee's work. Thus at the Committee's fifth session, six States324asked to 
postpone the consideration of their reports until the following Committee session. At the Committee's sixth session, two States 
made similar requests. 325For a State to postpone at the last 
moment seriously disrupts the Committee's procedures. Not only is the Committee forced to re-schedule its consideration of other 
reports but it is also unable to request new States to appear before 
it at such short notice. 
It was decided at the Committee's fifth session, following the 
procedure of the HRC, 326 that "on the third occasion that a State 
party's report is scheduled for consideration, it will, except in 
truly exceptional circumstances, proceed with the consideration of 
the report whether or not a representative of the State party 
concerned is able to be present. "3271t was also decided that this 
should be reflected in the Committee's rules of procedure. 328 
The adoption of this working practice at the Committee's fifth 
session appeared to have immediate results. Iran eventually 
appeared before the Committee and two other States (Afghanistan 
and Panama) made official pledges to submit their reports in time 
for the Committee's next session, which in fact they did. 
The Committee is prepared, however, to accept that States 
may have a valid reason for their non-appearance. 329Panama, for 
example, in asking for a postponement of the consideration of its 
324 Afghanistan, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 27, at 3, para. 16; the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, ibid; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, ibid; Yemen, ibid; 
Syria, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 29, at 2, para. 1; and Panama, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 35, at 
12, para. 48. Of these States, the Iranian report had been scheduled for 
consideration at the Committee's third session and that of Afghanistan at the 
Committee's first session. Tikhonov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 27, at 4, para. 18. 
325 Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 
14, Para-5; and Belarus, ibid. 
326 The HRC has actually gone as far as considering a state report 
without the representative being present (It first did this in 1983 at its 20th 
session with the report of Guinea). "Human Rights Committee: Commentary", 
33 I-C. J. Rev. 39 (1984). Nowak M., "UN Human Rights Committee: Survey 
of Decisions given up till 1984", 5 H. R. W. 199, at 200 (1984). 
327 E/1991/23, supra, note 98, at 9, para. 35. 
328 E/C. 12/1990/SR. 28, at 2. 
329 See, Sparsis, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 23, at 12, para-55. 
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report referred to the fact that it did not have the necessary 
technical expertise to answer the questions presented to it. 330 The 
Committee agreed to the postponement of consideration on the 
basis of the political upheavals experienced in that country since 
the report was drafted. In such cases however the Committee 
hoped that the State concerned would notify the Committee as far 
in advance as possible to avoid last minute withdrawals that may 
disrupt the work of the Committee. 331 Ideally, the Committee 
should be left enough time to call upon another State to present its 
report. 332 
It is considered that in the majority of cases, States could 
quite easily predict, at the time of the meeting of the pre-sessional 
working group, whether or not they will be able to present the 
report in the following months. The Committee should seek to 
gain an undertaking from the States at that time, to the effect that 
they consider themselves capable of presenting the report at the 
next session of the Committee. Only in cases where the State has 
experienced some upheaval in the intervening period should the 
Committee agree to postpone the consideration of the reports. 
5) Sources of Information 
Perhaps the most crucial factor in the success of any 
reporting procedure is the extent to which the supervisory body 
has access to information other than that provided by the State 
concerned. 333 If reliance is placed merely upon the information 
provided by the State, it is the State that controls the terms of 
discussion by raising or avoiding issues at will. "Alternative" 
sources of information provide the Committee concerned with a 
necessary foil to evaluate the State reports and contribute towards 
a more balanced assessment of the actual situation in a given 
country. Additionally, in so far as such information may contain 
allegations regarding violations of the Covenant upon which the 
Committee may rely in making its evaluation of the report, the 
330 See, Klein, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 35, at 12, para. 48. 
331 E/1990/23, supra, note 166, at 76, para. 306. 
332 See, Nenernan, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 35, at 13, para. 53. 
333 The Committee makes the following comment in its annual report: 
"The Committee has consistently noted that access to all relevant sources of 
information pertaining to economic, social and cultural rights was essential 
in 
order to enable it to discharge its monitoring functions effectively". E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 100, para. 384. 
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provision of alternative information can operate in a manner 
similar to that of a petition. 334 
In reality, however, States never have a complete monopoly 
over the information available to a Committee-, Committee 
members will inevitably bring with them information they have 
gathered generally as experts in their fields. Nevertheless, in a 
number of Committees this is the extent to which reference may be 
made to alternative sources of information. As has been noted, 
there has been a reluctance, on the part of monitoring bodies, to 
institutionalise the receipt of information from other sources upon 
the false premise that it is necessarily less accurate. 335 
There are a number of benefits to be gained by allowing a 
supervisory committee open access to alternative sources of 
information. First, it removes from individual members the 
burden of seeking relevant information informally and allows for 
more consistent and greater amounts of information to be 
available. Secondlyq it allows the Committee as a whole to assess 
the relevance and accuracy of the information provided. Thirdly, 
it provides Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's) with a 
permanent and formal mechanism through which they might 
present their concerns which might encourage greater 
participation. Finally, it allows for the involvement of the 
Secretariat which might actively seek information on the 
Committee's behalf. 
Ibe text of the Covenant itself makes scant reference to the 
use of alternative sources of information. Although the specialised 
agencies may submit reports to ECOSOC "on the progress made in 
achieving the observance of the provisions of the present Covenant 
falling within the scope of their activities ", 336 nothing is said about 
the possibility of their participating in the consideration of the 
reports or of any other bodies submitting information to 
ECOSOC. The Committee, however, in stressing the importance 
of alternative information in enabling it to discharge its 
monitoring functions effectivelyq has taken the unprecedented step 
of officially inviting "all concerned bodies and individuals to 
submit relevant and appropriate documentation to it. "337 Ile basis 
for this step and the various forms of information received will be 
addressed below. 
334 See, in relation to CERD, Buergenthal, supra, note 10, at 202. 
335 Alston, supra, note 30, at 496. 
336 Article 18 ICESCR. 
337 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 100, para. 386. 
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a) The Specialised. Agencies 
As noted above, the Covenant makes specific reference to 
the possibility of the Specialised Agencies reporting to ECOSOC in 
the supervisory process. Indeed, that all but two articles in Part IV 
of the Covenant refer in some manner to the Specialised Agencies, 
emphasises the important role envisaged for them during the 
drafting of the Covenant. 338 
Although there was considerable textual support for the 
participation of the Specialised Agencies in the consideration of 
State reports, following the entry into force of the Covenant, 
attempts were made to minimise their input. A number of States (particularly the USSR) opposed the consideration of the Agencies' 
reports and attempted to prevent the Agencies from commenting 
on State reports, or speaking within the Working Group. 339 The 
result was that the ELO at least, ceased to prepare special reports 
for the Working Group. 
Although it is clearly unfortunate that the Agencies were 
actively discouraged from participating in the supervision of the 
reports, two important points were raised about the of the form of 
their participation. First, it is apparent that the Agencies may 
receive copies of the relevant parts of State reports., 340 and may 
submit reports "on the progress made",, 341 but it is open to 
question whether they are entitled to comment specifically upon 
the reports of States parties. Ramcharan argues that whereas the 
travaux preparatoires were "inconclusive" on the point, at the end 
of the Council discussion "there was a clear agreement among all 
representatives that the specialised agencies could not comment on 
the reports of States Parties. "342 
It is considered that this is not the most obvious inference to 
be made from the text of the Covenant. It leaves the Specialised 
Agencies in the curious position of being able to utilise the 
information in the States reports to draw up their own reports 
under Article 18, but not being able to refer to the State reports 
per se. The Committee has not actively sought to clarify this issue. 
M8 See above, text accompanying notes 38-40, and 50-60. 
339 See generally, Samson, supra, note 38, at 635-637. For an overview 
of the IOLO experience see, "Impact of ELO Policies on the UN", ELO Doc. 
GB. 225/I0/3/3,16-22 (1984). 
340 Article 16(2)(b). 
341 Article 18. 
342 Ramcharan, supra, note 63, at 159. 
450 
In practice the ILO has undertaken to submit reports "on the 
results of the operation of various ILO supervisory procedures in 
the fields covered by the Covenant". 343 The reports do not make 
specific reference to the State reports, nor do they attempt to make 
a separate evaluation of the implementation of the Covenant. 344 
On the other hand, the most recent report of UNESCO, despite 
being less comprehensive and more general than the ILO reports, 
does make reference to the State reports indicating matters that 
have not been dealt with and discrepancies in data. 345 As no 
mention has been made of this development it is assumed that it is 
satisfactory to all concerned. 
The second issue that was raised in the Working Group 
concerned the active participation of the Agencies in the oral 
discussion of the reports. Although the Covenant does not refer to 
the possibility of the Specialised Agencies assisting ECOSOC in the 
consideration of reports, the Council expressly authorised 
representatives of the agencies to "take part in the proceedings of 
the Working Group". 346 Samson argues that the attempt to prevent 
the representatives from speaking "would have been contrary not 
only to the terms of the Council Resolution establishing the 
Working Group and to the Rules of Procedure of the Council, 
which were expressly applicable, but to the relationship 
agreements between the UN and the specialised agencies". 347 
The Committee has specifically endorsed in its Rules of 
Procedure, the right of Specialised Agencies to participate in the 
debate on State reports within the Committee. Rule 68 in 
particular states: 
"The specialised agencies concerned shall be invited to 
designate representatives to participate at the meetings 
of the Committee. Such representatives may make 
statements on matters falling within the scope of the 
activities of their respective organisations in the 
W UN Doc. E/1992/4, at 1 (1991). The reports of the ILO to the 
Comnfittee are to be found in documents: E/1987/59 (1986); E/1988/6 (1987); 
E/1989/6 (1988); E/1990/9 (1989); E/1991/4 (1990); E/1992/4 (1991). 
344 See, Dao (ILO), E/C. 12/19 8 8/SR. 2, at 5, para. 21. 
345 See e. g., Comments of UNESCO on the reports of Argentina, the 
Philippines and Ecuador, UN Doc. E/1990/8, (1989). 
346 ECOSOC Resn. 1988 (LX), supra, note 247, at 5. 
347 Samson, supra, note 38, at 637. 
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course of the discussion by the Committee of the 
report of each State party to the Covenant. "348 
Amendments made at the fourth session of the Committee in light 
of its established practice, make it clear that this rule does not impede the representatives of the Specialised Agencies from 
making specific comments as appropriate. 349 Nor are the 
representatives limited to making those comments at the end of the 
discussion. 350 In fact, the representatives of the Specialised 
Agencies are generally requested to be the first to make comments 
upon the report following its oral presentation by the State 
representative concerned. They have not, however, taken it upon 
themselves to become involved in the debate at later stages. 
It is clear that not all specialised agencies are directly 
involved in the matters covered by the Covenant. Only a limited 
number participated in the drafting of the Covenant, and an inter- 
agency consultation in 1976 elicited interest only from the ILO, 
WHO, UNESCO and the FAO. 351 Although the provisions of the 
Covenant certainly do not limit the participation to these 
specialised agencies, there is no correlative power for the 
Committee to demand co-operation. 'llie Committee has recently 
noted the importance of economic, social and cultural rights in the 
work of the international financial institutions of the UN. 352 As 
such it has read the reference in article 22 to specialised agencies 
as including, in addition to the above four agencies, the World 
Bank (IBRD) and the IMF. 353 
A differentiation might be made between co-operation with 
the ILO for example and co-operation with the financial 
institutions such as the IMF. Whereas the former can contribute 
directly to the elucidation of standards within the Covenant, the 
latter is relevant only in so far as aid given by the institution may 
effect the economic, social and cultural rights of the population 
concerned. 354 Accordingly it might be concluded that the financial 
348 Rules of Procedure, supra, note 123, at 16. 
349 E/1990/23, supra, note 184, at 74, para. 293. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Sohn, supra note 61, at 32-33. 
352 E/1990/23, Annex IR, supra, note 184, at 86-89. 
353 Ibid, at 86, para. 2. 
3.54 See, Harris D., "Commentary by the Rapporteur on the 
Consideration of States Parties'Reports and International Co-operation", 
9 
. _Q,, 
147, at 153 (1987). Hum. Rt5 
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institutions have little part to play in the supervisory role of the Covenant. 355 However, given the possible utility of statistical 
indicators in the Committee's supervision of the implementation of 
the Covenant,, 356 the financial institutions and other UN organs 
might have a significant role to play in providing the Committee 
with an idea of the current level at which certain rights are 
enjoyed and the progress made over time. 357 It is considered that 
the cooperation of such agencies as the IMF and the EBRD, 
although not forseeable in the near future. 358 would contribute 
enormously to the general effectiveness of the Committee's 
supervision. 359 
As the Committee noted in its General Comment No. 2,, "the 
attendance by representatives of the appropriate United Nations 
bodies at its first four sessions has, with the notable exceptions of 
11LO, UNESCO and WHO, been very low. Similarly, pertinent 
materials and written information had been received from only a 
very limited number of agencies. "360 Even given the fact that the 
Committee's experience is better than that of its pre-decessor, it is 
submitted that this is something of an overstatement. The 
Specialised Agencies have great potential for assisting and 
developing the work of the Committee and have, as yet, done very 
little. 
355 The term supervision here is intended to exclude the provision of 
technical assistance (article 22), to which the Committee's General Comment 
No. 2 was directed. 
356 See, The General Discussion at the Conunittee's sixth session, 
E/1992/23, Chap. VIII, supra, note 166, at 81-86, paras-332-351. 
357 For the potential role of the World Bank in the implementation of the 
right to food, see, Van Hoof G. and Tahzib B., "Supervision with Respect to the 
Right to Food and the Role of the World Bank", in de Waart P., Peters P., and 
Denters E. (eds), International Law and Development, 317 (1988). Alston 
comments: 
"... the position with respect to the right to food or the right to education in a 
given country would be described in infinitely more detail and in a far more 
informative way in internal reports regularly prepared by the World Bank, the 
FAO, UNICEF, and other agencies than in the reports submitted to the 
Committee by the States themselves. " 
Alston, supra, note 30, at 500. 
358 Although such agencies are becoming more involved in the question 
of human rights generally, their reports are still confidential. 
359 Cf. Limburg Principle 96,9 Hum. Rts-Q., 122, at 134-5 (1987). 
360 General Comment No. 2, UN Doc. E/1990/23, Annex IIII, at 86-7, 
para. 4, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3), (1990). 
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At the Committee's first six sessions, only the ELO and UNESCO have attended every session. The WHO has attended four 
sessions and the FAO only two. Similarly, whereas the ILO has 
submitted written information every session, UNESCO has 
submitted only two reports and the FAO and WHO have as yet 
submitted no written information to the Committee. Even the ]LO, 
which has by far the best record, has limited itself to providing the Committee with the relevant extracts of ILO supervisory 
procedures. 
The possible reasons for the poor record of participation are 
diverse. One may surmise that it is a result, in part at least, of the 
hostility shown by the Working Group to the Specialised Agencies. 
Other reasons include the more general inability of the UN and the 
Agencies to co-operate succesSfully361 and the traditional concern 
that involvement in human rights would politicise the work of the 
Agencies and prejudice their future effectiveness. 
It is curious that the Committee has not made a concerted 
effort to encourage the Agencies concerned to resume the form of 
participation that they were willing to undertake in 1976. At that 
stage the ILO, for example, resolved to entrust the Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
with the task of examining the State reports and other available 
information on the implementation of the Covenant. 362 It is 
considered that ideally this is the level of co-operation that the 
Committee should look towards. 
`Ihe attitude of members of the Committee, however, has 
been that the best way to use the experience of the Specialised 
Agencies was not necessarily through asking them for information 
or requesting them to attend the Committee meetings. Rather, 
members of the Committee should be authorised to make their 
own inter-disciplinary studies and obtain the necessary information 
themselves for presentation to the Committee at a later stage. 363 
Although this would certainly allow the Committee to tailor the 
substance and form of the information received from such sources 
to suit its own needs and would help develop the personal expertise 
of the Committee members, it is a rather poor substitute for the 
full participation by the Agencies themselves. 
361 See, Samson, supra, note 38, at 669-670. 
362Ibid, at 636. 
363See, Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 2, at 7, para. 32. 
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b) Non-Governmental Organisations 
The Covenant makes no reference to the participation of Non-Governmental Organisations in the supervisory process. However, by mandating ECOSOC with the responsibility for 
considering State reports, it is implicit that the supervision would 
take place in accordance with the Council's normal rules of 
procedure. According to ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV), 364 
Non-Governmental Organisations are, according to their 
consultative category, entitled to submit written statements and 
make oral presentations to the Council. 365 It would appear to be 
open to the Council to allow for the provision of NGO 
information in the consideration of State reports under the Covenant. 
However, at the Committee's first session, the question of 
NGO participation sparked a heated debate. 366 It was argued by 
those who opposed the provision of NGO material, that the 
Council decisions governing the work of the Committee provided 
only for the attendance of NGOS. 367 Further, the later, more 
specific, Council resolutions took legal precedence over the earlier 
general resolution allowing for the participation of NGOs in the 
work of the Council. 368 On the other hand, it was argued that 
NGO material was essential to the work of the Committee and that 
there was nothing in the Council's later resolutions that excluded 
the possibility of the submission of that material. 369 The question 
was eventually referred to ECOSOC which, in Resolution 
1987/5,, 370 resolved the issue by formally invited NGOs to submit 
'164ECOSOC Resn. 1296 (XLIV), (1968). 
365 See generally, Chiang P., Non-Governmental Organisations at the 
United Nations, (1981). 
366 See, Alston P. and Simma B., "First Session of the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 81 A. J. I. L., 747, at 752 (1987). 
367 ECOSOC Resn. 1984/9, (May 24 1984), in UN Doc. E/C. 12/1989/4, 
at 16 (1988). 
368 See, Sviridov, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 24, at 9, para. 64; Mratchkov, ibid, 
at 10, para. 67. 
369 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1987/SR. 24, at 10, para. 66; Rattray, Ibid, 
at 10, para. 69. 
370 ECOSOC Resn. 1987/5 (May 26 1987), in UN Doc. E/C. 12/1989/4, 
at 27 (1988). 
455 
to it "written statements that might contribute to full and universal 
recognition and realisation of the rights in the Covenant". 371 
In adopting this policy, the Committee was breaking new 
ground as far as human rights treaty monitoring bodies were 
concerned. Oddly enough, even though the Committee has taken its 
mandate to receive such information from ECOSOC rules of 
procedure, it has not undertaken to allow NGOs to participate in 
debates on State reports. One exception to this rule has been that 
individual NGO representatives may participate in their capacity as 
experts in the Committee's general discussions. 372 
As suggested above, the institutionalisation of a mechanism 
for the submission of information has a number of benefits over 
the informal process undertaken by other Committees373 not least 
because it should encourage greater involvement by NGOs in the 
Committee's work. 374 However, the experience of the Committee 
thus far has not been promising. 375 The only NGOs to attend 
consistently have been Habitat International Coalition and Rights 
and Humanity, and in all the Committees sessions there have been 
only a handful of written statements received from NGOs. 
ibis poor response has not been due to any lack of 
enthusiasm on the part of the Committee. Indeed in the one case 
where the Committee was in receipt of detailed information from 
an NGO it responded by finding the State concerned (the 
Dominican Republic) to be in violation of its obligations under the 
Covenant. 376 Similarly, NGO information has been used to good 
effect in the cases of Iran and Panama. The fact that the Committee 
371 Ibid, para. 6. 
372 See below, text accompanying notes 447-8. 
373 Members of CERD and BRC for example, have access to non- 
governmental information only in their positions as experts, see Del Prado J., 
"United Nations Conventions on Human Rights: The Practice of the Human 
Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
in Dealing with Reporting Obligations of States Parties", 7 Hum-Rts. 
-Q, 
492, at 
500 (1985). However, under rules 62(l) and (2) of its Rules of Procedure, CAT 
may receive NGO material. See, Zoller A-C., "UN Committee Against Torture" 
7 N. Q. H. R*, ) 210 at 251 (1989). 
374 Informal mechanisms also prevent the Committee members from 
using the information other than in asIdng questions of representatives. 
See, 
Buergenthal, supra, note 10, at 205. 
375 There was a certain amount of disappointment, at the Committee's 
fourth session, that only two NGOs attended. Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 
3, 
at 11, para. 69. 
376 See, E/1991/23, supra, note 98, at 64, para. 249. 
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is prepared to rely upon NGO information is extremely 
encouraging. It suggests that if developed in a more systematic 
manner, the receipt of NGO information might at some time in the future become assimilated to a form of informal petition system. The major obstacles to creative NGO participation with 
regard to the ICESCR seem to relate to the lack of sufficient 
publicity, and geographical and structural constraints relating to 
the nature of the organisations working within the sphere of 
economic, social and cultural rights. The relevant NGOs can be 
classified as either international "development" NGOs which direct 
and promote technical and material aid to "underdeveloped" 
countries, or national "voluntary organisations" which deal with 
concerns such as welfare rights and housing and which operate 
purely in the domestic field. Neither category of organisation 
naturally draws upon the work of human rights bodies, nor would 
necessarily have consultative status in ECOSOC. Conversely, the 
existing human rights NGOs have shown a distinct reluctance to 
become involved with the promotion of economic, social and 
cultural rights. 377 
That there is little homogeneity in the types of organisations 
that might successfully contribute to the Committee's work 
suggests that is no single method to encourage greater 
participation. Outside the ever important question of publicity, the 
most crucial factor will be the degree to which the Committee "is 
capable of yeilding satisfactory returns" to the input of time and 
effort by the NGO concerned. 378 It should be noted, however, that 
if NGO participation is premised upon these grounds, the 
Committee is forced into the position of taking up a more 
adversarial stance with respect to States, with an emphasis on 
finding "violations" of the Covenant. 
c) Institutional Mechanisms 
In order to institutionalise the receipt of information the 
Committee has requested the Secretariat to establish a separate file 
containing "all available information" on each of the States Parties 
whose reports are "currently pending consideration". The 
377 See, Tomasevski K., Development Aid and Human Rights, 113-116 
(1989). It has also been suggested that NGOs are uncertain about what 
information they should collect and how to obtain it, see, Steiner R, Diverse 
Partners: Non-Govemmental Omani: the Human Rizhts Movemen 
(1991). 
378 Alston, supra, note 30, at 502. 
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Committee has stipulated in addition, that the following 
information, at least, should be included in the file: 
a) Information on the country contained in any recent reports of 
the Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission. 
b) Inforrnation taken from the two most recent reports of the 
HRC, CERD, or CEDAW. 
c) Relevant information on the country concerned in the recent 
reports of the ILO Committee on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations. 
d) Any relevant information on the situation in the country 
concerned from the WHO. 
e) T'he relevant statistical information on the country concerned 
contained in the statistical tables of the UNDP's "World 
Development Report" and UNICEF's "State of the World's 
Children Report". 
f) Any UN or Specialised Agency report referred to by a State 
Party in its report. 
g) Any other relevant documentation submitted to the Secretariat 
for inclusion in the file. 379 
Although the files are to be created for States Parties whose 
reports are "currently pending consideration", it is stated that the 
files are to be maintained "on a continuing basis". 380 It is clear 
that relevant information may be submitted to the Secretariat at 
any time, but that a Secretariat "file" will only be created when 
that State's report is "pending consideration" by the Committee 
and thus will only be available to the Committee at that time. 
The files will arm the Committee with extensive information 
with which it may more readily assess the level at which rights are 
enjoyed in the country concerned. However, at the Committee's 
sixth session, members complained, of the lack of information in 
the files. 381 It was noted, in particular, that the file on Syria was 
merely four pages long. 382 Undoubtedly it will take a few years 
before the files are built up in the manner requested by the 
Committee. However, that only a few pages of information have 
been provided at this stage is indicative of the general lack of 
support provided to the Committee by the Secretariat. 
The high priority placed upon independent sources of 
information by the Committee is also reflected in its decision to 
379 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 100-1, para-386. 
380 Ibid, at 101, para. 387. 
381 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 10, at 4, para. 23. 
382 See, Simma, E/C. 121199 l/SR. 10, at 8, para. 39. 
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appoint "Eason-officers" from the Committee to follow any 
pertinent work of other human rights bodies (in particular CEDAW, CERD, CAT and HRQ and report to the Committee at 
the beginning of each session. 383 This decision appears to be a 
response to the increasing regularity in which other Committees 
are dealing with matters that fall within the scope of economic, 
social and cultural rights. 384 
In addition the Committee has persisted in its demand for 
the creation of a "Human Rights Resource Room" for use by 
members of all of the human rights committees, equipped with 
documents and statistical information from the UN bodies, 
regional human rights organisations and non-governmental 
organisations. 385 Although this proposal has been reiterated by 
members of the Committee since its third session and endorsed by 
the Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 
the Secretariat has yet to take any action. In fact the Secretariat has 
merely provided a number of wholly unsatisfactory proposalS386 
which have done nothing but further deteriorate the relations 
between the Committee and the Centre for Human Rights. In 
response, the Committee included the following statement in its 
annual report: 
"The Committee observed that it made little sense for 
the Secretary-General to be offering various forms of 
technical assistance to States Parties in relation to the 
Covenant and other instruments, while failing to take 
a major step specifically requested by the meeting of 
persons chairing the human rights treaty bodies in 
1988 and reiterated by the Committee in 1989, twice 
in 1990 and in 1991. It therefore expressed the hope 
that the matter would finally be treated with the 
urgency it deserved-11387 
The lack of action by the Secretariat is probably partially due to 
the overall level of resources made available by the General 
383 E/1990/23, supra, note 184,, at 75, para-298. Cf. Alston, 
E/C. 12/1991/SR. 24, at 6, para. 53. 
384 For example, the decisions taken by the HRC under article 26 ICCPR 
concerning social security. 
385 Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 1, at 10, para. 48; Simma, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 29, at 7, para. 28. 
386 One proposal was for the use of a reading room in the UN library, 
see, Martensen, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 1, at 4, para. 7. 
387 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 98, para. 377. 
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Assembly. However, members of the Committee have made clear 
their view that notwithstanding resource scarcity, the Centre for 
Human Rights has been primarily responsible for the failure to 
provide a resource room. 388 It is difficult to understand, given the 
negligible level of secretariat back-up to the Committee, that this 
request should present such problems. It appears that the 
Committee is faced with the task not only of convincing States that 
it is a serious monitoring body, but also of persuading the Centre 
for Human Rights that it deserves more attention. 
6) Additional Infon-nation 
It was decided early on in the Committee's work, that "it 
would not be fair to reject a report presented by a State party on 
the grounds that it did not comply with the general guidelines. "389 
It was therefore considered that States should be given the 
opportunity to provide additional information at a later stage. 
Similarly, following the procedure of CEDAW, it has also been 
established that additional information could also be requested by 
the Committee on questions that were left unanswered following 
the consideration of the report. 
The question of how to deal with the additional information 
has been addressed by the Committee at its most recent sessions. 
The possibility of adopting the procedure of the HRC was 
discussed. There, State reports are assessed for their adequacy by a 
working group and the Committee is entitled to postpone 
consideration of a report which is insufficient. It was pointed out 
that such a procedure was not suitable for the CESCR which met 
only once a year, as it could seriously disrupt the scheduling for 
the consideration of the reports. 390 Accordingly the Committee 
will consider all reports scheduled. If, following that 
consideration, the Committee is in any way dissatisfied with either 
the written or oral reports, it will request the submission of 
additional information. 
Although the use of written material was intended to 
expedite the Committee's working methods, it is becoming clear 
that this is not be the case. It is perhaps a reflection of the poor 
quality of reports submitted to the Committee, which may be 
improved with the new general guidelines, but at its fifth session, 
for example, every State that appeared before the Committee was 
388 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 10, at 4, para. 24. 
389 E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 62, para-360. 
390 See, Simma, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 22, at 9, para. 71. 
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requested to provide additional information. If this trend continues it will place an even heavier burden on the Committee which is 
already overloaded with reports. 
At its sixth session, the Committee was in receipt of a 
number of pieces of additional information submitted by 
France, 391 the Netherlands, 392 Zaire, 393 Colombia394 and 
Jamaica. 395 It had been noted at the Committee's fifth session, that 
the procedure of the HRC was to consider additional information 
during the examination of that State Party's following report. 396 
This was considered to be unsuitable as it might mean an 
unnecessary delay of some four years before the issue was 
considered again. 397 Accordingly, the Committee decided upon the 
following arrangement. Additional information will be considered 
by the pre-sessional working group prior to the Committee's 
following session. 398 The member of the Committee who 
presented the Committee's concluding comments on the State 
Party's report will make a preliminary evaluation of the additional 
information. 399 Following that, the pre-sessional working group 
will assess whether the information supplied provided answers to 
the questions asked by the Committee, and whether it does so in an 
adequate fashion. 400 The Committee will then have 45 minutes 
designated to consider the additional information in plenary 
session at which a State representative may be present. 401 If any 
further questions are raised at this point, depending on when the 
next report is due, the State concerned will be requested to deal 
with such issues either before or in its next report. 402 Finally the 
391 E/1989/5/Add. 1 
392 E/1989/5/Add. 2 
393 E/1989/5 
394 E/1989/5/Add. 3. 
395 E/1989/5/Add. 4. 
396 See, Texier, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 2, para. 3. 
397Ibid. 
398 E/C. 12/1990/SR. 45, at 12, paras. 83-85. 
399 See, Marchan Romero, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 3, para. 7. 
400 See, Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 2, para. 5. 
401 See, Kouznetsov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 4, para. 15. 
402See, Alston, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 15, at 5, para. 18, and 
E/C. 12/199 l/SR. 18, at 2, para. 1. 
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conclusions of the Committee following its consideration of the 
additional information will be contained in a separate chapter in its final report. 403 
These procedures were operated at the Committee's sixth 
sessions where the additional information provided by Zaire and Colombia were considered. 404 Unfortunately three States, whose 
additional information was due to be considered, requested that the 
discussion should be postponed until the next report. This was 
agreed to by the Committee. It is considered that although it is 
often preferable that the State representatives appear before the 
Committee during the consideration of reports, at this stage in 
procedings the Committee should not compromise its schedule 
merely on that basis. It is unlikely that the representative 
concerned will be able to respond any more directly to the 
questions poseO.. In some cases the State will already have had the 
opportunity to respond three times. 'Ibus, the Committee should 
place importance upon reviewing the additional information 
according to its schedule whether or not the State is able to send a 
representative. 
Notwithstanding these considerations, the review of 
additional information appears to be a useful mechanism for the 
Committee. The conclusions drafted on the information supplied 
by Zaire, in particular, are detailed and well considered, take into 
account the arguments presented by the State and make a useful 
evaluation of areas of concern to the Committee. It is considered 
that the Committee should endeavour to continue adopting 
conclusions of that quality which are a credit to its perseverence. 
Much as the additional information process has been a 
success for the Committee, consideration will have to be given to 
the non-submission of such information. A number of States such 
as the United Kingdom and Mexico have been requested to provide 
the Committee with such information and as yet have failed to do 
so. '111e Committee will have to establish a procedure to deal with 
such a situation. It would be appropriate as a start, if the 
Secretariat were to provide the Committee with an outline of 
which States have been requested to provide additional information 
and which have not yet done so and send the appropriate 
403 See, Kouznetsov, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 46, at 5, para. 23. See, 
E/1992/23, Chapter VI, supra, note 166, at 76-80. 
404 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 76-80, paras. 323-331. 
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reminders. 405 7Fhe Committee may also consider taking action 
along the lines of the ILO Committee of Experts. There if a 
request for additional information is not complied with, the 
question may become one of "public observation". 406 
Additionally, as an incentive to States parties it could adopt the 
procedure of the HRC where, if the additional information is 
submitted promptly and fully, the Committee will, if appropriate, 
defer the date for the submission of the State party's next report. 
An interesting development at the Committee's sixth session, 
which could have considerable impact upon its future working 
methods, was its approach to the Dominican Republic. It made the 
following statement in its report: 
"The Committee notes that its request for an 
additional report... has not yet evoked a response 
from the Government. It notes that in the meantime it 
has received additional information from several 
sources, including that contained in document 
E/C. 12/1991/NGO/l, which, if accurate, would give 
rise to serious concern on the part of the Committee. 
The Committee thus requests the State party to 
suspend any actions which are not clearly in 
conformity with the provisions of the Covenant, and 
requests the Government to provide additional 
information to it as a matter of urgency. of 
The overt implication of this statement is that the Committee 
expects additional information to be provided as to the new 
situation over and above that already requested at its previous 
session. The statement is somewhat ambiguous, however, and does 
not clearly indicate the Committee's intention. It might be argued, 
for example, that the Committee is not in fact requesting 
information as to the new situation, but merely taking note of it. 
Additionally, it is possible that the Committee does not consider 
that its initial consideration of the report is "closed" and therefore 
the receipt of new information is still appropriate. 407 
405 This Is a procedure adopted by CAT. UN Doc. CAT/C/SR. 38, paras 
10-11. 
406 Valticos, supra, note 102, at 370. 
407 The su"restion was made at the Committee's sixth session that there V= 
were two kinds of requests for additional information. First, those which merely 
required the submission of figures, following the completion of the consideration 
of the report, that would not give rise to further discussion. Secondly, those 
which required the submission of substative information such that the provision 
of the information had to be considered as another stage in the consideration of 
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Another possibility, which has considerable import, is that 
the Committee is asserting its authority to request information or 
reports ad hoc, upon receipt of a "complaint" by an NGO or other interested party. Certainly, in so far as the Committee, through 
ECOSOC, has authority to establish a system for the submission of 
reports, it may undertake to create a mechanism of reporting in 
such situations. If this is the case then the Committee win be in a 
position to operate what might be seen as an "unofficial petition 
system". 
7) The Concluding Comments. 
As from its second session, the Committee has adopted the 
practice of making "con1cluding observations" or "comments if on 
the State reports at the end of the constructive dialogue. The 
precise nature and purpose of the concluding comments, however, 
has been the subject of a certain amount of confusion on the part 
of the Committee members. It would appear that they evolved as 
part of the "constructive dialogue" and represent a stage in the 
ongoing process of "consideration". As such they do not represent 
the "suggestions and recommendations of a general nature it 
mandated by ECOSOC to assist it in undertaking its responsibilities 
in articles 21 and 22 of the Covenant. 408 
It was noted at all of the Committee's early sessions that the 
concluding observations were often inconsistent, 409 imprecise410 
and an "unsatisfactory reflection of the Committee is 
proceedings. "411 71bis was partially due to the political climate in 
which the Committee was working, which made it difficult for the 
Committee to agree upon a stronger formulation. 412 A decision to 
delay the formulation of concluding comments for at least a day 
the report. Here the Committee's consideration could be said to be incomplete 
and should be resumed at the Committee's next session. Alston, 
E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 15, at 4, para. 13. Although having considerable merit, these 
proposals were not acted upon by the Committee. 
408 ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17 paraff), supra, note 89, at 21. 
409 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 23, at 6, para. 57. 
410 See, Nenernan, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 23, at 7, para. 58. 
411 Alston, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 24, at 5, para. 38. 
412 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 10, at 5, para. 27. CEDAW for 
example, briefly introduced the procedure of adopting concluding comments 
but 
discontinued it after failing to come to agreement about the statement. See, 
Byrnes A., "The'OtherHuman Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women", 14 
Yale JIL. 
1, at 21 (1989). 
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following the consideration of the report concerned, has only 
partially tackled the problem. A debate on the role of the 
"discussion leader" in the presentation of the Committee's 
concluding observations at its fifth session underlined the fact that 
no coherent conception of the nature of the observations was 
apparent. 413 It became apparent in that debate, that the "discussion 
leader" was merely to present a detailed and considered opinion on 
the quality of the report. Ihis in no way impeded other Committee 
members from disagreeing with the discussion leader or 
presenting their own views. 414 The "conclusions" of the Committee would be drawn up by the rapporteur who would 
reflect the nature of support for a particular view in the 
Committee's final report. 
The matter was further discussed at the Committee's sixth 
session following an initial proposal that outlined the criteria upon 
which the concluding comments should be made. 415 After some 
discussion, the Committee adopted the following criteria for 
formulating concluding observations: 
"(a) The extent to which the written report was 
satisfactory according to the Committee's guidelines; (b) The extent to which the responses to written 
questions were satisfactory, including an indication of 
any major issues with respect to which no satisfactory 
response had been received; (c) 'Ihe extent to which the oral and written reports, 
taken together, had enabled the Committee to identify 
the major obstacles to the realisation fo the rights 
under consideration; (d) The extent to which the State party concerned had 
demonstrated progress in the realisation of the rights 
concerned since the consideration of its earlier 
reports; (e) Identification of specific issues in relation to 
which: 
i) The Committee requrires more information, 
perhaps in the form of a further written submission; 
ii) The Committee considered further action to be 
required in order to satisfy the obligations contained 
in the Covenant; 
413 See generally, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 31, at 6-13. 
414 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 3 1, at 11, para. 50. 
415 See, Alston, E/C. 12/199 l/SR. 14, at 11, para. 50. 
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iii) The Committee considered that follow-up action, 
in terms of technical co-operation or international 
assistance, might be appropriate. "416 
What is clear from these criteria is that the Committee is prepared 
to declare whether or not it views the reports as being 
"satisfactory" or otherwise. 417 Ibis is something of a new 
departure for the Committee. ) which had previously rejected 
proposals that the concluding comments should either indicate 
whether the reports were satisfactory, 418 or which questions had 
not been answered satisfactorily. 419 In addition, the Committee 
appears willing to indicate the degree to which States are acting in 
conformity with the provisions of the Covenant. 420 In adopting the 
criteria, however, members of the Committee stressed that they 
should not be applied in an excessively formalistic manner. 421 and 
416 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 99-100, para. 383. 
417 This differs from Rule 66(3)(A) adopted by CERD in so far as it is 
the quality of reports, not the degree of compliance that is to be considered 
"satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory". With regard to the operation of this rule in 
CERD see, Buergenthal, supra, note 10, at 198. 
418 A proposal was made to include a provision in the Rules of 
Procedure which read: 
"The consideration of reports by States parties shall conclude with an opinion (statement) whereby the Committee shall inform the Council whether it deems 
that they way in which the State party fulfils its obligations under the Covenant 
is, in the main, satisfactory of unsatisfactory. In the absence of consensus 
among the members of the Committee on this opinion (statement), the matter 
shall be put to the vote in accordance with the terms of rules 45,46,48 and 49 of 
these rules. " 
Wimer Zambrano, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 22, at 9, para. 65. 
419 One member proposed that the Committee's report to ECOSOC 
should include "those questions which, in the opinion of the experts, have not 
been adequately dealt with. " Alvarez Vita, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 22,, at 5, para. 33. It 
was argued in response to this suggestion that it would require the Committee to 
arrive at conclusions as to which of its questions had not been adequately dealt 
with which at that time was not possible. Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 22, at 6, 
para. 37. In particular, it was felt that the Committee "must not be turned into a 
tribunal for judging States parties. " Simma, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 22, at 7, para-52. 
420 Interesting enough CERD did eventually adopt Rule 66(3)A in its 
Rules of Procedure entitling it to make suggestions and genral recommendations 
in cases of non-compliance. It has been commented that this gives 
it a "quasi- 
judicial" function when dealing with State reports. Buergenthal, supra, note 10, 
at 198. 
421 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 14, at 11, para. 53. 
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that bearing in mind the experience of CERD, 422 there was a need for subtlety and flexibility. 423 Accordingly, the criteria were not intended to require that reference to compliance should be made in 
every case, but merely that it should remain an option. 424 
That the Committee has declared its willingness to make 
evaluations as to the degree of compliance of States, although 
reflecting the recent practice of the Committee. 425 goes some way 
to clarify the perceived role of the Committee. For some time the 
Committee was in the paradoxical situation of seeking to avoid the 
impression that it is passing judgement on the perfon-nance of a 
given State, whilst evidently being forced to move in that direction 
by the theoretical and practical considerations of efficacy. 426 This 
point of view had led Committee members to argue, rather 
curiously, that the Committee's role was to undertake an 
"assessment" of the State reports which would not mean expressing 
criticism or making a judgement, but rather "including an 
observation in the Committee's report. "427 It has never been 
evident that the Committee could have undertaken a proper 
assessment without making critical comments in certain cases. 
The assumption by the Committee of such a "quasi-judicial" 
role was somewhat inevitable given the fact that the Committee is a 
body of independent experts with authority to receive 
communications from NGOs. That it has undertaken to make 
substantive evaluations of State reports will undoubtedly contribute 
considerably to its perceived effectiveness. 428 As has been noted, 
the willingness of the Committee to question State parties' 
compliance "serves only to strengthen the value of the body, as 
422 Tle rule adopted by CERD has been considered "too rigid and 
applying the same criteria to every report, which would prevent the Committee 
from taking into account the special circumstances of each country and not leave 
the Committee the required flexibility. " Das, supra, note 175, at 314. 
423 See, Simma, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 25, at 4, para. 23. 
424 See, Alston, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 25, at 5, para. 29. 
425 Witness its concluding comments on the report of the Dominican 
Republic. 
426 For the open contradictions of the previous situation see, Note by the 
Secretary-General, supra, note 
, 
at 48-49, paras 123-125. 
427 Texier, E/C. 12/1989/SR. 13, at 14, para. 71. 
428 Buergenthal correctly notes that the effectiveness of the reporting 
procedure "depends ultimately upon the willingness of the Committee to... make 
a formal determination that a State Party has not discharged its obligations under 
the Convention. " Buergenthal, supra, note 10, at 201. 
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well as to convey a clear sense of independence and the desire to 
carry out its mandate effectively ". 429 It is important to note, however, that the Committee will have to exercise this power with 
considerable discretion. Consideration will have to be given, for 
example, to the nature and quality of the information before it and 
the desirability of taking an adversarial rather than a co-operative 
stance. 
The main obstacle before the Committee in making 
substantive assessments of State compliance seems to be the Emits 
on its fact-finding capabilities. As Capotorti notes: 
11 
... 
a specific recommendation presumes an accurate 
verification of the circumstances.... Thus, whenever 
examination of reports is superficial... the only 
possible outcome consists in general 
recommendations: and these have the function of 
means for political pressure, rather than of true 
instruments for supervising the observance of 
agreements. "430 
However the Committee has wisely decided that it is not required 
to make precise evaluations in every case. It is in a position where 
it may make either specific or more general observations 
according to the nature and quality of the material before it. What 
seems to be required then is a balanced approach that recognises 
the importance of making concrete assessments yet maintains the 
co-operative approach already shown by the Conunittee. 
8) General Comments 
In response to an invitation addressed to it by ECOSOC in 
paragraph 9 of resolution 1987/5,431 endorsed by GA Resolution 
42/102, the Committee decided at its second sesSion432 to begin, as 
from its third session, to prepare general comments on the various 
articles and provisions of the Covenant "with a view to assisting 
the States Parties to fulfil their reporting obligations. "433 
Although article 21 of the Covenant refers to the possibility of 
ECOSOC making recommendations of a general nature to the 
General Assembly, the Committee's assumed power bears little 
429 Leckie S., "The Fifth Session of the Comnuittee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights", 13 Hum. Rts. 
-Q., 
539, at 547 (1991). 
430 Capotorti, supra, note 15, at 138. 
431 Supra, note 281. 
432 E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 63, para. 367 
433 E/1992/23, supra, note 166, at 12, para. 42. 
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relation to that provision. Rather, the Committee's authority to 
make such comments derives from its mandate to assist ECOSOC 
in the consideration of the State reports. Whether or not this could be said to be a power implied by the terms of the Covenant, it is 
evident that no States have ob ected to such an interpretation. 
As the Committee has stressed, the purpose of the General Comments is to assist the States parties in fulfilling their reporting 
obligations. More explicitly the Committee aims with its general 
comments: 
"to make the experience gained so far through the 
examination of these reports available for the benefit 
of all States parties in order to assist and promote 
their further implementation of the Covenant; to draw 
the attention of the States parties to insufficiencies 
disclosed by a large number of reports; to suggest 
improvements in the reporting procedures and to 
stimulate the activities of the States parties, the 
international organisations and the specialised agencies 
concerned in achieving progressively and effectively 
the full realisation of the rights recognised in the 
Covenant. "434 
The method by which the Committee adopts its general comments 
was made clear at its second session. Any member of the 
Committee may propose, at any time, that a general comment on a 
specific article or articles should be prepared. That member then 
submits an informal draft general comment for circulation. The 
Chairman of the Committee may choose either to call for a 
consideration of the draft in plenary or for its referral to a pre- 
sessional working group which considers all relevant proposals 
and submits a draft text to the Committee. 'Me text of the general 
comment, as adopted, is included in the Committee's annual report 
to ECOSOC and is brought to the attention of the General 
Assembly. Texts are also transmitted to States parties by the 
Secretary-General. Any comments from States parties or the 
specialised agencies are to be brought to the attention of the 
Committee at its following session. 435 
As has been evident in the practice of the HRC, the use of 
General Comments is an important mechanism for developing the 
jurisprudence of a Committee in a way that is not possible in 
individual comments on State reports. Not only does it provide a 
4341bid, at 12, para. 44. 
435 E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 64, para-370. 
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means by which jurisprudence may be generated at a faster rate (which is particularly important for a Committee in the early 
stages of its development), but it is also a means by which 
members of the Committee may come to an agreement by 
consensus as to an interpretation of a specific provision without facing the difficult issue of addressing individual States. 
Thus far the Committee has adopted four General 
Comments at its third, fourth, fifth and sixth sessions. 436 The first 
three General Comments were directed primarily at outlining the 
foundations of the reporting system and laying down an analytical 
framework for the future generation of right-specific jurisprudence. The first, deals with the nature of the reporting 
system, the second with international measures of technical 
assistance, and the third with the general obligations embodied in 
article 2(l). Each one has contributed to a general understanding 
of the Committee's work and has been warmly received. 437 The 
most recent, and perhaps most important General Comment thus 
far, has been on the right to housing in article 11 
- 
its first General 
Comment on a substantive article. 
The Committee makes clear that the role of General 
Comments is to convey a sense of the existing jurisprudence of the 
Covenant as viewed by the Committee. 438 Overtly, the function of 
the General Comments is merely descriptive. However, in its 
fourth General Comment, the Committee has taken a more 
constructive approach. In outlining the essential qualitative 
elements of the right to housing in article 11, it could hardly be 
said that the Committee was merely describing its current practice, 
nor could it be said to be a reflection of the information collected 
from State reports. 439 Instead, the Committee appears to be using 
the General Comment as a means of developing a common 
understanding of the norms by establishing a prescriptive 
436 General Comment No. 1, (E/1989/22, annex III[); General Comment 
No. 2, (E/1990/23, annex I[I); General Comment No. 3, (E/1991/23, annex III) 
and General Comment No. 4, (E/1992/23, annex III). The text of each General 
Comment may be found in the Appendices. 
437 See e. g., comments by Martenson on General Comment No. 2, 
E/C. 12/1990/SR. 36, at 2-3, paras 6-7. 
438 E/C. 12/190/CRP. 4, Chap. IH, at 9. It is clear nevertheless that the 
General Comments will not be confmed to the substantive rights in the 
Covenant, General Comments No. 1 and 2 thus reflect the broader terms of the 
Committee's mandate. 
439 General Comment No. 4 was produced as the result of extensive co- 
operation with NGOs, one of which drafted the initial version. 
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definition. By doing so, the Committee appears to be asserting its 
authority to exercise an interpretative function in abstracto, rather 
than confining that function to its particular role in the 
consideration of State reports. Although such interpretations are 
not binding per se, it is undoubtedly true that they have 
considerable legal weight. 
In absence of an authoritative procedure for settling 
divergencies of opinion over the interpretation of the Covenant, it 
is for the State parties to construe the Covenant for themselves. 
Individual States may put forward their own interpretations of the Covenant's provisions but such interpretations are by no means 
authoritative and may be rejected by other States. In fact States 
have rarely made direct statements regarding the meaning of 
Covenant provisions. The only real indication as to an agreement 
by States of a particular interpretation of the Covenant is to be 
found where there is a significant degree of concurrence in State 
practice. The relevant State practice is to be found not merely in 
how the States undertake to realise the rights, but also in their 
participation in the supervisory processes of the Covenant. As 
Meron commented: 
"... the Committee may be competent to interpret the 
Convention insofar as required for the performance 
of the Committee's functions. Such an interpretation 
per se is not binding on States parties, but it affects 
their reporting obligations and their internal and 
external behaviour. It shapes the practice of States in 
applying the Convention and may establish and reflect 
the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation. "440 
Indeed,, the endorsement by ECOSOC and the General Assembly (in which significant numbers of States parties participate) of the 
Committee's annual report gives considerable weight to the 
Committees interpretations. 441 
Given the fact that the terms of the Covenant are 
particularly vague and the general absence, on the national or 
international plane, of an understanding of the content of the 
440 Meron T., Human Rights Law-MaIdn in the United Nations, at 10 
(1986). He was spealdng specifically about CERD, but his analysis is still 
pertinent in the context of the Committee. 
441 Tomuschat similarly argues that the HRC, by the fact of its 
independence and impartiality, is "the best suited meeting point and clearing 
centre for diverging interpretations" of the ICCPR put forth by 
States with 
different ideological standpoints. Tomuschat C., "National Implementation of 
International Standards on Human Rights". n. H. R. Y., 31, at 36 (1984/5). 
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rights, there is a necessity for the Committee to attempt to fill the 
void. Until it does so, economic, social and cultural rights win 
remain, in the minds of many, general aspirations which bind States in only the most general manner. The Committee does not benefit by having a petition system in which general principles 
may be established, and the "constructive dialogue" is a most 
unsatisfactory means of developing jurisprudence. Considerable 
importance must be placed, therefore, upon the use of General Comments to develop a general understanding of the norms within 
the Covenant. Once it has created a qualitative framework 
outlining the general scope and content of each of the rights, the 
Committee will be in a far better position to utilise the reporting 
procedure effectively. 
Unfortunately, despite the urgency with which the 
Committee needs to develop its jurisprudence, it has, as yet, only 
succeeded in producing one General Comment each session. 
Ideally, it would be for the Secretariat to produce draft comments 
for discussion and adoption by the Committee. In absence of 
sufficient Secretariat resources or motivation to take on such a 
role, the Committee should look to other means by which the 
production of General Comments may be increased. In the near 
future, consideration could be given to sacrificing the constructive, 
but less productive, general discussion in favour of adopting 
additional General Comments. 
9) The General Discussion 
At the Committee's second session it was felt that a general 
discussion would be useful to its work. One member commented in 
presenting the idea to the Committee that: 
"the reporting process was designed to encourage 
States parties to reflect on their general policies with 
respect to economic, social and cultural rights and on 
the issues raised by the members of the Committee. 
However, at no time did the Committee try to 
synthesize all the information put before it and to 
understand all the implications of specific rights. It 
could do so by earmarking one day in each session, 
perhaps in the third week, for such a discussion. That 
discussion would be based on the reports of States 
parties over the previous 10 years and focus on 
interesting practices and experiences in different 
countries and economic and social systems with 
regard to the right under consideration. It would be 
facilitated by inputs from relevant specialised 
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agencies, but would not focus upon or criticise 
specific reports by States parties... No elaborate 
conclusions need be drafted... "442 
It was commented, in addition, that the Committee would establish 
a "common assessment of the criteria relating to the observance of 
the Covenant" and would "lay the foundations of its future work" by providing for the "concrete expression of the Covenant on an increasingly uniform basis. "443 In addition it would facilitate the 
exchange of experience among States and to develop a better 
understanding of the content and implications of different 
rights. 444 
It has become the practice of the Committee to devote one 
day at each session to a general discussion of one specific right or 
a particular aspect of the Covenant "in order to develop in greater 
depth its understanding of the relevant issues. " At the third session 
the principal emphasis was on the right to adequate food, 445 at the 
fourth the right to housing, 446 and at the sixth, the focus was on 
the use of economic and statistical indicators pertaining to the 
work of the Committee. 447 
In the discussion the Committee has sought to draw widely 
on the available expertise which may assist its work. In particular 
it has invited special rapporteurs from the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, 
experts from relevant Non-Governmental Organisations and 
representatives of the Specialised Agencies (ILO, FAO, WHO, 
UNESCO) and other UN organs (UNDP, UNRISD and the UN 
Centre for Human Settlements). 
The discussions have highlighted issues of importance, 
allowed the Committee to address broader issues that are not 
directly related to its examination of State reports and has served 
to develop the relationship between the Committee and other 
interested bodies. It is particularly notable that the participation of 
NGOs has been considerably greater at such discussions than in 
other stages of its work. 
442AIston, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 22, at 5, para. 30. 
443Rattray, E/C. 12/1988/SR. 22, at 5, para. 31. 
444E/1988/14, supra, note 165, at 60, para. 349. 
445UN Docs. E/C. 12/1989/SR. 20-21. 
446UN Docs. E/C. 12/1990/SR. 22-23. 
447UN Docs. E/C. 12/1991/SR. 20-21. 
473 
It was considered by several members at the Committee's 
third session that the general discussion (on the right to food), 
might be expected to provide the basis of a draft general comment in future. 448 However., only in the case of the right to housing has 
the general discussion actually born fruit. The general criticism 
may be made that although the general discussions are undoubtedly 
useful, they are not entirely productive. The Committee has 
adopted the practice of summarising the outline of the general discussions in its annual report, but such outlines give little 
indication of any common agreement. 
It is considered that given the lack of time available to the 
Committee, emphasis should be placed upon using its time in a 
productive manner. In particular it could look to the 
establishment, at the end of the debate, of a number of general 
principles that demonstrate common agreement. It would also be 
appropriate for the Committee to make it a policy that a general 
comment be drafted following all of its general discussions. If 
agreement on such a draft is not possible, that might signify the 
need to discuss the matter further. 
10) Technical Assistance 
The Covenant specifically envisages the use of technical assistance 
in the implementation of the rights within the Covenant. Article 22 
reads: 
"'Ille Economic and Social Council may bring to the 
attention of other organs of the United Nations, their 
subsidiary organs and specialized agencies concerned with 
furnishing technical assistance any matters arising out of the 
reports referred to in this part of the present Covenant 
which may assist such bodies in deciding, each within its 
field of competence, on the advisability of international 
measures likely to contribute to the effective progressive 
implementation of the present Covenant. " 
Moreover, it is clear that under article 23, the possible international 
measures for the implementation of the rights was not strictly limited to 
technical assistance, but included "a range of possible international 
action". The idea behind the inclusion of these articles was that the 
promotion of economic, social and cultural rights depended to a 
considerable extent on the extent economic conditions and therefore the 
provision of technical assistance was of considerable relevance. 
Essentially, with the wide definition of technical assistance, these 
provisions throw open the concem of the Committee through ECOSOC, 
4u E/1989/22, supra, note 170, at 73, para. 330. 
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to all action taken within the United Nations that may affect the 
economic, social and cultural rights of a given population. The Committee has emphasised this point by identifying a large number of bodies to which it feels itself capable of directing its recommendations including inter alia the UNDP, UNICEF, IMF, I]BRD,, ILO UNESCO, 
FAO and the VMO. 449 
The Committee has directed itself in two main directions in its 
recommendations regarding technical assistance. First, it has made 
certain recommendations to institutions concerned with development 
activities to the effect that consideration should be given at all times to 
the impact of economic policies on the economic, social and cultural 
rights of the population. 450 The concern of the Committee is primarily 
upon the need to ensure that assistance programmes do not negatively 
affect the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. It must be 
recognised however that by the terms of article 22, this is a somewhat 
limited goal. Essentially what is required is the specific direction of 
technical assistance towards the realisation of the rights. 
Secondly, the Committee has recommended action to be taken by 
the Secretariat to assist developing States in complying with their 
reporting requirements through, for example, the establishment of 
ally training courses. 451 As the provision of advisory services is technic ii 
outside the competence and capabilities of the Committee itself, the 
Committee's interest has been to make recommendations to the 
Secretariat. Accordingly, following the invitation of the Under-Secretary 
General, the Committee outlined its suggestions for the development of 
the Advisory Services programme452 with regard to the Covenant. In 
particular it suggested the provision of: 
a) technical assistance in reviewing national legislation, or drafting 
appropriate legislative or other instruments as necessary as preparation 
for the possible ratification of the Covenant. 
b) technical assistance in the preparation of an initial report, including 
monitoring of the situation with respect to the enjoyment of the rights. 
c) assistance to enable a State parties to send an expert to present the 
449 General Comment No. 2 (1990), supra, note 360, at 86, para. 2. 
45OIbid, at 86-89. 
451 See below, text accompanying note 463. 
452 The Advisory Services programme was created by GA Resn. 926 (X), 
(1955). It has four basic functions: the provision of advisory services by experts; the 
awarding of fellowships and sholarships; the holding of international seminars; and the 
organisation of regional or national training courses. 
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report to the Committee, where it would otherwise be unable to do SO. 453 The Committee has also stressed that note should be made of 
article 23 of the Covenant which provides for the holding of regional 
meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of consultation and 
study organised in conjunction with the Governments concerned. It 
concluded that "every effort should be made to ensure that economic, 
social and cultural rights are, wherever possible, on the agenda of an 
regional and other training courses, workshops and seminars. "454 
It is clear that the UN programme of technical assistance compares 
rather poorly with that undertaken by the ELO. 455 ne principal 
problem facing the Committee is that it has no authority to provide, or 
require that technical assistance be provided. All it is capable of doing, is 
to pass on requests for technical assistance to the Secretariat or other 
bodies concerned and hope that they might be taken up. It has not been 
helped in this regard by the failure of States to indicate themselves what 
assistance they require. 
G) THE ROLE OF OTHER BODIES IN THE COMMITTEE'S WORK 
1) The Secretariat 
Given the range and complexity of issues confronting the 
Committee the need for strong secretariat assistance is paramount. 456 In 
contrast to the rather ambiguous relationship that the HRC has with the 
Secretariat (as it is not a United Nations Body per se) the Committee has 
no such problems. As an expert group of a UN organ, the Secretariat is 
automatically responsible for its servicing. The general functions of the 
Secretariat can be described inter alia as: 
1) Providing the Committee with summary records of its proceedings 
it with the necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of 
its functions bearing in mind the need to give adequate publicity to its 
work. "457 
2) Ensuring that the UN press service issues press releases on the 
454 Ibid. 
455 See, Leary V., "Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour 
.4 
Organisation", in Alston P. (ed), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical 
Assessment, 580, at 589-60 (1992). 
456 Sohn, supra, note 61, at 35. 
457 ECOS OC Resn. 19 85/17, para. (g), supra, note 89, at 2 1. For the Worldng 
Group see ECOSOC Decision 1979/43, para. 15, (11 May 1979), in, UN 
Doc. E/C. 12/1989/4, at 8. ECOSOC Resn. 1982/33, para. (e), (6 May 1982), ibid, at 13. 
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2) Ensuring that the UN press service issues press releases on the Committee's proceedings. 458 
3) Bringing the suggestions and recommendations of the Committee to 
the attention of States Parties. 459 
4) Giving publicity to the proceedings of the Committee. 460 
5) Sending reminders to States Parties from which reports have not been 
received. 461 
6) Bringing the report of the Committee to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-Commission, CERD, CEDAW, 
HRC and other UN organs, specialised agencies concerned with 
providing technical assistance and regional commissions. 462 
7) Providing Advisory Services to assist States Parties in discharging 
their reporting obligations, including holding training courses on the 
preparation of reports. 463 
8) Providing a compilation from official UN sources of statistics relevant 
to the Committee's work. 464 
9) The establishment and maintenance of files of information on the 
4-% ECOSOC Resn. 1983/41, para. 8, (27 May 1983), in, UN 
Doc. E/C. 12/1989/4, at 15 (1988); ECOSOC Resn. 1984/9, para. 6, (24 May 1984), ibid, 
at 17. 
459 ECOSOC Resn. 1984/9, ibid, para. 8. 
460 ECOS OC Resn. 19 87/5, supra, note 28 1, at para. 12. 
461 ECOSOC Decision 1979/43, para. 14,11 May 1979. 
462 ECOS OC Resn. 19 87/5, supra, note 28 1, at para. 10. 
463 ECOSOC Resn. 1987/5, supra, note 28 1, at para. 11. Following the 
invitation of the Under-Secretary General, the Committee outlined its suggestions for the 
development of the Advisory Services programme with regard to the Covenant. In 
particular it suggested: 
a) technical assistance in reviewing national legislation, or drafting appropriate legislative 
or other instruments as necessary as preparation for the possible ratification of the 
Covenant. 
b) technical assistance in the preparation of an initial report, including monitoring of the 
situation with respect to the enjoyment of the rights. 
c) assistance to enable a State parties to send an expert to present the report to the 
Committee, where it would otherwise be unable to do so. 
In addition the Committee has stressed that note should be made of article 23 of 
the Covenant which provides for the holding of regional meetings and technical meetings 
for the purpose of consultation and study organised in conjunction with the 
Governments concerned. It concluded that "every effort should be made to ensure that 
economic, social and cultural rights are, wherever possible, on the agenda of all regional 
and other training courses, workshops and serninars. " F, /1989/22, supra, note 165, at 
76, paras 343-345. 
464 ECOSOC Resn. 1987/5, para. 13,26 May 1987. 
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States Parties to the Covenant. 465 
10) Providing a table of issues for the Pre-Sessional Working Group 
identifying those issues that a State Party has not addressed in its report 
that is required by the reporting guidelines. 466 
11) Providing for the Rapporteur or other member, a dossier of information on the current developments of relevance to the 
Committee. 467 
The relationship between the Committee and the Secretariat has 
not been a happy one. Members of the Committee have repeatedly 
expressed, with due cause, their great dissatisfaction with the general 
lack of support provided by the Secretariat. The Committee is serviced 
by a single member of the Centre of Human Rights, who also has duties 
with respect to other human rights committees. The assistance provided 
to the Committee on a steady basis includes merely the provision of basic 
secretarial services and the drafting of routine parts of the report. Thus 
far, outside the production of a very limited bibliography, virtually no 
research or other analytical work has been undertaken by the Secretariat 
on behalf of the Committee. Indeed it has been noted that "once the 
annual session was finished, members received no more than one or two 
perfunctory administrative communications until the following session 
began". 468 
Although the Committee would clearly appreciate the Secretariat 
playing a greater role in its work, its main cause for complaint has been 
the almost total lack of cooperation. It is perceived that the problem is 
not merely one of financial hardship on the part of the Centre for Human 
Rights but mismanagement and lack of concern. Even the fairly limited 
requests for assistance, such as the compilation of files of information on 
States and the creation of a human rights treaty resource room, have not 
received satisfactory attention. 
As has been noted elsewhere, the Committees effectiveness would 
be greatly enhanced by proper Secretariat support. Ideally, the 
Secretariat would undertake functions., in addition to those outlined 
above, such as the production of draft General Comments and other 
analytical reports, the collection and compilation of information both 
from official and unofficial sources (such as NGOs) on the situation in 
each of the State parties, the identification of inadequacies in State 
reports and issues that deserve further consideration, and the provision 
of advice and assistance to States parties as to how they might 
further the 
465 E/1990/23, supra, note 184,, at 75, para. 298. 
466 Ibid. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Alston, supra, note 30, at 502. 
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enjoyment of the rights. It is patently unrealistic to expect the Committee, which meets for a limited time each year, to undertake all of 
these functions itself. If the operation of the Covenant is to have any long- 
term success, there is a pressing need for the Secretariat to begin 
undertaking a more active role in the work of the Committee. 
2) The Economic and Social Council 
On the basis that the Committee is mandated with assisting 
ECOSOC in the consideration of State reports, it might be assumed that 
ECOSOC itself would take some part in the evaluation process much like 
the ELO Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations. 469 To that end, the Committee is asked to include in 
the report on its activities, a summary of its consideration of the reports 
submitted by States parties to the Covenant. 470 
In practice ECOSOC does little more than make note of the 
Committee's report. Indeed, it was decided after the Committee's third 
session that in future the reports of the Committee would be discussed 
not by ECOSOC in plenary, but by its Social CounciJ471 which has no 
provision for summary records. 472 In justifying such action, it was noted 
that even if ECOSOC did not consider the report in plenary, it was 
referred to the General Assembly Third Committee where the report 
was given substantive consideration. 473 
Although it was noted with disappointment that ECOSOC took 
little interest in the report of the Committee, 474 it was stressed that 
ECOSOC should not be encouraged to pronounce on any substantive 
matters which were rightly in the exclusive domain of the Committee. 475 
To the extent that the Council should not take over those functions 
adopted by the Committee this decision is undoubtedly correct. However, 
it cannot be maintained on the other hand that ECOSOC has no essential 
469 The report of the ILO Committee of Experts iis considered by the Conference 
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. It chooses the 
most important cases that arise and asks the government for explanations. The replies 
form the basis of a discussion within the Conference Committee and in particularly 
serious disputes a procedure for "direct contact" exists whereby a representative of the 
Director General undertakes a discussion, in the country concerned, with the 
governmental authorities. 
470 ECOS OC Resn. 1985/17, supra, note 89. 
471 See, Houshmand, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 1, at 10, para. 70. 
472 See, Badawi El Sheikh, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 3, at 7, para. 45. 
473 See, Houshmand, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 3, at 9, para. 59. 
474 See, Simma, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 3, at 9, para. 55. 
475 See, Alston, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 3, at 9, para. 56. 
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role in the implementation process. It is, after all, the Council that is 
empowered with making general recommendations to be submitted to the General Assembly. 
Any conclusions drawn by the Committee following the 
consideration of State reports become the responsibility of ECOSOC 
when the report is adopted. This would suggest that the Council has a direct interest in considering the report in some depth. From the point of 
view of the Committee, it is clearly better if the Council, which has 
direct control over its resources, is aware of all its issues and concerns. 
H) THE FUTURE: AN OPTIONAL PROTOCOL? 
Despite the fact that proposals for a petition procedure relating to 
economic, social and cultural rights were specifically rejected during the 
drafting of the Covenant, at the Committee's most recent sessions the 
debate has been revived. 'Me Committee has undertaken several 
discussions as to the possibility of drafting an Optional Protocol to the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to provide for some 
form of individual or group complaints mechanism. Whereas in earlier 
sessions the debate generally ended with the conclusion that it was "too 
early" to consider realistically the possibility of such a system, 476 at its 
sixth session in 1991 it was generally felt that the matter deserved 
further consideration. 
The Committee had before it a useful document produced by 
Professor Alston outlining a number of arguments in favour of 
developing an Optional ProtoCol. 477 Whilst the majority of the 
Committee agreed that the institution of an Optional Protocol would be a 
beneficial development both in terms of increasing the status of the 
Covenant and the Committee. 478 and in terms of improving the degree 
of protection offered, questions were raised as to the form that the 
Optional Protocol would take. It was generally considered that an inter- 
state petition system would not be fully effective, 479 and that individuals 
and possibly NGOS should have standing to submit complaints,, 480 but it 
was questioned whether a system like that operated by the HRC in which 
476 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/1990/SR. 4, at 5, para. 17. 
477 See,, Discussion Note, E/C. 12/1991/WP. 2. 
478 See e. g., Konate, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 13, at 10, para. 51; Bonoan-Dandan, 
E/C. 12/1991/SR. 14, at 14, para. 67. 
479 See e. g., Simma, E/C. 12/1991/SR-14, at 13, para. 
61. 
480 See e. g., Mratchkov, E/C. 12/1991/SR-13, at 9, para. 
43. 
480 
decisions were not binding was satisfactory. 481 It was also suggested that 
there was a need for the Committee to do further work in establishing 
benchmarkS482 and that the system, if established, should operate only in 
relation to a limited number of rights. With regard to the latter point it 
was commented that: 
"... it was inconceivable that it should subject the fun range 
of economic, social and cultural rights, particularly those 
enshrined in the crucial article 11, to the kind of legalistic jurisprudential review undertaken by the Human Rights 
Committee. "483 
The result of the debate was that the Committee decided to consider the 
possibility of the Optional Protocol in more detail at its seventh session. 
It is considered that the creation of a system of individual or NGO 
complaints is an attractive proposition on a number of grounds. First and 
formost, such a system, if operated effectively, would vastly increase the 
level of national and international awareness of both the Covenant and 
the Committee. This in turn may encourage better reporting and more 
participation by NGOs, stimulate the institution of domestic remedies, 
and generate greater support for the work of the Committee (including 
more sessions and Secretariat involvement). 
Secondly, the insititution of a complaints mechanism would enable 
the Committee to increase the effectiveness of the supervision system in a 
way not possible otherwise. Not only would it provide an additional 
means of supervision bringing extra force to bear on recalcitrant States, 
it would provide the Committee with the ability to develop the normative 
content of the rights in a specific and tangible manner. As Alston has 
noted: 
"... the collected 'views' of the Committee based on 
individual cases are of much greater value in shedding light 
on the meaning of the various rights formulations than 
either the Committee's General Comments or the insights 
generated by its examination of State reports". 484 
Contrary to the general perception of petition systems, their value lies 
not so much in the degree to which they operate as corrective or 
remedial mechanisms, but rather in the specificity they provide to the 
481 See, Simma, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 14, at 13, para-64. 
482 See e. g., Rattray, E/C. 12/199 1/SR. 13, at 7, para. 36. 
483 Simma, E/C. 12/1991/SR. 14. ) at 13, para. 62. 
484 Discussion Paper, supra, note 477, at 7, para. 18. 
481 
norms allowing States to appreciate in advance the precise type of action 
required of them. 485 
'Me principal argument against the creation of a petition system 
relating to economic, social and cultural rights, has been, and remains, 
the idea that they are essentially non-justiciable. More specifically, it is 
argued that given the promotional nature of the rights and the generality 
of their terminology, it would be impossible for a supervisory body to 
decide whether or not a State is acting in conformity with its 
obligations under the Covenant. As was suggested during the drafting of 
the Covenant, complaints "could only refer to insufficient programmes 
in the attainment of certain goals and it would be impossible for the 
committee to determine what the rate of progress in any particular case 
should be". 486 
It is coming to be accepted that it is no longer valid to characterise 
economic, social and cultural rights as exclusively "promotional" or 
entirely non-justiciable. There is increasing evidence of economic, social 
and cultural rights being the subject of international petitions. 487 As far 
as the Committee is concerned, it has already gone some way to 
identifying rights and obligations within the Covenant that require 
immediate implementation and therefore would traditionally be suited to judicial determination. In particular, it has mentioned article 3 (equal 
rights for men and women), article 7(a)(i) (equal remuneration for work 
of equal value), article 8 (trade union rights), article 10(3) (protection of 
children from exploitation), article 13(2)(a) (free and compulsory 
primary education), article 13(3) (respect for parental choice in 
education), article 13(4) (right to establish and direct educational 
institutions), article 15(3) (freedom of scientific research and creative 
activity). 488 In addition, the Committee has indicated that those aspects 
of rights that involve State abstention would similarly be capable of 
immediate implementation. A number of examples could be: freedom 
485 As Vasak notes, petition systems operate not so much to present a remedy 
for the individual or group, but to prevent the reoccurrence of that situation. Vasak, 
supra, note 12, at 216: 
486 UN Doc. A/2929, supra, note 33, at 124, para. 41. 
487 One may cite the recent jurisprudence of the HRC and CERD. It should also 
be noted that the Migrant Workers Convention and UNESCO operate petition systems 
in 
the field of economic, social and cultural rights. Moreover, the Inter-American system 
has recently adopted a protocol allowing for individual petitions on economic, social and 
cultural rights, and there is evidence that a system might be established under the 
European Social Charter, see, Harris, supra, note 148, at 673-4. 
488 See, General Comment No. 3, (1990), in, UN Doc. E/1990/23, Annex III, at 
84, para-5. 
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from forced labour (article 6(l)), freedom from arbitrary dismissal (article 6), and freedom from arbitrary eviction (article 11). 
Such arguments suggest that there is, in fact, a justiciable core to 
every human right and indeed that it would be theoretically possible to 
operate a petition system with respect to economic, social and cultural 
rights. The impression left by the Committee, however, is that it would be better to institute an Optional Protocol with respect to a limited range 
of rights, leaving in particular, rights such as those relating to food, 
housing and health to one side. 'Me perceived problem is that those 
rights that are phrased in excessively general terms and which are, for 
the main part, to be implemented progressively, might not be suited to judicial determination. 
At a theoretical level, it is considered that it is entirely 
inappropriate for the Committee to devide the rights into those which are 
suited to a petition procedure and those which are not. Not only would it 
undermine the indivisibility of the rights, but it would also raise 
questions as to the relative importance of each group of rights. More 
importantly, however, it is considered that the problems associated with 
the operation of a petition system in relation to general or progressive 
rights are overstated. 
First, in theory, whether or not a provision is worded generally or 
is subject to progressive implementation, there is nothing to prevent a 
body with the necessary interpretative powers from making a decision as 
to the compliance of a State with its obligations. The decision might be a 
difficult one to make, but that is a different question. The justiciability of 
a particular issue depends, not upon the quality of the decision, but 
rather upon the authority of the body to make the decision. Prima facie 
then, in so far as the Committee is given the authority to assume a quasi- judicial role over the rights in the Covenant those rights will be justiciable. 
'The Committee,, however, in order to maintain its credibility, 
would have to concern itself with the quality of the decisions made. 
Given the difficulty of establishing either the precise conditions of 
deprivation or the direct responsibility of States, the Committee will 
have to allow the States a margin of appreciation. Although this will 
mean concentrating upon overt or manifest violations of the Covenant, it 
does not entirely deprive the procedure of merit. 
It is clear that the precise temis and conditions under which a 
complaints mechanism might operate will have to be established and 
agreed upon by the States parties. It will be for the Committee, however, 
to act as the spur to encourage any such action to be taken. For the 
Committee to effectively push through the institution of such a 
mechanism itself, it will have to demonstrate the necessity and 
advisability of such a development. The primary means by which 
it 
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might do so is through developing its existing supervisory role in a way 
that shows the potential of a complaints mechanism. 
IV CONCLUSION 
It is undoubtedly the case that in the relatively short period of time 
that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has been 
charged with monitoring the implementation of the Covenant, it has 
transformed the supervision system beyond recognition. The Committees 
work has been marked by a series of procedural reforms, undertaken 
swiftly and with relative ease, that places it in the position of having one 
of the most developed and potentially effective reporting mechanisms of 
all the human rights supervisory bodies. Notably, the Committee has 
undertaken to receive information from Non-Governmental 
Organisations, has adopted the procedure of making State-specific 
comments following its consideration of State reports, conducts General 
Discussions with experts from other fields and organisations, and drafts 
General Comments to farther an understanding of the normative content 
of the rights in the Covenant and the reporting obligations. 
Tbat the Committee has been able to undertake such far-reaching 
procedural reforms is partially a reflection of the 
nature of its mandate. Essentially the Committee is charged with assisting 
the Economic and Social Council with the consideration of State reports. 
Unlike other human rights Committees, the CESCR is not constrained by 
specific textual provisions in the treaty, it receives its authority from, 
and is primarily responsible to ECOSOC. ECOSOC itself is authorised 
merely to "consider" State reports. Its approach has been to interpret this 
mandate in a wide sense, allowing the Committee considerable lee-way in 
its development of procedural initiatives. 
The success of the Committee in its reform process is more 
significantly a reflection of the friendly and co-operative relations 
between its members. On no occasion has it been necessary to take 
decisions other than by consensus, nor has there been any serious 
disagreement between Committee members. Effectively, much work is 
conducted informally with compromises and agreements being made out 
of session. The formal cohesiveness of the Committee is, to a large 
extent, a reflection of the amount of informal work that takes place. 
Having said that, the development of the Committee's work has been 
pushed forward by a small number of members. Others, while not being 
opposed to the direction in which the Committee is moving, have not 
tended to contribute as fully as they might. Ibis is fortuitous in the sense 
that it allows a greater unity of purpose, but it also means that the work 
load becomes disproportionately spread. one might also speculate on the 
possibly disastrous scenario in which certain of the more active members 
are not re-elected to the Conunittee in future. 
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Notwithstanding the success of its reforms, the Committee still faces a number of problems in developing the effectiveness of the 
supervision process. In particular one might note the continuing 
inadequacy of the State reports, the failure on the part of a large number 
of States to report in a timely manner and the disruption of the process 
of supervision by States failing to appear before the Committee. In 
addition, the Committee itself is subject to considerable pressure by the 
fact that it has only a single three-week session per annum. Quite 
appropriately, the Committee has sought to ease the reporting burden 
and expedite the process of considering reports, but has not resorted to 
taking measures that might compromise the quality of supervision. 
The largest problem facing the Committee, however, is posed by 
the substance of the Covenant itself. The breadth of subjects covered by 
the Covenant, combined with the lack of jurisprudence (whether national 
or international) in certain vital areas such as health and nutrition, mean 
that significant importance has to be placed upon the Committee's 
it creative" or "interpretative" functions. That it has undertaken to draft 
General Comments to develop an understanding of the normative content 
of the rights is a useful development in this respect. However, there is no 
doubt that the Committee lacks the support of a skilled and committed 
Secretariat prepared to produce analytical reports and provide other 
necessary assistance. Thus far, the Secretariat not only has failed to 
provide the form of support that ideally would be expected of it, but it 
has done little to assist the Committee in taking up those tasks itself. The 
failure to provide a resource room for the human rights treaty bodies 
stands out in this respect. 
Although the Committee's procedural reforms have been directed 
at increasing its effectivenes as a supervisory body, they have also lent its 
work a certain duplicity. Whilst the reforms themselves, have placed the 
Committee in the position whereby it is theoretically capable of making 
substantive evaluations of the degree of State compliance with the 
obligations under the Covenant, it has shown itself, until recently, 
unwilling to do so. The Committee itself, has preferred to characterise 
its role as one of monitoring, and facilitating the provision of technical 
advice and assistance. The inherent tension in its position is evident from 
the fact that monitoring itself does not exclude the possibility of making 
quasi-judicial determinations of compliance, and that the Committee is 
not really in a position to undertake a significant role in the provision of 
technical assistance. 
There are indications, nevertheless, that the Committee is wining, 
on occasion, to take a more adversarial stance. Certainly, in so far as the 
Committee is capable of receiving information from NGOs and has 
undertaken to make concluding observations of a substantive nature on 
the State reports, it is likely to develop its role in making quasi-judicial 
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determinations of compliance. Indeed, if it adopts the authority to 
request ad hoc reports, the procedure might evolve at some stage into an 
unofficial complaints mechanism. At present, however, in light of the 
present lack of established standards, minimal NGO participation, and 
insufficient information, it is considered that the Committee should act 
with a certain amount of discretion. 
Similar considerations have to be born in mind with respect to the 
proposed institution of an official complaints mechanism in the form of 
an Optional Protocol. Undoubtedly, a complaints system would be a 
useful and beneficial development, not merely in terms of increasing the 
level of supervision, but in so far as it would assist in the normative 
development of the Covenant and would elevate the status of the 
Covenant as a human rights instrument. That there might be certain 
difficulties in establishing criteria to guide decision-making as regards 
the more generally-stated and progressive rights, should not be 
overstated. Indeed, in so far as a complaints systems would be the most 
effective mechanism for defining State obligations in a specific and 
concrete manner, suggests that the generality of the norms should not 
stand in the way of such a development. 
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It is something of a paradox that the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was intended to form part of the new 
world order following the Second World War, is now, forty seven 
years later, only in the early stages of its development. An unduly lengthy and complex drafting process followed by a slow process of 
ratification meant that the Covenant only entered into force in 1976. It 
suffered a false start with the abortive supervision process operated by 
the Working Group such that the beginning of its development as an 
effective human rights treaty essentially began in 1987 with the creation 
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
That the emergence and development of the Covenant has been a 
painfully slow process may be put down, to a large extent, to the 
political and ideological forces that have used human rights as a 
battleground. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were long 
championed by the Socialist States who, whilst ensuring their inclusion 
in a human rights treaty, were not prepared to accept strong 
implementation (or rather supervision) procedures. Western States, on 
the other hand, in making unsubstantiated and categorical claims about 
the nature of economic, social and cultural rights, ensured that they 
were separated from their civil and political counterparts in a different 
instrument. The resulting Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights was a poor counterpart to the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, suffering in particular from a weaker implementation 
procedure. ýffie political or ideological conflict continued into the mid-1980s 
and effectively ensured that the already weak supervision system created 
for the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights would have 
little real force. The revitalisation of the Covenant, under the auspices 
of the Committee, may be indirectly attributed to the end of the 
ideological confrontation between East and West, the democratisation 
process in former Socialist States and the strengthening of international 
co-operation. 
The emergence of the Committee may also be appreciated as a 
response to the increasing interest in, and concem with economic, social 
and cultural welfare which accompanied the political "enlightenment" of 
the 1980s. Despite the resolutely "monetarist" philosophies of the UK 
and the USA, it had become evident in the context of development at 
least, that attention needed to be paid to the economic and socially 
vulnerable, and that sustainable development was not to be achieved 
merely by reliance upon economic growth and the "trickle down" effect 
as advocated in the early 1970s. More recently, development 
organisations such as the World Bank and UNDP have begun to place 
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emphasis upon the notion of "good governance" (broadly speaking the 
range of civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights) and have 
noted the importance of basic needs in the development process. 
Whilst there is increasing awareness and concern as to the 
economic, social and cultural welfare of populations, this has not, as 
yet, been entirely transposed into the context of human rights. On the 
one hand, there remains considerable resistance on the part of legal 
commentators to the acceptance of economic, social and cultural rights 
on the same basis as civil and political rights. The rights in the Covenant 
continue to be characterised as "non-justiciable" or "programmatic". On 
the other hand, development organisations have been wary of adopting a 
rights-based stance, which is seen as being too inflexible and 
confrontational. In the long run, the effectiveness with which the 
Committee develops the Covenant will be measured by the extent to 
which it disposes of such arguments in a conclusive manner. 
That the Covenant has considerable potential as an international 
instrument for the protection of economic, social and cultural rights is 
evidenced by the material scope of protection offered. Although a 
number of the economic rights are already the subject of international 
procedures under the auspices of the IILO, the Covenant does offer 
unparalleled protection as regards social and cultural rights. In 
particular, it is the only universal instrument that seeks to guarantee in 
general the rights to food, clothing, housing, health and cultural life. 
The unique nature of the rights to which the Covenant is 
addressed is, however, not without its problems. Perhaps most 
significant is the fact that the rights are stated in an excessively broad 
and general manner. This has not necessarily posed a problem for 
supervisory bodies in the field of civil and political rights, as they have 
been in the priviledged position of being able to draw upon vast array 
of both national and international jurisprudence generated by other 
human rights supervisory bodies and the various national constitutional 
courts that had traditionally dealt with the same, or similar, rights. 
However, in the case of economic, social and cultural rights, even 
where they are found in the Constitutions of States, they have rarely 
given legal effect by the courts concerned. Moreover, international 
organisations working in the field of economic, social and cultural 
rights (with the exception of the ILO and, to a lesser extent UNESCO) 
have resolutely refused to deal with the issues in terms of rights. 71his 
inevitably means that a considerable burden is placed upon the 
Covenant's supervisory body to attempt to breath some life into the 
provisions. 
Further problems evidenced in the text of the Covenant are its 
confused and inconsistent structure. Firstq it is not clear whether the 
obligations clause in article 2(l) relates to all of the substantive rights in 
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Part III, or only to those that are specifically recognised. Secondly, the 
substantive articles themselves often contain a confused mixture of 
rights, objectives and implementation procedures. Thirdly, it is unclear 
to what extent the rights are intended to be covered by the general or 
specific limitations clauses to be found in the Covenant or whether 
indeed it is possible to derogate from the rights at all. Finally, and 
perhaps most crucially, the general State obligations are so obscure that 
it appears, on the face of it, to be virtually impossible to establish the 
extent to which a State is in compliance with its obligations under the Covenant. 
Similarly, Part IV of the Covenant which outlines the supervision 
system is marked more by what it leaves out than by what it includes. 
Broadly speaking it is a reporting system to be operated under the 
auspices of ECOSOC. Provision is made for the participation of the 
Specialised Agencies and the Commission on Human Rights and for 
general reports to be submitted to the General Assembly. The text, 
however, does not make clear the degree to which each of the bodies 
mentioned should involve themselves. Although ECOSOC is mandated 
with the "consideration" of the reports, the Commission on Human 
Rights may similarly "study" the reports and make general 
recommendations. It is unclear which body has the primary 
responsibility for undertaking supervision. Moreover, although many 
assumptions could be made about the object and purpose of reporting 
systems in general, the Covenant only provides for the submission of 
reports and their consideration. The periodicity., form and content of 
the reports is left open, as is the nature of the consideration that should 
be given to them. As a whole, the the raw text of the Covenant could be 
said to offer considerable potential but little promise. 
As of December 1991, there are 104 States parties to the 
Covenant which, given the date on which it entered into force, is not 
unreasonable. Apart from their poor record of reporting under the 
Covenant, which is by no means unusual for the universal human rights 
treaties, their participation has been consistent if disinterested. To a 
large extent the unenthusiastic response of States may be put down to 
the unsatisfactory experience of the Working Group in which there was 
very little call for States to take their reporting responsibilities 
seriously. In the experience of the Committee, howeverg States have 
participated in a co-operative manner and have not found it necessary to 
challenge either the procedural or substantive developments in the 
Committee's work. In fact the Committee has largely been allowed to 
develop its role and practices without obstruction. 
It is primarily the manner in which the Committee has 
transformed the supervision system that marks its work thus far. In 
contrast to the superficial and wholly unsatisfactory working methods 
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of the Working Group, the Committee has adopted a number of useful 
and innovative procedural initiatives to further the efficacy of its 
supervisory role. In particular, one could mention the receipt of 
information from NGOs, the adoption of State-specific concluding 
comments, the allocation of days to undertake general discussions, and 
the adoption of General Comments. Whilst the quality of State reports 
still leaves a certain amount to be desired, the rewards of the reform 
process are beginning to show. The Committee has adopted four 
influential General Comments, the most recent of which was on a 
substantive article, and has come to the point where it was able, with 
reasonable certainty, to find a State in violation of its obligations under 
the Covenant. 
Having said that, there remain a number of problems that have 
impeded the full development of the supervisory process in the manner 
desired by the Committee. First, as noted above, there is need for a 
considerable improvement in both the quality and timeliness of State 
reports. The measures taken thus far by the Committee, such as the 
establishment of new reporting guidelines and the creation of a "black 
list" of States whose reporting has been particularly bad, have yet to 
reap rewards. Additionally the most recent decision of the Committee to 
consider situations where the State has failed to submit a report in ten 
years, poses problems both of a logistical and legal nature. 
Secondly, despite the existence of mechanisms for the receipt of 
information from NGOs and Specialised Agencies, the response has 
been particularly poor. There is something of a vicious circle here. 
Until the Committee demonstrates itself to be an effective supervisory 
mechanism, giving considered and detailed analyses of State reports and 
making determinations as to non-compliance in appropriate cases, it will 
not be deemed worthy of attention by such bodies. Equally, the 
Committee is essentially hamstrung without adequate access to 
alternative sources of information. As there is a limited amount that the 
Committee itself may do in such circumstances, the need for greater 
Secretariat support and more publicity become of central importance. 
The lack of proper Secretariat support has been one of the most 
unsatisfactory aspects of the Committee's work which, if it continues, 
could easily stultify the future development of the Covenant. The 
Secretariat has undertaken no analytical studies and has provided only a 
minimal amount of assistance in terms of collecting information, 
undertaking an initial consideration of State reports and publicising the 
work of the Committee. This is particularly unfortunate in the context 
of the Committee's work, given its dependence upon large quantities of 
detailed information on the situation prevailing in the countries 
concerned and the urgent need for a greater understanding of the 
content of the non-ns within the Covenant. 
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The headway made by the Committee in terms of its procedural 
reforms have not been matched by its development of the substantive 
guarantee. It has produced useful General Comments on article 2(l) and 
on the right to housing in article 11 
, 
which have done much to clarify 
the issues involved, but it continues to be overwhelmed by the range and detail of the subjects with which it is dealing. The reporting guidelines indicate quite clearly that, whereas the Committee has formulated its 
general approach, it has considerable work to do before it win be able 
to focus effectively upon the salient issues. 
In terms of its general approach, the Committee has made a 
number of important points about the nature of State obligations under 
the Covenant. In particular, it has pointed out that despite the broad 
terms of article 2(l), a number of the rights and articles are capable of 
immediate implementation. Further, it has suggested that there is a 
"core obligation" under which States are required to ensure, at least, the 
enjoyment of a minimum core content of each right. Failure to comply 
with the core obligation will amount to a prima facie violation of the 
Covenant. However, in so far as the Committee has not spelt out what it 
understands to be the minimum core content, or even whether it is a 
national or international standard, suggests that it has considerable more 
work to do in this area. Other significant aspects of the Committee's 
general approach have been its use of the "margin of appreciation" 
doctrine in evaluating whether or not the course of action taken by the 
State was "appropriate", and its requirement that certain rights be 
ensured on an inter-individual level. 
As regards the specific rights themselves, however, the 
Committee has only undertaken an in-depth analysis of the right to 
housing in article 11. Otherwise, it has tended to interpret the articles in 
a broad manner without excessive analysis of terminology. On the one 
hand this has enabled the Committee to view the provisions in a 
dynamic manner, giving them a relevance and validity in current 
circumstances that they might not otherwise gain. For example, the 
Committee has extended the range of grounds upon which distinctions 
might be considered discriminatory far beyond those actually specified 
in article 2(2). However, on the other hand, the Committee may be 
criticised for being too general in its approach and for failing to address 
the precise terms of the articles with sufficient rigour. A particular 
example is article 8, which is not only considerably more detailed than 
other articles and encompasses issues that have been dealt with at length 
by other bodies, but also contains a number of questions that require 
clarification. Specifically, there is a need for consideration to be given 
to the relative scope and operation of the limitations clauses in articles 
8(l)(a) and 8(2). 
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Notwithstanding the generality of its approach, the Committee has 
made a certain amount of headway with articles 6 to 8 in terms of 
outlining the scope of the provisions and occasionally addressing 
important points of concern. For example, the Committee has 
interpreted the right to work in article 6 as including a right not to be 
arbitrarily dismissed from employment and a right not to be forced to 
work. Similarly with respect to article 8 it has made important, if 
controversial, decisions such as viewing pre-entry closed shop 
agreements as being in violation of the right to join the trade union of 
one's choice. 
In developing the substance of the rights in articles 6 to 9, it is 
clear that the Committee will have to make reference to the work of the 
ELO in the area. Not only is it necessary that there should not be any 
conflict in standards, but it is also apparent that excessive duplication of 
the supervisory process would be a waste of time and resources for an 
parties concerned. The main function of the Committee in the area 
should be to supplement the protection already offered by the IILO. This 
means concentrating upon the position of those States that are not party 
to the relevant IILO Convention or who have persistently failed to take 
the necessary remedial action. 
Even for the Committee to undertake such a limited function, it is 
necessary for it to develop the necessary expertise. It is somewhat 
unfortunate in this respect, that the participation of the ILO remains at a 
minimal level, despite the reformed nature of the Committee. In the 
absence of adequate assistance from the ILO itself, the Committee will 
have to adopt alternative strategies for developing the necessary 
expertise. It has been suggested, for example, that the Committee have 
greater control over the appointment of its members and that individual 
members should take on the responsibility for developing expertise in 
particular subject areas. 
As suggested, some of the failings of the Committee as regards its 
approach to the substance of the articles may be put down to the 
dynamics of its operation as a supervisory body. In particular one might 
note the lack of technical expertise within, and available to, the 
Committee, the inadequate amount of time allowed to the Committee to 
exercise its functions in an effective manner, the lack of strong 
Secretariat support and the relatively unfocused nature of the reporting 
procedure. It appears to be extremely difficult, under present 
conditions, for the Committee to concentrate upon specific issues of 
relevance during its consideration of a State report. What is required, 
is 
some form of assistance whether in terms of secretariat support or time, 
even of a temporary nature, that might in effect generate some 
momentum in the implementation process as a whole. 
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Notwithstanding the various problems faced by the Committee, 
the prospects for the future are positive. The Committee has operated for a number of sessions without significant conflict, has adopted a 
number of important general comments and has begun to make headway 
in developing the normative content of the rights. In addition, it has one 
of the most well-developed reporting systems to be found at the 
universal level and has begun to receive useful assistance from NGOs- 
The level of confidence within the Committee is perhaps reflected in its 
recent discussions on the possibility of drafting an Optional Protocol 
providing for a system of individual complaints. Although the 
establishment of a complaints system is as yet a distant prospect, it is 
undoubtedly true that the operation of such a system would have a 
beneficial effect,, not only in terms of improving the protection offered 
by the Covenant, but also in raising the level of international awareness 
of the work of the Committee. 
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APPENDIX I 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
PREAMBLE 
The States Parties to the present Covenant, 
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in 
the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
Recognising that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of 
the human person, 
Recognising that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from 
fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby 
everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as 
his civil and political rights, 
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the 
United Nations to promote universal respect for and observance of, 
human rights and freedoms, 
Realising that the individual, having duties to other individuals 
and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to 
strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognised in the 
present Covenant, 
Agree upon the following articles: 
PART I 
Article I 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual 
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of 
its own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having 
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and 
Trust 
494 
Territories, shall promote the realisation of the right of 
self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
PART Il 
Article 2 
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially eceonomic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of 
the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that 
the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without 
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth of 
other status. 
3. Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their 
national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee 
the economic rights recognised in the present Covenant to 
non-nationals. 
Article 3 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal 
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and 
cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant. 
Article 4 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise that, in the 
enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the 
present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such 
limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be 
compatible with the nature of those rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. 
Article 5 
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for 
any State, group or person any right to engage in activity or to perform 
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms 
recognised herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than 
is 
provided for in the present Covenant. 
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2. No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognised or existing in any country in virtue of law, 
conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognise such rights or that it recognises them to a lesser extent. 
PART III 
A rticle 6 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right to 
work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take 
appropriate steps to safeguard this right. 
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realisation of this right shall include technical and 
vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques 
to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full 
and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental 
political and economic freedoms to the individual. 
Article 7 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work 
which ensure, in particular: (a) Remuneration which provides all workers as a minimum with: (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal 
value without distinction of any kind, in particular women 
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those 
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; (ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant; (b) Safe and healthy working conditions; 
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment 
to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than 
those of seniority and competence; (d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and 
periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public 
holidays. " 
Article 8 
l. 'Fhe States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: 
(a)The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union 
of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, 
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for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than 
those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others; (b)The right of trade unions to establish national federations or 
confederations and the right of the latter to form or join international 
trade-union organisations; (c)The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations 
other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public order 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (d)The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with 
the laws of the particular country. 
2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on 
the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the 
police or of the administration of the State. 
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the 
International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise to take 
legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a 
manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that 
Convention. 
Article 9 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to social security, including social insurance. 
Article 10 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise that: 
1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to 
the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, 
particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care 
and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into 
with the free consent of the intending spouses. 
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable 
period before and after childbirth. During such period working 
mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social 
security benefits. 
3. Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on 
behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination 
for 
reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and young persons 
should be protected from economic and social exploitation. 
Their 
employment in work harmful to their morals or health or 
dangerous to 
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life or likely to hamper their normal development should be punishable 
by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid 
employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by 
law. 
Article 11 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take 
appropriate steps to ensure the realisation of this right, recognising to 
this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based 
on free consent. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognising the 
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, 
individually and through international co-operation, the measures, 
including specific programmes, which are needed: (a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution 
of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by 
disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by 
developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve 
the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources; (b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food 
exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food 
supplies in relation to need. 
Article 12 
1. Tbe States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realisation of this right shall include those necessary 
for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant 
mortality and for the healthy development of the child, (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical 
service and medical attention in the event of sickness. 
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Article 13 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyon to education. 17hey agree that education shall be directed to the 
full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, 
and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to 
participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or 
religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of peace. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise that, with a view 
to achieving the full realisation of this right: (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; (b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and 
vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and 
accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the 
progressive mitroduction of free education; (c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis 
of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the 
progressive introduction of free education; (d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as 
possible for those persons who have not received or completed the 
whole period of their primary education; (e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively 
pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the 
material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect 
for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to 
choose for their children schools, other than those established by the 
public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational 
standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure 
the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with 
their own convictions. 
4. No part of this article shal be construed so as to interfere with the 
liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational 
institutions, subject always to the observance of the principles set forth 
in paragraph 1 of this article and to the requirement that the education 
given in such institutions shall confon-n to such minimum standards as 
may be laid down by the State. 
Article 14 
Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming 
a Party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or 
other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, 
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free of charge, undertakes, within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a 
reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of 
compulsory education free of charge for all. 
Article 15 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
is the author. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realisation of this right shall include those necessary for 
the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and 
culture. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the 
freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the benefits to be 
derived from the encouragement and development of international 
contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields. 
PART IV 
Article 16 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit in 
conformity with this part of the Covenant reports on the measures 
which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the 
observances of the rights recognised herein. 
2. (a) All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, who shall transmit copies to the Economic and Social 
Council for consideration in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Covenant; (b) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall also transmit to 
the specialised agencies copies of the reports, or any relevant parts 
therefrom, from States Parties to the present Covenant which are also 
members of these specialised agencies in so far as these reports, or parts 
therefrom, relate to any matters which fall within the responsibilities of 
the said agencies in accordance with their constitutional instruments. 
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Article 17 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant shall furnish their reports in stages, in accordance with a programme to be established by the Economic and Social Council within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant after consultation with the States Parties and the 
specialised agencies concerned. 
2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of obligations under the present Covenant. 
3. Where relevant information has previously been fumished to the United Nations or to any specialised agency by any State Party to the 
present Covenant, it will not be necessary to reproduce that information, but a precise reference to the information so furnished 
will suffice. 
Article 18 
Pursuant to its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations 
in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Economic 
and Social Council may make arrangements with the specialised 
agencies in respect of their reporting to it on the progress made in 
achieving the observance of the provisions of the present Covenant 
falling within the scope of their activities. These reports may include 
particulars of decisions and recommendations on such implementation 
adopted by their competent organs. 
Article 19 
The Economic and Social Council may transmit to the Commission on 
Human Rights for study and general recommendation or, as 
appropriate, for information the reports concerning human rights 
submitted by States in accordance with articles 16 and 17, and those 
concerning human rights submitted by the specialised. agencies in 
accordance with article 18. 
Article 20 
The States Parties to the present Covenant and the specialised agencies 
concerned may submit comments to the Economic and Social Council 
on any general recommendation under article 19 or reference to such 
general recommendation in any report of the Commission on Human 
Rights or any documentation referred to therein. 
Article 21 
The Economic and Social Council may submit from time to time to the 
General Assembly reports with recommendations of a general nature 
and a summary of the information received from the States Parties to 
the present Covenant and the specialised agencies on the measures taken 
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and the progress made in achieving general observance of the rights 
recognised in the present Covenant. 
Article 22 
The Economic and Social Council may bring to the attention of other 
organs of the United Nations, their subsidiary organs and specialised 
agencies concerned with furnishing technical assistance any matters 
arising out of the reports referred to in this part of the present 
Covenant which may assist such bodies in deciding, each within its field 
of competence, on the advisability of international measures likely to 
contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the present 
Covenant. 
Article 23 
The States Parties to the present Covenant agree that international action 
for the achievement of the rights recognised in the present Covenant 
includes such methods as the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of 
recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance and the holding 
of regional meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of 
consultation and study organised in conjunction with the Governments 
concerned. 
Article 24 
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the constitutions 
of the specialised agencies which define the respective responsibilities of 
the various organs of the United Nations and of the specialised agencies 
in regard to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant. 
Article 25 
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the 
inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilise fully and freely their 
natural wealth and resources. 
PART V 
Article 26 
1. The present Covenant is open for signature by any State Member of 
the United Nations or member of any of its specialised agencies, by any 
State Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by 
any other State which has been invited by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations to become a party to the present Covenant. 
2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification. Instruments of 
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ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
3. T'he present Covenant shall be open to accession by any State referred 
to in paragraph 1 of this article. 
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of 
accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States 
which have signed the present Covenant or acceded to it of the deposit 
of each instrument of ratification or accession. 
Article 27 
1. The present Covenant shaH enter into force three months after the 
date of the deposit with the Secreaty-General of the United Nations of 
the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession. 
2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant or acceding to it after 
the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of 
accession, the present Covenant shaH enter into force three months after 
the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or 
instrument of accession. 
Article 28 
The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of 
federal States without any limitations or exceptions. 
Article 29 
1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may propose an amendment 
and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The 
Secretary-General shall thereupon communicate any proposed 
amendments to the States Parties to the present Covenant with a request 
that they notify him whether they favour a conference of States Parties 
for the purpose of considering and voting upon the proposals. In the 
event that at least one third of the States Parties favours such a 
conference, the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under 
the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendments adopted by a 
majority of the States Parties present and voting at the conference shall 
be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations for 
approval. 
2. Amendments shall come into force when they have been approved by 
the General Assembly of the United nations and accepted by a two- 
thirds majoirity of the States Parties to the present Covenant in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 
3. When amendmens come into force they shall be binding on those 
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bound by the provisions of the present Covenant and any earlier 
amendment which they have accepted. 
Article 30 
Irrespective of the notifications made under article 26, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States referred 
to in paragraph 1 of the same article of the following particulars: (a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under article 26; (b) The date of entry into force of the present Covenant under article 
27 and the date of the entry into force of any amendments under article 
29. 
Article 31 
1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the 
archives of the United Nations. 
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified 
copies of the present Covenant to all States referred to in article 26. 
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APPENDIX 11 
STATES PARTIES TO THE C OVENANT ON ECONOMIC 
SOCIAL A ND CUL TURAL RIG HTS 
Partic 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Central African 
Republic 
Chile 
Colombia 
Congo 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Czech and Slovak 
Republic 
Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Finland 
Sienature 
10 Dec. 
19 Feb. 
18 Dec. 
10 Dec. 
19 Mar. 
10 Dec. 
1968 
1968 
1972 
1973 
1968 
1968 
8 Oct. 1968 
16 Sep. 1969 
21 Dec. 1966 
19 Dec. 1966 
9 Jan. 1967 
7 Oct. 1968 
Ratification 
Accession (a) 
Suceession 
24 Jan. 
4 Oct. 
12 Sep. 
8 Aug 
10 Dec. 
10 Dec. 
5 Jan. 
12 Nov. 
21 Apr. 
12 Aug. 
21 Sep. 
9 May 
27 Jun. 
19 May 
1983(a) 
1991 (a) 
1989 
1986 
1975 
1973 
1973(a) 
1973 
1983 
1982(a) 
1970 
1990 
1984(a) 
1976(a) 
8 May 
10 Feb. 
29 Oct. 
5 Oct. 
29 Nov. 
2 Apr. 
1976(a) 
1972 
1969 
1983(a) 
1968 
1969 
23 Dec. 1975 
14 Sep. 1981(a) 
20 Mar. 1968 61 an. 1972 
4 Jan. 1978(a) 
29 Sep. 1967 6 Mar. 1969 
4 Aug. 1967 14 Jan. 1982 
21 Sep. 1967 30 Nov. 1979 
25 Sep. 1987(a) 
21 Oct. 1991(a) 
11 Oct. 1967 19 Aug. 1975 
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Ratification 
, 0ý Accession (a) Partic Si2nature Suceessio 
France 4 Nov. 1980(a) 
Gabon 21 Jan. 1983(a) 
Gambia 29 Dec. 1978(a) 
Germany 9 Oct. 1968 17 Dec. 1973 
Greece 16 May 1985(a) 
Grenada 6 Sep. 1991 (a) 
Guatemala 19 May 1988(a) 
Guinea 28 Feb. 1967 24 Jan. 1978 
Guyana 22 Aug. 1968 15 Feb. 1977 
Honduras 19 Dec. 1966 17 Feb. 1981 
Hungary 25 Mar. 1969 17 Jan. 1974 
Iceland 30 Dec. 1968 22 Aug. 1979 
India 10 Apr. 1979(a) 
Iran (Islamic 
Republic of) 4 Apr. 1968 24 Jun. 1975 
Iraq 18 Feb. 1969 25 Jan. 1971 
Ireland 1 Oct. 1973 8 Dec. 1989 
Israel 19 Dec. 1966 3 Oct. 1991 
Italy 18 Jan. 1967 15 Sep. 1978 
Jamaica 19 Dec. 1966 3 Oct. 1975 
Japan 30 May 1978 21 Jun. 1979 
Jordan 30 Jun. 1972 28 May 1975 
Kenya 1 May 1972(a) 
Lebanon 3 Nov. 1972(a) 
Libyan Arab 
Republic 15 May 1970(a) 
Lithuania 20 Nov. 1991 (a) 
Luxembourg 26 Nov. 1974 18 Aug. 1983 
Madagascar 14 Apr. 1970 22 Sep. 1971 
Mah 16 Jul. 1974(a) 
Malta 22 Oct. 1968 13 Sep. 1990 
Mauritius 12 Dec. 1973(a) 
Mexico 23 Mar. 1981(a) 
Mongolia 5 Jun. 1968 18 Nov. 1974 
Morocco 19 Jan. 1977 3 May 1979 
Nepal 14 May 1991 (a) 
Netherlands 25 Jun. 1969 11 Dec. 1978 
New Zealand 12 Nov. 1968 28 Dec 1978 
Nicaragua 12 Mar. 1980(a) 
Niger 7 Mar. 1986(a) 
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Participant 
Norway 
Panama 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Republic of Korea 
Romania 
Rwanda 
St Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
San Marino 
Senegal 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
Spain 
SriLanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Sweden 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
U. S. S. R. 
United Kingdom 
United Republic 
of Tanzania 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Viet Nam 
Yemen 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Sign ture 
20 Mar. 
27 Jul. 
11 Aug. 
19 Dec. 
2 Mar. 
7 Oct. 
1968 
1976 
1977 
1966 
1967 
1976 
27 Jun. 1968 
6 Jul 1970 
28 Sep. 1976 
29 Sep 1967 
30 Apr. 1968 
20 Mar. 1968 
18 Mar. 1968 
16 Sep. 1968 
21 Feb. 1967 
24 Jun. 1969 
8 Aug. 1967 
Ratification 
Accession (a) 
Suceession (d) 
13 Sep. 
8 Mar. 
28 Apr. 
7 Jun. 
18 Mar. 
31 Jul. 
10 Apr. 
9 Dec. 
16 Apr. 
1972 
1977 
1978 
1974 
1977 
1978 
1990(a) 
1974 
1975(a) 
9 Nov. 
18 Oct. 
13 Feb. 
17 Mar. 
24 Jan. 
27 Apr. 
11 Jun. 
18 Mar. 
28 Dec. 
6 Dec. 
21 Apr. 
24 May 
8 Dec. 
18 Mar. 
21 Jan. 
12 Nov. 
16 Oct. 
20 May 
11 Jun. 
1 Apr. 
10 May 
24 Sep. 
9 Feb. 
2 Jun. 
1 Nov. 
10 Apr. 
13 May 
1981 (a) 
1985(a) 
1978 
1982(d) 
1990(a) 
1977 
1980(a) 
1986(a) 
1976(a) 
1971 
1969(a) 
1984(a) 
1978(a) 
1969 
1987(a) 
1973 
1973 
1976 
1976(a) 
1970 
1978 
1982(a) 
1987(a) 
1971 
1976(a) 
1984(a) 
1991 (a) 
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The foUowing States have signed but not ratified: 
Cambodia 17 Oct. 1980 
Liberia 18 Apr. 1967 
U. S. A. 5 Oct. 1977 
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APPENDIX III 
MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE 
CURRENT MEMBERS 
Mr P. ALSTON (Australia): 
Mr J. ALVAREZ VITA (Peru): 
Mr A. H. BADAWI (Egypt): 
Mrs V. BONOAN-DANDAM(Philippines): 
Mr M. L. FOFANA (Guinea): 
Mrs L. IDER (Mongolia): 
Mrs M. JIMENEZ BUTRAGUENO(Spain): 
Mr S. C. KONATE (Senegal): 
Mr V. KOUZNETSOV (U. S. S. R. ): 
Mr J. A. MARCHAN ROMERO (Ecuador): 
Mr V. MRACHKOV (Bulgaria): 
Mr A. MUTERAHEJURU (Rwanda): 
Mr WNENEMAN (Poland): 
Mr K. O. RATTRAY (Jamaica): 
Mr B. SIMMA (F. R. G. ): 
Mr M. D. SPARSIS (Cyprus): 
Mr P. TEXIER (France): 
Mr J. VVIMER ZAMBRANO (Mexico): 
PREVIOUS MEMBERS 
Mr LBADAWI EL SHEIKH (Egypt): 
Mr A. DAOUDI (Syrian Arab Republic): 
Mr S. GLAIEL (Syrian Arab Republic): 
Mr E. P. SVIRIDOV (U. S. S. R. ): 
Ms C. TAYA (Japan): 
1987- (re-elected 1990). 
1987- (re-elected 1988) 
1991- 
1991- 
1987- (re-elected 1988) 
1991- 
1987- (re-elected 1988) 
1987- (re-elected 1988) 
1989- (re-elected 1990) 
1987- (re-elected 1990) 
1987- (re-elected 1988) 
1987- (re-elected 1990) 
1987- (re-elected 1988) 
1987- (re-elected 1988) 
1987- (re-elected 1990) 
1987- (re-elected 1988) 
1987- (re-elected 1988) 
1987- (re-elected 1990) 
1987-1990. 
1987 
-19 88. (resigned) 
1989-1990. 
1987 
-1988. (resigned) 
1987-1990. 
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APPENDIX IV 
GENERAL COMMENT No. 1 (1989) 
Reporting by States Parties 
1. The reporting obligations which are contained in part IV of the Covenant are designed principally to assist each State party in fulfilling 
its obligations under the Covenant and, in addition, to provide a basis on 
which the Council, assisted by the Committee, can discharge its 
responsibilities for monitoring States parties' compliance with their 
obligations and for facilitating the realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant. The 
Committee considers that it would be incorrect to assume that reporting 
is essentially only a procedural matter designed solely to satisfy each 
State party's formal obligation to report to the appropriate international 
monitoring body. On the contrary, in accordance with the letter and 
spirit of the Covenant, the processes of preparation and submission of 
reports by States can, and indeed should, serve to achieve a variety of 
objectives. 
2. A first obiective,, which is of particular relevance to the initial report 
required to be submitted within two years of the Covenant's entry into 
force for the State party concerned, is to ensure that a comprehensive 
review is undertaken with respect to national legislation, administrative 
rules and procedures, and practices in an effort to ensure the fullest 
possible conformity with the Covenant. Such a review might, for 
example, be undertaken in conjunction with each of the relevant 
national ministries or other authorities responsible for policy-making 
and implementation in the different fields covered by the Covenant. 
3. A second obiective, is to ensure that the State party monitors the 
actual situation with respect to each of the rights on a regular basis and 
is thus aware of the extent to which the various rights are, or are not, 
being enjoyed by all individuals within the territory or under its 
jurisdiction. From the Committee's experience to date, it is clear that 
the fulfilment of this objective cannot be achieved only by the 
preparation of aggregate national statistics or estimates, but also 
requires that special attention be given to any worse-off regions or 
areas and to any specific groups or subgroups which appear to be 
particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged. Thus, the essential first step 
towards promoting the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights is diagnosis and knowledge of the existing situation. The 
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Committee is aware that this process of monitoring and gathering 
information is a potentially time-consuming and costly one and that international assistance and co-operation, as provided for in article 2, 
paragraph 1 and articles 22 and 23 of the Covenant, may wen be an integral part of any process designed to promote accepted goals of 
public policy and is indispensable to the effective implementation of the Covenant, it may note that this fact in its report to the Committee and 
indicate the nature and extent of any international assistance that it may 
need. 
4. While monitoring is designed to give a detailed overview of the 
existing situation, the principal value of such an overview is to provide 
the basis of the elaboration of clearly stated and carefully targeted 
policies, including the establishment of priorities which reflect the 
provisions of the Covenant. Therefore, a third ob of the 
reporting process is to enable the Government to demonstrate that such 
principled policy-making has in fact been undertaken. While the 
Covenant makes this obligation explicit only in article 14 in cases where 
"compulsory primary education, free of charge" has not yet been 
secured for all, a comparable obligation "to work out and adopt a 
detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation" of each of 
the rights contained in the Covenant is clearly implied by the obligation 
in article 2, paragraph 1 "to take steps... by all appropriate means... " 
5. A fourth objective of the reporting process is to facilitate public 
scrutiny of government policies with respect to economic, social and 
cultural rights and to encourage the involvement of the various 
economic, social and cultural sectors of society in the formulation, 
implementation and review of the relevant policies. In examining 
reports submitted to it to date, the Committee has welcomed the fact 
that a number of States parties, reflecting different political and 
economic systems, have encouraged inputs by such non-governmental 
groups into the preparation of their reports under the Covenant. Other 
States have ensured the widespread dissemination of their reports with a 
view to enabling comments to be made by the public at large. In these 
ways, the preparation of the report, and its consideration at the national 
level can come to be of at least as much value as the constructive 
dialogue conducted at the international level between the Committee and 
representative of the reporting State. 
6. A fifth obiective is to provide a basis on which the State party itself, 
as well as the Committee, can effectively evaluate the extent to which 
progress has been made towards the realisation of the obligations 
contained in the Covenant. For this purpose, it may be useful for 
States 
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to identify specific bench-marks or goals against which their 
performance in a given area can be assessed. Tbus, for example, it is 
generally agreed that it is important to set specific goals with respect to 
the reduction of infant mortality, the extent of vaccination of children, 
the intake of calories per person, the number of persons per health care 
provider, etc. In many of these areas, global bench-marks are of limited 
use, whereas national or other more specific bench-marks can provide 
and extremely valuable indication of progress. 
7. In this regard, the Committee wishes to note that the Covenant 
attaches particular importance to the concept of "progressive 
realisation" of the relevant rights and, for that reason, the Committee 
urges States parties to include in their periodic reports information 
which shows the progress over time, with respect to the effective 
realisation of the relevant rights. By the same token, it is clear that 
qualitative, as well as quantitative, data are required in order for an 
adequate assessment of the situation to be made. 
8. A sixth objective is to enable the State party itself to develop a better 
understanding of the problems and shortcomings encountered in efforts 
to realise progressively the full range of economic, social and cultural 
rights. For this reason, it is essential that States parties report in detail 
on the "factors and difficulties" inhibiting such realisation. This process 
of identification and recognition of the relevant difficulties then 
provides the framework within which more appropriate policies can be 
devised. 
9. A seventh obiective is to enable the Committee, and the States parties 
as a whole, to facilitate the exchange of information among States and to 
develop a better understanding of the common problems faced by States 
and a fuller appreciation of the type of measures which might be taken 
to promote effective realisation of each of the rights contained in the 
Covenant. This part of the process also enables the Committee to 
identify the most appropriate means by which the international 
community might assist States, in accordance with articles 22 and 23 of 
the Covenant. In order to underline the importance which the 
Committee attaches to this objective, a separate general comment on 
those articles will be discussed by the Committee at its fourth session. 
512 
GENERAL COMMENT No. 2 (1990) 
Intemational Technical Assistance Measures (Article 22 of the 
Covenant) 
1. Article 22 of the Covenant establishes a mechanism by which the 
Economic and Social Council may bring to the attention of relevant 
United Nations bodies any matters arising out of reports submitted 
under the Covenant "which may assist such bodies in deciding, each 
within the field of competence, on the advisability of international 
measures likely to contribute to the effective progressive 
implementation of the... Covenant". While the primary responsibility 
under Article 22 is vested in the Council, it is clearly appropriate for 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to play an 
active role in advising and assisting the Council in this regard. 
2. Recommendations in accordance with Article 22 may be made to any 
"organs of the United Nations, their subsidiary organs and specialised 
agencies concerned with furnishing technical assistance". 71he 
Committee considers that this provision should be interpreted so as to 
include virtually all United Nations organs and agencies involved in any 
aspect of international development co-operation. It would therefore be 
appropriate for recommendations in accordance with Article 22 to be 
addressed, inter alia, to the Secretary-General, subsidiary organs of the 
Council such as the Commission on the Status of Women, other bodies 
such as UNDP, UNICEF and CDP, agencies such as the World Bank 
and IMF, and any of the other specialised agencies such as ILO, FAO, 
UNESCO and WHO. 
3. Article 22 could lead either to recommendations of a general policy 
nature or to more narrowly focused recommendations relating to a 
specific situation. In the former context, the principal role of the 
Committee would seem to be to encourage greater attention to efforts to 
promote economic, social and cultural rights within the framework of 
international development co-operation activities undertaken by, or with 
the assistance of, the United Nations and its agencies. In this regard the 
Committee notes that the Commission on Human Rights, in its 
resolution 1989/13 of 2 March 1989, invited it "to give consideration to 
means by which the various United Nations agencies working in the 
field of development could best integrate measures designed to promote 
full respect for economic, social and cultural rights in their activities' . 
4. As a preliminary practical matter, the Committee notes that its own 
endeavours would be assisted,, and the relevant agencies would also 
be 
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better informed, if they were to take a greater interest in the work of 
the Committee. While recognising that such and interest can be demonstrated in a variety of ways, the Committee observes that 
attendance by representatives of the appropriate United Nations bodies 
at its first four sessions has, with the notable exceptions of ILO, UNESCO and WHO, been very low. Similarly, pertinent materials and 
written information had been received from only a very limited number 
of agencies. The Committee considers that a deeper understanding of 
the relevance of economic, social and cultural rights in the context of 
international development co-operation activities would be considerably 
facilitated through greater interaction between the Committee and the 
appropriate agencies. At the very least, the day of general discussion on 
a specific issue, which the Committee undertakes at each of its sessions, 
provides and ideal context in which a potentially productive exchange of 
views can be undertaken. 
5. On the broader issues of the promotion of respect for human rights 
in the context of development activities, the Committee has so far seen 
only rather limited evidence of specific efforts by United Nations 
bodies. It notes with satisfaction in this regard the initiative taken jointly 
by the Centre for Human Rights and UNDP in writing to United 
Nations Resident Representatives and other field-based officials, inviting 
their "suggestions and advice, in particular with respect to possible 
forms of co-operation in on-gomig projects [identified] as having a 
human-rights dimension or in new ones in response to a specific 
Government's request". The Committee has also been informed of 
longstanding efforts undertaken by ILO to link its own human rights 
and other international labour standards to its technical co-operation 
activities. 
6. With respect to such activities, two general principles are important. 
The first is that the two sets of human rights are indivisible and 
interdependent. This means that efforts to promote one set of rights 
should also take full account of the other. United Nations agencies 
involved in the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights should 
do their utmost to ensure that their activities are fully consistent with 
the enjoyment of civil and political rights. In negative terms this means 
that the international agencies should scrupulously avoid involvement in 
projects which, for example, involve the use of forced labour in 
contravention of international standards, or promote or reinforce 
discrimination against individuals or groups contrary to the provisions 
of the Covenant, or involve large-scale evictions or displacement of 
persons without the provision of all appropriate protection and 
compensation. In positive terms, it means that, wherever possible, the 
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agencies should act as advocates of projects and approaches which 
contribute not only to economic growth or other broadly-defined 
objectives, but also to enhanced enjoyment of the full range of human 
rights. 
7. The second principle of general relevance is that development co- 
operation activities do not automatically contribute to the promotion of 
respect for economic, social and cultural rights. Many activities 
undertaken in the name of "development" have subsequently been 
recognised as ill-conceived and even counter-productive in human 
rights terms. In order to reduce the incidence of such problems, the 
whole range of issues dealt with in the Covenant should, wherever 
possible and appropriate, be given specific and careful consideration. 
8. Despite the importance of seeking to integrate human rights concerns 
into development activities, it is true that proposals for such integration 
can too easily remain at a level of generality. Tbus, in an effort to 
encourage the operationalisation of the principle contained in article 22 
of the Covenant, the Committee wishes to draw attention to the 
following specific measures which merit consideration by the relevant 
bodies: 
(a) As a matter of principle, the appropriate United Nations 
organs and agencies should specifically recognise the intimate 
relationship which should be established between development activities 
and efforts to promote respect for human rights in general, and 
economic, social and cultural rights in particular. The Committee notes 
in this regard the failure of each of the first three United Nations 
Development Decade Strategies to recognise that relationship and urges 
that the fourth such strategy, to be adopted in 1990, should rectify that 
omission; 
(b) Consideration should be given by United Nations agencies to 
the proposal, made by the Secretary-General in a report of 1979,1 that a 
"human rights impact statement" be required to be prepared in 
connection with all major development co-operation activities; 
1 "The international dimensions of the right to development as a human right in 
relation to other human rights based on international co-operation, including the right to 
peace, taking into account the requirements of the new international economic order and 
the fundamental human needs" (E/CN. 4/1334, para. 314). 
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(c) The training of briefing given to project and other personnel 
employed by United Nations agencies should include a component dealing with human rights standards and principles. 
(d) Every effort should be made, at each phase of a development 
project, to ensure that the rights contained in the Covenants are duly 
taken into account. '111is would apply, for example, in the initial 
assessment of the priority needs of a particular country, in the 
identification of particular projects, in project design, in the 
implementation of the project, and in its final evaluation. 
9. A matter which has been of particular concern to the Committee in 
the examination of the reports of States parties is the adverse impact of 
the debt burden and of the relevant adjustment measures on the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights in many countries. 
ýFhe Committee recognises that adjustment programmes will often be 
unavoidable and that these will frequently involve a major element of 
austerity. Under such circumstances, however, endeavours to protect 
the most basic economic, social and cultural rights become more, rather 
than less, urgent. States parties to the Covenant, as well as the relevant 
United nations agencies, should thus make a particular effort to ensure 
that such protection is, to the maximum extent possible, built-in to 
programmes and policies designed to promote adjustment. Such an 
approach, which is sometimes referred to as "ad ustment with a human 
face" or as promoting "the human dimension of development" requires 
that the goal of protecting the rights of the poor and vulnerable should 
become a basic objective of economic adjustment. Similarly, 
international measures to deal with the debt crisis should take full 
account of the need to protect economic, social and cultural rights 
through, inter alia, international co-operation. In many situations, this 
might point to the need for major debt relief initiatives. 
10. Finally, the Committee wishes to draw attention to the important 
opportunity provided to States parties, in accordance with article 22 of 
the Covenant, to identify in their reports any particular needs they 
might have for technical assistance or development co-operation. 
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GENERAL COMMENT No. 3 (1990) 
The Nature of States Paries Obligations (art. 2, Dara. 1 of the Coven 
1. Article 2 is of particular importance to a full understanding of the 
Covenant and must be seen as having a dynamic relationship with all of 
the other provisions of the Covenant. It describes the nature of the 
general legal obligations undertaken by States parties to the Covenant. 
Those obligations include both what may be termed (following the work 
of the International Law Commission) obligations of conduct and 
obligations of result. While great emphasis has sometimes been placed 
on the difference between the formulations used in this provision and 
that contained in the equivalent article 2 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, it is not always recognised that there are 
also significant similarities. In particular, while the Covenant provides 
for progressive realisation and acknowledges the constraints due to the 
Inimits of available resources, it also imposes various obligations which 
are of immediate effect. Of these, two are of particular importance in 
understanding the precise nature of States parties obligations. One of 
these, which is dealt with in a separate General Comment, and which is 
to be considered by the Committee at its sixth session, is the 
"undertaking to guarantee" that relevant rights "win be exercised 
without discrimination... ' 
2. The other is the undertaking in article 2(l) "to take steps", which in 
itself, is not qualified or limited by other considerations. The full 
meaning of the phrase can also be gauged by noting some of the 
different language versions. In English the undertaking is "to take 
steps", in French it is "to act" ("s'engage 'a agir") and in Spanish it is "to 
adopt measures" ("a adoptar medidas"). 'Mus while the full realisation 
of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps towards that 
goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenant's 
entry into force for the States concerned. Such steps should be 
deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting 
the obligations recognised in the Covenant. 
3. The means which should be used in order to satisfy the obligation to 
take steps are stated in article 2(l) to be "all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures". The 
Committee recognises that in many instances legislation is highly 
desirable and in some cases may even be indispensable. For example, it 
may be difficult to combat discrimination effectively in the absence of a 
sound legislative foundation for the necessary measures. In fields such 
as health, the protection of children and mothers, and education, as well 
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as in respect of the matters dealt with in articles 6 to 9, legislation may 
also be an indispensable element for many purposes. 
4. The Committee notes that States parties have generally been 
conscientious in detailing at least some of the legislative measures that 
they have taken in this regard. It wishes to emphasise, however, that the 
adoption of legislative measures, as specifically foreseen by the 
Covenant, is by no means exhaustive of the obligations of States parties. Rather, the phrase "by all, appropriate means" must be given its full and 
natural meaning. While each State party must decide for itself which 
means are the most appropriate under the circumstances with respect to 
each of the rights, the "appropriateness" of the means chosen win not 
always be self-evident. It is therefore desirable that States parties 
reports should indicate not only the measures that have been taken but 
also the basis on which they are considered to be the most "appropriate" 
under the circumstances. However, the ultimate determination as to 
whether all appropriate measures have been taken remains one for the 
Conunittee to make. 
5. Among the measures which might be considered appropriate, in 
addition to legislation, is the provision of judicial remedies with respect 
to rights which may, in accordance with the national legal system, be 
considered justiciable. The Committee notes, for example, that the 
enjoyment of the rights recognised, without discrimination, win often 
be appropriately promoted, in part, through the provision of judicial or 
other effective remedies. Indeed, those States parties which are also 
parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are 
already obligated (by virtue of arts. 2 (paras. 1 and 3) 3 and 26 of that 
Covenant) to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms 
(including the right to equality and non-discrimination) recognised in 
that Covenant are violated, "shall have an effective remedy" (art. 2 (3) 
(a)). In addition, there are a number of other provisions in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
including articles 3,7(a)(i), 8,10(3), 13(2)(a), (3) and (4) and 15(3) 
which would seem to be capable of immediate application by judicial 
and other organs in many national legal systems. Any suggestion that 
the provisions indicated are inherently non-self-executing would seem 
to be difficult to sustain. 
6. Where specific policies aimed directly at the realisation of the rights 
recognised in the Covenant have been adopted in legislative form, the 
Committee would wish to be informed, inter alia, as to whether such 
laws create any right of action on behalf of individuals or groups who 
feel that their rights are not being fully realised. In cases where 
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constitutional recognition has been accorded to specific economic, social 
and cultural rights, or where the provisions of the Covenant have been 
incorporated directly into national law, the Committee would wish to 
receive information as to the extent to which these rights are considered 
to be justiciable (i. e. able to be invoked before the courts). The Committee would also wish to receive specific information as to any instances in which existing constitutional provisions relating to 
economic, social and cultural rights have been weakened or significantly 
changed. 
7. Other measures which may also be considered "appropriate" for the 
purposes of article 2(l) include, but are not limited to, administrative, 
financial, educational and social measures. 
8. The Committee notes that the undertaking "to take steps... by all 
appropriate means including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures" neither requires nor precludes any particular form of 
government or economic system being used as the vehicle for the steps 
in question, provided only that it is democratic and that all human rights 
are thereby respected. Thus, in terms of political and economic systems 
the Covenant is neutral and its principles cannot accurately be described 
as being predicated exclusively upon the need for, or the desirability of 
a, socialist or a capitalist system, or a mixed, centrally planned, or 
laisser-faire economy, or upon any other particular approach. In this 
regard, the Committee reaffirms that the rights recognised in the 
Covenant are susceptible of realisation within the context of a wide 
variety of economic and political systems, provided only that the 
interdependence and indivisibility of the two sets of human rights, as 
affirmed inter alia in the preamble to the Covenant, is recognised and 
reflected in the system in question. The Committee also notes the 
relevance in this regard of other human rights and in particular the 
right to development. 
9. The principal obligation of result reflected in article 2(l) is to take 
steps "with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the 
rights recognised" in the Covenant. The term "progressive realisation" 
is often used to describe the intent of this phrase. The concept of 
progressive realisation constitutes a recognition of the fact that full 
realisation of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not 
be able to be achieved in a short period of time. In this sense the 
obligation differs significantly from that contained in article 2 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which embodies an 
immediate obligation to respect and ensure an of the relevant rights. 
Nevertheless, the fact that realisation over time, or in other words 
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progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant should not be 
misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of an meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities 
of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in 
ensuring full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. On the 
other hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d'etre, of the Covenant which is to establish clear 
obligations for States parties in respect of the full realisation of the 
rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, 
any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require 
the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by 
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and 
in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources. 
10. On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the Committee, 
as well as by the body that preceded it, over a period of more than a 
decade of examining States parties reports the Committee is of the view 
that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon 
every State party. 7hus, for example, a State party in which any 
significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of 
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the 
most basic fon-ns of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its 
obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such 
a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be 
largely deprived of its raison d'etre. By the same token, it must be 
noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its 
minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints 
applying within the country concerned. Article 2(l) obligates each State 
party to take the necessary steps "to the maximum of its available 
resources". In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to 
meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available 
resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all 
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of 
priority, those minimum obligations. 
11. The Committee wishes to emphasise, however, that even where the 
available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains 
for a State party to strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the 
relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances. Moreover, the 
obligations to monitor the extent of the realisation, or more especially 
of the non-realisation, of economic, social and cultural rights, and to 
devise strategies and programmes for their promotion, are not in any 
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way eliminated as a result of resource constraints. 7he Committee has 
already dealt with these issues in its General Comment No. 1 (1989). 
12. Similarly, the Committee underlines the fact that even in times of 
severe resource constraints whether caused by a process of adjustment, 
of economic recession, or by other factors the vulnerable members of 
society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption of relatively 
low-cost targeted programmes. In support of this approach the 
Conunittee takes note of the analysis prepared by UNICEF entitled 
"Adjustment With a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and 
Promoting Growth", 2 the analysis by UNDP in its Human Development 
Report 1990-3and the analysis by the World Bank in the World 
Develgpment Report 1990.4 
13. A final element of article 2(l), to which attention must be drawn, is 
that the undertaking given by all States parties is "to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical... ". The Committee notes that the 
phrase "to the maximum of its available resources" was intended by the 
drafters of the Covenant to refer to both the resources existing within a 
State and those available from the international community through 
international co-operation and assistance. Moreover, the essential role 
of such co-operation in facilitating the full realisation of the relevant 
rights is further underlined by the specific provisions contained in 
articles 11,15,22 and 23. With respect to article 22 the Committee has 
already drawn attention, in General Comment No. 2 (1990), to some of 
the opportunities and responsibilities that exist in relation to 
international co-operation. Article 23 also specifically identifies "the 
furnishing of technical assistance's as well as other activities, as being 
among the means of "international action for the achievement of the 
rights recognised... ' 
14. The Committee wishes to emphasise that in accordance with Articles 
55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, with well-established 
principles of international law, and with the provisions of the Covenant 
itself, international co-operation for development and thus for the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all 
States. It is particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a 
Comia. G., Jolly R. and Stewart F(eds), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 
oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990. 
4 oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990. 
521 
position to assist others in this regard. The Committee notes in 
particular the importance of the Declaration on the Right to 
Development adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 41/128 
of 4 December 1986 and the need for States parties to take fun account 
of all of the principles recognised therein. It emphasises that, in the 
absence of an active programme of international assistance and co- 
operation on the part of all those States that are in a position to 
undertake one, the full realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights will remain an unfulfilled aspiration in many countries. In this 
respect, the Committee also recalls the terms of its General Comment 
No. 2 (1990). 
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GENERAL COMMENT No. 4 (1991) 
The Right to., Adequate Housing (Article 11 (1) of the Covenant) 
1. Pursuant to article 11 (1) of the Covenant, States parties "recognise 
the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions". Ile human right to 
adequate housing, which is thus derived from the right to an adequate 
standard of living, is of central importance for the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
2. The Committee has been able to accumulate a large amount of 
information pertaining to this right. Since 1979, the Committee and its 
predecessors have examined 75 reports dealing with the right to 
adequate housing. The Committee has also devoted a day of general 
discussion to the issues at each of its third (see E/1989/22, para. 312) and 
fourth sessions (E/1923, paras. 281-285). In addition, the Committee has 
taken careful note of information generated by the International Year of 
Shelter for the Homeless (1987) including the Global Strategy for 
Shelter to the Year 2000 adopted by the General Assembly in its 
resolution 42/191 of 11 December 1987.5 The Committee has also 
reviewed the relevant reports and other documentation of the 
Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 6 
3. Although a wide variety of international instruments address the 
different dimensions of the right to adequate housing7 article 11 (1) of 
5 Official 
-Records of the 
General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Supplement 
No-, 8 addendum (A/43/8/Add. 1). 
6 Comn-ussion on Human Rights resolutions 1986/36 and 1987/22; reports by 
NIr Danilo Tiirk, Special Rapporteur of the Subcommission (E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1990/19, 
paras. 108-120; E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1991/17, paras. 137-139); see also Subcommission 
resolution 1991/26. 
7 See, for example, article 25(l) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
article 5(e)(iii) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, article 14(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrm* =*ation Against Women, article 27(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, article 10 of the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, section In (8) 
of the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, 1976 (LZ= -of Habitat: United 
Nati Human Settlements (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E. 76. IV. 7 and corrigendum), chap I), article 8(l) of the Declaration on the Right to 
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the Covenant is the most comprehensive and perhaps the most important 
of the relevant provisions. 
4. Despite the fact that the international community has frequently 
reaffirmed the importance of full respect for the right to adequate 
housing, there remains a disturbingly large gap between the standards 
set in article 11 (1) of the Covenant and the situation prevailing in many 
parts of the world. While the problems are often particularly acute in 
some developing countries which confront major resource and other 
constraints, the Committee observes that significant problems of 
homelessness and inadequate housing also exist in some of the most 
economically developed societies. The United Nations estimates that 
there are over 100 million persons homeless worldwide and over 1 
billion inadequately housed. 8 There is no indication that this number is 
decreasing. It seems clear that no State party is free of significant 
problems of one kind or another in relation to the right to housing. 
5. In some instances, the reports of States parties examined by the 
Committee have acknowledged and described difficulties in ensuring the 
right to adequate housing. For the most part, however, the infon-nation 
provided has been insufficient to enable the Committee to obtain an 
adequate picture of the situation prevailing in the State concerned. This 
General Comment thus aims to identify some of the principal issues 
which the Committee considers to be important in relation to this right. 
6. The right to adequate housing applies to everyone. While the 
reference to "himself and his family" reflects assumptions as to gender 
roles and economic activity patterns commonly accepted in 1966 when 
the Covenant was adopted, the phrase cannot be read today as implying 
any limitations upon the applicability of the right to individuals or to 
female-headed households or other such groups. Ibus, the concept of 
"family" must be understood in a wide sense. Further, individuals, as 
well as families are entitled to adequate housing regardless of age, 
economic status, group or other affiliation or status and other such 
factors. In particular, enjoyment of this right must, in accordance with 
article 2(2) of the Covenant, not be subject to any forin of 
discrimination. 
Development and the ILO Recommendation Concerning Workers'Housing, 1961 
(No. 115). 
8 See footnote 1- 
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7. In the Conunittee's view, the right to housing should not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense which equates it with, for 
example, the shelter provided by merely having a roof over one's head 
or views shelter exclusively as a commodity. Rather it should be seen as 
the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity. This is 
appropriate for at least two reasons. In the first place, the right to housing is integrally linked to other human rights and to the 
fundamental principles upon which the Covenant is premised. Thus "the inherent dignity of the human person" from which the rights in the Covenant are said to derive requires that the term "housing" be 
interpreted so as to take account of a variety of other considerations, 
most importantly that the right to housing should be ensured to an 
persons irrespective of income or access to economic resources. 
Secondly, the reference in article 11 (1) must be read as referring not just to housing but to adequate housing. As both the Commission on 
Human Settlements and the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000 
have stated: "Adequate shelter means... adequate privacy, adequate 
privacy, adequate space, adequate space, adequate security, adequate 
lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and adequate 
location with regard to work and basic facilities- all at a reasonable 
cost". 
8. Thus the concept of adequacy is particularly significant in relation to 
the right to housing since it serves to underline a number of factors 
which must be taken into account in determining whether particular 
forms of shelter can be considered to constitute "adequate housing" for 
the purposes of the Covenant. While adequacy is determined in part by 
social, economic, cultural, climatic, ecological and other factors, the 
Committee believes that it is nevertheless possible to identify certain 
aspects of the right that must be taken into account for this purpose in 
any particular context. They include the following: 
(a) Legal Security of Tenure. Tenure takes a variety of forms, 
including rental (public and private) accommodation, cooperative 
housing, lease, owner-occupation, emergency housing and informal 
settlements, including occupation of land or property. Notwithstanding 
the type of tenure, all persons should possess a degree of security of 
tenure which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, 
harassment and other threats. States parties should consequently take 
immediate measures aimed at conferring legal security of tenure upon 
those persons and households currently lacking such protection, in 
genuine consultation with affected persons and groups; 
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(b) Availability of Services, Materials, Facilities and 
Infrastructure. An adequate house must contain certain facilities 
essential for health, security, comfort and nutrition. All beneficiaries of 
the right to adequate housing should have sustainable access to natural 
and common resources, safe drinking water, energy for cooking, 
heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means of food 
storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services; 
(c) Afford Personal or household financial costs associated 
with housing should be at such a level that the attainment and 
satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised. 
Steps should be taken by States parties to ensure that the percentage of 
housing-related costs is, in general, commensurate with income levels. 
States parties should establish housing subsidies for those unable to 
obtain affordable housing, as well as forms and levels of housing 
finance which adequately reflect housing needs. In accordance with the 
principle of affordability, tenants should be protected by appropriate 
means against unreasonable rent levels or rent increases. In societies 
where natural materials constitute the chief sources of building 
materials for housing, steps should be taken by States parties to ensure 
the availability of such materials; 
(d) Habit Adequate housing must be habitable, in terms of 
providing the inhabitants with adequate space and protecting them from 
cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to health, structural 
hazards, and disease vectors. The physical safety of occupants must be 
guaranteed as well. The Committee encourages States parties to 
comprehensively apply the Health PrinciDles of HolLsin&I prepared by 
WHO which view housing as the environmental factor most frequently 
associated with conditions for disease in epidemiological analyses; i. e. 
inadequate and deficient housing and living conditions are invariably 
associated with higher mortality and morbidity rates; 
(e) AccessibililY. Adequate housing must be accessible to those 
entitled to it. Disadvantaged groups must be accorded full and 
sustainable access to adequate housing resources. nus, such 
disadvantaged groups as the elderly, children, the physically disabled, 
the ten-ninally ill, HIV-positive individuals, persons with persistent 
medical problems, the mentally ill, victims of natural disasters, people 
living in disaster-prone areas and other groups should be ensured some 
degree of priority consideration in the housing sphere. Both housing 
law and policy should take fully into account the special housing needs 
9 Geneva, World Health Organisation, 1990. 
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of these groups. Within many States parties increasing access to land by landless or impoverished segments of the society should constitute a 
central policy goal. Discernible governmental obligations need to be developed aiming to substantiate the right of all to a secure place to live in peace and dignity, including access to land as an entitlement; 
(f) Location. Adequate housing must be in a location which allows 
access to employment options, health-care services, schools, child-care 
centres and other social facilities. This is true both in large cities and in 
rural areas where the temporal and financial costs of getting to and from the place of work can place excessive demands upon the budgets 
of poor households. Similarly, housing should not be built on polluted 
sites nor in immediate proximity to pollution sources that threaten the 
right to health of the inhabitants; 
(g) Cultural Adequacy. 'Me way housing is constructed, the 
building materials used and the policies supporting these must 
appropriately enable the expression of cultural identity and diversity of 
housing. Activities geared towards development or modernisation in the 
housing sphere should ensure that the cultural dimensions of housing 
are not sacrificed, and that, inter alia, modem technological facilities, as 
appropriate are also ensured. 
9. As noted above, the right to adequate housing cannot be viewed in 
isolation from other human rights contained in the two International 
Covenants and other applicable international instruments. Reference has 
already been made in this regard to the concept of human dignity and 
the principle of non-discrimination. In addition, the full enjoyment of 
other right- such as the right to freedom of expression, the right to 
freedom of association (such as for tenants and other community-based 
groups), the right to freedom of residence and the right to participate in 
public decision-making- is indispensable if the right to adequate housing 
is to be realised and maintained by all groups in society. Similarly, the 
right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
onets privacy, family, home or correspondence constitutes a very 
important dimension in defining the right to adequate housing. 
10. Regardless of the state of development of any country, there are 
certain steps which must be taken immediately. As recognised in the 
Global Strategy for Shelter and in other international analyses, many of 
the measures required to promote the right to housing would only 
require the abstention by the Government from certain practices and a 
commitment to facilitate "self-help" by affected groups. To the extent 
that any such steps are considered to be beyond the maximum resources 
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available to a State party, it is appropriate that a request be made as 
soon as possible for international cooperation in accordance with 
articles 11 (1), 22 and 23 of the Covenant, and that the Committee be 
informed thereof. 
11. States parties must give due priority to those social groups living in 
unfavourable conditions by giving them particular consideration. 
Policies and legislation should correspondingly not be designed to 
benefit already advantaged social groups at the expense of others. The 
Committee is aware that external factors can affect the right to a 
continuous improvement of living conditions, and that in many States 
parties overall living conditions declined during the 1980s. However, as 
noted by the Committee in its General Comment No. 2 (1990) (E/1990/23, annex IH), despite externally caused problems, the 
obligations under the Covenant continue to apply and are perhaps even 
more pertinent during times of economic contraction. It would thus 
appear to the Committee that a general decline in living and housing 
conditions, directly attributable to policy and legislative decisions by 
States parties, and in the absence of accompanying compensatory 
measures, would be inconsistent with the obligations under the 
Covenant. 
12. While the most appropriate means of achieving the fun realisation 
of the right to adequate housing will inevitably vary significantly from 
one State party to another, the Covenant clearly requires that each State 
party take whatever steps are necessary for that purpose. This will 
almost invariably require the adoption of a national housing strategy 
which, as stated in paragraph 32 of the Global Strategy for Shelter, 
"defines the objectives for the development of shelter conditions, 
identifies the resources available to meet these goals and the most cost- 
effective way of using them and sets out the responsibilities and time- 
frame for the implementation of the necessary measures". Both for 
reasons of relevance and effectiveness, as well as in order to ensure 
respect for other human rights, such a strategy should reflect extensive 
genuine consultation with, and participation by, all of those affected, 
including the homeless, the inadequately housed and their 
representatives. Furthermore, steps should be taken to ensure 
coordination between ministries and regional and local authorities in 
order to reconcile related policies (economics, agriculture, 
environement, energy, etc. ) with the obligations under article 11 of the 
Covenant. 
13. Effective monitoring of the situation with respect to housing is 
another obligation of immediate effect. For a State party to satisfy 
its 
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obligations under article 11 (1) it must demonstrate, inter alia, that it has 
taken whatever steps are necessary, either alone or on the basis of international cooperation, to ascertain the full extent of homelessness 
and inadequate housing within its jurisdiction. In this regard, the 
revised general guidelines regarding the form and contents of reports 
adopted by the Committee (E/C. 12/1991/1) emphasise the need to 
"provide detailed information about those groups within... society that 
are vulnerable and disadvantaged with regard to housing". They 
include, in particular, homeless persons and families, those inadequately 
housed and without ready access to basic amenities, those living in 
"illegal" settlements, those subject to forced evictions and low-income 
groups. 
14. Measures designed to satisfy a State party's obligations in respect of 
the right to adequate housing may reflect whatever mix of public and 
private sector measures considered appropriate. While in some States 
public financing of housing might most usefully be spent on direct 
construction of new housing, in most cases, experience has shown the 
inability of Governments to fully satisfy housing deficits with publicly 
built housing. 'Me promotion by States parties of "enabling strategies", 
combined with a full commitment to obligations under the right to 
adequate housing, should thus be encouraged. In essence, the obligation 
is to demonstrate that, in aggregate, the measures being taken are 
sufficient to realise the right for every individual in the shortest 
possible time in accordance with the maximum of available resources. 
15. Many of the measures that will be required will involve resource 
allocations and policy initiatives of a general kind. Nevertheless, the 
role of formal legislative and administrative measures should not be 
underestimated in this context. The Global Strategy for Shelter (paras. 66-67) has drawn attention to the types of measures that might be 
taken in this regard and to their importance. 
16. In some States, the right to adequate housing is constitutionally 
entrenched. In such cases the Committee is particularly interested in 
learning of the legal and practical significance of such an approach. 
Details of specific cases and of other ways in which entrenchment has 
proved helpful should thus be provided. 
17. r1he Committee views many component elements of the right to 
adequate housing as being at least consistent with the provision of 
domestic legal remedies. Depending on the legal system, such areas 
might include, but are not limited to: (a) legal appeals aimed at 
preventing planned evictions or demolitions through the issuance o 
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court-ordered injunctions; (b) legal procedures seeking compensation 
following an illegal eviction; (c) complaints against illegal actions 
carried out or supported by landlords (whether public or private) in 
relation to rent levels, dwelling maintenance, and racial or other forms 
of discrimination; (d) allegations of any form of discrimination in the 
allocation and availability of access to housing; and (e) complaints 
against landlords concerning unhealthy or inadequate housing 
conditions. In some legal systems it would also be appropriate to 
explore the possibility of facilitating class action suits in situations 
involving significantly increased levels of homelessness. 
18. In this regard, the Committee considers that instances of forced 
eviction are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the 
Covenant and can only be justified in the most exceptional 
circumstances, and in accordance with the relevant principles of 
international law. 
19. Finally, article 11 (1) concludes with the obligation of States parties 
to recognise "the essential importance of international cooperation based 
on free consent". Traditionally, less than 5 per cent of all international 
assistance has been directed towards housing or inhuman settlements, 
and often the manner by which such funding is provided does little to 
address the housing needs of disadvantaged groups. States parties, both 
recipients and providers, should ensure that a substantial proportion of 
financing is devoted to creating conditions leading to a higher number 
of persons being adequately housed. International financial institutions 
promoting measures of structural adjustment should ensure that such 
measures do not compromise the enjoyment of the right to adequate 
housing. States parties should, when contemplating international 
financial cooperation, seek to indicate areas relevant to the right to 
adequate housing where external financing would have the most effect. 
Such requests should take full account of the needs and views of the 
affected groups. 
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